CONTRACTS-Continued.

change orders, the compensation of the plaintiff there-
for was to be fixed by the Supervising Architect of the
Treasury, whose decision should be binding upon both
of the parties. Id.

XXXVI. Where plaintiff, a real estate broker, entered into a con-
tract with the Government to obtain options or settle-
ment figures satisfactory to the Government upon
certain parcels of land, such contract providing that
the broker's commissions should be due and payable
only as title to each parcel was "acquired by the
Government," and where, by reason of a court decision
that the lands sought to be acquired were not for public
use, the project was abandoned by the Government,
which did not acquire title, by purchase or otherwise,
to any of the parcels in question, it is held that the
plaintiff is not entitled to compensation. Knouse, 595.
XXXVII. The rule that one party to the contract cannot escape
liability for payment for services rendered thereunder
because of the impossibility of performance on its
part is applicable only where the agreement between
the parties with reference to payment is not other-
wise conditioned. Id.

XXXVIII. Where bid was submitted July 11, 1933, and accepted by
letter dated August 14, 1933, and received August 17,
1933, it is held that claim for additional costs by reason
of the National Industrial Recovery Act does not come
within the provisions of the Act of June 25, 1938.
General Bronze, 612.

XXXIX. Execution of formal contract at later date does not affect
the fact that there was a meeting of the minds of con-
tracting parties when letter of acceptance was sent. Id.

COTTON LINTERS.

I. Upon the evidence adduced, it is held that the plaintiff,
receiver, has no title to the claim which is the subject
of the instant suit. Sherman Oil Mill, 616.
II. Order of State court, appointing a receiver, is held not
binding upon the Government, which was not a party
to the receivership proceeding. Id.

DAMAGES, MEASURE OF.

See Contracts XXII.

DATES OF CONCEPTION.

See Patent Cases Procedure V, VII.

DEDUCTIONS.

See Taxes XLII, XLIII, LV.
DEDUCTION FOR ADVANCES.
See Taxes XI.

DEDUCTION OF LOSS.

See Taxes V.

I. Where shipments of coal were delivered by common car-
rier to the Naval Fuel Depot, and the common carrier
collected from the owners of the coal, or their agents,
freight charges on the basis of the export rates, on the
presumption that the coal was to be used on voyages
or to be transshipped, there can be no recovery from
the Government for the difference between the export
rate and the domestic rate when it transpires that a
quantity of the coal was not transshipped but was
diverted to local Government activities. Virginian
Railway Company, 142.

II. Where the Government advertised for bids for coal f. o. b.
the Navy Fuel Depot, and on shipments of coal deliv-
ered in accordance with these bids the freight charges
were paid by the owners of the coal, or by their repre-
sentatives, the Government was not the consignee,
actually or by construction of law. Id.

III. The party who pays the freight charges and receives
delivery is the party responsible for payment of the
lawful freight rate. Id.

HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE.
See Taxes XLVI, L, LI, LIII.

INCOME.

See Taxes LVI, LVIII, LIX.

INCOME OF ANOTHER.

See Taxes XXX, XXXI.

INDIAN CLAIMS.

I. In enacting the Act of January 14, 1889, providing for
the disposition of the lands held by the Chippewa
Indians of Minnesota, it is held that Congress clearly
intended to put into effect the Government's prevail-
ing Indian policy, which was to secure the dissolution
of the various Indian Bands and Tribes, allot to them
lands in severalty, dispose of surplus lands for their
benefit and otherwise seek to civilize the Indians
themselves. Chippewa Indians, p. 1.

II. Where Congress provided, in the Act of 1889, that tribal
funds accruing from the sale of surplus lands, should
be conserved for the benefit of the Indians, it was not
the intent of Congress to establish a trust fund, which
would be beyond the control of Congress itself. Id.
III. The fact that the Chippewa Indians of Minnesota as a
Tribe were divided into bands does not destroy the
identity of the Tribe as such or alter the character of
the title by which their lands are held. Id.

IV. Where, under the Act of 1889, there was a voluntary
merger of all the tribal lands, participated in by all
the Bands of the Chippewa Tribe, and consummated
by cessions of all the Chippewa Bands, the funds re-
sulting from the sale of said lands were tribal funds.
Id.

