PART V. CH. V. Settle ments by parties having particular estates and if a reversioner or remainderman settles his estate after the statute has begun to run against the person entitled to the particular estate in possession, the title of all persons claiming under such settlement will be barred if and when the settlor is barred. Thus, suppose A. be tenant for life with remainder in fee to B., and A. is dispossessed by a stranger, and B. afterwards during A.'s life settles his estate in remainder on himself for life, with remainder to C. for life, remainder to D. in fee. If on A.'s death B. takes no steps to recover the land till the statute has run out against him and his own title is barred, in that case C. and D. and all persons claiming through them are barred also. It must be observed that the clause only applies "where the right of any such person. . . . shall have been barred." If, therefore, B., the settlor, in the case supposed die before his remainder fall into possession, or if he becomes entitled in possession and dies while the statute is running against him, and before his right is barred, this clause has no operation, and the rights of persons claiming under the settlement must be determined by the other provisions of the statute. Having considered the effect of the dealing by an owner of an estate in possession with such estate after time has begun to run, and by an owner of an estate in remainder with his estate after time has begun to run against the owners of the prior estate in possession, let us reversions. consider what is the effect of the dealings by a tenant for life and remainderman, when time is running against the tenant for life, with their estates inter se, and their joint dealings with such estates in favour of third parties. Where A. is tenant for life, with remainder to B., and, while time is running against A., A. surrenders his estate to B., it would seem clear that, as B.'s remainder is accelerated by the merger of the two estates and so falls into possession, time will begin to run against B. under the fourth CH. V. branch of the 3rd section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 from the PART V. date of the surrender and not from the death of A.; so, if in similar circumstances B. conveys his remainder to A., it would seem that A. by acquiring B.'s estate acquires a new right in respect of such estate, and that A. would be barred not in twelve years from the moment when the statute began to run against his life estate, but, as in the former case, in twelve years from the date of the conveyance, by which A. acquires in possession B.'s estate in remainder; and it would follow that, if in similar circumstances A. and B. together conveyed their estates to a third person, time would run against such third person from the date of such conveyance. Let us now consider the case where, while time is running against A., A. and B. together concur, not in conveying the property to one absolutely, but by way of settlement creating particular estates and remainders. If some of these estates are of such a nature that they are commensurate with and must take effect out of A.'s estate only, and all the rest are such that they must take effect out of B.'s estate, it would seem that the owner of the former class of estates may be considered as claiming through A. only, and the owners of the latter class as claiming through B. only, and that time would run against their respective interests accordingly. If, however, the resettlement creates an estate in remainder which takes effect out of the estates of A. and B. jointly, a difficult question arises, whether time begins to run from the date of the resettlement, or from the time of such new estate in remainder taking effect in possession; the latter view is probably correct, because until the new estate takes effect in possession, the merger of the two estates through which the new estate takes effect can hardly be said to take place. In Doe v. Edmonds (1) an Doe v. estate stood limited to a mother for life, with remainder Edmonds. to her son in tail, and while time was running against the mother, the father, mother and son suffered a recovery and (1) 6 M. & W. 295. CH. V. PART V. resettled the estate on the father for life, remainder to the mother for life, remainder to the son for life, remainder to his issue in tail, remainder to a daughter. The new estate of the father in possession took effect out of the old estates of the mother and son jointly, so that there must have been a merger of the two old estates to create such new estate; yet it was held after the death of the father and mother, and of the son without issue, that for the purpose of ascertaining when time began to run against the daughter, the new estate tail of the son and the estate of the daughter ought to be considered as having been carved out of the old estate tail of the son enlarged into a fee. In this case it was said that time ran against the daughter from the death of the mother in 1822. But, as the action was brought within twenty years of that date, it was unnecessary to consider whether time began to run then or on the death of the son in 1828. If A., the owner of a particular estate, and B., the person entitled in remainder, join in a conveyance or resettlement when A. has been so long out of possession that the statutory period has run out against him, then, A.'s estate being