CALCULATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONTRACT.
See Contracts VI.
CHANGES.
See Contracts VII.
CLAIM FOR REFUND.
See Taxes I, II, III, LXVII, LXVIII, LXXI.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
See Taxes XXXVII.
COMPLETION OF WORK.
See Contracts XXVI.
CONSOLIDATED GROUP OF CORPORATIONS.
See Taxes IV.
CONSTITUTIONALITY.
See Taxes XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV,
XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.
CONTINUITY OF INVENTION.
See Patents II.
CONTRACTS.
I. Where plans, specifications, and statements are alleged
to have led to the belief that the Government would
construct a railroad track, adjacent to proposed loca-
tion of hangars to be built by plaintiff, it is held that the
evidence fails to show that any contract or agreement
was made by the Government to construct such a
railroad track, and in the absence of any agreement
there can be no recovery for cost and expense incurred
by reason of the defendant having failed to construct
such railway. Sobel, 149.
II. Where soil conditions, unknown when the contract was
made, rendered it necessary to change the character
of the foundations, which delayed the work, it is held
that this was not such a change as was contemplated
by the contract, and plaintiff is entitled to recover for
incidental costs and damages resulting from the delay
so occasioned, although the contract price was in-
creased to cover the increased cost of construction of
the foundations and the time limit for completion of
the contract was extended. Id.
III. Where the contract made provisions for the erection of
an additional hangar, at the option of the defendant,
it is held that the plaintiff cannot recover for the delay
caused by the erection of such additional hangar. Id.
IV. Where contract called for "hydrostatic" test of the steam
heating system, and it was provided that the defendant
should furnish the steam for such test, but no steam
was in fact furnished, and a test was made with com-
pressed air, it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover for cost of repairing the system when defects
developed. Id.
V. Where contract for construction of a lock in the Kanawha
River called for a test of certain valves to ascertain if
said valves would lower and raise the gates of the lock,
without specifying the character of such test, and
where plaintiff successfully made a mechanical test,
and was then required, at extra expense, to make an
oil test, it is held that plaintiff is entitled to recover.
General Contracting Corporation, 214.
VI. Where contract provided that steel castings should be
within a given percentage of the theoretical "weight as
calculated from the drawings," it is held that a differ-
ent method of calculating the weight, or a deduction
from the weight calculated in accordance with the
method prescribed in the contract, is not allowable;
even if a different method may be in accord with good
engineering practice, it is the contract that governs.
Id.
VII. Contract provisions are not susceptible to modification
or change when they expressly state what may be
done thereunder and the method and procedure for
making changes; where the record does not sustain a
contention that contractor could not possibly observe
the provisions of the specifications, and where a choice
of method was permitted and the contractor adopted
the more expensive way, contractor may not recover.
Id.
VIII. Where the record does not support a holding that a
claimed misrepresentation of conditions actually
misled the contractor, it is held that there is no basis
for recovery. Id.
IX. Where a contractor made no investigation of its own as
to subsurface conditions, and there is no positive and
convincing proof of misrepresentation by the defend-
ant as to said conditions, it is held that the plaintiff
cannot recover. Id.
X. It is held that under the facts of the case the contract
itself determined the rights of the parties and the
General Accounting Office was without jurisdiction.
McShain Co. v. United States, 83 C. Cls. 405 and
authorities therein cited. Rumsey, 254.
XI. Where contractor, in excavating for Government build-
ing, encountered a large quantity of reinforced con-
crete, not visible from the usual inspection, which it
was necessary to remove, it is held that this involved
extra work for which contractor is entitled to extra
pay in accordance with the decision of the contracting
officer. John McShain, Inc., 284.
CONTRACTS-Continued.
XII. Where there existed an admitted difference between the
specifications and the work called for under the plans,
involving the character of backfill over drains, and the
contracting officer reached a conclusion by construing
the specifications and drawing to exact a backfill of
gravel by implication, and the contractor performed
this extra work under protest, it is held that the con-
tractor is entitled to recover for the added cost. Id.
XIII. Where contractor failed to appeal from the decision of
the contracting officer, which was his right under the
contract, it is held that he cannot now recover.
XIV. Where contractor could not meet the requirements of the
specifications within the time limit fixed for perform-
ance because the Government did not possess title to
sufficient lands to enable it to be done, causing the
contractor to incur a loss it was not under obligation
to incur, it is held that the contractor is entitled to
recover. Gillen, 347.
XV. Failure on the part of the Government to make available
to a contractor the site upon which the work is to be
performed, if it occasions delay in performance and
causes damages to the contractor, entitles him to
recover his loss. Id.
