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WEEKLY DIGEST.

Weekly Digest of Important Opinions of the State Courts of Last Resort and of the Federal Courts.

Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn.

Arkansas.

Delaware

D. C....

Florida

Georgia.

Indiana.

Iowa..

Kentucky.

Maine

Michigan.

Mississippi

Nebraska.

New Jersey

North Carolina

New York

Rhode Island

South Carolina.
Texas..

United States C. C. A..

32, 57, 72, 75.

United States D. C..
United States S. C...

Vermont.

Virginia

West Virginia.

.4, 12, 17, 55, 60

58

.11, 27, 81 47 ...3, 45, 46, 51, 59, 67 .30, 34, 36, 52, 73, 84 .29, 54, 66, 76, 83 1, 2, 10, 14, 22, 49, 68 65 .33, 70, 79 .64 .23, 31, 48, 69 .18 ..5, 20, 40, 56 .25, 63 61 .35, 38, 39, 82 15, 37, 44, 50, 53 .6, 7, 8, 19, 24, 28,

.7" 13

.9, 41, 42, 43, 80 26

..16, 21, 62, 71, 74, 78

1. Abandonment-Neglect.-Mere neglect to assert rights in a vested estate as a tenancy by curtesy will not result in loss of title where there is no adverse possession by another.Childers v. Kennedy, Ky., 224 S. W. 651.

2. Adverse Possession-Actual Possession.— Adverse possession, which will ripen into title after 15 years, must be actual and continuous; and where one moved his family about a mile distant, and remained for the cropping season, and then moved back, there was a break in his actual possession, which was fatal to his claim. of title by adverse possession.-Meek v. Davis, Ky., 224 S. W. 659.

3.-- ---Prescriptive Title.-Adverse possession of land under a claim of right for 20 years, though originating in mistake, will ripen into good prescriptive title against all the world, except the state and persons not sui juris, provided such possession is public, continuous, exclusive, and peaceable, and is accompanied by a claim of right, and does not originate in fraud. -Waxelbaum v. Gunn, Ga., 104 S. E. 216.

4. Tacking.-Privity which will allow tacking of possessions may be created in any way that will prevent a break in the adverse possession and refer the several possessions to the original entry, and it may be created either by parol or otherwise from vendor to vendee.Waller v. Dansby, Ark., 224 S. W. 615.

5. Assignments-Contingent Interest.-A contingent interest in land, while not subject to sale under execution, may be conveyed.-Bourne v. Farrar, N. C., 104 S. E. 170.

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6. Bankruptcy Discharge. Evidence the bankrupt had a large measure of control over a corporation which owned two newspapers and was formed by the Non-Partisan League to protect the members from individual liability, and which at most raised a suspicion that the bankrupt had a proprietary interest in the corporation, is sufficient to prevent his discharge in bankruptcy for failure to schedule his interest in the corporation as part of his assets.-McCutcheon v. Townley, U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 985. 7.- False Statement.-The giving of a check on a bank in which the account of the bankrupt has been overdrawn does not constitute a "materially false statement in writing," within Bankruptcy Act, relating to denial of discharge. -Robinson v. J. R. Williston & Co., U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 970.

8.Trustee.-Under Bankruptcy Act, § 60b, as amended by Act June 25, 1910, § 11, recording is deemed required when, through delay, a position superior to the challenged transfer has been gained by some creditor for whom the trustee represents, or whose place he is entitled to take. The trustee is not such a person by virtue of section 47a, as this lien arises subsequently to the recordation of the challenged transfer.-Bradley v. Robie, U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 884.

9. Bastards-Impeaching Verdict.-Affidavits of jurors, to the effect that they considered evidence which had been withdrawn, was clearly incompetent.-Dailey v. Bond, Vt., 111 Atl. 394. 10. Bills and Notes-Fraudulent Representations. Though defendant, as part of the price for plaintiff's farm, indorsed to plaintiff without recourse a third person's note, defendant is liable thereon; he having made fraudulent representations as to the note to induce the trade.-Hartsfield v. Pace, Ky., 224 S. W. 647.

