INFANT.

Liability for injury to.] See NEGLIGENCE, 393.

INHERITANCE.

Power of legislature to legitimate a bastard.] See DESCENT, 428.

INNKEEPER.

Liability of] An inkeeper is not liable to his guests for property destroyed
whithout his negligence by accidental fire. Cutler v. Bonney (Mich.), 127,
and note, 130

INSANITY.

Deed of lunatic when voidable only.] See DEED, 716.

When defense

burden of proof.] See CRIMINAL LAW, 420.

When lunatic competent as witness.] See WITNESS.

INSURANCE.
FIRE.

1. Limitation of time of action.] A fire insurance policy contained a condition
that "no suit for the recovery of any claim under this policy shall be
sustained in any court unless commenced within the term of one year after
any claim shall occur, and in case such suit shall be commenced after the
end of one year next after such loss or damage shall have occurred, the
lapse of time shall be conclusive evidence against the validity of the
claim," etc. Under the policy the insured was required to furnish a state-
ment and proof of loss, and the company had sixty days thereafter to
pay. Held, (1) that a condition requiring an action to be brought within
a time shorter than the statute of limitations, was valid; (2) that as the
company were not liable to pay until after the furnishing of statement
and proof of loss, the cause of action did not accrue until then, and the
insured had one year from that time in which to bring suit, notwith-
standing the second clause limiting the time to one year from the occur
rence of the loss. Chandler v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. (Minn.)
385.

8. When misdescription does not invalidate policy.] A material misrepresenta-
tion in an application for insurance against fire, whether made by design
or mistake, will avoid the policy, though an immaterial one will not. But
if the description of the property is by the terms of the policy made a
warranty, it is a condition precedent, and any mistake therein will avoid
the policy. Continental Ins. Co. v. Kasey (Va.), 681.

.] Where, however, the insurance company, not relying on the state.
ments of the applicant, sends its own agent to examine the premises to
be insured, and the agent, having done so, inserts a misdescription in the
policy, which is not material, e. g., that a house partially built of logs and
weather-boarded is a frame house, the company will be liable on the
policy, even though there is a warranty, and the representations of the
insured, made in good faith, contributed to induce the misdescription. Ib.

LIFE.

Custom of notifying the insured when premiums become due.] One whose
life defendants had insured, had been accustomed to receive notice from
defendants of the time when premiums fell due. He changed his residence
and notified defendants' agent of the fact, but notice of the next premium
falling due was sent to his former residence, and consequently he failed
to pay the premium on the day. Held, in an action on the policy, that the
defendants were bound by their custom to give notice, and could not set
up such non-payment, where no notice had been given, as a forfeiture of
the policy. Mayer v. The Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Iowa), 34.

5. Performance of condition prevented by war does not avoid policy.] A life
insurance company, incorporated and having its office in the State of New
Jersey, but having an agent who received premiums and did other busi-
ness for it, residing in Virginia in 1846, insured the life of A. The policy
contained a clause vacating the policy in case of non-payment of the annual
premium punctually. The agent in Virginia was paid until December,
1861, when he refused to receive a premium tendered on account of the
pending war. A. and the agent resided in territory subject to the Confed-
erate government, and were unable to communicate with the company.
Before the next premium became due, A. died. Held, the war suspended
but did not abrogate the contract, and that the non-payment of premium,
A. being ready and willing to pay it, did not relieve the company from lia-
bility under the policy. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Atwood's Admin
istratrix (Va.), 652.

6. Effect of the war on contract.] A policy of life insurance, issued before the
war, by a corporation in New Jersey, for the benefit of parties in Virginia,
where premiums had previously been paid, is not dissolved or forfeited
for the mere non-payment of a premium falling due during the war, and
where the payment, with proper interest, was promptly tendered at its
termination. The payment had become impossible by the act or force of
the law, and, for that reason, was suspended, and excused for the time
being. The Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Hillyard (N. J.), 741.

