per is written in the belief that therein is presented the only substantial plan promising permanent rational relief from the conditions mentioned. Speaking of the importance of the work of this commission, Mr. Stimson in his first report, says:

"It is probably not too much to say that this is the most important juristic work undertaken in the United States since the adoption of the Federal Constitution. By all means let this work go on. Every state should take part in formulating uniform laws, and then in enacting them. The State Bar Associations should lend their powerful influence in their own states to make this first attempt successful. But at the best the work of the State Commission, so long as it is confined to a few disconnected subjects, however successfully the laws of the states may be harmonized on these few subjects, will be only a partial consummation of the unification of the law which the people of the country demand and will ultimately obtain. The State Commissions have begun the work in the only way in which it could be begun, but the next step is in the formulating and enacting of codes upon several topics of the law, which shall be not only the codes of the states but of the nation."

President Kibler, of the Ohio State Bar Association, speaking to the same subject, said:

"This body of eminent men, not elected but appointed upon merit, who, without a vestige of legislative power or authority, by the sheer worth of their accomplishments as to matters of vital importance to the welfare of the whole people are, in fact, legislating for the federal good, are in a sense greater than Congress itself."

And quoting from Judge Simeon E. Baldwin:1

"The existence of the American Conference as a permanent body was one of the causes that encouraged the Netherlands to call the first Hague Conference. Its work ought to be forwarded by all who are interested in advancing the unity of American jurisprudence."

And speaking of the general subject, Judge Brewster of Connecticut, said:

"The argument for greater legal unity lies in the national unity. Our people today in their business, contractural and commercial relations, are one people-one, just as they are one and homogeneous in language, education, literature, and in their whole civic and social life. They are one in a unity such as never before existed in this, or any other great country. The constantly increasing interstate. trade and traffic, interstate migration, and the wonderful development of the means of intercommunication, fuse and unite all interests and localities. Variance, dissonance, subdivision of the one American people, in the general laws affecting the whole people in their business and social relations cannot but produce perplexity, uncertainty and damage. Such diversity, always an annoyance, is often a nuisance. It is harmful and injudicious in the same way, in kind if not in degree, as it would be for us to have, fifty different languages, or fifty different metric systems. The business man may well ask why should not the meaning and effect of a promissory note, a bill of lading, or a guaranty be as certain and definite and practically identical in all the states as the meaning of words in an American dictionary and for the same reason, the common convenience of all."

But how can the full fruition of the example and labors of this body be best attained, for as commendable and exalting as its labors and efforts are, it must be conceded that its achievements have not been commensurate with its deserts. One writer, John L. Scott suggests that under the power vested in the federal constitution to provide for general welfare, Congress should establish a bureau of commissioners for the purpose of devising uniform laws for recommendation to the different states. This was fifteen years ago, but up to date no bureau has been established. Another proposition

of similar import was presented the year previous by the late Leonard A. Jones of

Boston in an address to the Virginia State Bar Association, proposing an enactment by Congress of a statute providing for the appointment of commissioners whose duties it would be to frame codes for all the states to be submitted to the state commissioners, and after receiving the approval of the commissioners of two-thirds of the states, should then be submitted to the different legislatures for their adoption. This suggestion likewise has failed in receiving favorable action. A similar article by William L. Snyderk read before the American Bar Association in 1892 (46 Albany Law Journal, 185) contains the statement that "the reform must be secured by the voluntary action of the states." Taking the course of the entire matter, and viewing all that has been said, written and accomplished, this sentence spoken at the time of the organization of the commission it seems to me to carry with it the final word on the whole subject, for I believe it is futile to look to Congress for favorable action. While it is true the object is of importance to the people of the nation, it is the states themselves which must finally act; and this action. it seems to me should be along the line of organization of a more permanent body than the present one. For, as Mr. Jones in the article referred to, says:

"It is hardly possible for state commissioners as now constituted to undertake to frame such codes as are necessarythese codes would require years of constant labor and this would be a work of vast difficulty."

Therefore, profiting by and continuing the valued example set by the present commission, and in no degree offering a criticism, I would suggest a uniform statute to be presented to the different legislatures of the states of the nation providing for the appointment of a permanent Uniform Interstate Legislative Commission of not exceeding three in each state (and possibly two would be

sufficient) who should hold their positions for life or during good behavior or at any rate for a term of considerable length and whose salary would be sufficient to attract to its service the best legal talent of that state. This commission should be required to meet for two sessions annually of sixty days each or for such further period as they might themselves elect, at such times and places as they might fix. For instance, its sessions in the winter might be held at some southern and in the summer at some northern capital, and their duties in such sessions would be to formulate and recommend to the different state legislatures of the nation uniform codes upon all general subjects of the law, the scope being largely left to their own discretion. With the completion of each specified act it should be transmitted to the different state legislatures with the recommendation of these official commissioners accompanied by an argument for its adoption. These men from their previous training and the experience they would acquire in performing the duties of their office, would attain the highest possible degree of proficiency in the art and science of legislation and rapidly bring order out of the chaos which now exists in our state statute laws. In addition to the great relief which would come to the social and business interests of the nation as a result of their labors, there would be an immense time salvage in every state legislature at its every session. The beneficial effects by reason thereof would be felt throughout the nation. Moreover, if uniform statutes could be submitted for the consideration of fifty appellate courts instead of as many different statutes to as many different courts, there would naturally grow up a body of uniform construction upon these statutes and each state would thereby secure the full benefits of the labors of the courts of all the other states, rather

than merely their own, for as was said by Mr. Amasa M. Eaton, President of the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (July, 1909):

"In the decision of cases arising under uniform laws, courts of last resort are showing a tendency to follow the decisions on the same question in other states that have adopted the same laws.”

