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line and a number of transports between the capes of Virginia and Delaware. This intelligence has every appearance of authenticity; and if true, the arrival of the fleet on the coast

considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend.*

2. The advantages of possessing the port of New York, by the squadron of France. have been already enumerated to Count de Rochambeau and Chevalier de Ternay, and are so obvious, as not to need recapitulation. A delay in the execution of this enterprise may defeat all our projects, and render the campaign inactive and inglorious.

3. To render our operations nervous and rapid, it is essential for us to be masters of the navigation of the North River and of the Sound. Without this, our land transportation will be great, our expenses enormous, and our progress slow if not precarious for want of forage and others means.

4. With these ideas, and upon this ground, it is conceived that many advantages will result from the French squadron's taking possession of the inner harbor between Staten Island and the city of New York, and detaching a frigate or two above the chevaur-de-frise in the North River opposite Fort Washington, for the purpose of opening the navigation of the River, shortening the transportation by land on the upper and lower communication, and bringing the enemy to an explanation respecting Staten Island. Shipping so near the town would, at the same time they cover the frigates in the North River, keep the garrison in check, and be more likely to facilitate other movements of the army, than if they were to remain at the Hook or below the Narrows. 3. Our operations against the enemy in the city of New York may commence from either of three points, to wit, Morrisania, or the height near Kingsbridge, or Staten Island. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, but, under a full view of all circumstances, the preponderancy is in favor of Morrisania; especially since the aid of his Most Christian Majesty has come by the way of Rhode Island, instead of Cape Henry, as it was expected they would do, and touch at Sandy Hook, in consequence of advices lodged there.

6. As the means for carrying on our operations are not yet sufficiently appreciated, nor is the time by which our aids will arrive sufficiently ascertained, it is impossible to be precise as to the time the American troops can with safety rendezvous at Morrisania; but, as it is necessary to fix some epoch, it is hoped that it may happen by the 5th of August. I would propose that day for the reembarkation of the French efficient force at New London (if they should have come there), and that they proceed up the Sound to Whitestone on Long Island, or to such other place on that Island, or on the main, as circumstances may require, and the Count shall be advised of. For, the operations against the enemy depending very much upon their holding all or dismantling some of their present posts, and upon contingencies on our side, it is not possible at this time to mark out a precise plan, or determine whether our approaches to the city of New York shall be by the way of York Island, Brooklyn, or both. Numbers must determine the latter, and circumstances of the moment the former.

7. It must be clearly understood and agreed between the parties, that, if any capital operation is undertaken, the French fleet and land forces will at all events continue

You have totally misconceived my meaning, if you think I have or shall relinquish the idea of an enterprise against New York, till it shall appear obviously impracticable, from the want of force or means to operate. I have not as yet relaxed in any preparation tending to this end; nor shall 1, till I am convinced of the futility of the measure. I would, by all means, have it understood as my wish, that the French squadron, if superior to Arbuthnot's since the junction, should take a station, while it can do it with safety, off Sandy Hook. This, and our exertions in the mean while, will demonstrate, long before the equinoctial gales, to what we are competent.

"What I had in view, by discouraging the first draft of the letter to the French general and admiral, was, first, with our ignorance of their strength, I thought we ought not to give them more than the information of Graves's arrival: and, secondly, not to hold up strong ideas of success, which probably would not be warranted by the issue; because I never wish to promise more than I have a moral certainty of performing."-Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette, 16 July, 1780.

The New York paper of the 14th announced the arrival of Admiral Graves on the 13th with a "formidable squadron" to reinforce Admiral Arbuthnot. From private information Washington learned that this squadron consisted of six vessels, the London (90 guns), Resolution (74), Bedford (74), Royal Oak (74), Prudent (64) and America (60). This gave the English a greater naval force than the French possessed.

may instantly be looked for. This indeed must be the case at any rate from the time they are said to have sailed.*

It cannot be too much lamented that our preparations are still so greatly behind hand. Not a thousand men, that I have heard

their aid until the success of the enterprise, or until it is mutually determined to abandon it.

8. In all matters of arrangement and accommodation, not repugnant to the foregoing ideas, the Marquis, in behalf of the United States, will consult the convenience and wishes of the Count and Chevalier, and will be pleased to assure them of the disposition I possess to make every thing as agreeable to them as possible, and of my desire to manifest on all occasions the high sense I entertain of their merit, and the generous aid they have brought to us."