11. Cancellation of Instruments-Equity.Equity will afford some form of relief from conveyances for support on nonperformance of the agreement.-Stephens v. Daly, D. C., 266 Fed.

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13. Commerce-Telegram.--The which a message was transmitted in the ordinary course of business by a telegraph company between two points within the state determines its character as an interstate or intrastate transaction, and it is interstate where it actually was sent through a portion of another state, though it was not necessary to send it across the state boundaries.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight, U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 11. 14.

Conspiracy-Circumstantial Evidence.--A conspiracy is almost necessarily established by welding into one chain of a number of links, each in itself inconclusive and insufficient to prove a conspiracy, but when connected and examined as a whole sufficient to show it.Gibson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 224 S. W. 657.

15. Lawful Purpose.-The fact that two or more persons join in an action does not make the action actionable, if it was not actionable in itself.-Pye v. Cardwell, Tex., 224 S. W. 542.

16. Contracts-Performance Impossible.-If the manifest purpose of a contract is impossible of accomplishment in the manner in which it was intended to be effected, on account of a legal obstacle, but can be fully executed in a different way which is consistent with law, it must be permitted to operate in the latter mode. -Wilson v. Riffle, W. Va., 104 S. E. 285.

17. Public Policy.-A contract to furnish another evidence which would help him out in litigation made without any regard to the truth of the evidence to be furnished is void as against public policy because contemplating subordination of perjury, which is a felony.Luce v. Endsley, Ark., 224 S. W. 619.

18. Public Policy.-Provision of contract, between an association representing nearly all the building contractors of New York City and Long Island and an association representing the labor unions thereof, binding the contractors to employ only union men in their enterprises therein, and having for its object the closed shop, the monopolization of the labor market by the unions, violates public policy as to monopolies. -Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining Works, N. J., 111 Atl. 376.

19. Termination.-The general rule is that contracts not expressly made for fixed period are terminable at the will of either party.Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 973.

20. Conversion-Personalty.-Where a will directed the sale of real estate and distribution of proceeds, the proceeds are personalty, so that the husband of the beneficiary acquires no interest therein as tenant by curtesy.-In re Brogden, N. C., 104 S. E. 177.

21. Corporations-Libel and Slander.-A corporation will not be liable for the publication of a libel by its agent, unless he was authorized thereto, or the same was published while acting within the scope of his authority, or his act in regard thereto was subsequently ratified by the proper corporate authority.-Barger v. Hood, W. Va., 104 S. E. 280.

22. Notice.-The mere fact that the secretary of a corporation has authority to draw checks to pay the corporation's obligations will not estop the corporation from questioning the validity of his act when he issues a check, not to pay the corporation's debt, but the obligation of a third party to one charged with notice of such fact.-McDonald v. Bauman, Ky., 224 S. W. 641.

23.- -Parties to Suit.-Creditors of an insolvent corporation cannot maintain an action against a part of the stockholders for the payment of corporate debts until it is shown that the stockholders who are not made parties defendant and who are not served with process are nonresidents of the state, or for other good and sufficient reason cannot be reached by the process of the court.-M. A. Gedney Co. v. Sanford, Neb., 179 N. W. 385.

24. Priority.-One who loans money to a financially embarrassed corporation, to enable it to continue in business, and takes security therefor, is not thereby entitled to priority over mortgages existing when the loans were made. -Andrews Institute for Girls V. New York Steam Co., U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 872.

25.- -Imputability.-Ordinarily knowledge on the part of an agent of a corporation imputes knowledge to the corporation because of the agent's duty of disclosure, except where the agent is engaged in transactions for his own benefit, hostile to the corporation, or for the benefit of some other person in a manner detrimental to the corporation, when the presumption of disclosure does not follow.-Rocky River Development Co. v. German-American Brewing Co., N. Y., 184 N. Y. Sup. 155.

