I should have been glad to have added columns showing the number of affirmances and of reversals and their relative percentage, but time did not permit of this being done in season for this meeting. The average percentage is 46+. In order to see how the practice in Canadian courts compared with that in the courts of our own country, I examined 362 cases decided by the courts of Canada, with the results that I found that a little over 50 per cent. of the points therein decided were upon matters not connected with the merits of the question in dispute. Our professional cousins across the border cannot, it seems, credit themselves with any higher standard of professional ability than that which is our meagre portion. Indeed, the figures, which are given in an added line to the table, show that the advantage is slightly in our favor.

Another curious fact found by this compilation is the relative merit of the common law and the code practice as agencies in securing rights. Leaving out Louisiana, which is under the civil law, we find that the code states of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming show an average of 48 per cent. of practice points; while the common law states, including the Federal tribunals, show an average of only 433 per cent. Whatever of argument against a change from the common law to a code system, the opponents of the latter may find in these figures is fully offset, I take it by the fact that, as stated, the Canadian courts, where the common law practice is more entirely preserved than is general in our so-called common law states, the ratio of practice points is over 50 per cent. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that while our systems of legal practice require stringent and prompt reform in the direction of greater simplicity, there is no system, however admirable in principle or in detail, there can survive in the hands of incompetent or insincere practitioners.

In all that has been here presented, and all that is thereby indicated, we see the solemn obligation resting upon us to clarify, in mind and in heart, the noble profession to which we are unselfishly devoted. No graver duty lies before us. I am strong in the faith that we shall triumph in our present efforts to fulfil that duty.

J. Newton Fiero, of New York :

Mr. Chairman: The facts presented by Mr. Frank C. Smith suggest another consideration not entirely foreign to this discussion, but first let me express what I know must be in the minds of all of us-that is surprise, almost amazement, at the results of the examination as to the percentage of points of practice decided by our appellate courts. If it were not quite certain from my acquaintance with the gentleman who prepared the tables of the painstaking care with which the work has been performed, I should be sceptical as to the correctness of the figures. I am unable to doubt either the figures or the deduction therefrom, that substantially 50 per cent. of the points decided in our Courts of Appeal are upon matters of procedure.

I desire, however, to enforce a view different from that for which the statistics are presented. They show not alone that the young lawyer needs to be educated and the old lawyer instructed in the intricacies and difficulties relating to matters. of practice, but the argument presented in favor of a simpler, cheaper and more expeditious method of procedure is so cogent that I cannot forbear enforcing it.

Even in those States which have adopted a code of procedure and are most progressive, we are twenty-five years behind the age in which we live. I do not care to discuss the question of the relative advantages of code practice and common law procedure. We in the code States believe that system to be the simpler and better. But in New York, by reason of amendments and careless revision, it has become so complicated that the embarrassments are nearly as great as those it was intended to obviate.

The great need of the time in the way of law reform is that methods of legal procedure should be made so plain and simple as no longer to remain mere pitfalls for the practitioner and sources of unnecessary expense to the client; so plain and simple that it will be impossible to delay the trial of an action upon the merits by technical objections or to obstruct justice by appeals upon questions having no relation to the actual rights of the parties; that we should have throughout the length and breadth of the land a system of remedial procedure which would enable a lawyer to conduct his business with relatively as little unnecessary friction and delay as the client conducts his affairs.

The business interests of the community demand that lawyers shall reach results in litigations which shall be conclusive, if not beneficial and permanent, if not always useful in the most expeditious manner, without waste of time or money, and this is in the interest of the attorney as well as the client. We should no longer be subject to the just criticism arising from the law's delays, but devise and put in execution a practice and procedure adapted to the demands of modern business

interests.

James F. Colby, of New Hampshire:

Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Nomination of Officers for the ensuing year would respectfully report recommending for Chairman, Professor James B. Thayer, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and for Secretary, George M. Sharp, of Baltimore, Maryland.

Simeon E. Baldwin:

I move that the report be accepted and the gentlemen nominated be elected.

The motion was adopted.

On motion, the Section adjourned until Friday, August 24th, at 3 o'clock P. M.

PAPERS BY EDMUND WETMORE AND W. A. KEENER. 373

August 24th, 1894.

The Section of Legal Education was called to order at 3 o'clock P. M.

The Chairman:

The first paper on the programme this afternoon is by Mr. Edmund Wetmore, of New York, on "Some of the Limitations and Requirements of Legal Education in the United States." It affords me very great pleasure to introduce Mr. Wetmore to the Section.

Edmund Wetmore then read his paper.

(See the paper at the end of these Minutes).

The Chairman :

The second paper of the afternoon is by Professor William A. Keener, of Columbia College, New York, on "The Inductive Method in Legal Education." Professor Keener is not able to be with us to-day, but his paper will be read by Professor Kircheway, of Columbia College, whom I now introduce to the Section.

The paper was then read by Professor Kircheway.

(See the paper at the end of these Minutes.)

The Chairman:

The papers are now open for discussion.

Henry Budd, of Pennsylvania:

May I ask Mr. Wetmore to state in brief what are the requirements of a Regent's examination in the State of New York?

Edmund Wetmore:

As I understand it, under an old statute in New York, there was established a University of the State, which comprised all the higher institutions of learning in the State and was under the general direction of the Board of Regents. In the course of the development of that system there was established some years ago by the rules of our Court of Appeals, as a pre-requisite for admission to the bar, a course of examination open to all, which was known as the Regents' examination. Before a