CH. XIII. in insol PART V. namely, whether an admission of title in an insolvent's schedule could be an acknowledgment within this section. Admission This question has been sufficiently considered above, as the observations on this point and also on the effect of an admission in a bankrupt's balance sheet, made in a former chapter (1), with regard to acknowledgments under the 40th section, would seem applicable to acknowledgments under this section. vent's schedule and bank rupt's balance sheet. Lewis v. Thomas. With reference to this section the case of Lewis v. Thomas (2) should be mentioned. The bill in that suit was filed in September, 1840, by the heir of Alice Thomas against the devisees of Mary Davies, with whom Alice Thomas had lived since 1811. Alice Thomas died in 1828, having been of unsound mind since 1798, and it appeared that she had in 1815 become entitled to the property in question, as heiress of the husband of Mary Davies, but from that time Mary Davies or her devisees had received the rents and profits, Alice Thomas never having received any, except so far as Mary Davies may have applied them for her benefit. The suit was brought to set aside, on the ground of insanity and of fraud, a will and other instruments executed in 1818 and 1827 by Alice Thomas, the effect of which was to assure or devise the property to Mary Davies. Issues were directed by the Master of the Rolls, and the jury found that there was no devise, and found fraud as to the other instruments. The case came on for hearing before Wigram, V.-C.; he, in giving judgment, remarked that a defence founded on the statute having been insisted on by the answer, the Court by directing the issues must be taken as having decided that such defence failed, and he did not think any question on the statute then open to him; but he then proceeded to say :-"Looking at the case on the merits, I have not the slightest doubt of the justice of the decision which determined that Mary Davies did not (1) Part III. Ch. V. p. 224. (2) 3 Hare, 26. CH. XIII. acquire an adverse title to any part of this property; PART V. nor have I any doubt that I should have come to the same conclusion if the question had been now open for my decision. It would have been greatly to be lamented if the law had permitted Mary Davies under such circumstances to have acquired a title to the property. She has herself, as appears by the instruments in question in the suit, put her title upon those instruments. Those deeds are conclusive evidence that she did not claim against, but on the contrary that she claimed under Alice Thomas; they are direct acknowledgements of the title of Alice Thomas; it is not a case of adverse possession. I do not know whether the Master of the Rolls had under his consideration the question whether the case was or was not one of concealed fraud within the meaning of the statute, but I think I should have had no difficulty in concluding that such was the case." This is not the place to consider the question of fraud or the effect of the statute as a bar to the setting aside of void or voidable deeds, or the use of the expression. "adverse possession," but, so far as the question of acknowledgment is concerned, it is submitted that if the Vice-Chancellor meant to say that the instruments referred to amounted to acknowledgments within the 14th section so as to prevent the operation of the statute, he was mistaken, for, except with respect to part of the copyhold, the only instruments were a power of attorney signed by Alice Thomas, a surrender in pursuance thereof and a will. Now none of these could have been acknowledgments by Mary Davies because not signed by her, and as to the other part of the copyhold, although there was a deed, it does not appear to have been executed by Mary Davies, although she was a party to it. On the whole, the decision may perhaps be more safely supported on the other grounds suggested in the case. CH. XIV. CHAPTER XIV. POSSESSION NOT ADVERSE AT THE PASSING OF THE ACT (3 & 4 WM. IV. c. 27, s. 15). PART V. IT has been pointed out that time did not run under the old Statutes of Limitations unless the possession was strictly adverse to the title of the rightful owner. The former sections of the statute being generally retrospective and operating against the title of an owner out of possession, whether the possession of the party holding the land may have been adverse or not, might, if they stood alone, have barred the title of an owner of land the moment the Act passed, though till then time had not begun to run against him. To prevent this hardship arising a period of five years for owners to bring their action in such cases was allowed by the 15th section, which provides as follows: 3 & 4 "When no such acknowledgement as aforesaid shall have been given before the passing of this Act, and the possession or receipt of the profits of the land or the receipt of the rent shall not at the time of the passing of this Act have been adverse to the right or title of the person claiming to be entitled thereto, then such person, or the person claiming through him, may, notwithstanding the period of twenty years, hereinbefore limited shall have expired, make an entry or distress or bring an action to recover such land, or interest [sic], at any time within five years next after the passing of this Act." This section is now of little practical importance, the period of five years mentioned in it having so long ago PART V. elapsed. The section contains no saving in case of disability, and therefore if the rightful claimant were under a disability at the time of the passing of the Act he would not have a period of five years given by this section to institute proceedings from the time the disability ceased (1). Neither is the effect of this section to give every person who had a right at the time of the passing of the Act a period of five years for the assertion of that right. It applies only to those cases in which there was no adverse possession at the time of the passing of the Act. That does not mean an adverse possession for twenty years; an adverse possession for any period, however short, before the passing of the Act would be sufficient to oust a person from the benefit of this section (2). The question whether at the time of the passing of the Act there was such an adverse possession as would bring a person within the 15th section, had to be determined as it would have been if the Act had never passed (3). The word "interest" in the last clause of this section is found in the Parliament roll and appears to be a mistake for "rent" (4). (1) Scott v. Nixon, 3 Dru. & War. 388, 405. (2) Judgment of Pennefather, B., in O'Sullivan v. McSweeny, 2 Ir. L. R. 89, 94. (3) Doe v. Williams, 5 A. & E. 291, 296; Culley v. Doe d. Taylerson, 11 A. & E. 1008, 1025. (4) Per Lord Denman, C.J., Doe d. Angell v. Angell, 9 Q. B. 360. CH. XIV. PART V. CH. XV. 3rd section of 37 & 38 CHAPTER XV. DISABILITIES (3 & 4 WM. IV. c. 27, s. 18; 37 & 38 VICT. c. 57, ss. 3, 4 & 5). BEFORE the coming into operation of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57 the absence beyond the seas of a person to whom a right to land accrued was a disability which prevented the Statute of Limitations running against his claim. This ground of disability no longer exists, and time runs against the title of a person who is abroad at the time when a right to land accrues to him as if he were in the United Kingdom. The provisions relating to disabilities are now contained in the 3rd, 4th and 5th sections of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57 and in the 18th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 as altered by the 9th section of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57. These sections are as follows: "If at the time at which the right of any person to Vict. c. 57. make an entry or distress, or to bring an action or suit to recover any land or rent, shall have first accrued as aforesaid, such person shall have been under any of the disabilities hereinafter mentioned, (that is to say) infancy, coverture, idiotcy, lunacy, or unsoundness of mind, then such person, or the person claiming through him, may, notwithstanding the period of twelve years, or six years, (as the case may be) herein before limited shall have expired, make an entry or distress, or bring an action or suit, to recover such land or rent, at any time within six years next after the time at which the person to whom such right shall first have accrued shall have ceased to be under any such disability, or shall have |