26. Courts-Stare Decisis.-While great consideration should be given to precedents of long duration and general acceptance, a rule, established merely by precedent, is not infallible, and if it is highly technical, so that courts have had to make exceptions thereto from time to time, and the reason therefore has ceased, it need be no longer followed.-Whitaker & Fowle v. Lane, Va., 104 S. E. 252.

27.

Criminal Law-Accomplice.-While there is no absolute rule of law preventing convictions on the testimony of an accomplice, the jury should be instructed and cautioned as to the character of such testimony, and the danger of convicting without supporting evidence.-Freed v. United States, D. C., 266 Fed. 1013.

28.Acquittal on Count.-An acquittal on the second count of an indictment for violating the Espionage Act is not inconsistent with a conviction under the first count, where the first count contained the element of intent to interfere with the success of military service, which did not enter into the offense alleged in the second count.-Hinkhouse v. United States, U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 977.

29.- -Embezzlement.—In a prosecution for larceny by embezzlement, testimony of other acts of embezzlement or fraudulent conversion by defendant as bearing on his motive in converting the money in the case at bar held properly admitted, subject to proper instruction to consider it only as showing motive.-State v. Wilson, Iowa, 179 N. W. 305.

30.- Harmless Error.-Where accused, after the court's refusal to discharge him at the close of the state's evidence in chief, introduced evidence, he cannot claim that such refusal was error.-Wukina v. State, Ind., 128 N. E. 435.

31. Insanity.-The defense of insanity, when interposed by the accused in a criminal action, is a question of fact for the jury.-Philbrick v. State, Neb., 179 N. W. 398.

32. -Intent.-In cases where there are eye or ear witnesses to the happening of an isolated transaction, and the sole question is whether it happened or did not happen, it is not proper or competent to permit the introduction of evidence of other remote and disconnected matters, not charged in some good count in the indictment, to prove intent, where the element of intent is not involved in the crime charged.-Holzmacher v. United States, U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 979.

33.- -Sentence.-A sentence that accused be confined for a maximum period of his natural life and a minimum period of 10 years, with recommendation of 10 years as a reasonable maximum sentence, is a sentence for life, to which the indeterminate sentence law is not applicable; the recommendation being surplusage, except as it may be considered by the pardoning power. In re Smith, Mich., 179 N. W. 346.

34. -Withdrawal of Plea.-Ordinarily, the granting of leave to withdraw a plea of guilty is within the sound discretion of the trial court. -Atkinson v. State, Ind., 128 N. E. 433.

35. Damages-Breach of Contract.-In an action for breach of contract to supply defendants' motion picture films to plaintiff for exhibition, where it was shown that defendants' films were popular, and that the income from their exhibition was reasonably ascertainable, plaintiff is entitled to more than nominal damages, though his witness could not state the rental value of the pictures; rental value meaning only such damages as are recoverable in a particular case, and in this case would mean the revenue which the exhibition of the pictures would bring.-Lester v. Fox Film Corporation, S. C., 104 S. E. 178.

36. Dedication-Public Way.-Where a strip of ground for more than 20 years had been used as a way of ingress and egress to certain elevators and a mill, and as a public way connecting two streets, and by the general public for traveling purposes, both by pedestrians and vehicles, all with the knowledge and acquiescence of the successive owners of the abutting land, and had been improved by certain of the latter and by the town and city, it was dedicated for a public way.-Lome v. City of Monticello, Ind., 128 N. E. 449.

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38.- -Words of Inheritance.-Though plaintiff's mother, who conveyed lands to him, intended to grant the fee, yet as the deed contained no words of inheritance in the granting or habendum clauses, only a life estate passed, notwithstanding the instrument contained the usual covenants of warranty.-Fore v. Marion County Lumber Co., S. C., 104 S. E. 179.

