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CH. II.

Prosecutions.

CHAPTER II.

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND CROWN PRACTICE.

PART VII. IT has already been pointed out that, owing to the rule of law according to which time does not run against the Crown, prosecutions for felonies and misdemeanours may generally be commenced at any distance of time after the commission of the offence (1). There are, however, several cases in which the time for commencing prosecutions has been limited by statute.

Treason.

Treason felony.

By 7 & 8 Wm. III. c. 3 no person may be indicted, tried, or prosecuted for any high treason whereby corruption of blood may be made, or for misprision of such treason committed within England, Wales, or Berwick-uponTweed, unless the indictment be found by the grand jury within three years after the offence (2); but if any person be guilty of designing, endeavouring or attempting any assassination on the body of the king by poison or otherwise, such person may be prosecuted at any time (3). This limitation, it would seem, is extended to similar cases of treason committed in Scotland by 7 Anne, c. 21 (4), and is expressly extended to Ireland by 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 24; but it does not extend to acts done in foreign parts, or on the high seas.

The Act 11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, which makes it felony to compass the deposition of the Queen, or the intimidation of the Queen, or parliament, or the stirring up of for

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CH. II.

eigners to invade Her Majesty's dominions, provides (1) PART VII. that no person shall be prosecuted for any felony by virtue of that Act in respect of such compassings, &c., in so far as the same are declared by open and advised speaking only, unless information be given upon oath within six days after the words shall have been spoken, and unless a warrant for the apprehension of such person be issued within ten days after such information given," and unless such warrant shall be issued within two years after the passing of this Act." In this last proviso "and" has probably been inserted by mistake for "or." If the words of the clause be taken literally as they at present stand, no prosecution for such a felony, if expressed by speaking only, could now be commenced at all.

persons to

By 60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 1, the Act to prevent Training training persons to the use of arms and to the practice of the use of military evolutions and exercises, it is enacted that no arms. person shall be prosecuted for anything done contrary to that Act, unless such prosecution be commenced within six calendar months after the offence committed (2).

The 120th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 53 (now repealed) Offences provided that all suits, indictments, or informations for against any offence against that or any other Act relating to the Acts. Customs in any of Her Majesty's Courts of Record at Westminster or in Dublin or in Edinburgh or in the royal courts of Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, Sark, or Man, must be commenced within three years next after the date of the offence committed, and before any justice of the peace within six months next after the date of the offence committed. This limitation was held not to apply to an indictment at the assizes for a conspiracy to defraud the Queen of certain duties, such a conspiracy being an offence at Common Law, and the court in which the indictment was preferred not being one of the courts

(1) Sect. 4. (2) Sect. 7.

PART VII. mentioned in the section (1).

CH. II.

Night poaching.

Criminal

Law
Amend-

ment Act,
1885.

What is the com

of a pro

secution ?

But by the "Customs Consolidation Act, 1876" (2), it is enacted that "All suits, indictments, or informations brought or exhibited for any offence against the Customs Acts in any Court, or before any justice, shall be brought or exhibited within three years next after the date of the offence committed."

By 9 Geo. IV. c. 69, the Act for the more effectual prevention of persons going armed by night for the destruction of game, prosecutions for every offence punishable upon indictment or otherwise than upon summary conviction by virtue of that Act must be commenced within twelve calendar months after the commission of the offence (3). And this limitation must, it seems, be applicable to unlawfully taking game on a road or highway under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 29, as that Act only operates by extending the provisions of 9 Geo. IV. c. 69.

By sect. 5 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (4), no prosecution for unlawfully and carnally knowing or attempting to have unlawful carnal knowledge of any girl of or above the age of thirteen years and under the age of sixteen can be commenced more than three months after the commission of the offence.

In a case where persons were prosecuted and convicted mencement under 9 Geo. IV. c. 69, the information was laid before justices and a warrant for the apprehension of the defendants issued within a year of the commission of the offence, but the indictment was not preferred till after the year had expired. The judges were unanimously of opinion that the conviction was right (5). And where the defendant was taken before a magistrate, and a warrant of commitment granted within the year, and such warrant was produced in court, Pollock, C.B., held that the prosecution

(1) Reg. v. Thompson, 20 L. J. M. C. 183; 16 Q. B. 832.