To Lafayette, July 16, Washington wrote:

"Alluding to the harbor of New York. The Chevalier de Ternay declined attempting to pass Sandy Hook, in any event, being convinced, as he said, by the experience of Count d'Estaing, and by such charts as he had examined, that such an attempt with his large ships would be extremely hazardous. I have therefore concluded,' he wrote, 'that, if it is possible to sustain the fleet at Long Island without entering the Hook, this arrangement will be preferable on all accounts. I will combat the English squadron at sea, should it attempt to oppose the passage of troops. All my vessels are actually without water. I have landed thirteen hundred men sick. It was with difficulty that I was enabled to supply the wants of the frigates, which I despatched yesterday to endeavor to intercept some of the enemy's vessels.'"'

From headquarters July 22, Washington wrote as follows to Lafayette:

"I have received, My Dear Marquis, your letter enclosing me those you had received from Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay. As I speak to you in confidence, I am sorry to find that the objections made by M. de Ternay are of a nature to prevent his entering the harbor, notwithstanding any superiority he will probably have. I certainly would not wish him to endanger his fleet in any enterprise not warranted by prudence, and by a sufficient prospect of success and security, and I shall acquiesce in his better judgment of Maritime Affairs. But I should hope, whenever he shall have a decided superiority, he may possess the port; and certainly, without this, our operations must be infinitely more precarious, and in success much less decisive.”— Washington's Writings, Volume VIII.

The key of the military position in the east was recognized to be West Point. Its capture or possession by the British meant that the backbone of American revolution was broken. Every New Yorker of influence was naturally aroused in his determination to maintain it and in his resistance to any movement that would threaten it. The accompanying correspondence is introduced at this point, the better to elucidate the beginning of Arnold's perfidy and to demonstrate how completely he deceived not only the shrewdest men in the American Congress and Army, but his best friends in

the American cause.

From Ramapo, 29 June, 1780, Washington had written to Robert R. Livingston in Congress:

Dear Sir, I have had the honor to receive your favor from Trenton, and thank you for the aid you have been pleased to afford in getting the provisions and stores removed from that place. Happily for us, the transportation is in a better train, and in greater forwardness, than I had reason a few days ago to expect it would be at this time. I am under no apprehension now of danger to the post at West Point, on the score either of provisions, the strength of the works, or of the garrison. I am sorry, however, to find there are apprehensions on account of the commandant, and that my knowledge of him does not enable me to form any decisive judgment of his fitness to command; but, as General McDougall and Baron Steuben, men of approved bravery, are both with him, and the main army is within supporting distance, I confess I have no fear on the ground of what I presume is suspected. To remove him, therefore, under these circumstances, and at this period, must be too severe a wound to the feelings of any officer, to be given but in cases of real necessity. When a general arrangement is gone into, and a disposition made for the campaign, I can with

!

of have yet joined the army; and in all probability the period for commencing our operations is at hand. I am happy to learn, that a spirit of animation has diffused itself throughout the State, from which we may expect the happiest consequences.

propriety, and certainly shall, bring him into the line of the army, and place the general you have named at that post, if the operations of the campaign are such as to render it expedient to leave an officer of his rank in that command."

If the States mean to put the army in a condition to adopt any offensive plan, the period cannot be far off when this measure must take place. Your sentiments, my dear Sir, upon this occasion required no apology. The opinion and advice of friends I receive at all times as a proof of their friendship, and am thankful when they are offered. I as so well persuaded of the safety of West Point, the necessity of easing the militia as much as possible, and of husbanding our provisions and stores, that I have dismissed all the militia, that were called in for the defence of the posts on the North River. With the greatest esteem and regard, I have the honor to be, &c.

Under date of Peekskill, 3 August, 1780, Washington issued the following instructions to Arnold:

You are to proceed to West Point, and take the command of that post and its dependencies, in which are included all from Fishkill to King's Ferry. The corps of infantry and cavalry, advanced towards the Enemy's lines on the East side of the River, will also be under your orders, and will take directions from you; and you will endeavor to obtain every intelligence of the Enemy's motions. The garrison of West Point is to consist of the Militia of New Hampshire and Massachusetts; for which reason, as soon as the number from those States amounts to twelve hundd. the New York Militia under the command of Colonel Malcom, are to join the Main Army on the West side of the River; and, when the number from Massachusetts Bay alone shall amount to fifteen hundred, Rank and File, the Militia of New Hampshire will also march to the Main Army. Colonel James Livingston's regiment is, till further orders, to garrison the redoubts at Stony and Verplanck's Points.

Claverac, upon the North River, is appointed for the place of rendezvous of the Militia of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, from whence you will have them brought down as fast as they arrive. A supply of provision will be necessary at that place, which you will order, from time to time, as there may be occasion. You will endeavor to have the Works at West Point carried on as expeditiously as possible by the Garrison, under the direction and Superintendence of the Engineers, the Stores carefully preserved, and the provision safely deposited and often inspected, particularly the salted meat. A certain quantity of provision has been constantly kept in each

*Mr. Livingston had suggested his fears, that General Howe, in case of an exigency, would not inspire such a degree of confidence in the New York militia, as would be essential for engaging their emcient services. He solicited the appointment for General Arnold. "If I might presume so far," he said, "I should beg leave to submit to your Excellency, whether this post might not be safely confided to General Arnold, whose courage is undoubted, who is the favorite of our militia, and who will agree perfectly with our governor."-MS. Letter, June 22d.

