1823. The KING v. Dugger. Lord Hardwicke since, upon exceptions to the significavit, held it was proper to make him a party, and that he was liable to costs." Now, in that case the Court might have collected from the significavit, that the suit was properly in a matter of ecclesiastical cognizance, and over which the court of appeal would have jurisdiction. There is another case in Strange, of Rex v. Eyre (a), where two significavits were quashed, being only said to be in a cause which came by appeal concerning a matter merely spiritual; and Lord Chancellor Talbot said, "We are not to lend our assistance but where it appears clearly they have jurisdiction; and are not to trust them to determine what is a matter merely spiritual. It is no more than saying, it is within their jurisdiction, which is never endured. In Fowler's case, in Salk. 293, it was in causis jurium ecclesiasticorum, and held not sufficient." The significavits in that case went rather farther than the significavit does in the present, for in that they clearly imported that the matter was originally of spiritual jurisdiction; but here, what the original suit was, does not appear. Therefore we cannot say, from the present significavit, that the matter before the court of appeal was properly matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Not being able to say that this was an appeal in a matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, we think the authority last referred to is directly in point, and the defendant must be brought up and discharged. Rule absolute. (a) 2 Stra. 1067. 1823. The KING v. PINNEY and Another. ON shewing cause against a rule nisi, for quashing an Where a local ment, passed act of Parlia the affairs of order of Sessions, confirming an order of two Justices, dated 25th March, 1823, appointing four persons therein for regulating named, to be overseers of the poor of the parish of Wool- the parish of wich, in the county of Kent, for the year ensuing; the case was this : di or By a local act, 47 Geo. 3. s. 2. c. 111, for regulating the affairs of the parish of Woolwich, it was enacted, by s. 92, "that the then overseers of the parish should continue to be overseers for the remainder of the year 1807, and until two other overseers should be nominated and appointed, in the manner and at the time by law rected to succeed them; and that in Easter week, within one month after Easter in every year, two persons, being substantial householders in the said parish, should be nominated and appointed in the manner by law directed, to be overseers of the poor of the said parish ;" and two Justices having appointed four overseers, the question was, whether such appointment was authorised by the act. Bolland, (with whom was Andrews) in support of the order of Sessions. The statute on which this question arises, does not restrain the discretion of the Justices as to the number of overseers which shall be appointed. Two at least are to be appointed; but there is nothing to prevent the appointment of more. There are no words to be found in the act which take away the power given by the 43 Eliz. c. 2, as to the appointment of overseers. Undoubtedly it was decided in Rex v. Loxdale (a), that more than four overseers cannot be appointed under the statute of Eliza(a) 1 Burr. 445. W. declared affirmatively, that there should be two Overseers nominated and appointed to who were in succeed those office at the me at the passing of the act:-Held, that the Justices might still appoint under the aufour overseers, thority of 43 Eliz. C. 2. 1823. The KING บ. PINNEY. beth. The doctrine there laid down is, that as the sta- Scarlett and Adolphus, contrà. The argument on the other side proceeds on the supposition, that the words of the local act are "two or more." There is nothing to support that proposition. The statute expressly says, that two shall be nominated and appointed; and the 92d section actually refers to the jurisdiction exercised by the Justices under 43 Eliz.; so that it limits the power of appointment to the number of two. Therefore if no more than two are to be appointed, it is clear, that an appointment which exceeds that number, must be bad. ABBOTT, C. J.-The general rule of construction, as laid down by Lord C. B. Comyn (a), is, that affirmative words in a later statute, do not repeal a prior statute, unless there is something in the later which necessarily leads one so to understand it. One of the instances given, is this: "The statute 23 Eliz. which gives 201. a month (a) Com. Dig. tit. Parliament, R. 25. Vide Plow. 112, 113. and 3 P. Wms. 461. against a recusant, does not take away the penalty of 12d. for every Sunday, given by 1 Eliz. c. 2. But where affirmative words in sense, contain a negative, as where a new ordinance is made, which directs the form or order of the proceedings, it shall be otherwise." If the two cannot be reconciled, the later must prevail, but if they are not inconsistent, the affirmative words in the later statute do not repeal the former. I see nothing in this statute inconsistent with the 43 Eliz. which is the general law of the land, and enables the Justices to appoint four, three, or two overseers. Before the passing of this later statute, the parish of Woolwich might have had more than two Overseers. The statute says, affirmatively, that there shall be two, and there is a provision that the Justices shall regulate the appointment with reference to the statute of Elizabeth. Two, at all events are to be appointed, but I do not see why the Justices may not appoint four. The statute does not say that there shall be two and no more, or two only; but that there shall be two. The Justices must appoint two; but still I do not see why they may not appoint four. BAYLEY, J.-This act does not take away from the Justices the power of appointing the same number of overseers, which they might have done had the act not been passed. It is perfectly clear, that before this act they might have appointed four, three, or two. They must have appointed two at the least; and then this act says, that the then present overseers shall continue in office until two be appointed, that is, until two at the least be appointed, and it provides, that in Easter week, or within one month afterwards, two persons shall be appointed. It does not say two and no more; but two at the least. There being nothing, therefore, in the act which shews that the intention of the legislature was tỏ 1823. The KING v. PINNEY. 1823. The KING V. PINNEY. confine the number to two, I think we are not warranted in saying that the statute has excluded the power which the magistrates had of appointing four, three, or two. BEST, J. (a), concurred. Rule discharged. (a) Holroyd, J. was absent, in the Bail Court. Ex parte JOHN SMITH. A conviction CONVICTION on 45 Geo. 3. 8.7. reign brandy in half-ankers, alleged to be "then and on the 45 Geo. 3. c. 121. s. 7, for c.121. s. 7. for carrying and conveying foreign spirits. The conviction; carrying and being returned into this Court by certiorari, stated, that on, &c. at Dover, &c. John Smith had been duly convicted before J. S., &c. of having on, &c. at, &c (he the said J. S. then and now being a subject of his present Majesty, and being a seaman or seafaring man) being found carrying and conveying, and assisting in the carrying away and conveying contrary to the form of the statute in that case made and provided, divers, to wit, seven gallons of of smuggling." foreign brandy, in two casks, called "half-ankers," then is insufficient, there liable to forfeiture, the said offence being committed against the provisions of the acts for the prevention in not shewing and there subject and liable to forfeiture, the said offence the particular being by him the said J. S. committed, against the pro grounds of forfeiture. visions of the acts of parliament made and passed for the prevention of smuggling, which offence has been duly proved before the Justices on the oath of one credible witness; concluding with judgment, that the said J. S. had, for such offence, forfeited the sum of 100%. pursuant to the 3 Geo. 4. c. 110, &c. Platt moved to quash the conviction for insufficiency in not describing any offence for which the defendant was |