39. Depositions-Parts of.-Plaintiff can at the trial read from a deposition taken on behalf of defendant, which was incompetent, admissions made by defendant's counsel in open court without permitting the other parts of the deposition to be read in evidence.-Lanter Southern States Life Ins. Co., S. C., 104 S. E. 193.

V.

40. Easements-Right of Way.-Defendants could not deprive plaintiff of his easement of right of way over their lands by providing another outlet for him, however detrimental the original right of way was to defendants' land, if plaintiff had actually acquired title to the use of the way by prescription.-Smith v. Jackson, N. C., 104 S. E. 169.

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43. Mistake.-Where grantor conveyed one piece of land as executor of one estate, and as part of the same transaction conveyed adjoining piece of land to same grantees as administrator of another estate, and where it necessarily followed that, if there had been a mistake in the description in one deed, a similar mistake had been made in description in other deed, a bill to reform the two deeds was multifarious.-Viall v. Hurley, Vt., 111 Atl. 395. 44. Evidence-Building Restrictions.-Parol representations by the owner of a subdivision to lot purchasers that all subsequent conveyances of lots would contain certain restrictions are admissible against a subsequent purchaser who was found to have had knowledge of the restrictions in conveyances of other lots at the time he made his purchase.-Wilson Co. v. Gordon, Tex., 224 S. W. 703.

45.- -Expert Testimony.-Where a witness testifies that he is familiar with the handwriting of a party, a written instrument is admissible in evidence as to the handwriting of such party, upon proof by the witness that it is genuine. Waddell v. J. R. Watkins Medical Co., Ga., 104 S. E. 250.

46. Muniments of Title.-The objection to deeds and other muniments of title, on the ground that it does not appear that the land described in the deed or other instrument is the same land as that sued for, is without merit, as parol evidence would be admissible to identify the land described in the instrument as the land sued for. -Sheffield v. Sheffield, Ga., 104 S. E. 213.

47. Frauds, Statute of-Memorandum.-Telegrams or letters to the writer's agent may constitute adequate memorandum of the contract under the statute of frauds, and several telegrams, letters, or other writings signed by the party to be charged may be considered together in supplying the essential elements of such memorandum as will satisfy the statute.-Meek v. Briggs, Fla., 86 So. 271.

48. Gaming-Future Delivery.-Evidence examined, and held that the only conclusion to be reached from the plaintiff's evidence is that the contract was based on a wagering transaction, and that there was, in fact, no intention on the part of the parties to engage in a bona fide purchase to be followed by an actual delivery of the commodity in which they nominally dealt. and that such transaction was a gambling venture and speculation in the fluctuation in the price of wheat in the markets, and is void as being contrary to public policy.-Hall v. Davis, Neb., 179 N. W. 391.

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50. Husband and Wife-Fraud.-A wife, who was named as grantee in the deed at the request of her husband, is bound by his fraud, causing the conveyance to her. Campbell v. Turley, Tex., 224 S. W. 528.

51.- -Maintenance.-A contract between husband and wife, providing for the wife's maintenance, made after a separation has taken place, is valid and enforceable.-Watson V. Burnley, Ga., 104 S. E. 220.

52. Injunction-Indirect Contempt.-The jurisdiction of the court to punish for an indirect contempt of its authority in disobeying a restraining order held properly invoked by filing an affidavit of the plaintiff in the case in which the restraining order was entered.-Ramer v. State, Ind., 128 N. E. 440.

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53. -Mandatory.-Injunction ally be used pending final determination of a suit for possession of property to transfer such possession from defendant to plaintiff.-Vogelsang v. Gray, Tex., 224 S. W. 535.

54. Insurance-Eyewitness. In an action to recover death indemnity from an association, a by-law of which contained a clause limiting amount of liability for injuries caused by firearms, where there was no eyewitness except the member, the burden was on defendant to prove that there was no such eyewitness.-Fiedler v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., Iowa, 179 N. W. 317.