(2) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 36, s. 257.

(3) Sect. 4; see 47 & 48 Vict. c. 43, s. 4.

(4) 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69.

(5) Reg. v. Brooks, 1 Den. C. C. 217.

CH. II.

was shown to have been commenced in time (1). In PART VII. another case on the same statute a warrant for the defendant's apprehension had been issued within a week after the commission of the offence, but was not served owing to the defendant's having absconded. On the defendant's return after an absence of six years an indictment was preferred against him, and at the trial the original warrant for his apprehension was tendered in evidence. The attention of Pollock, C.B., was called to the cases above quoted, but he was of opinion that none of them went to the extent contended for in the case before him, and that the issuing of the original warrant was not a commencement of proceedings within the statute (2). It is not clear from the report in what way the case was distinguished from that of Reg. v. Brooks, above referred to; the difference, however, was probably this, that in the case of Reg. v. Hull the defendant was not apprehended under the warrant first issued, but under another warrant issued upon an information laid after his return, so that in fact the prosecution at the Assizes was not a continuation of the proceedings which were commenced within the year, but that in the case of Reg. v. Brooks the prosecution, which began by the laying of the information within the year, was carried on continuously till the defendant's conviction (3). When an indictment preferred within the year was thrown out by the grand jury, and another indictment was preferred after the expiration of the year, Coleridge, J., refused to stop the case, on the ground that the prosecution was not commenced in time, but reserved the point, considering it one open to much doubt (4). The question raised in that case was not decided, the defendant being acquitted on the merits. Under an Act (5), now repealed, against counterfeiting (1) Reg. v. Austin, 1 C. & K. 621.

(2) Reg. v. Hull, 2 F. & F. 16.

(3) See Rex v. Willace, 1 East, P. C. 186.
(4) Rex v. Killminster, 7 C. & P. 228.
(5) 8 & 9 Wm. III. c. 26.

CH. II.

PART VII. coin which required prosecutions under its provisions to be commenced within three months after the offence committed, an indictment was preferred after that period had elapsed. Parol evidence was given that the prisoners were apprehended within the three months, but no warrant of apprehension or commitment was produced. The judges were of opinion that there was not sufficient evidence that the prisoners were apprehended upon transactions respecting coin within three months after the offence committed (1).

Summary proceedings

before justices.

By virtue of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 (2) summary proceedings before justices, whether under then existing or subsequent Acts, must, in the absence of any special limitation, be instituted within six calendar months from the time when the matter of the complaint or information arose (3). Informations for forfeitures on penal statutes were included in 31 Eliz. c. 5 (4), the part of which relating to the time limited for exhibiting an information on any penal statute is repealed by the 36th section of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 (5); but this repeal extends, it would seem, only to informations before justices. Many statutes which impose penalties recoverable by summary proceedings before justices impose special periods of limitation shorter than that prescribed by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 (6).

In Jacomb v. Dodgson (7) it was held that proceedings before justices to recover from adjoining owners their share of the expenses of making a new street under 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 63, might be commenced at any time within six months after the expiration of the three months during which the surveyor's apportionment might be disputed.

(1) R. v. Phillips, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 369.

(2) Sect. 11; see Jacomb v. Dodgson, 3 B. & S. 461; 32 L. J. M. C. 113; and see 12 & 13 Vict. c. 103, s. 9.

(3) See Guardians of Ulverstone v. Park, 53 J. P. 629.

(4) See ante, Part VI. p. 511.

(5) Since repealed. See 38 & 39 Vict. c. 66.

(6) E.g. 41 Vict. c. 16, s. 91, sub-sect. (1), and 54 & 55 Vict. c. 75, s. 29. (7) 3 B. & S. 461; 32 L. J. M. C. 113.

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