PART III. Legacy out of a rever sionary fund. on these points, besides the cases just referred to, is believed to be Bright v. Larcher (1). There the testator died in 1812; a sum was set apart by his executor to answer an annuity, and the annuitant died in 1856. Soon after the death of the annuitant an unpaid legatee claimed payment out of the fund. Romilly, M.R., declined to express an opinion whether, if it had been shewn that there were no assets previous to the cesser of the annuity, the legatee would have been barred or not, but laid down that the burden of proof that there were no such assets lay on the legatee, and that, as he had not furnished such proof, he was barred. The Master of the Rolls did not state very clearly what the period was during which the plaintiff must prove that there were no such assets, but it is submitted that now it would be sufficient if the plaintiff proved that there were no such assets till within twelve years of the bringing of the action. To apply the principles laid down above to the case of Bright v. Larcher, it is submitted that, if the legatee had proved that there were no other assets properly applicable to the payment of the legacy except the sum set apart, and that the annuity had priority over the legacy, the legatee would not have been barred; but if the annuity had no such priority, the legatee would have been barred, because, when the legacy became payable, he had a right to make the annuity abate in his favour and to receive part, the rest being retained to meet the annuity (2). When a legacy is demonstrative and directed to be paid out of a reversionary fund, time does not begin to (1) 27 Beav. 130; affirmed on appeal, 4 De G. & J. 608; 28 L. J. Ch. 837. (2) Rogers v. Millicent, 2 Dickens, 570; Wroughton v. Colquhoun, 1 De G. & Sm. 357; Carr v. Ingleby, 1 De G. & Sm. 362; Long v. Hughes, 1 De G. & Sm. 364; Ashburnham v. Ashburnham, 16 Sim. 186. See Wright v. Callender, 2 De G. M. & G. 652; Carmichael v. Gee, 5 App. Cas. 588; Todd v. Bielby, 27 Beav. 353; Potts v. Smith, L. R. 8 Eq. 683. CH. II. run till the reversion falls in (1). Where the legacy is PART III. given generally, and the only assets applicable for payment are such reversionary or contingent funds as are before referred to, the question whether time will begin to run against the legatee till the funds fall in depends upon whether such interests, while remaining reversionary or contingent, are of actual value, and such as could properly, having regard to the interests of all parties, be turned into money and applied in payment of the legacy; if they are of such a nature, it cannot be said that there are no assets applicable for the satisfaction of the legacy (2). It would seem that, whenever the legatee's right to the payment of his legacy out of assets would not be barred, if the assets were actually in the hands of the executor, neither will his right be barred to compel the executor to get in such assets for his benefit. Where the person entitled to receive a legacy is also the executor who is liable to pay it, the statute will not run so long as the two characters are united in the same person; and if after the statute has begun to run the same union of characters takes place, the statute ceases to have any operation, the legacy being in the hands entitled to receive it (3). The principles with regard to time running between an executor and residuary legatee apply equally between an administrator and the next of kin (4), and also, therefore, necessarily between an executor and the next of kin with regard to residue undisposed of (5), if time runs at all in that case (6). Where a sum of money was charged on land in favour of trustees upon trust for certain persons for life with (1) Earle v. Bellingham (No. 2), 24 Beav. 448. (2) In re Blachford. Blachford v. Worsley, 27 Ch. D. 676. In re Johnson. Sly v. Blake, 29 Ch. D. 964. (3) Binns v. Nichols, L. R. 2 Eq. 256. (4) In re Johnson. Sly v. Blake, 29 Ch. D. 964. (5) See Reed v. Fenn, 35 L. J. Ch. 464. (6) See p. 173. Legacy payable to executor. Case be tween next of kin and executor or adminis trator. CH. II. PART III. remainder over, and the trustees had no power to give receipts, time was held not to run against the remainderman until the death of the tenants for life, because there was no person capable of giving a discharge (1). But as trustees have now, by statute (2), the power of giving receipts which are a sufficient discharge of any person liable to pay, it would seem, therefore, that time must now, in such a case as that just referred to, run from the date at which the money became payable to the trustees. But if the trustees do not act, and no trustees are appointed in their place, the statute does not run against the persons entitled in remainder until the determination of the life interest (3). The words of sect. 40 of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 (now sect. 8 of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57), if taken alone, would prevent the time running in the case of any sums becoming payable to the estate of an intestate in the interval between his death and the grant of administration until such administration was taken out. The 6th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, as will be hereafter seen, expressly provides that an administrator claiming the estate or interest of a deceased person shall be deemed to claim as if no interval had elapsed between the death and the grant of administration, and it has been held by Stirling, J., that the 6th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 applies for all the purposes of the Act (4). Expenses incurred by local Where a local authority had incurred expenses which, by virtue of sect. 62 of the Local Government Act, 1858 (5) authority (corresponding to sect. 257 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (6)), were made a charge on the premises in respect of which they were incurred, it was held that the expenses became a charge on the premises upon completion of the made a charge on the premises. (1) McCarthy v. Daunt, 11 Ir. Eq. R. 29. See Carroll v. Hargrave, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 123. (2) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 36. (3) Carroll v. Hargrave, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 123. (4) In re Williams. Davies v. Williams, 34 Ch. D. 558. See ch. VII. (5) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98. (6) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55. CH. II. works, and that, under sect. 8 of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, PART III. time ran against the local authority from that date, and not from the date of the apportionment of the expenses among the frontagers, although the sum for which the charge was imposed was not ascertained till the latter event (1). In that case the Court of Appeal held that the words "present right to receive" in sect. 8 of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57 are not equivalent to " present right to enforce payment of," and that the words, " capable of giving a discharge," referred to cases of disabilities and not to a case where the sum in respect of which the charge is imposed is not ascertained. The argument which seems to have weighed most with the Court in coming to this conclusion was that, as no time was limited for making the apportionment, the local authority by delay in making the apportionment might delay the application of the Statute of Limitations for any time they pleased. (1) Hornsey Local Board v. Monarch Investment Building Society, 24 Q. B. D. 1. CH. III. CHAPTER III. DISABILITIES. PART III. THE existence of a person capable of giving a discharge is a condition precedent to the time beginning to run, and this person is to be the person to whom the right to receive accrues. There must be a person capable of giving a discharge. Although there is no exception in favour of disabilities in cases falling within the 40th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27 or the 8th section of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, yet certain disabilities are practically provided for by the condition above referred to. If the person entitled to the money be an infant or non compos, he is clearly incapable of giving a discharge (1); no allowance was made for coverture, because under the old law the husband would have a right to receive; now in all cases where the husband has not a right to receive, the wife has the right by virtue of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (2), and is capable of giving a discharge. In cases where the guardian or committee of an infant or lunatic can give a receipt for the money, it might be said that there is a person capable of giving a discharge, and, therefore, that the infant or lunatic in such cases. would not be protected. But this view, it is submitted, is incorrect, because, though the guardians or committee may prosecute, on behalf of and in the name of the infant (1) See Piggott v. Jefferson, 12 Sim. 26; and Sugden's Property Statutes, 129. (2) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1. |