55. -Insurable Interest.-A person may take out a policy of insurance on his own life and designate any other person he chooses as beneficiary, though the person so designated has no insurable interest in the life of the insured, and a joint policy taken by two former partners in favor of the survivor is in effect a policy taken by each for the benefit of the other. -Atkins v. Cotter, Ark., 224 S. W. 624.

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56. Misrepresentation.-Insured's resentation as to the condition of his health in application for life policy, where in fact he was suffering from an incurable disease at the time of such application, was no defense in an action on the policy commenced more than a year after policy was issued, where policy contained clause making it incontestable on expiration of one year from date of policy.-Hardy v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., N. C., 104 S. E. 166. 57. Internal Revenue-Stock Dividend.-A stock dividend declared by a corporation from its accumulated surplus is not taxable as "Income," under Act October 3, 1913.-Loomis v. Wattles, U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 876.

58. Judgment-Election of Remedies.-The election by a servant to pursue one remedy for his wrongful discharge bars his right to pursue another remedy, since his contract of employment is indivisible and the discharge is a single breach, so that an employe whose wages are paid to the time of discharge cannot bring separate actions for future installments of wages as they become due.-Brand v. OgdenHoward Co., Del., 111 Atl. 370,

59. -Opening Default.-Though no defense is filed by the defendant, and on the call of the appearance docket an entry of "in default" is made by the judge, it is within the legal discretion of the judge, during the same day and before the adjournment of the term, to allow the defendant to plead.-Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Southern Express Co., Ga., 104 S. E. 233.

60. Landlord and Tenant-Dispute of Title.In lessee's action against sublessee on note given for rent, it was no defense that land had been sold for purpose of paying owner's debts, and that sublesse, to protect his own interest, was forced to purchase land, since the tenant cannot dispute his landlord's title, nor interpose an after-acquired title in defense.-Montgomery v. Massey, Ark., 224 S. W. 631.

61. -Tenant at Sufferance.-A tenant for a definite term may become a tenant at sufferance

entitled to notice to vacate under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 334, § 1, by holding over his term without a new contract only in case the landlord is guilty of laches in commencing ejectment.— Mitchell v. Hyman, R. I., 111 Atl. 369.

62. Libel and Slander-Illegality and Malice. -The illegality and malice involved in the publication of a libel constitute the essence of the offense.-State v. Payne, W. Va., 104 S. E. 288.

63. Limitations of Actions-Discovery of Fraud. An accounting by an executor, in which he charged himself with some money received from a corporation in which deceased had been a stockholder, did not put a legate on inquiry which would lead to her discovering fact that the executors were claiming the stock as individuals; the receipts accounted for not being stock dividends.-Gaines v. Huyler, N. Y., 184 N. Y. Sup

145.

64. Logs and Logging-Deed.-A deed conveying "all pine timber and timber like trees" being, growing, and standing, "and being 195 acres of good pine timber," is a conveyance only of the pine timber on the land.-Sauls v. Denkmann Lumber Co., Miss., 86 So. 265.

65. Master and Servant-Loss of Foot. Where so much of an employe's foot as lay forward of the plane of the front surface of the tibia, or shin bone, was amputated, so that he lost the toes and instep, but not the heel. and so that with the aid of a specially constructed boot he was able to step on the heel he did not sustain the "loss of a foot," within the Workmen's Compensation Law, § 16. prior to amendment by Pub. Laws 1919, c. 238. and was entitled to an award for loss of his toes. -McLean v. American Ry. Express Co., Me., 111 Atl. 383.

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66. Presumption of Care.-The tion is that deceased servant was in the performance of his duty to close factory windows when killed by collapse of the part of the building he was in, caused by a tornado.-Reid v. Automatic Electric Washer Co., Iowa, 179 N. W. 323.

67. Mortgages-Deed.-A petition, in an action to have a conveyance of land absolute on its face declared to be a security deed, alleging plaintiffs to be the sole heirs of the grantor dying intestate in possession, and plaintiffs' possession and the refusal of their offer before suit to pay the debt, and offering payment in full on an accounting in the suit, set out an equitable cause of action.-E. Tris Napier Co. v. Gloss, Ga., 104 S. E. 230.