extinguished, no conveyance by him has any effect, and the conveyance and resettlement, so far as they take effect, take effect out of B.'s estate only, and time runs as if B. had aliened an estate in remainder expectant on the determination of an estate held for the life of A. Renewal of lease during encroachment. Where a lease is surrendered and a new lease contemporaneously granted to the lessee, the reversion must be considered as falling into possession at the time of the renewal of the lease. If a person without title has during the currency of the old lease obtained possession of the demised premises or any part thereof, a right of action within the meaning of the Act accrues to the reversioner at the time of the renewal, and the statute runs against him from that time (1). If a trespasser is in possession of demised pre (1) Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. Rowe, 5 App. Cas. 736, overruling on this point Corpus Christi College v. Rogers, 49 L. J. C. L. 4. See Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England v. Treemer (1893), 1 Ch. 166. CH. V. mises and continues so in possession at the expiration of PART V. the lease, time begins to run against the reversioner from the expiration of the lease, and the granting of a fresh lease by the reversioner cannot avail him as against the trespasser, if there is no possession under the fresh lease. At the end of twelve years from the expiration of the first lease the right both of the reversioner and of the person claiming under the fresh lease will be barred (1). A conveyance by the Irish Landed Estates Court of a leasehold interest which has become barred, does not defeat the right which has been acquired by possession. Such a conveyance does not affect the rights of third parties, but only transfers the lessee's estate, whatever it is, with all its incidents, conditions, and liabilities (2). Although a lessee has paid no rent to the lessor for more than twelve years, it is clearly settled that the right of the lessor to recover in ejectment accrues under the fourth branch of the 3rd section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, at the determination of the lease, and that he may bring his action at any time within twelve years of that event (3). The case in which this was laid down seems to have been decided without reference to the effect of a proviso for forfeiture for the non-payment of rent which will be discussed below (4). Right of where lessor no rent has been paid for twelve years. of future estates. If a tenant in tail convey to a stranger by an assurance Instances which is ineffectual to bar the issue, and possession is taken under such assurance, the right of the issue or remainderman, as the case may be, to enter on the death of the tenant in tail is a future estate within the fourth branch of the 3rd section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 (5). If land be limited to a husband and wife for their lives, remainder to the husband in fee, the right of the husband (1) Kennedy v. Woods, 1 Ir. R. C. L. 76 ; 2 Ir. R. C. L. 436. 467. (3) Doe d. Davy v. Oxenham, 7 M. & W. 131. (4) Part V. Ch. VI. p. 336. (5) Cannon v. Rimington, 12 C. B. 1. CH. V. PART V. and his heirs on the death of the wife is also a future estate within that branch (1). And so, in cases not governed by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, is the right of a wife, or her heirs, to enter on her property on the death of her husband when he has conveyed it to another by an assurance not binding on the wife (2); but if a husband and wife simply discontinue the possession of the wife's property, then, subject to the question of disabilities, time runs against the wife and her heirs from the time when the possession is discontinued, and no fresh right accrues under the fourth branch of the 3rd section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, on the death of the husband (3); and in such a case no fresh right accrues to the husband on the death of the wife in respect of the curtesy, as, by the interpretation clause of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 (4), a tenant by the curtesy is considered as claiming through the wife. Several If a person has two independent rights to the same dent rights property, there would seem to be nothing in the 1st section indepen to same property. of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, which would of necessity bar at the same time all his remedies in respect of both rights. The remedy for each right would stand on its own footing, and, as the effect of the 34th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 is only to extinguish the right as to which the remedy is taken away, it seems clear that, if it had not been for the 20th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, each right would exist and be barred independently and irrespective of the others. But the effect of the 20th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 is that, if the right to a particular estate in possession has been barred, the right of the owner of such estate or of any one claiming through him to any future estate or interest, to which such owner was or became entitled at any time while the statute was running against (1) Doe d. Johnson v. Liversedge, 11 M. & W. 517. See post, p. 331. (2) Jumpsen v. Pitchers, 13 Sim. 327. (3) Doe d. Corbyn v. Bramston, 3 A. & E. 63. |