The Secretary:

I have received the credentials of the following-named gentlemen as delegates from State and local bar associations, and they are entitled to all the privileges of membership during this meeting.

(See List of Delegates.)

The report of the Executive Committee was then read. On motion the report was received and placed on file. (See the Report at end of Minutes.)

After a brief recess, the roll of States was called, and the General Council was elected.

(See List of Officers at end of the Minutes.)

The President:

The report of the Secretary is next in order.

The Secretary, John Hinkley, of Maryland, read his report.

On motion, the report was received, approved and placed on file.

(See the Report at end of Minutes.)

The President:

The report of the Treasurer is next in order.

The Treasurer, Francis Rawle, of Pennsylvania, then read his report.

(See the Report at the end of the Minutes.)

On motion, the report was received and ordered referred to an auditing committee to be appointed by the chair, under the by-laws.

The President:

I will appoint as such auditing committee Ignatius C. Grubb, of Delaware, and Gilbert E. Munson, of Ohio.

The President also announced the following Committee of Reception:

R. Wayne Parker, New Jersey; Horace W. Fuller, Massachusetts; Charles Claflin Allen, Missouri; Hampton L. Carson, Pennsylvania; Walter B. Hill, Georgia; Emlin

McClain, Iowa; John J. Hall, Ohio; Spencer C. Doty, New York and Jerome C. Knowlton, Michigan.

Also the following Committee on Publications:

Leonard A. Jones, of Massachusetts; Walter B. Hill, of Georgia; Charles Borcherling, of New Jersey; Thomas Dent, of Illinois; and Henry C. Ranney, of Ohio.

The Association then adjourned till 8 o'clock P. M.

The President:

EVENING SESSION.

Wednesday, August 22, 1894, 8 o'clock.

My brethren of the bar, I am sure, will all remember the contribution to the literature of the profession in the "History of the Supreme Court of the United States." The author is with us to-night. The topic which he has selected for his paper is "Great Dissenting Opinions," and I have the pleasure of introducing to you now Mr. Hampton L. Carson, of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Carson then read the paper.

(See the Appendix.)

The President:

It has been said that freedom itself must be protected from perilous activities quickened into life by its own fearless spirit, and that there must be new defenses for democracy in the new trials of its life. The questions of social order which now engross public attention involve the security of our homes and the peace of our streets. To what extent the arbitrary power of injunction may be invoked under certain conditions is a question of lasting concern to the profession and the country. "Injunction and Organized Labor" is the title of a paper prepared by Mr. Charles Claflin Allen, of Missouri, whom I now have the pleasure of introducing to you.

Mr. Allen then read the paper.

(See the Appendix.)

The President:

The papers are open for discussion, but the hour is so late that it would be well, perhaps, to postpone any discussion until

to-morrow.

Judson Starr, of Illinois:

Mr. Chairman, I should like to submit a few remarks on the subject of one of these papers, but I feel that the hour is so late that it would be more in order to adjourn this discussion until the next regular session.

George Gluyas Mercer, of Pennsylvania :

I would move, sir, that the discussion be postponed until to-morrow, and that it follow next after the Annnal Address. I think the last paper raises a question of very great importance at the present time-a question that can be discussed with the same interest and with like ability at no other time, and a question that ought to be discussed very fully just now. I, therefore, trust that the discussion may be made the special order for to-morrow forenoon, immediately after the Annual Address.

The motion was carried.

The Association adjourned until Thursday, at 10 A. M.

The President:

SECOND DAY.

Thursday, August 23, 10 A. M.

The Annual Address will now be delivered by Mr. Moorfield Storey, of Massachusetts.

The Annual Address was then delivered by Mr. Storey. (See the Appendix.)

New members were then elected.

(See list of New Members.)

The President:

At the session last evening discussion of the papers then read was made the special order for this morning following the Annual Address. The attention of the members is called to three rules, viz, that all resolutions and amendments must be in writing and handed to the Secretary; that each member on rising to speak must state his name and State, and that no speaker shall speak more than ten minutes at a time, or more than twice on the subject under discussion. The discussion is now in order.

The papers may be considered in the order in which they were read. The first was "Great Dissenting Opinions."

Everett P. Wheeler, of New York:

Mr. President: There is one observation on the very interesting paper of Mr. Carson which deserves a moment's notice, and that is in reference to the effect of the decision in the Legal Tender cases upon our constitutional jurisprudence. I remember very well that in the law school at Cambridge, Chief Justice Parker, of New Hampshire, who filled the chair of constitutional law, used to lay it down as an elementary principle which at that time had universal recognition, that the powers of Congress were solely those that were affirmatively conferred by the Constitution, whereas the State legislatures had all the power of the British parliament, except that which was denied to them by their respective constitutions or by the Constitution of the United States. It seems to me that the effect of the Legal Tender decisions, particularly the last one in the Julliard case, is to apply to Congress in effect the rule previously applied to the State legislatures and to hold that the power of Congress is practically unlimited, except by prohibition in the Federal Constitution. That much deserves very serious consideration, and I do think that the dissenting opinion in the first case and the prevailing opinion in the second mark an epoch in our constitutional history.

There is an interesting fact in the jurisprudence of the State of New York which illustrates those Legal Tender decisions that may be new to some of our members from other States, and possibly it might be worth while for a moment to call attention to that. When the first decision in the Legal Tender cases was announced, which was against the validity of the law, there were many who maintained that that decision would be overruled, and one pugnacious gentleman in New York, named Jex, who had an equally pugnacious lawyer, was so convinced of this that he undertook to make a formal tender in legal tender notes of a mortgage on which he was not personally liable, but which was on property which belonged to him. Under an earlier decision of our Court of Appeals, in Kortright vs. Cady, 21 N. Y., 343, it was held that a tender of the amount due on a mortgage, whether it was accepted or not, discharged the lien ipso facto; and he had this in mind, that if the decision should subsequently be changed and his tender should be held to be good, he would get rid altogether of the lien of that mortgage, and, as he had never assumed it and was not on the bond, he would gain its amount. Foreclosure suit was commenced, as he refused to pay interest, and, after the trial there came out the second decision which sustained the validity of the Legal Tender acts, and Jex was very confident that he would carry his point and obtain the land free from the lien of the mortgage. At that juncture I had the honor of being consulted, and I advised that as the decision of the Supreme Court was in force at the time of the original tender the validity of the tender must be judged by the decision that was then in force. It was a novel proposition. It really gave to the decision of the court the effect of a statute. It was to be sure, carrying out the analogy of the decisions that Mr. Carson referred to last night in the cases of Gelpeke vs. Dubuque and those following cases, which had given that effect to the decisions of the local courts upon the validity of State statutes; and finally that contention was sustained by our Court of Appeals, (Harris vs. Jex, 55 N. Y., 421), and