and the Garrison much larger. The Town is upon a plane covered on two sides by the river Wateree and Pinetree Creek, the other two Sides by a chain of strong Redoubts all nearly of the same size, and independant of each other, our force was too small either to invest the Town or storm the works, which obliged us to take a position at a little distance from it.

Before we began our March from Deep River, I detached Lieut. Colo. Lee with his Legion and part of the 2d Maryland Regim't to join General Marion to invest the Enemy's posts of Communication upon the Santee, and one of their posts is now invested called Fort Watson, and must fall if not relieved by a Detachment of Lord Cornwallis's army.

I have been greatly disappointed in the force I expected to operate with me. Fifteen hundred Virginia Militia were called for immediately after the Battle of Gilford, having this present Movement in contemplation at the Time: and the State gave an order for a greater Number than was required, but the busy Season of the year, and the great distance they have to march, prevents their coming to our assistance in time, is not in force. General Sumter also engaged to have 1000 Men in the field by the 18th to operate with us, but the difficulty of collecting the militia from the disagreeable Situation of their families, has prevented their embodying yet in any considerable force. These Disappointments lay us under many disadvantages, to say nothing worse. The country is extremely difficult to operate in, being much cut to pieces by deep creeks and impassable Morasses; and many parts are covered with such heavy Timber & thick underbrush as exposes an army, and particularly Detachments, to frequent Surprizes.

The Service has been so severe that it will be absolutely necessary to give the army some Relaxation soon: and, therefore, I lament the delay which is occasioned at this time for want of sufficient force to invest all the enemy's posts of communication.

Our Numbers are so reduced by the different actions & Skirmishes which have happened, and by the fatigue & Hardships of the Service, that we have but the Shadow of an army remaining; and this we are obliged to divide, to push our operations to any effect, tho' it is attended with danger, and may prove our Ruin.

I am extremely mortified at the Disappointment which happened in Virginia, in the plan of co-operation against Portsmouth, between our good ally and the Marquis de la Fayette. Success there, would have given us great Relief here, and I am persuaded that nothing can recover this country out of the hands of the Enemy, but a similar plan in the Southern States. At present, the enemy have as full possession of Georgia and almost the whole of South Carolina as they can wish. The last accounts I had from Lord Cornwallis, he lay at Wilmington, and his army it was said was getting very sickly. I have the Honor to be &c.

His Excellency, The Presid't of Congress.

Nath. Greene.

[No. 3747.]

Colonel Hay Applies for the Exchange of Captain Townsend. Poughkeepsie 28 May 1781.

Sir, The merits of Capt'n Townsend, lately my assistant, as an officer, claim my particular attention, and induce me to hope

want of which the matter remains doubtful. Upwards of five Months have I been in this Department with nothing but the shattered remains of a routed army, except the addition of Colo. Lee's Legion and a couple of small detachments from Virginia, amounting to little more than a Regiment, and those without discipline, or even Officers to command them. In this Situation, with a temporary aid of Militia we have been struggling with a very unequal force under every possible disadvantage, and surrounded with every kind of Distress.

We have run every hazard and been exposed to every danger not only of been beaten, but of being totally ruined. I have been anxiously waiting for Succour, but the prospect appears to me to be remote, except the temporary aid of the militia, which is too precarious and uncertain to commence any serious offensive operations upon.

The more I enquire into the natural Strength of North & South Carolina either to form or support an army, the more I am persuaded they have been greatly over-rated. More of the Inhabitants appear in the King's Interest than in ours, and the country is so extensive and thinly inhabited that it is not easy either to draw any considerable force together, or subsist them when collected. The Militia in our Interest can do little more than keep Tories in Subjection, and in many places not that. These States were in a better condition to make Exertions last campaign than this. The well affected last year spent their time and their Substance in fruitless exertions, and finding themselves unequal to the Conflict, and their families being exposed and in distress, hundreds and hundreds of the best whigs have left the country. Last year it was full of Resources; this, it as almost totally exhausted, and the little Produce that remains

lies so remote, and the means of Transportation so difficult to command, that it is next to an Impossibility to collect it.

The Enemy have got a firmer footing in the Southern States than is generally expected. Camden, Ninety-six and Augusta cover all the fertile parts of South Carolina & Georgia, and they are laying waste the Country above them, which will effectually secure those posts, as no army can be subsisted in the neighbourhood to operate against them. Below, they have a great many intermediate Points of communication, for the purpose of awing the country & commanding its Supplies. Nor can I see how we are to reduce those capital posts but with a superior army in the field. I wish Congress not to be deceived respecting the Situation of things in the Southern department, and, therefore, I hope they will excuse the freedom I take: If more effectual Support cannot be given than has been, or as I can see any prospect of, I am very apprehensive that the Enemy will hold their Ground not only of the Seaports, but the interior country. The conflict may continue for some time longer, and Generals Sumter & Marian deserve great credit for their exertions & perseverance, but their Endeavours rather serve to keep the contest alive than lay a Foundation for the Recovery of the States.

We began our March from Deep River on the 7th and arrived in the Neighbourhood of Camden on the 19th. All the country through which we passed is disaffected, and the same Guards & Escorts were necessary to collect provisions & forage as if in an open & avowed enemies country.

On our arrival at Camden we took post at Long Town, about half a Mile in front of their works, which upon reconnoitering were found to be much stronger than had been represented,

and the Garrison much larger. The Town is upon a plane covered on two sides by the river Wateree and Pinetree Creek, the other two Sides by a chain of strong Redoubts all nearly of the same size, and independant of each other, our force was too small either to invest the Town or storm the works, which obliged us to take a position at a little distance from it.

Before we began our March from Deep River, I detached Lieut. Colo. Lee with his Legion and part of the 2d Maryland Regim❜t to join General Marion to invest the Enemy's posts of Communication upon the Santee, and one of their posts is now invested called Fort Watson, and must fall if not relieved by a Detachment of Lord Cornwallis's army.

I have been greatly disappointed in the force I expected to operate with me. Fifteen hundred Virginia Militia were called for immediately after the Battle of Gilford, having this present Movement in contemplation at the Time: and the State gave an order for a greater Number than was required, but the busy Season of the year, and the great distance they have to march, prevents their coming to our assistance in time, is not in force. General Sumter also engaged to have 1000 Men in the field by the 18th to operate with us, but the difficulty of collecting the militia from the disagreeable Situation of their families, has prevented their embodying yet in any considerable force. These Disappointments lay us under many disadvantages, to say nothing worse. The country is extremely difficult to operate in, being much cut to pieces by deep creeks and impassable Morasses; and many parts are covered with such heavy Timber & thick underbrush as exposes an army, and particularly Detachments, to frequent Surprizes.