Arnold had some time before written on the same subject to General Schuyler, who was then in camp as one of the committee from Congress. "I know not,' said Arnold, "who is to have the command on the North River. If General Heath joins the army, as I am told he intends, that post will of course I suppose, fall under his command. When I requested leave of absence from General Washington for the summer, it was under the idea, that it would be a very inactive campaign, and that my services would be of little consequence, as my wounds made it very painful for me to walk or ride. The prospect now seems to be altered, and there is a probability of an active campaign, in which, though attended with pain and difficulty, I wish to render my country every service in my power; and, by the advice of my friends, I am determined to join the army; with which I beg you will do me the favor to acquaint General Washington, that I may be included in any arrangement that may be made."MS. Letter, May 25th.

The application, on the part of Mr. Livingston, was no doubt made at the request of General Arnold, who immediately afterwards visited the camp and West Point. On the 30th of June, General Howe wrote to General Washington from that post: "I have taken General Arnold round our works and he has my opinion of them, and of many other matters. I have long wished to give it to you, but I could not convey it by letter."

But the exigency is so pressing, that we ought to multiply our efforts to give new activity and dispatch to our measures levying and forwarding the men, providing the supplies of every sort required; forage and transportation demand particular attention. After what had been preconcerted with the honorable the Congress; after two months' previous notice of the intended succor; if our allies find us unprepared, and are obliged to wait several weeks in a state of inaction, it is easy to conceive, how unfavorable the impression, it will make of our conduct. Besides this, the season is exceedingly advanced, a decisive enterprise, if our means are equal to it, will not permit us to lose a moment of the time left for military operations, which if improved with all the vigor in our power, is less than were to be wished for an undertaking of so arduous and important a nature. So much is at stake, so much to be hoped, so much to be lost, that we shall be inexcusable if we do not employ all our zeal and all our exertions. With the highest respect &

The Committee for Co-operation.

G. Washington.

'copy.

work, to be ready against a sudden attack. Where there are bomb-proofs, they serve for Magazines; but in the smaller works, where there are none, you will have places erected sufficiently tight to preserve the provision from damage and pillage.

You will as soon as possible, obtain and transmit an accurate Return of the Militia, which have come in, and inform me regularly of their increase. Should any Levies from the State of New York, or those to the Eastward of it, intended for the Continental Army, arrive at West Point, you will immediately forward them to the lines to which they respectively belong. The difficulties, we shall certainly experience, on the score of provisions, render the utmost economy highly necessary. You will, therefore, attend frequently to the daily Issues; and, by comparing them with your Returns, will be able to check any impositions. I am, &c.*

Although there had been various intimations to the Commander-in-Chief, that Arnold wished to command at West Point, yet he had delayed conferring it, probably because he considered the services of so efficient an officer much more important in the main army. In the arrangement of the army, therefore, published in general orders on the 1st of August, the command of the left wing was assigned to Arnold. When it was found, that he was disappointed and dissatisfied, and complained that his wound would not allow him to act in the field, Washington complied with his request to be stationed at West Point.

[No. 3073.]

Robert Bohonnan Makes Application for Permission to Continue with His Regiment.

Nestehuna, July 13th 1780.

May it Please your Excellency, In pursuit of the request I made to your Excellency, at Half Moon, on your return from the lakes, I procured the inclosed from my Colo. and Endeavoured to wait on your Excellency in Albany as you desired, but arrived there a few moments too late.

I hope your Excellency will in that case Excuse this Trouble, & will please to write a few lines to either Colo. V. S. hoven or to Colo. Wemple so that I may be retaind in the Regim't. I have hitherto served for these twenty two years past. The sooner your Excellency settle this matter the better, as I am warn'd to do duty by both, and altho this being the case, and that I have paid my quota in hard Cash to furnish men for seven months &c., notwithstanding my body Cloaths have been distraind by order of Colo. Wemple & sold by the Constable for like duty in his Regt. If your Excell'cy pleases to inclose what ever you please to write on this matter for me to the care of Henry Glen, Esqr. A. D. Q. M. G. in Schen'y, it will for ever oblige your dis tress'd Humble Serv't bound to Pray.

Robt. Bohonnan.

[To G. C.]

Halfmoon, 6th Day of June 1780.

This is to Certify that Robert Bohannan has formerly served in my Regiment and I would be verry Desireous that he may

remain in the said Regement as he is verry willing for to do.

Jacobus VanSchoonhoven, Collo.

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