-] A condition for the payment of the premium on a life policy after the
first is sui generis, and not of the nature of a condition precedent to the
vesting of a right, and is subject to be suspended, the same as clauses for
performance in any other contract. Ib.

.] The fact that the insurance company is mutual does not create a part-
nership among the insured, so as to make the contract continuing — the
insurance is between the corporation and the insured. lb.

-

-.] The fault of the rebellion cannot be imputed to the plaintiffs, so as
to make the non-payment their fault; the law deals with the existence of
hostilities, and considers all citizens of the belligerent States respectively
as mutual enemies. The causes of the contest do not affect the legal re
sults between the individuals. lb.

INTEREST.

By what law governed.] See UsURY, 306, 886.

JOINDER.

Of parties.] See TRESPASS, 298.

JUDGMENT.

Who not bound by.] C. was the administrator of the estate of M. In an action
by her heirs against him, to which H. and I. were not parties, judgment
was rendered requiring him to include deposit in a bank, which deposit H.
and I. claimed the intestate had given to them, in the inventory of M.'e
estate. Held, that H. and I. were not bound by the judgment. Hill v.
Stevenson (Me.), 231.

JURISDICTION.

Arrest of mail carrier.] See ARREST, 269.

Of action for trespass by U. S. Marshal.] See BANKRUPTCY, 355.

Mandamus to Governor.] See MANDAMUS, 89, 330.

Of State court over action against ship owner.] See CARRIER, 527.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. When tenant may deny title of lessor.] Defendant, who was in possession as
tenant in common of certain real estate, agreed by parol to pay rent to C.
for an undivided share therein not owned by defendant and claimed by C.
After paying rent for several years defendant disclaimed tenancy under
C. and refused to longer pay rent. Held, that defendant was not estopped
from denying the title of C. Fuller v. Sweet (Mich.), 122.
2. Estoppel, to deny title.] A lessee is not, by a covenant to pay rent, estopped, in
an action for the rent, to show that the lessor's estate ended before the
rent accrued. Lamson v. Clarkson (Mass.), 498.

8. Land under eaves.] A lease of a "building" conveys the land under the
eaves, if that land be owned by the lessor. Sherman v. Williams (Mass.),
522.

4. Eviction.] The erection, by authority of the lessor, of a wall upon land under
the eaves of a leased building is a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoy.
ment. lb.

What fixtures tenant may remove.] See FIXTURES, 452

LEASE.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 522.

LICENSE.

To enter upon land, revocation of.] A parol license to enter upon land "at any
and all times" and cut and carry away growing wood, must be acted
upon within a reasonable time, and if not acted upon within a period of
more than three years, may be revoked. Hill v. Hill (Mass.), 455.

-

LIEN.

For purchase-money — assignment of bond.] The vendor of land took two bonda
muring at different dates, for the unpaid purchase-money. He assigned

to plaintiff the bond last falling due. Held, (1) that the assigned bond was
entitled to priority of payment out of the land, and (2) that want of due
diligence in proceeding against the obligor on the bond did not affect
such priority. McClintic v. Wise's Administrator (Va.), 694.

LIFE INSURANCE.

See INSURANCE.

LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS.

1. Constitutional law.] A statute, authorizing the expense of paving the road-
bed of a city street, to be assessed in the proportion of two-thirds on the
property abutting on the street, and the remaining third on the public at
large, is unconstitutional. Assessments for local improvements of this
character may be made against the property pecuniarily benefited, but
such assessments must be made to the extent only of such peculiar bene-
fits. State v. The Mayor, etc., of Newark (N. J.), 729.

3. Assessment for.] This rule does not apply to improvements of the sidewalk,
which is to be regarded as subservient to the premises to which it is
attached, and the expense of improving which may be charged wholly to
the owner. Ib.

LUNATIC.

