Pag. 58.

former, that which has the Power of Action lodg'd in it; and by the latter, the bare Action it felf: But he objects, This is not Ariftotle's, but his Commentators new-fangl'd Diftinction, to bring the Philofopher over to his Party: What then? Was Ariftotle of another Party before? I thought all the Divines in the World had built upon him, and I fhall have occafion elsewhere to fhew, that he needs no bringing over. But I must confess these Definitions, like all the reft of Ariftotle's, run in too loose and general Terms; yet ftill they plainly enough declare his Opinion, That Life, and Senfation, and Understanding, were to be accounted for, upon no other befides an Immaterial Principle; and then it was no Strain in his Commentators, to understand him of a Subftantial Principle. But ftill the Objector ftrives hard to prove, That Actus Corporis Organici must be a Corporeal Quality; and confequently corruptible with the Body, and no otherwise diftinguish'd from other Corporeal Qualities, but by being the first or chiefeft. To which I anfwer, whatever was Ariftotle's Senfe of Actus Corporis Organici, it cou'd not poffibly be this; for in the fame Dif courfe, he has many Arguments to prove that Matter cannot think, and this amongst the reft:

Διόπερ 8δὲ νές στο μεχὴς ἀλλ ̓ ἤτοι αμερής, κ εχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθ@ τι μεχής πως δε νοήσε μέγεθ@ ὤν, ὅτο ἐν τῷ μορίων αὐτό,

ร

De Anima, μορίων ἢ ἔτσι καὶ μέτεια, ή και ειδμών lib.1.cap.3. e sful, auto 5 Teeg, αὗται δῆλον ὡς ἐδέποτε διέξεισιν· ε

μέτως πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσὶ τὸ αὐτό. The fenfe and meaning of which is this; Therefore the Mind or Intellect is not a continuous Subftance; but either without Parts, or has not fuch as belong to Magnitude; for how, if it be Magnitude, can it understand with fuch Parts, whether conceived as Magnitudes or Points? If as Points, they are infinite, and there will be no end of multiplying Understandings; if as Magnitudes, cach Part of that Magnitude will receive a different Impreffion of the fame Thing.

From which convincing Argument, it is clear that Aristotle, by his Actus cou'd not understand a Corporeal Quality; but he muft understand that indivifible, and immaterial Part of us, which actuates the Body, and is the Seat of Senfation and Intellect. By which I am fatisfy'd, had this Author come by Ariftotle's Definition at first hand,

Fag. 62.

he wou'd not have faln fo unreafonably foul upon the Philofopher, as to trump up this abfurd Meaning, for his, That the Soul is the Effence of the Body, and that, without which it wou'd have no being at all. If this does not appear to

the

the Reader abfurd enough at first sight, he may find it elaborately exploded by our Author, with no less than Four Demonstrations. And I will farther venture to remit him thither, if he is not yet convinc'd that a Subftantial Form, and Forma mixti and the Potentia paffiva, are unserviceable Principles in Phyfics; I doubt not but when he has read from Pag. 57, to Pag. 70, upon this Subject, he will make the Author's Remark, with fomewhat a different Application: What a troublesom trifling pag. 67. Fatigue is here! But by the way

Ibid.

we meet with something that looks as if it were defign'd for an Argument, and we must not neglect any thing of that kind, We own, that the Soul has no Principles of Corruption in it; but Eftibius cannot conceive how Man, upon this Suppofition, fhou'd ever become corruptible. I hope Eftibius does not mean (for I do not) the fame thing by Soul, and by Man; and if not, Man, as fuch, may be liable to Corruption, tho' he has an incorruptible Soul; So that here's no Contradiction in Terms: But we have this farther Reafon offer'd for his want of Conception in this Matter; If an Incorruptible Being endu'd with Reafon, Free-Will, and Power to act, or not to act; can bind or lock up the Principles of Corruption, fo as they do not

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Can

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cannot act; What can force that Rational Incorruptible Being to let go its Power ? &c. Truly nothing but this; that it never had fuch a Power, fince we were confcious it had any Power over our Bodies: I fuppofe the Power of moving Matter was given it by God, and I fuppofe alfo that God may limit and conditionate any Power he communicates, as he fees fit: Nor is it of weight with me,to prove my Soul Material, that I find it has not all the Power which I can conceive an Immaterial Being capable of.

That

But the Objector is refolv'd, we fhall not anfwer thus; we fhall only affirm, God ordains the Soul of every Man

Pag. 68.

before Death, immediately to let those turbulent Principles loofe, in order to Man's Diffolution; which he remarks, Is a pretty Notion for any whimsical Philofopher to broach; and truly to me, Eftibius is the

Man.

The next thing to be confider'd after the Definition, is the Properties of the Soul; and this Method is chalk'd out for the fake of that one Expreffion of fome Philofophers, Tota in toto, & tota in

Pag. 70. qualibet parte. He immediately fets

himself to confute this, as if it were the avow'd Principle of all his Adverfaries; whereas many, I may fay the moft and the

best

best of them, both Ancient and Modern, have charg'd it as an Abfurdity, upon others. But to fet this Matter in its true Light, I will briefly state the Nullibifts Hypothefis, as it is call'd, from which this Expreffion had its rife; and then fhew how they that maintain it are able to answer all that this Objector has to urge.

Amongst those that held an Immaterial Human Soul, fome conceiving all Extenfion divisible, and confequently, every thing extended to be material, cou'd give the Soul no determinate and circumfcrib'd Place in the Body; imagining that, as a Mode of Extenfion; but yet they did not hold the Soul to be, properly fpeaking, no where; for they own'd its Influence and Operation to be confin'd to the Body, and therefore to the Place in which the Body is Now the Subftance being indivifible from its own Operations, they did not therefore thruft out of the Rank of Being, Things Inimaterial; but maintain'd their Real Prefence, tho' according to them, they cou'd be no otherwise Present in any circumfcrib'd and determinate Place than by their Operations. But finding the Human Soul present by its Operation, to every Part of the Body; and at the fame time judging it incapable of being coextended with the Body, they faid the Soul was tota in toto, & tota in M 4

libet parte.

qua

Against