PART VIII. that if the decree was not a decree to account, but a final CH. II. decree for the payment of a sum of money, it was in the nature of a judgment at law, and a bill of revivor or supplement to get the benefit of such a decree was therefore limited by the 40th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 (1); nor was any statute a bar to the right of a party to prosecute a decree, but, if a party committed gross laches in doing so, the Court would direct him to prosecute it with effect within a short period, and in default dispose of the matter summarily under the 37th section of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 80 (now repealed: see 38 & 39 Vict. c. 66). The procedure as to reviving a suit has been altogether changed since the Judicature Act, 1873, and is now governed by R. S. C. 1883, O. XVII. r. 1 (2), which provides that a cause or matter shall not become abated by reason of the marriage, death or bankruptcy of any of the parties, if the cause of action survive or continue, and shall not become defective by the assignment, creation, or devolution of any estate or title pendente lite, and, whether the cause of action survives or not, there shall be no abatement by reason of the death of either party between the verdict, or finding of the issues of fact, and the judgment, but judgment may in such cases be entered, notwithstanding the death; rules 2-10 of the same order (3) provide for the carrying on of an action by or against the proper persons. These rules have not interfered with the equitable construction of sect. 4 of the statute of James (4), or of sect. 6 of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42 (5), but have only supplied an additional remedy. Thus, where a plaintiff issued a writ within the six years, but the defendant died before (1) Dunne v. Doyle, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 502; and see Onge v. Truelock, 2 Molloy, 38. (2) See R. S. C. Ir. 1891, O. xvII. r. 1. (3) R. S. C. Ir. 1891, O. xvII. rr. 2-11. (5) See ante, p. 148. CH. II. the writ was served, but while the writ was still a valid PART VIII. writ, and the plaintiff commenced a fresh action against the executors of the defendant within a year of the proof of the will, but more than six years after the accrual of the cause of action, it was held that the fresh action was rightly brought, and that the plaintiff was not obliged to resort to the steps made possible by O. XVII. (1). It seems that the granting of an order for the substitution of parties under R. S. C. 1883, O. XVII. r. 4 (2) is within the discretion of the Court. In Arnison v. Smith (3), where some of the plaintiffs had died before trial and the proceedings had gone on and judgment been given, the Court of Appeal refused to make an order after final judgment allowing the executors of the deceased plaintiffs to carry on the action, but both Cotton and Lindley L.JJ., seem to have thought that in such a case, if there were any fear of the statute being set up in a fresh action, the Court would make the order. It seems that such an application should be made within a reasonable time, and in the case of the death of a party intestate the fact that there was no personal representative appointed for a considerable time would not prejudice such an application (4). In the absence of special circumstances an order of revivor after judgment under O. XVII. r. 4, for the purpose of enabling parties to appeal, will not be made after the expiration of the time limited for appealing (5). The fact of there being no personal representative in existence would perhaps be a special circumstance in such a case (6). An order under O. XVII. r. 4 will not be made for the purpose of reviving the remedy on a judgment which has been (1) Swindell v. Bulkeley, 18 Q. B. D. 250. (2) R. S. C. Ir. 1891, 0. xvII. r. 4. (3) 40 Ch. D. 567. (4) See Perry v. Jenkins, 1 Myl. & Cr. 118; and see ante, Part II. Ch. II. p. 148. (5) Curtis v. Sheffield, 21 Ch. D. 1; Fussell v. Dowding, 27 Ch. D. (6) See Perry v. Jenkins, 1 Myl. & Cr. 118. CH. II. PART VIII. barred by sect. 8 of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57 (1). Where the Court holds money that has been paid in to the credit of a suit, lapse of time, however long, is no ground for refusing an order for revivor. Thus recently Chitty, J., granted an order of revivor after the lapse of 150 years, the applicant seeking the order in order to get at funds which were in Court, but the order was limited to that extent (2). Bills of review. Bills of review, it seems, were, before the Judicature Act, 1873, absolutely barred in twenty years from the date of the decree. This rule was adopted by analogy to the limitation of twenty years prescribed for writs of error by 10 & 11 Wm. III. c. 14 (3). It would appear that even since the Judicature Acts, the Chancery Division of the High Court can grant leave to bring an action in the nature of a bill of review (4), but leave would probably be refused, if application were made more than twelve years from the date of the judgment; such an application would probably now be held to be governed by sect. 8 of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57. (1) Jay v. Johnstone (1893), 1 Q. B. 25, 189; Evans v. O'Donnell, 18 L. R. Ir. 170. (2) Micklethwaite v. Vavasour, 9 Times L. R. 376; 37 Sol. Jo. 386. (3) Smith v. Clay, 3 Br. C. C. 639, note. (4) Falcke v. The Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., 57 L. T. 39; 35 W. R. 794. But see In re St. Nazaire Co., 12 Ch. D. 88. PART IX. CHAPTER I. MISCELLANEOUS LIMITATIONS UNDER VARIOUS ACTS. CH. I. In conclusion it may be well to mention certain special PART IX provisions which do not come within the scope of any of the former chapters. Local and personal Acts frequently contain special provisions limiting the right of action against persons having powers under such Acts for anything done under the provisions of the Acts, and there are many public Acts that contain similar provisions. It is of course out of the question to enumerate the local and personal Acts that contain such provisions. As to the public Acts, without attempting to enumerate them all, the following are given as instances of such provisions. against throne. By 35 Geo. III. c. 125, it is provided that, when an Claims heir apparent to the throne has a separate establishment, heir appaany person having or claiming any debt or demand rent to against him must deliver the particulars of it to the proper officer within ten days after the expiration of the quarter in which the debt or demand was incurred, or that in default every such debt or demand shall be barred both at law and in equity, and every security given in consideration thereof shall be void (1), and that, when such particulars have been properly delivered, the creditor may sue and prosecute in the manner therein (1) Sect. 7. CH. I. PART IX. provided for such debt or demand within three calendar months after delivery of such particulars, but not afterwards (1). Turnpike Highway Act. By the General Turnpike Act (2), any action or suit against any person for anything done in pursuance of or under the authority of the Act must be commenced or prosecuted within three months of the fact committed, and not afterwards. By the Highway Act, 1835 (3), no action or suit can be commenced against any person for anything done in pursuance of or under the authority of the Act after three calendar months next after the fact committed for which such action or suit shall be so brought. In the case of Taylor v. Meltham Local Board (4), it was held by Grove and Denman, JJ., that in the case of a local board who had been constituted surveyors of highways by sect. 117 of the Public Health Act, 1848 (5), the period of limitation was six months under sect. 139 of the Public Health Act, 1848, and not three months under the Highway Act, 1835. This case was distinguished by Cave, J., in Burton v. Mayor and Corporation of Salford (6); in that case the mayor and corporation of Salford had been constituted surveyors of highways by a local Act passed in 1862, which provided that they should have all such powers and be subject to all such liabilities as any surveyors of highways were invested with and subject to by virtue of the law for the time being in force; at the time of the passing of the local Act the only limitation in force which was applicable to surveyors of highways was that provided by sect. 109 of the Highway Act, 1835, viz. three months, unless the case fell within the provisions of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 5, which fixes the period of limitation |