68. Redemption.-A mortgage in possession will not be allowed to make improvements which will render it more difficult for the mortgagor to redeem by charging him with costs of improving the property.-Bowen v. Boughner, Ky., 224 S. W. 653.

69. Redemption.-When it is established that a deed was in fact given as security only, the grantor therein stands in the relationship to the premises as mortgagor, and is entitled to redeem. In such case the mortgagor is entitled to the possession of the premises and to receive the rents and profits therefrom.-Snoke v. Beach, Neb., 179 N. W. 389.

70. Municipal Corporations-De Facto Officer. -Officers elected under the provisions of a new municipal charter which was invalid as to the election provisions only are de facto officers whose actions within the scope of the charter are valid until they are legally ousted.-Wattles v. Upjohn, Mich., 179 N. W. 335.

71. Partnership-Joint and Several Contract. -Ordinarily, a contract by which the members of a copartnership bind themselves is joint and several, wherefore an action against one of them may be maintained.-Harris v. Welch, W. Va., 104 S. E. 277.

72. Patents-Abandonment.-The limiting of broad, general claims which would cover the whole field of the art, to claims covering more specifically the invention, but not in such a manner as to abandon any elements of the invention relied on in the infringement suit, is not an abandonment which defeats the right to enjoin the infringement.-General Electric Co v. Nitro Tungsten Lamp Co., U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 994.

73.

to an

Pleading-Demurrer.-Demurrer swer admits for the purposes of such demurrer that the facts alleged therein are true.-Bryan v. Mieler, Ind., 128 N. E. 437.

74. Quieting Title-Bar to Action.-Invalidity of the instrument or provision under which the claim is set up, on its face, constitutes no bar to a suit to remove cloud from title, if the true owner is in possession of the property affected by the cloud.-Gilbert v. McCreary, W. Va., 104 S. E. 273.

75. Railroads - Contributory Negligence. An automobile driver who approached a crossing where the view was obstructed, without stopping his car to listen, and was struck by a train whose approach he did not hear, though its rumbling was heard by numerous witnesses at greater distances, was contributory negligence as a matter of law.-Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Biwer, U. S. C. C. A., 266 Fed. 965.

76. Rape Void Consent. Consent of the woman to sexual intercourse from fear of personal violence is void, and though the man lays no hand on her, if, by an array of physical force he overpowers her so that she dares not resist, he is guilty of rape.-State v. Morrison, Iowa, 179 N. W. 321.

77. Removal of Causes-Jurisdiction.-Under Judicial Code, § 29, the filing of a sufficient petition and bond for removal ipso facto removes the cause, and deprives the state court of further jurisdiction; any question of the right of removal being for the federal court.-Williams v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., U. S. D. C., 266 Fed 1003.

78. Specific Performance-Equity.-A court of equity will specifically execute an oral contract for the sale of land by a father to a son, where the son has paid part of the purchase money, has been placed in possession of the land, and has made valuable and permanent improvements thereon. Moore v. Moore, W. Va., 104 S. E. 26 79. Stipulations-Relief from.-The court has power to relieve a party from stipulations upon a showing of sufficient cause, and it is within the discretion of the court to set aside stipulations of attorneys relating to the conduct of a pending cause, where their enforcement would result in injury to one of the parties, and the other would not be materially prejudiced, and they may also be set aside where it would be inequitable to enforce them, or where they were entered into under mistake of fact connected with the subject-matter, or by inadvertence.— Borgman v. Bultema, Mich., 179 N. W. 347.

80. Taxation-Situs of Debt.-Generally, debts can have no locality separate from the parties to whom they are due.-National Metal Edge Box Co. v. Town of Readsboro, Vt.. 111 Atl. 386.