Under such a system, then, when a prospective litigant presented his case to the counsel in any state in the union, basing his right for recovery upon a uniform statute, his counsel would have at his hand a chance for its construction by forty-nine courts where in many instances today he would have but his own,

and that one oftener than otherwise would never have reached it. His counsel discovering that the statute had been passed upon by some court would advise with more certainty than where as frequently happens today, he finds conflicting statutes with conflicting decisions and is able to advise only upon conjecture and speculation. Should he find it construed and against his client's claims, no suit would likely be brought, or should the statute be found construed favorable, and suit brought, counsel for his adversary would doubtless speedily advise his client to compromise, and thus there would be one less case tried and one less reported case would find its way into the books. Thus, this system would get for each state the full measure of benefit of the adjudication of the courts of all other states. Furthermore, if courts in the preparation of opinions were not confronted with the eternal question of where lay the weight of authority on any proposition, the opinion which they prepare could be reduced more than onehalf their present length, for where the principles in the instant case had been passed upon by some court whose judgment and logic recommended its opinion as sound, but little more than a reference thereto would be necessary. Cer

tainly courts considering a statute simultaneously, on refusing to follow a previous decision by another court, might break the current of uniformity, but this is just where a permanent official commission would prove its greatest worth, for at its next session an amendment could be considered adopted, passed, and recommended to all the state legislatures harmonizing the conflict and thus uniformity be again established and maintained. Nor, in my judgment, are the virtues of this proposition exhausted in the foregoing considerations. These state commissioners should be required. to attend upon each session of their own legislatures for the purpose of advising

on the uniform acts recommended and of aiding in formulating and preparing laws. peculiar to each state and advising the different legislators in the proper formulation of measures to the end that internal conflicts in the statutes might be avoided. Being adepts and skilled in law making, there would be no good reason for a measure to pass the legislature with a defective title or embodying more subjects than were constitutionally permitted or in any other way leave patent constitutional defects on its face, which would bring about litigation to determine. its validity. Here again would be a salvage of vast proportions to the people of the state not only in the character of the laws proposed and passed, but in the time saved to the great body of law makers at their different sessions as well as to litigants and the courts. Moreover, this commission would, through its skill and experience, possess the highest possible talent which the state could command for the codification and annotation of its laws and it should stand as a permanent code commission.

So that, surveying the entire field of duties which would naturally follow the commission and the high order of service which it would be qualified to ren

der, to my mind there can be but little doubt that these would be the most valuable of all our public servants. Mr. Thomas A. Street' says:

"The existence or nonexistence in any state of a shapely and intelligible body of statutory law cannot but be a factor that will in the end prove a potent one in its effect for good or ill on the judiciary laws of that state. This has not always been sufficiently understood and appreciated by the lawmaking profession themselves. It is the plan that if the statutory law of a state is in good shape the case law of the state is likely to de

velop harmoniously and upon intelligent lines; while if the statutes are unshapely,

illy conceived, and unharmonious, the decisions dealing with those statutes are very apt to be in a great measure unintelligible and inconsistent. Under such conditions difficulties multiply and one illogical decision breeds another, until the case law of the state becomes very much larger in amount and much more difficult of comprehension by the lawyer than it ought to be."

Again, one of the burdens of litigation mentioned above is the question of procedure. It is uniform between practically none of the states, while if a uniform code for trial and appellate practice could be adopted generally, there is no way of computing the great benefit which would come to the litigants, the courts and the Bar therefrom. A large percentage of cases are reversed because of a misconception on the part of the trial courts or counsel in the rules of practice. Uniform statutes would be easily annotated, and if fifty courts were passing upon the same practice act, soon a body of uniform adjudications would grow up, and but few courts, and they the careless ones, would make any other than a uniform application thereof. If the multifarious decisions on practice alone could be reduced one-half, every lawyer recognizes at once the effect it would have upon the number of reported cases. This

(4) Law Notes, February, 1910.

one reform in itself would be sufficient to justify the organization of the commission suggested.

