CH. II. for which the note is a security (1), because the money PART I. does not become payable till the time has expired. If, however, the bill be payable at sight, the statute runs from the presentment (2), but if payable at a specified period after sight or demand, the statute does not run till the expiration of such period (3). A bill payable at sight must be presented within a reasonable time (4), but as between the holder and the drawer, no time less than six years is unreasonable for presentment, unless some loss be occasioned to the drawer by the delay (5). But where presentment is unnecessary (6), the statute runs from the time when the holder first became aware of some fact that makes presentment unnecessary, e.g. that the drawer had no means of meeting the bill (7). Where a defendant accepted a bill in blank which was not filled up for twelve years, it was held that he was liable at the suit of an innocent holder for value, and that time did not begin to run till the bill became due as filled up (8). In the case of In re Bethell, Bethell v. Bethell (7), a debtor drew a cheque, gave it undated to a creditor, and told the creditor that he would let the creditor know when he had completed a loan from which he expected to get sufficient money to meet the cheque, and that the creditor was then to fill in the cheque and obtain payment; the debtor afterwards informed the creditor that he could not complete the loan; it was held that the creditor could not prevent the statute from (1) Wittersheim v. Countess of Carlisle, 1 Hy. Bl. 631; Buckler v. Moor, 1 Mod. 89. (2) Dixon v. Nuttall, 1 C. M. & R. 307; Holmes v. Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323; In re Boyse. Crofton v. Crofton, 33 Ch. D. 612. (3) Thorpe v. Booth, Ry. & Moo. 388; and see Moore v. Petchell, 22 Beav. 172. (4) Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), s. 40. (5) Laws v. Rand, 27 L. J. C. P. 76; Robinson v. Hawksford, 9 Q. B. 52. (6) See Terry v. Parker, 6 A. & E. 502; Wirth v. Austin, L. R. 10 C. P. 689; Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 46. (7) In re Bethell. Bethell v. Bethell, 34 Ch. D. 561. (8) Montague v. Perkins, 17 Jur. 557; 22 L. J. C. P. 187. PART I. Cheques. running by not filling in the date, but that the statute ran from the time when the creditor was informed that the debtor could not complete the loan. In the lastmentioned case of In re Bethell, it should be observed, the creditor had only a limited authority to fill in the date, while in the previous case of Montague v. Perkins (1) the creditor's authority was unlimited. If a bill or note be made payable on demand, the statute runs from the date of making or accepting, because the bill or note is payable immediately, and no demand is necessary (2). And the same rule applies to any promise to pay on demand (3). Nor will it make any difference in this respect that the debt is to be repaid with simple (4) or even with compound (5) interest. A cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand (6); and if a cheque be duly presented and dishonoured, an action will lie against the drawer for breach of the implied promise, that the cheque would be paid on presentment at the bank on which it is drawn. As no such action will lie without presentment, unless there are special circumstances which render presentment unnecessary, it might seem that the holder of a cheque by delaying to present it might postpone the accrual of the right of action for an unlimited time, and that therefore the drawer of a cheque might be sued for the amount any number of years afterwards. But it is apprehended that the implied contract on the drawing of a cheque is only that it will be paid by the banker if presented in a reasonable time, and therefore that if a cheque is not presented until more than a reasonable time has elapsed, no cause of (1) Montague v. Perkins, 17 Jur. 557; 22 L. J. C. P. 187. (5) Jackson v. Ogg, Johns, 397. action accrues upon payment being refused, and the holder can only sue upon the original consideration for which the cheque was given, or on the new promise to pay which arises on the cheque being given for an existing debt. Where a note payable on demand was deposited with a banker for delivery to the payee on his producing another note cancelled, it was held that the payee had no cause of action till the note was delivered to him by the banker, and that the statute only ran from that time (1). PART I. CH. II. Where a bill or note is not payable on demand, but, Days of on the expiration of a certain specified period, three days grace. of grace are (unless the bill or note otherwise provides) to be added to the period fixed for payment, and the bill or note falls due on the last of these three days. The cause of action accrues on the last day of grace, and the time begins to run then. If the last day of grace fall on a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday, or