V. The fact that Congress in the Act of 1889 did not exert
to the limit the power and authority which Congress
indisputably possessed over tribal funds does not sus-
tain the contention that the plenary power of Congress
over tribal funds was surrendered; the inclusion of a
referendum clause in the Act did not change the estab-
lished relationship of the government and the Indians;
the mutual assent of the interested parties to the en-
actment of the Act did not create a contract. Id.
VI. In the enactment of statutes similar to the Act of 1889,
Congress did not intend to surrender its plenary power
if subsequent conditions justified further legislation,
for the benefit of the Indians, provided such subsequent
legislation did not take from the Indians vested rights.

INDIAN CLAIMS-Continued.

VII. There is held to be no foundation for the contention that
under an Act of Congress providing for the settlement
of Indian tribal estates a succeeding Congress is power-
less to alter a former Act, when the succeeding Con-
gress deems it essential to exercise its plenary power
over tribal funds for the good of the tribe. Id.
VIII. It is held that the policy of Congress in providing that
expenditures made by the Government for the benefit
of the Indians, including education and drainage,
should be reimbursed from tribal funds is an exercise
of the discretion and authority of Congress in which
the courts may not intervene. Id.

IX. It is held that the Act of 1889 did not accomplish an
"immediate emancipation" of the plaintiff Indians;
that the Act did not dissolve the relationship of guard-
ian and ward; and that it did not place the Govern-
ment in the position of being absolutely unable to
administer their tribal affairs. Id.

X. If Congress determined to utilize the existing fund for a
generation of tribal Indians who in their judgment
needed it to ward off the hardships of life, and who were
really the creators of the fund, it was a matter for
Congress to determine and not the courts. Id.
XI. Congress possesses the exclusive and plenary authority to
deal with tribal Indian lands and funds as in its wisdom
it deems just; this is a matter within the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress and if the legislation does not
impair vested rights or appropriate property for a
public purpose the courts are absolutely without
jurisdiction. Id.

XII. The jurisdictional Act does not create rights and conse-
quent liabilities; nor does it by its terms recognize
existing rights under the Act of 1889. Mille Lac Band
of Chippewa Indians v. The United States (229 U. S.
498, 520) cited. Id.

XIII. Where it is contended that the President of the United
States, through his Secretary of War, in 1818 made a
promise to the Cherokee Indians of a perpetual outlet
west, as an inducement to them to move from the east
to the west of the Mississippi River, it is held that
although these promises had been held out to the
Indians by the Secretary of War, nevertheless Con-
gress did not grant an outlet in any treaty until 1828
and in this treaty the outlet is fixed as far as the
sovereignty of the United States and their right of soil
extend; and at that time the right of soil and sover-
eignty of the United States did not extend beyond the

INDIAN CLAIMS-Continued.

100th degree of west longitude as fixed in the treaty
with Spain in 1821. Eastern or Emigrant Cherokees, 452.
XIV. Treaties entered into between nations are political and
not judicial questions and courts can not declare a
treaty fraudulent or non-effective. Id.

XV. The courts have to consider treaties as valid and binding.
Id.

XVI. At the time the patent in question was granted, the limit
of the western boundary of the United States was
fixed at 100 degrees of west longitude and the United
States did not possess any sovereignty or right of soil
west of that degree of longitude. Id.

XVII. The outlet mentioned in the patent was that contained
in the Indian Territory, and after the agreement of 1891,
which was subsequently ratified in 1893, the Cherokee
Indians conveyed for a valid and valuable considera-
tion all their right, title, and interest to this outlet;
therefore, from that date they have not possessed an
outlet for which claim can be made against the United
States.

Id.

XVIII. It is held that plaintiffs have no legal or equitable claim
arising or growing out of any treaty or agreement or
act of Congress which entitles them to compensation
from the United States for which they have not been
paid in full. Id.

INTENTION OF GOVERNMENT.

See Contracts XVII.

INVENTORY, VALUATION OF.

See Taxes XII, XIII, XIV.
INVESTMENT EXPENSE.
See Taxes XXXIX, XLV.

JURISDICTIONAL ACT.

See Indian Claims XII.

LANDING WHEEL FOR AEROPLANES.

See Patents IV.

LEASEHOLD, VALUATION OF.

See Taxes LXV, LXVI.

LEGATEE.

See Taxes LX.

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

See Taxes XXXIX, XLI, XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII, XLIX, L.
LIMITATIONS UPON CLAIMS.

See Taxes LXX.

MISREPRESENTATION OF CONDITIONS.

See Contracts VIII, IX.

MORTGAGE MARKETING CONTRACT.

See Taxes XVII.