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in this Sense, the Person is also said to die; but tho' the Person may be thys call'd a refylt from both, yet the Personality must determin only in one: That is to say it must be either his Soul thinking after such a particular manner, by the use of such particular Organs; or else it must be the Body only, so peculiarly modify'd, as to distinguish the Thoughts of one Man, from those of another. But then this is not the Adequate, tho' it is the usual Notion of Person; for still the Perfonality may be preserv'd, if the Self-confciousness is so, in the separation of Life or Soul from the Body. The difference between these two Notions is only this, the one places Personality in the fame Self-consciousness, the other more restrainedly, and indeed more improperly, in the same manner of being Self-conscious. 2ly, By the Creation of this person of Man, must be understood, according to the Mosaic History, the breathing or infusing Soul or Life into his Body; for Man is said to be made at some distance of time from the Creation of the Earth, out of which his Body was taken ; but the præexisting Parts of his Body, hinder not this subsequent Act, from being properly call’d his Creation ; because that, in which his Personality conlists, was then made out of nothing. Therefore 3dly, By reviving the same Man, must
be understood the re-infulion of the same Life or Soul into that same Body; I menti. on the same Body, as an Article of reveal'd Religion ; for, according to the Sense I have given of Person, I do not think the same Body requisite, in order to make the same Person live again ; but only to make him the same Person, under some of the same Circumstances he was in, when alive before, (which I think rationally accounts for' the design of the Resurrection) becaufe I am persuaded he will continue the same selfconscious Being, when strip'd of his Body. However Estibius must grant that the same Life or Soul, is absolutely requisite to make up the same Person ; who will be the same after the Resurrection, notwithstanding his Celestial Body, as much as lie is now the Same, thro' all the gradual Changes of his present Body.
From hence we may easily collect what fort of a Resurre&tion, I do not say Estibius, but his Hypothesis makes ; it plainly makes a re-creation, and that cannot be of the Same Person. For, in order to have the same. Person live in any two different States, I maintain it absolutely necessary, that he continue the same self-conscious Being, thro' the intermediate State, whatever it be, which leads him from one to the other. For what was his first Creation more than enlivening
his Body? And what is bis second less than reviving of it? But now the same Adtion repeated, does not bring back into Being the same Person, who in any point of Time or Duration, had quite lost his Being : For Life, according to this Notion, is only an accident to the Body in which it is; but it is demonstrative, or rather self-evident, that Accidens non migrat de Subjecto in Subjectum; and if the same Life which is in my Body, cannot possibly be cominunicated to any other Body; then neither can it be recommunicated to my own when lost, tho' but for a Moment; for, in that Moment, it must exist without it's Subject, which is impossible an Accident shou'd do. This is plain in all parallel Cases; a white Body for instance turn'd to any other Colour, can never regain the same Numerical Whiteness, tho' we suppose every particle of it to be exactly dispos'd as it was before; but only a Colour of the fame species or kind, but now a Specific Resurrection, is indeed no Resurrection at all; supposing the numerical Body that is now enliven'd do then revive, it may re-assume the Title of Man, and so the fame kind of Being is restor'd, but it is not the same Peter or John reviv'd, nor can any individual be restor'd from not being, without a Contradi&tion.
Eftibins seems to have been somewhat aware of this Consequence, when he talks of Life centring in God, and fo returning to Mant; but this, as I have said, is only añ unintelligible piece of Cant, if he wou'd have it to return to God, in any other sense thàñ all extin&t Accidents do ; whichi indeed is in no Senfe at all ; for how, or in what proper Sense that which center's in nothing, can center in Bin whose effential Character is I am, "Estibius will never satisfy the World; and therefore having fo often inculcated the not bea ing, and the cealing to be of Human Soul, he must confess that the centring again in God are meer Words, which carry no Senfe or Idea with them, and much less are they explanatory of the Author's Senfe.
It is certain all Life was originally in God; but let Estibius shew me what difference there is between his Interñnediate Staté, and that preceding the Creation; or between thie Life return'd to God, and that which was never communicated by him; and then let him prove that reviving of Man, is not a new Creation; or else let him make a new Creation confiftent with the identical and individual Nature of the Perfon; and when he has done that, I shall crave leave to withdraw this Article ; but till then, let him quote as much as he pleases out of Scripture, I must
charge upon him the most pernicious fort of Deism, that which denies all future Rewards and Punishments. And tho he shou'd reply, that these are only subtle Metaphysical Notions, of Perfon, Identity, &c. Yet I must continue the Charge ; for are they true? If fo, the Mischief is surely there this only shews it lies the deeper, and there is no Mischief lies so deep, but some will dive into it.
But truly I think the Consequence does not lie fo far beyond the common reach ; it requires no great depth of Reason for a Man to be altogether unconcern'd for his Body while it lies in the Grave; and the case is much the same, as to the reviving of it ; for it is not I that carry guilt with me into the other World ; my Sins are blotted out, with my Being ; I am neither concern'd in that A&tion of God Almighty upon my Body, whereby he will revive it, nor can he make those new-liv'd Particles remember that they liv'd in a former World, if annihilation of Life intervenes; for in that State of new Being they can remember no farther backward, than that Being extends: Or if he shou'd impress upon them all their former Guilt, it is not I that remember the Fact, but a new Person, punilh'd with the Remembrance of what I did; I my self being no more concern'd