terms of admission and cession either by treaty to be submitted to the Senate or by articles to be submitted to both houses. The purpose of the section was to effect if possible the acquisition and still maintain peaceful relations with Mexico. Negotiations were not resorted to, and Texas having accepted and complied with the conditions of the resolution, was by the joint resolution of December 29, 1845,3 admitted as a State into the Union.

A treaty was signed at Washington, June 16, 1897, with the Republic of Hawaii for its annexation to the United States. The treaty was ratified by the Hawaiian legislature, but the United States on its part accepted and confirmed the cession by a joint resolution approved July 7, 1898. Although, as a matter of fact, the resolution was agreed to in the Senate, July 6, by a two-thirds vote (42 to 21), the annexation was effected by an act of legislation, and not by an act of the treaty-making power. In 1845, a foreign state was admitted by a resolution of Congress as a State into the Union; in 1898, a foreign state was joined by a resolution of Congress to our territorial possessions. One feature, however, is common and furnishes precedent-the other contracting party in each case, by the very agreement, lost its identity as a nation with which international relations could exist, the agreement becoming immediately on its con

15 Stat. at L., 797.

'Benton, Thirty Years in the United States Senate, vol. ii, pp. 602, 619 et seq.

'9 Stat. at L., 108. Mr. Archer of the Committee on Foreign Relations submitted a report to the Senate, Feb. 4, 1845, objecting on constitutional grounds to this method of acquisition. Compilation of Reports of Sen. Com. on For. Rel., pt. 6, p. 78.

30 Stat. at L., 750.

'Cong. Globe, p. 6712, 55th Cong. 2nd Sess.

summation exclusively a matter of internal cognizance, and ultimately of unilateral construction.'

A recent agreement with Cuba signed by the President of the United States, February 23, 1903, for the leasing, subject to terms to be agreed upon by the two governments, of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval

'A still different case was presented in 1802. On April 24th of that year an agreement was entered into with the State of Georgia for the cession of western lands. The commissioners on the part of the United States, James Madison, Albert Gallatin and Levi Lincoln, were appointed by President Adams under an act of Congress, approved April 7, 1798. An act of May 10, 1800, vested final powers in the commissioners. On the part of Georgia the agreement was ratified and confirmed by the legislature, June 16, 1802. House Mis. Doc. 45, pt. 4, pp. 78-81, 47th Cong. 2nd Sess. As such a matter is at all stages during the negotiations, as well as after the conclusion of the agreement, exclusively an internal affair, such regulations doubtless fall properly within the powers of Congress. During the negotiations on the northeastern boundary in 1832, an agreement with the State of Maine for the cession to the government of the United States of the territory under dispute, and claimed by that State, east of the St. Francis river and north of the St. John, was signed. The agreement was never consummated; but in the fifth article of the Webster-Ashburton treaty the following clause was inserted: "the government of the United States agreeing with the States of Maine and Massachusetts to pay them the further sum of three hundred thousand dollars, in equal moieties, on account of their assent to the line of boundary described in this treaty, and in consideration of the conditions and equivalents received therefor from the government of Her Britannic Majesty." The irregularity of incorporating into an international treaty such a stipulation was not overlooked by the British negotiator. On the day of signing the treaty Lord Ashburton addressed a note to Mr. Webster, stating that the introduction of an agreement between the central and State governments would have been “irregular and inadmissible if it had not been deemed expedient to bring the whole of these transactions within the purview of the treaty." He requested an assurance that his government should incur no responsibility for these engagements. To this Mr. Webster replied on the same date: "It purports to contain no stipulation on the part of Great Britain nor is any responsibility supposed to be incurred by it on the part of your government." Moore, Int. Arb., vol. i, p. 138. Webster's Works, vol. vi, pp. 289–290.

stations, was entered into in conformity with the provisions of the act of Congress, approved March 2, 1901. In defining the relations that should exist between the United States and Cuba, the act prescribed the condition that, to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba and to protect the people thereof, the Cuban government should sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling and naval stations at points "to be agreed upon with the President of the United States." Neither this agreement nor the protocol of July 2, 1903, in which the United States promised to pay annually, as long as it should occupy the areas designated, the sum of $2,000 in gold, was submitted to the Senate, although the latter was formally approved by the President and the ratifications exchanged. Numerous guano islands, which have been occupied by citizens of the United States, have been announced under the act of Congress of August 18, 1856, as "appertaining to the United States."

5 AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY INDIVIDUAL STATES OF THE UNION

By Article I, section 10, of the Constitution, the States are absolutely forbidden to enter into "any treaty, alliance or confederation," and, without the consent of Congress, to enter into "any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power." Accordingly, whatever treaty-making power the States may exercise must always be with the consent of Congress. The exact distinction between the expressions "treaty, alliance or confederation" and "agreement or compact" has not been determined. Under the Articles of Con

111 Stat. at L., 119. See Jones vs. United States, 137 U. S., 202.

federation, the States were forbidden to enter, without the consent of Congress, into any "conference, agreement, alliance or treaty" with a foreign power, or into any "treaty, confederation or alliance" with another State. The latter expression is incorporated as the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. The proceedings of the Federal Convention give little light as to the intention of the framers. Madison, on June 19, observed that although the States had by the Articles of Confederation been forbidden to enter, without the consent of Congress, into treaties, Virginia and Maryland, in one instance, and Pennsylvania and New Jersey in another, had entered into "compacts without previous application or subsequent apology." The same expressions that occur in the Constitution are found in the plan as reported, August 6, by the Committee of Detail. A natural inference is that the expression "agreement or compact" was intended to comprehend such agreements as had been considered by the States under the Articles of Confederation as not included under "treaty, confederation or alliance." These embraced several boundary agreements besides the compact between Virginia and Maryland of March 28, 1785, which went so far as to stipulate for the regulation of port charges and dues.3

The prohibition of agreements between a State and a foreign power was the subject of an opinion given by Chief Justice Taney in 1840. The governor of Vermont had issued a warrant ordering a sheriff of that State to arrest one Holmes, a refugee from Canada, convey him to some convenient place on the boundary between the

'Doc. Hist. of the Const., vol. iii, p. 155.

2 Ibid., p. 455.

'See for list of such agreements, Poole vs. Fleeger, 11 Pet., 185; Wharton vs. Wise, 153 U. S., 163, 171.

State and the province of Lower Canada, and there deliver him to such persons as might be empowered by the Canadian authorities to receive him. All would admit, said Chief Justice Taney, that an agreement between Vermont and Canada formally made to deliver up offenders would be unconstitutional. As the surrender of the fugitive to the Canadian authorities was not the exercise of a power which operated only upon the internal concerns of the State, it was a part of the foreign intercourse of the country. The warrant of the governor authorized by State law was a State act. As no application by the governor of Canada for the arrest appeared in the record, it could not be assumed to have been made; but the warrant itself imported an agreement with the Canadian authorities. How, asked the Chief Justice, was the fugitive to be delivered unless they accepted him; and if the authorities of Vermont agreed to deliver him up, and the authorities of Canada agreed to accept, was not that an agreement between them? From the nature of the transaction the act of delivery necessarily implied a mutual agreement. It was mutually understood in some way that the fugitive should be seized, in order to be delivered up pursuant to this understanding. The terms "treaty," "agreement," and "compact," were not used superfluously, but indicated that the framers of the Constitution had intended to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms in order to cut off all connection or communication between a State and a foreign power. Accordingly, the term "agreement" must be so construed as "to prohibit every agreement written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied by the mutual understanding of the parties.' The Chief Justice added that the States might, with the consent of Congress, and under its direct and specific supervision, enter into such