German Government and its diplomatic representatives in the United States, by wireless or cable, are impossible for reasons which the American Government knows.

Apparently the enemies of Germany have succeeded in giving the impression that the German Government is in some way, Mr. Garrett continued, responsible for what Mr. Wilson has characterized as anti-American activities, comprising attacks on property and the violation of the rules which the American Government has seen fit to impose on the course of neutral trade. This the German Government absolutely denies. It cannot specifically repudiate acts committed by individuals over whom it has no control, and of whose movements and actions it is neither officially nor unofficially informed. It can only say it does most emphatically declare to Germans abroad, to the United States and to the American people all alike, that whoever is guilty of conduct tending to associate the German cause with lawlessness in thought, suggestion, or deed against the life, property, and order in the United States is, in fact, an enemy of that very cause, and a source of embarrassment to the German Government, nothwithstanding anything he or they may believe to the contrary.

It happens regularly that Press messages from Germany are taken from the air by the English and are reproduced as representing the official German point of view, the assumption being that the German censor will only pass such things as the German Government wishes the world to believe. Finally, owing to these conditions, all German expression of opinion falls under an awkward restraint. If the German Government could speak, and alone, to the American Government, out of the hearing of the rest of the world, and if it could communicate confidentially with its diplomatic representatives in the United States, much misconception, Mr. Garrett was sure, could be avoided. By the use of wireless, it is true, the German Government may communicate with its Ambassador in Washington in a private code known only to the American Government; but, as all other Governments may communicate by cable in an absolutely secret code, the German Government feels that to be alone deprived of this same privilege, and to be required, as no other Government is, to correspond with its representatives

in a code open to the American Government, is an unfair discrimination. This, therefore, is an obstacle that combines both fact and feeling, and if one adds thereto the misfortune that the German Government thinks it has reason to distrust the neutrality of the United States, it will be seen how serious it is. We need not inquire whether the German Government is justified in regarding American neutrality with reservation. The doubt exists, and hinders every approach to an understanding.

The reason for denying the German Government the privilege of using a secret code by wireless was, in the beginning, that it might communicate in this way with its ships at sea, but the German Government thinks that if this reason were ever valid it has ceased to exist, since there are no more German ships upon the seas.

CHAPTER VIII

SINKING WITHOUT WARNING

THE Imperial German Government having inquired into the circumstances of the sinking of the Arabic, and having obtained a report from the commander of the submarine from which the torpedo was fired, Ambassador von Bernstorff delivered to the Secretary of State a note in which Germany refused "to acknowledge any obligation or grant any indemnity in the matter."

On August 19, 1915, it said, a German submarine stopped the British liner Dunsley about sixteen miles south of Kinsale, and was about to sink her by gun fire when the commander beheld a large steamship making towards him. This steamer, the Arabic, was recognized as an enemy vessel because she did not fly any flag and had no neutral markings. "When she approached she altered her original course, but then again pointed directly towards the submarine." Sure that the Arabic "had the intention of attacking and ramming him," the commander gave the order "to dive and fired a torpedo at the steamship."

"The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were lost," and "particularly expresses this regret to the Government of the United States on account of the death of American citizens." But "the German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the Arabic." Should the two Governments find it impossible "to reach a harmonious opinion on this point" the German Government was ready "to submit the difference of opinion, as being a question of international law, to The Hague tribunal." In doing so, the German Government assumed "that, as a matter of course, the arbitral decision shall not be admitted to have the importance of a general

decision on the permissibility of, or the converse, under international law, of German submarine warfare."

Thus was the hope that the commander of the submarine would be disciplined and his act disavowed, dispelled. But the German Ambassador after conferences with the Secretary of State declared in an interview that he was sure all differences would soon be adjusted. "Ordinarily," he said, "I give only prepared interviews over my signature. To-day I shall make an exception. You may say for me that I am sure that within a fortnight all supposed difficulties between the United States and Germany will have been settled and permanently settled, and the nations will be more friendly than they ever have been."

A Berlin newspaper, the National Gazette, remarked that "for the moment it does not seem to have been recognized with sufficient clearness in America that Count von Bernstorff's principal statement and the Arabic note are two totally different expressions of intention on the part of the German Government and only superficially connected."

The destruction of the Arabic was "in no sense a diminishing of assurances given shortly before in Washington, and which were hailed with lively satisfaction in America, showing the wish of the overwhelming majority of the American people to maintain peace between Germany and America. There can be no talk about Germany having broken her word to the United States, or of trying to liberate herself from a given promise."

The Imperial Government having denied responsibility for indemnity in the case of the Arabic now returned to that of the Frye; and to the manner of fixing the damages. It proposed to do away with an umpire, settle the damages by means of two experts, and name its own expert, agreed to separate the question of indemnity from that of interpretation of the Prussian treaties of 1799 and 1828, and to refer this dispute to The Hague Tribunal.

To the question, whether in the meantime, Germany would govern her submarine operations according to the American or the German interpretation, the answer was, that "it is not prevented, in its opinion, from proceeding against American ships

conveying contraband, according to its interpretation, until the question is settled by arbitration." Nevertheless, as evidence of its "conciliatory attitude" the German Government had ordered its naval forces "not to destroy American merchantmen which have loaded conditional contraband," but allow "them to continue their voyage unhindered, if it is not possible to take them into port." But it reserved "the right to destroy vessels carrying absolute contraband" whenever allowable under the Declaration of London.

In its note on the Arabic the German Government had declared itself unable "to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the Arabic." From this position the Imperial Government now retreated and on October 5, Count von Bernstorff informed Secretary Lansing that, prompted by a desire to reach a satisfactory agreement with respect to the Arabic incident, his Government had instructed him to say His Imperial Majesty had issued such stringent orders "that the recurrence of incidents similar to the Arabic case is considered out of the question.

"According to the report of Commander Schneider of the submarine which sank the Arabic and his affidavit as well as those of his men, Commander Schneider was convinced that the Arabic intended to ram the submarine.

"On the other hand, the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the affidavits of the British officers of the Arabic, according to which the Arabic did not intend to ram the submarine. The attack of the submarine, therefore, was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act, and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly," and would pay indemnity for the lives of Americans lost on the Arabic.

Before the month ended, Germany, in a note explaining the attack on the Orduna, renewed her pledge that large passenger steamers were "only to be torpedoed after previous warning and after the rescuing of passengers and crew.”

At about a quarter past seven on the morning of July 3, said the note, a German submarine sighted a steamer some