not defirous to confine him to the Jus & norma loquendi, (which if, as Horace tells us, Ufe commands, Mens ought to have the fame Acceptation with Anima) my chief Business is to correct his Method of Reasoning: But when he falls foul upon De la Forge and others, for confounding the Notion of Mens and Anima, he puts me in mind of the Greek Proverb, Aixlu úpişi κἂν ὄν ο δάκη κωα: and the Latin that answers to it, Rixatur de lana caprina.

Now let us take a fhort Review of thefe Grand Definitions, and find out if we can, to what Grand End or, Purpose they ferve. The Ancients, Eftibius tells us, feent to be guilty of great Dotage, as to take Pag.ii4. no more Notice of Life, than to de fine it to be, Id or Principium, quo vivimus; which Explication, he adds, what Inftruction it affords to the Inquifitive Reader, I leave all the World to judge: And truly for one, I give Judgment on Eftibius's Side, That no Inftruction is afforded from this Definition. But then methinks Eftibins, who had with such a piercing Judgment observ'd, and discover'd the Flaw in this Definition, fhou'd himfelf have been able, in the Compafs of 30 or 40 Pages fpent in explaining his own Definitions, to afford us abundance of Inftruction in this Matter: And yet I fear, upon ExaΟ mination,

mination, we shall find, we have only been a little amus'd with various Profpects; but Eftibius has really left us juft where the Ancients did, which is I canaffure him much worse than he found us. When he says the Soul is Life, we understand his Meaning; which in plain English is, We live without a Soul: But then, in order to give us a truc Notion of the Soul in his Sense of it, he ought above all things, to have explain'd to us his Notion of Life. In the first Definition it is ftil'd Afflatus, Breath; which as it ftands there, is I am fure not in the least inftructive: For what Connexion there is between the Ideas of Breath and Life; or what Notion Breath, taken in what Senfe you will, gives us of Life, I borrow Eftibius's Words, and leave all the World to judge: Nor has he explain'd this, in it felf infignificant Term, by any other befides Power; but fure Life and Power are not Terms convertible; for then all Power, the Power of one Body to move another, wou'd be Life: Well then, it must be fome determinate Power; and thus Eftibius has determin'd it, Qua eadem vivit, fentit, & ratiocinatur. Now it is certain, and moreover Eftibins's Opinion, that Senfe, or Senfation Pag. 96. is an Effect, or Operation of Life; and, I don't say it is certain, but it is his

Pag. 90.

2

3

Judg

Pag. 97

Judgment, that Reafon is the fame; for he affirms it to belong, in fome Degree, to every thing that has Life: So that in fhort, the Soul, according to him, is in effect defin'd to be, A Power to Live; and then the Refult of all that has been faid in this Explanatory Chapter, will amount to this Syllogifm; The Soul is a Power to Live; but Life and Soul, are the fame thing; Ergo, Life is a Power to Live. Now upon Comparison of these two Definitions, Life is the Principle by which we Live, and Life is a Power to Live, I must leave my Reader to choofe which he will stick to, for I must confefs, I cannot choose for him: But if he fhou'd happen to be as indifferent as I am, let him not however recriminate upon Eftibius, great Dotage; for I am confident he has explain'd his Notion as far as it wou'd bear.

And now that we have gone thro' this Chapter, we shall hardly make any thing of it, unless we look back upon the Contents; where we shall find, the Design was to have fet the Author's Hypothesis in its true Light; and that I confefs the Chapter anfwers. If Difficulties and Perplexities are to his Reader, as they are to Eftibius, as clear and queftionless, as the Sun and the Moon in the Firmament. 02

Pag. 82.

After

After all, we find this Pompous Chapter fhrunk in the Perufal, into Three Definitions; which I dare averr, in Eftibius's his Language, neither make out the Facility, nor the Verity of his Notion. But, implenda erat Pagina, his Friend Hobbs fhew'd him the Way; many Words, and an empty Shew of Learning and Elaborateness, as they are fitted for the Ufe of Men of that Persuasion, so they will keep them in Countenance; and perhaps gain fome few Profelytes, tho' the Author may not have fufficiently confider'd his own Strength, when he prophefy'd, It fhou'd be univerfally entertain'd and taught.

CHA P. IV.

Containing a full Answer to all that he has objected in his Fifth Chapter, to the Receiv'd Doctrin of Human Soul, from Philosophy,

T is fomething of a Difficulty upon a Man, to be oblig'd to confider, as well what an Objector has not faid, as what he has faid to the Purpose; and yet this Drudgery they must undergo, that

pro

propose to answer Men of Eftibins's Character; for it is not to be fuppos'd they wou'd deal fo very much as they do in Foreign and Sophifticated Ware, without Experience, or fome reasonable Hopes at leaft, that they will pafs with one fort of Men for found Argument. This is all the Apology I have to make to my Reader, for detaining him fo long from the Merits of the Caufe; and for following, I hope at a good Distance, the Dance that Efti bins has led me, thro' 124 Pages of his Book. But the Contents of this Chapter give us now fome Hopes, that we have done trifling about the Question; and from nibling at it, are come to argue in good earneft. Philofophy must be own'd to be a very proper Topic to argue from, upon this Subject, but to our Mortification, Eftibius is too great a Genius to be confin'd to Topics; unless it may be judg'd a Piece of Philofophy, to fet forth Pa. 126, the Difficulty of conquering Re- & 127. ceiv'd Opinions; and the great Prejudice, with which the Author is apprehensive he and his Work fhall be receiv'd. Sure Prejudice fits very ill upon his Stomach, it is fo often uppermoft; and by his venting it in fuch general Terms. I can imagin nothing less than this to be his Meaning, That we must lay afide all we ever yet