PART VII. EFFECT OF TIME ON RIGHTS OF THE CH. I. Nullum RIGHTS CHAPTER I. OF THE CROWN AND DUCHY OF CORNWALL (9 GEO. III. c. 16; 7 & 8 VICT. c. 105; 24 & 25 VICT. c. 53; 24 & 25 VICT. C. 62). PART VII. ACCORDING to the rules of the old common law no right once vested in the Crown could be prejudiced by the mere lapse of time. Nullum tempus occurrit regi was a maxim applicable on all occasions. It has been said that the rule is founded on the doctrine that the sovereign can do no wrong, from which the law determines that he cannot be guilty of negligence or laches (1). tempus occurrit regi. Debts due to the Crown. The law is still the same in all cases where the right of the Crown has not been expressly limited by statute, and accordingly prosecutions for felonies and misdemeanours may, in general, be commenced any length of time after the commission of the crime (2). No limitation is prescribed by any statute to the right (1) Stephen's Comm. Bk. IV. Part I. Ch. 6, Vol. II. p. 473; 11th ed. Vol. II. p. 490. (2) Stephen's Comm. ubi supra. See per Lord Ellenborough, C.J. Dover v. Maestaer, 5 Esp., at p. 93. CH. I. to recover Crown debts; consequently, when a chose in PART VII. action is once vested in the Crown, no lapse of time will bar the Crown's remedy on it. But where to a scire facias issued at the suit of the Crown, founded on a writ of diem clausit extremum (1) against a debtor to the Crown under which the defendant was found indebted to the Crown's debtor upon a bill of exchange, and calling on the defendant to pay the bill to the Crown, the defendant pleaded that the debt was not contracted, and did not accrue to the Crown's debtor within the statutory period before his death, the plea was held good on demurrer, on the ground that the Crown is only entitled to the debtor's right, and cannot create or revive a right if none existed, or if it has become barred (2). If, however, the period necessary to bar a creditor's remedy under the statute of James has not actually expired before his debt becomes vested in the Crown, the statute has no operation against the Crown's right to recover. And, if the Crown transfer a Crown debt to a subject after the statutory period has elapsed, the assignee will not be barred of his right of action, at least if he sue immediately (3). If such assignee allow six years to elapse from the time when a simple contract debt was assigned to him from the Crown, it would seem hard to say that the assignee would not be barred by the statute. But, if the period during which the debt might have been sued for by a subject before it became vested in the Crown, and the period which has elapsed, since it again passed from the Crown into the hands of a subject, be each separately less than six years-but together amount to more than six years-in such a case it is not clear whether the assignee's right of action is barred or not (4). The limitations of time with respect to penal actions (1) See Tidd's Practice, 9th ed. 1057, 1091. (2) Rex v. Morrall, 6 Price, 24. (3) Lambert v. Taylor, 4 B. & C. 138. (4) See Lambert v. Taylor, 4 B. & C. pp. 144, 153. PART VIL brought on behalf of the Crown have been discussed above (1). CH. L Petition of right. Real property of the Crown. 9 Geo. III. c. 16. No Statute of Limitation applies to a petition of right, and the Crown cannot plead any Statute of Limitation in answer to such a petition (2), except in the case of a petition of right in respect of the personal estate of any deceased person (3). By the Act 9 Geo. III. c. 16, commonly called the "Nullum Tempus Act," it is in effect provided that the Crown shall not sue for or lay claim to any manors or other real property (other than liberties or franchises), except when the right or title to the same shall have first accrued within sixty years before the commencement of proceedings, unless the Crown shall have received the rents or profits thereof, or of some manor or other hereditament of which the premises in question are part within the said space of sixty years, or the same shall have been in charge to the Crown, or have stood insuper of record within that time. And after the lapse of that period the subject is secured in the quiet enjoyment of the property, both against the Crown and against all persons claiming by colour of letters patent, or grants upon suggestion of concealment, or wrongful detaining (4). When any reversion or remainder is vested in the Crown, or when any limited estate has been granted by the Crown, the Crown is allowed a like period of sixty years to enforce its rights from the time when the estate comes or ought to come into possession (5). The manors, lands, &c., to which the subject's title is established by the Act, are to be held of the Crown on the same tenures as they would have been if the title confirmed had originally been valid at law (6). Provision is also CH. I. made for securing to the Crown all fee-farm-rents or PART VII. other rents which have been paid out of such manors, lands, &c., within sixty years of any action brought to recover such rents (1). It is by the same Act provided that, where the rents or profits of any lands are in charge with the proper officers of the revenue, such rents and profits are to be considered duly in charge within the meaning of the statute. But no putting in charge of manors or lands which have virtually been out of charge is to be deemed a putting in charge, unless thereupon such manors or lands have been in some suit on behalf of the Crown adjudged to belong to the Crown within the period of sixty years therein before limited (2). As by the first section of this statute time runs against the Crown's right to recover real property only from the time when such right accrued, the sections which provide for the Crown's rights in respect of reversions and particular estates seem quite unnecessary. These sections were borrowed from the statute of 21 Jac. I. c. 2, 21 Jac. I. which was the foundation of the Nullum Tempus Act, c. 2. and in the earlier statute their meaning is clear; for by that statute the rights of the Crown were to be barred when the subject had been sixty years in possession before the passing of the Act; and as the subject might have been in possession for that time without any right having accrued to the Crown, there was inserted a direct saving of reversions then vested in the Crown (3). The statute of James does not in all points correspond with the Nullum Tempus Act, but the provisions of the two are generally similar, and a commentary by Lord (1) Sect. 7. See Doe d. William IV. v. Roberts, 13 M. & W. 520; Att.-Gen. for British Honduras v. Bristowe, 6 App. Cas. 143. (2) Sects. 2 & 10. See 3rd Inst. 189. (3) See Tuthill v. Rogers, 1 Jo. & Lat. 83; 6 Ir. Eq. R. 451. CH. I. PART VII. Coke in his 3rd Institute (1) on the earlier enactment will be found to explain most of the technical expressions used in the later statute. With respect to the provisions concerning fee-farm-rents, from which the 7th section of 9 Geo. III. c. 16, seems to be taken, he says: "This was added for the preserving of the king's fee-farms and rent out of such manors, &c., which are established and made sure by this Act. For example, King Edward VI. did grant the manor of D., which came to him by the statute of Chanteries, to I. S. and his heirs, reserving a fee-farm or any other rent, which grant for some imperfection was insufficient in law to pass the said manor and yet is established and made sure by this Act. This proviso maketh good the fee-farm or rent to the king, if he hath been answered the same by the greater part of sixty years last past" (2). The rights of the subject as against the Crown in Ireland were left unprotected by lapse of time until the passing of the Act 48 Geo. III. c. 47, which contains, with respect to the claims of the Crown in Ireland, almost the same provisions as those of the English Nullum Tempus Act. The meaning of these Acts was considered and the effect of their various sections commented on in an Irish case (3) heard before Sir Edward Sugden, L.C., and the Master of the Rolls. In 1680 certain lands had been granted by the Crown to A. in tail male by letters patent, reserving a quit rent of 3d. per acre. In 1681 A. conveyed the land to S., the conveyance expressly saving the rights of the Crown. In 1776 the estate so granted determined by the failure of A.'s male issue; but S.'s representatives remained in possession of the property till 1841, and the quit rent was regularly paid to and received by the Crown for the whole of that time. It was held that, by the operation of (1) 3rd Inst. 188-191. (2) 3rd Inst. 191. (3) Tuthill v. Rogers, 1 Jo. & Lat. 36; 6 Ir. Eq. 429. |