Deed of, when voidable only.] See DEED, 716.
Defense of insanity.] See CRIMINAL LAW, 420.
When competent as witness.] See WITNESS, 711.

MAIL CARRIER.

When liable to arrest.] See ARREST, 269.

-

MANDAMUS.

1. Jurisdiction — issue of mandamus to governor of State.] The courts of a
State have not jurisdiction to compel, by mandamus, the governor to per
form a duty imposed upon him by law, whether it be ministerial or politi.
cal. People v. Governor (Mich.), 89, and note, 98.

2. Will not lie to a governor.] When the performance of an act is by statute
imposed upon the governor, it is imposed upon him not as a private person
but in his official capacity. Rice v. Austin (Minn.), 330.

8.

] Where by the constitution the legislative, judicial and executive
departments are made distinct and independent, neither is responsible to
the other for the performance of its duties, and neither can enforce such
performance by the other. Accordingly a mandamus to the governor
refused. Ib.

MANSLAUGHTER,

In resisting illegal arrest.] See CRIMINAL LAW, 601.

MARRIAGE.

1. Foreign contract of, presumptively valid.] In an action for criminal con
versation, an actual marriage must be proved. If the supposed marriage

takes place in the State, proof that the parties, either with or without
ceremonies, agreed presently to take each other for husband and wife,
and from that time lived together in that relation, would be sufficient.
And where ceremonies of marriage in a foreign country, with cohabitation
following it, are shown, it is presumptively a valid marriage, and it is not
necessary to prove the foreign law of marriage. Hutchins v. Kimmell
(Mich.), 164.

2. Divorce — subsequent marriage of defendant.] A resident of Massachusetts,
whose wife has there obtained a divorce for his adultery (in which case
he is prohibited by statute from marrying again without leave of the
court), and who, without having obtained leave of the court, and being
still a resident of this Commonwealth, is married to another woman in
another State according to its laws, and afterward cohabits with her in
Massachusetts, the first wife being still alive, is not liable to indictment
for polygamy there under the Gen. Stats., ch. 164, § 4, without proof
that the second wife was a resident of Massachusetts, and that he and she
went into the other State to avoid the provisions of our statutes. Com
monwealth v. Lane (Mass.), 509, and note, 521.

3. Revival of action for breach of promise of marriage.] An action for breach
of promise of marriage abates, at common law, upon the death of the
defendant and cannot be revived or continued against his representatives;
nor can it be continued under a statute allowing an action for "tres-
pass to the person or property to be maintained against the personal
representatives of the trespasser. Hayden v. Vreeland (N. J.), 723.
See DIVORCE; HUSBAND AND WIFE.

MARRIED WOMEN.

1. Separate estate not liable for obligation not for its benefit and not charged
thereon.] In order to render the separate estate of a married woman lia-
ble under a statute allowing her to contract with respect to her separate
estate, the debt must have been contracted in regard to it, or for her own
benefit, on the credit of her separate property, or by some appropriate
instrument executed by her with a view to make the debt a specific
charge on it. A general engagement to pay a debt contracted by a bill
or note having no reference to her separate property-e. g., an indorse
ment by her of a note given by her husband for his own indebtedness-
will create no such charge as can be enforced in a court of equity. Wil
liams v. Hugunin (I11.), 607.

2. Settlement upon, in lieu of dower, when valid against creditors.] Where an
insolvent husband, in consideration of a relinquishment by his wife of
her inchoate right of dower in real estate, settled on her certain prop
erty: Held, that, in the absence of fraud, the settlement would not be dis-
turbed in behalf of the creditors unless it appeared to be grossly excessive.
And that, in case the value of the property settled exceeded the value of
the dower, the deed of settlement would be vacated only as to the excess.
Burwell's Executor v. Lumsden (Va.), 648.

Law governing dower.] See DOWER, 1.

Certificate of acknowledgment of deed.] See TEED, 634.

Liability of husband for fees of wife's attorney.] See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2