XVI. Determination of a claim by department officials is not.
binding upon the Court but is a fact, a proceeding in
the course of the administration of the transaction, to
be given such weight as the Court thinks it is entitled
to receive.
XVII. It cannot be inferred from the record that the Govern-
ment intended to make the performance of the work
extremely costly when a more inexpensive way was
available. Id.
XVIII. Where completion of work on remodeling Veterans' Hos--
pital was delayed due to the failure of Government to
vacate building and make it available, and where the
delay resulted in extra costs due to the weather, it is
held that contractor was not liable for liquidated dam-
ages and is entitled to recover for such extra costs.
MacDonald, 473.
XIX. Where a contractor's delay is caused by the other party
to the contract, he cannot be held responsible for not
completing the work within the specified time. Id.
XX. Where a contractor is prevented from executing his con-
tract according to its terms, he is relieved from the
obligation of the contract and from paying liquidated
damages. Id.
XXI. Where plaintiff entered into a contract with the Govern-
ment, through the Civil Works Administration, in
response to invitation for bids, to supply and to make
available certain quantities of clay, from which plain-
tiff, at his expense removed the overburden of sand;
and where the Government, after having called for,
loaded and hauled away from plaintiff's clay pit a por-
tion of the total amount which the Government had
agreed to take and to pay for, cancelled the contract,
it is held that this constituted a breach of the contract
for which the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Tyree, 510.
XXII. Where plaintiff had performed his part of the contract
by removing the overburden from the clay, and making
the clay available for removal by defendant, the meas-
ure of plaintiff's damages upon breach of the contract
is the difference between the unpaid contract price and
the fair value of the clay which the defendant refused
to take. Id.
XXIII. Where it is shown by the evidence that the contractor
had prosecuted the work with diligence so as to insure
its completion within the time allowed by the contract
and that the entire fault for the delay was due to the
failure of the Government to comply with its part of
the contract, it is held that cancellation of the contract
by the Government was arbitrary and capricious, and
the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Largura, 531.
XXIV. The Government can be required to make compensation
to a contractor for damages which he has actually sus-
tained by defendant's default in its performance of its
undertaking to him. Id.
XXV. While under the authorities plaintiff would have been
entitled to whatever profit it could prove it would have
made under the contract, it is held that in the instant.
case the proof does not show a profit would have been
made. Id.
XXVI. Where construction of the buildings called for by the
contract was completed on May 25, 1929, and accepted
by the defendant on that date, it is held that the
instant suit was not barred by the statute of limitation
of six years when the original petition was filed June
27, 1936; since decision on questions arising under the
contract was not made, and the amount due plaintiff
under the contract was not determined or paid, nor
was a final voucher prepared and submitted to plaintiff
for execution, as provided in the contract, earlier than
July 9, 1930; voucher was transmitted to plaintiff in
August 1930, and final payment was made in June
1936. Austin Engineering, 559.
134281-39-c. c.-Vol. 88- -42
XXVII. The rule that all claims under a contract for the purpose
of bringing suit accrue when the work called for by the
contract is completed and accepted by the Government
is not a rule of universal application where it appears
from the contract provisions and the existing facts
that the amount to which the contractor may be
entitled under the contract may be due and payable
at a certain time depending upon certain determina-
tions, decisions, or action after the actual completion
of the work. Id.
XXVIII. The statute of limitation does not begin to run until the
right of action "has accrued in a shape to be effectually
enforced." United States v. Wirts, 303 U. S. 414, 416.
Id.
XXIX. The statute of limitation does not begin to run until the
time when payment becomes due under the contract.
Id.
XXX. A cause of action or a claim under a contract does not
accrue piecemeal, and where a contract contains a pro-
vision with reference to the time when the contract
shall be regarded as finally concluded, the statute of
limitation with reference to bringing suit does not
begin to run until that date.
XXXI. Where claims of plaintiff for additional fees, arising out
of change orders calling for extra work, were sub-
mitted to the Supervising Architect of the Treasury
Department, it is held that said claims were settled
by the decision of the Supervising Architect in accord-
ance with the provisions of the contract. Fourchy, 564.
XXXII. The question of whether there was an agreement, as
claimed, was within the scope of the matter submitted
to the Supervising Architect. Id.
XXXIII. Where it is stated in the contract that architect's fee
shall not be due "until the entire scheme has the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attor-
ney General," it is held that under the terms of the
contract the approval of the Attorney General, who
was not a party to the contract, was not necessary in
order to enable the architect to recover payment for
his services. Id.
XXXIV. If it had been intended that one not a party to the con-
tract must manifest his approval, it would have been
so stated in the contract.
XXXV. While provisions of the contract with reference to arbi-
tration are indefinite, it is held that the intention of
the parties to the contract was that if there was failure
to agree concerning compensation for work done under
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