Judge Allen of the Supreme Court of Kansas said:

"To lack of uniformity in judicial procedure may be charged failure of justice, which is the most serious charge that can be brought against any judicial system; and, in addition to this, vast expenditure of money, of time and of research, which might better be otherwise employed. Through the technicalities of different courts under different state precedents and methods of procedure, come many of the delays which are conspicuous in legal matters. In suits for injury, for instance, the decision is often so long delayed by the devices of sharp practice that by the time the damages finally are paid the suitor receives no benefit from the money adjudged to be due. In probate cases. there are many complications where the estate has property in different states, and the delay in settling, as is well known, often causes serious loss because of the uncertainty of the beneficiaries as to their real financial condition."

Pressing necessity for reform is beyond controversy.

Of it President Taft said:

"There is a subject upon which there. may be uniformity of legislation after we in the Federal Government have adopted a proper system, and that is with reference to judicial procedure. If there is anything in our whole government, state or national, that justifies an attack upon our present system of living, it is the delays in our judicial procedures and the advantage that wealth gives in the struggle in the courts against those who haven't the means to meet the expense that is now imposed upon them."

That the remedy here proposed would not eliminate entirely all the evils noted in this article, is readily conceded, but that it offers a method which would tend in a substantial way to correct and not merely palliate must be conceded by all. JESSE J. DUNN..

Oakland, Calif.

INSURANCE-FALSE STATEMENTS IN

APPLICATION.

STANULEVICH v. ST. LAWRENCE LIFE ASSN.

Court of Appeals of New York. April 13, 1920.

127 N. E. 315.

Where application for health policy was annexed to and formed part of the contract of insurance under Insurance Law, § 58, and was signed by the insured, a material false statement therein that insured had not had any medical or surgical treatment within the preceding five years held to preclude recovery on policy, though insured could not read or write English well and had informed soliciting agent, who furnished policy, of his illness during such period.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Action by Julius Stanulevich against the St. Lawrence Life Association. From an order and judgment of the Appellate Division (183 App. Div. 111, 170 N. Y. Supp. 161), unanimously affirming the judgment for plaintiff on a verdict of jury, and an order denying defendant's motion for new trial, defendant appeals. Judgment and order reversed, and complaint dismissed.

This is an appeal by the defendant by permission from an order and judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Department, unanimously affirming a judg ment entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Dutchess on the 5th day of July, 1917, upon a verdict of a jury for the sum of $280.52 in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.

The defendant issued an insurance policy to the plaintiff, indemnifying the plaintiff for loss of time by sickness. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to the amount sued for by reason of his illness. The material defense is that the plaintiff, in making the application for this policy, which, in pursuance of section 58 of the Insurance Law (Consol. Laws, c. 28), was annexed to and formed part of the contract of insurance, made a material false statement when he said that he had not had any medical or surgical treatment within the past five years, which statement is conceded not to be the fact. The plaintiff could not read or write English well, and the soliciting agent for the defendant, who furnished the policy, testified in

his behalf that he knew and the plaintiff informed him of his illness, but that he did not state the same in the application.

PER CURIAM. Upon the authority of Bollard v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co. (decided January 27, 1920) 228 N. Y. -, 126 N. E. 900, and Baumann v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co., 225 N. Y. 480, 122 N. E. 628, the application being a part of the policy, the insured and assured are bound by its terms, as it is part of the contract of insurance. The application in question was signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff cannot maintain his present action, and the judgment and order appealed from should therefore be reversed, and the complaint dismissed, with costs in all courts. HISCOCK, C. J., and COLLIN, HOGAN, POUND, MCLAUGHLIN, .ANDREWS, ELKUS, JJ., concur.

Judgment and order reversed, etc.

and

NOTE-False Answers Knowingly Written by Company Agent and Signed by Applicant for Insurance. The instant case shows that it is based on the precise wording of a New York statute, the effect of which is to make an insurance policy void if material false statements are made in the application by whomsoever those answers were written therein. This view was set out at large in Ballard v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., N. Y., 126 N. E. 900, referred to in the opinion, and the reversal is of Supreme Court's construction of the Ballard case. It is on the terms of the N. Y. statute, which New York Court of Appeals holds is mandatory. It is not to be taken as an overturning of the principle set forth in New York decision prior to the enactment of this statute.

Thus the reversed decision cites Sternaman v. Met. L. Ins. Co., 170 N. Y. 13, 62 N. E. 763, as holding that when an applicant for insurance makes truthful answers to all questions propounded by a medical examiner, who records them erroneously or falsely, this falsity will not avoid the policy. The opinion urged that the company is not deceived when its agent knows the actual facts, and therefore does not issue a policy relying on a misrepresentation and has no right to rescind.

Along this line are many cases. Thus in Masonic L. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 149 Ky. 80, 147 S. W. 882, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 505, it was held that, if answers are made in good faith under advice of the agent and company physician, the insurer cannot avoid the policy, though the policy provided that such agent and physician are to be regarded as agents of the insured.

In this case applicant stated he had never applied to other companies and been rejected, when he had. It was averred that as the medical examiner knew the truth and there was evidence that the applicant did not understand the question referred to prior applications to other companies, there was estoppel against the company. The clause in the policy that the agent and physician were assured's agents could not displace this principle, because such statement "is, generally speaking, in direct variance with the actual facts."