public fast or thanksgiving, the bill is due and payable, and the cause of action therefore accrues on the preceding business day (2). If the last day of grace is a Bank Holiday (under the Bank Holidays Act, 1871), other than Christmas Day, or Good Friday, or is a Sunday, and the second day of grace is a Bank Holiday, the bill is due and payable, and the cause of action accrues on the business day following the last day of grace (3). When the last day of the six years or other period of limitation is a Sunday or other day on which an action cannot be commenced, the action must be commenced on the preceding business day, or it will be too late (2). And R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXIV. r. 3 (4) does not apply to the commencement of such an action (2). (1) Savage v. Aldren, 2 Stark. 232. (2) Morris v. Richards, 45 L. T. 210. (3) Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), s. 14 (a) and (b). (4) R. S. C. Ir. 1891, O. LXIV. г. 3. PART I. Guarantee of current account. Action against drawer of a bill. they were not to apply to A. until failure of their utmost efforts and legal proceedings against B. In March, 1820, in consideration of the plaintiffs giving B. two years for payment, A. reserved to them their claim against himself under the former guarantee, in case they should not be paid at the expiration of that period. B. went abroad in 1824; process was issued against him in 1826 and continued till 1830, when he returned; the plaintiffs then arrested him, and he took the benefit of the Insolvent Act. In 1828 the plaintiffs sued A. on his guarantee. A. died in 1829, and an action was then brought against his executors which was not tried till after B. became insolvent; the defendants set up the statute, and it was held to be a good defence, as the plaintiffs' right of action against A. accrued at the expiration of the two years' time given to B.-that is, in March, 1822, and the action ought to have been brought within six years of that time. A joint and several promissory note payable on demand was given by A. and B. to a banking company on the 4th of December, 1855, and by a memorandum of the same date it was declared that the note was intended as a security for an account to be opened by B. with the banking company, and in case of the company suing on the note, the production of the note was to be conclusive evidence that the amount claimed was owing from B. On the 31st of December, 1855, B. was indebted to the company, but no balance was struck till June, 1856. It was held that an action against A. commenced in March, 1862, was not defeated by the statute (1). If a bill of exchange is dishonoured by non-acceptance, an action lies against the drawer at the suit of the payee, immediately upon the latter giving notice of the nonacceptance (2); hence, when a foreign bill has been (1) Hartland v. Jukes, 1 H. & C. 667; 32 L. J. Exch. 162. dishonoured by non-acceptance, and duly protested and notice given, the statute begins to run immediately notice is given, not from the time at which the bill would have become due (1). In Webster v. Kirk (2) the plaintiffs were payees of bills of exchange, drawn by the defendant, which they had indorsed over. The bills became due in 1843, and were dishonoured: in 1847 the plaintiffs were sued by the indorsees, and ultimately, in 1851, were compelled to pay the amount; the plaintiffs then sued the defendant, but the statute was held to be a bar. An unsuccessful attempt in this case was made to show that the plaintiffs were merely accommodation parties, and it seems to have been admitted that, if that contention failed, the plea of the statute was good, time running from the dishonour. The same rule must hold good in an action between an indorsee and any prior holder. PART I. CH. II. heir or On the principles laid down above, as to the right of a Payment surety to sue a co-surety or the principal debtor, it would of debt by appear that if the heir or devisee of a deceased debtor devisee. has been compelled to pay a simple contract debt of the deceased, time will begin to run against his right to recover the amount out of the personalty as soon as he has made the payment, and if one of several devisees has paid such a debt, time will run against his right to obtain contribution from the other devisees as soon as he pays more than his proportion. for ante debts of his wife. The liability of a husband for the ante-nuptial debts Husband's of his wife accrues to him on his marriage, but the cause liability of action is the indebtedness of the wife, and the statute nuptial runs in his favour as well as in favour of the wife; and the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (3), has made no difference in this respect; and if a husband is sued under sects. 14 & 15 of that Act, for an ante (1) Whitehead v. Walker, 9 M. & W. 506. (3) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75. |