81. Tender-Conditional Tender.-A statement on checks offered by a tenant, 'rent" for certain periods named, was equivalent to saying that they represented "the sum agreed upon" or the "compensation," not a part, but all, "for the use of the property"; rent commonly meaning "a certain pecuniary amount, agreed upon between a tenant and his landlord, and paid at fixed intervals by the tenant to the landlord, for the use of land or its appendages." Hence the offers of the checks were conditional tenders, and not valid.-Davidge v. Simmons, D. C., 266 Fed. 1018.

82. Vendor and Purchaser-Notice.-Where purchaser had notice of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of all facts which a reasonably diligent inquiry would have elicited, and cannot rely on bona fide purchase.-Cathcart v. Matthews, S C., 104 S. E. 181.

83. -Reliance on Representation.-A buyer of land has no right to accept and rely on the representations of the seller, unless made to influence the purchase.-McCane v. Wokoun, Iowa, 179 N. W. 332.

84. Witnesses-Cross-examination.-Substantive evidence is inadmissible to contradict extraneous or collateral matters, brought out on cross-examination for purpose of impairing the credibility of a witness, with whose answers the interrogating party must be content.-Bush v State, Ind., 128 N. E. 443.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., DECEMBER 24, 1920.

VALIDITY OF RENT-FIXING STATUTES.

We have been asked to express some opinion on recent statutes which interfere with the landlord's right to fix rents and deprive him of his right of possession. by taking away his common law action of ejectment and the summary statutory proceedings common to many states.

The mania for public regulation of private business, so prevalent in 1919 and the early part of 1920, was no doubt due to the desperation of the people, who found themselves threatened with extinction by what looked to them as the extortionate demands of those who controlled the necessities of life. Since deflation has begun and the extortioners are beginning to look for cover, it is likely that the public demand for rate fixing laws will diminish in the same ratio. An indication of this change of sentiment is already apparent in the action of the House in repealing the Lever Food Control Act over the constitutionality and construction of which a sharp legal controversy has been raging for many months.

Rate fixing, even if constitutional when applied to matters in which the public have not a direct interest, are of doubtful expediency. Our Public Service Commissions are centers of continual controversy with the public as well as with the utility companies. Recent decisions of such commissions authorizing increases of public service rates above these set by contracts between such companies and the municipalities which bestowed the franchises are convincing the people that they fared better without regulation than with it; for under regulation the companies have no incentive to keep down expenses and simply pile the burden of their extravagance and the higher wage demands of their employes upon the people.

We are not attacking the Public Service Commissions. We believe that in many respects they are serving a useful purpose, but their unscientific and hap-hazard methods of fixing rates are not such as to encourage the people to multiply experiments of this kind until those already under way have proven more acceptable. And of all such experiments that which attempts to fix rents and gives to tenants after the termination of their leases the right of continued possession without the landlord's consent is the most unreasonable and ridiculous. We make this statement only on the assumption that property has not yet been nationalized by the adoption of the principles of Socialism. If all property belongs to the state, the state may properly fix the price and transfer its possession to whomsoever it pleases, but if the individualistic theory of property rights is still recognized and if these rights are still protected by the Constitution and may not be taken away without due process of law and, if taken for a public use, must be paid for, we do not see on what plausible ground the owner of a house can be singled out and told to rent his house at pre-war rates while the shoe merchant is allowed to demand fifteen dollars for five-dollar shoes. To require a landlord to rent his property at a loss or even at a net profit which in view of the decline in the value of money is virtually a loss is unfair discrimination against the property owner and deprives him of his property without due process of law.

The rent fixing statutes in the different states, as a rule, follow the provisions of Ball Rent Law passed by Congress for the District of Columbia. This Act first declares rental property, hotels and apartments "affected with a public interest, and that all rents shall be fair and reason

able; and any unreasonable or unfair provision of a lease . . . is hereby declared to be contrary to public policy."

It provides for a rent commission which, on complaint of either the landlord or ten

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