and common:

Effay, lib. 4.

cap. 3. fect. 6.

This makes it fomething wonderful to me, that, of two Ways only, an inquisitive Philofopher shou'd forget the more obvious Which I judge was forgot, when Mr. L. faid it was impoffible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas to difcover, whether Omnipotence, has not given Thought to fome Systems of Matter, &c. As much as to fay, I not only find no Inconsistency between Extenfion and Thought; but I pronounce it a thing impoffible for any Man elfe to find it out: If this be true, this Author does know all the Properties of Matter; for thus far I am fure, my Ignorance of them is a good Argument to prove that a Property given, if I don't find it actually inherent in the Subject, may be inconsistent with some other Property belonging to it, which I indeed know not, but which it is poffible for another Man to difcover. Therefore nothing but a perfect Knowledge of the Subject, and a compleat Induction of Particulars, which I have not yet found in that Work, and despair to find it in any other, cou'd warrant that Conclufion.

To return to the Objection; if we have difcover'd already, as I think we have done, an Inconsistency between fome known Properties of Material, and others of Cogita

tive Subftance; our Ignorance of as many others as the Objector pleases, is no hinderance at all from our concluding peremptorily, That a Thinking Material Substance is a thing in rerum natura imposfible.

2. Whereas we say, that the Capacity of Thought is not included in our Idea of Matter; this, fays the Objector, does not prove, that no fort, or Syftem, of Matter thinks.

Reply to the B. of Worce fter's Answer to his fecond Letter, p. 397.

Anfw. We do affert, That the Capacity of Thought is not included in our Idea of Matter; and Mr. L. fays, that to make good our Affertion, viz. That Thought in Matter wou'd change the Effential Properties of it, we have no more to say, but that Thought and Reason are not included in the Effence of Matter: This he says is all we have to fay; tho', in the very next Page, he is pleas'd, to put another, and a farther Objection into our Mouths. But how is Thought not included in the Effence of Matter? Why, in-as-much as a paffive and divisible extended Bulk, gives us no Idea of Thought, either as contain'd in, or dependent upon, it. And thus much we both fay, That Thought is not included in that Effence; but when we come to confider, and compare our Idea of Thought in fome of its Effential Properties, with

Our

our Idea of Matter; then, I think, we have fomething more to fay, viz. That neither is it, nor can it be included in the Effence of Matter: For there is this real and remarkable difference between First and Secondary Properties; that, as all these depend upon the firft, fo the first must diffuse it self through them all, and they can have nothing in them but what is, formally or eminently, in the first, they must agree in this, tho' they may differ from one another, as Contraries. To explain and apply this; if we fhou'd argue, That because a Stone is paffive in being broken, it's therefore paffive in rolling down a Hill; there is no confequence or connexion at all in it: But he that proves it originally paffive, with regard to Motion, rightly inferrs it must be so as well defcending, as in being divided, and in every other Instance of its Motion: And hence it is, that finding no Activity included in the first Property of Matter, he concludes, that it cannot affume Activity in any fubordinate Quality; and that there is no Motion in any Body, but what is communicated, either from another Body, or from an Immaterial Subftance; and therefore, that Matter is abfolutely paffive. Not again, but that Omnipotence, having put a Parcel of Matter into motion, may

con

continue it in that State eternally; but this is eternally to move it himself: And fo likewife he cannot be faid to make Matter think, in any other fenfe but this, that he thinks in it himself; which is not, that I can collect, Mr. L's. Senfe; and thofe, whose Sense it is, fhall be consider'd by and by.

This Confideration answers all that he objects from the Variety of Qualities found in Matter, and the Excellency of fome above others, as of Vegeta

tion above bare Motion; for Ibid. these are all reconcilable to its

first Property, and fo may have a dependence upon it, tho' we know not the Manner how they depend. But when he proceeds to inftance in Brutes, and then adds, If one venture to go one Step farther, and Say God may give to Matter, Thought, Reafon, and Volition, as well as Senfe, and Spontaneous Motion; there are Men ready to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator, he is a little unfair; for thefe Men deny Senfe and Spontaneous Motion, as well as Thought, Reason, and Volition to Matter; and therefore, instead of harkning to his Complaint of being stopt here, I must complain that he has gone a Step too far.

The fame Anfwer will ferve to what he objects from Mr. Newton, The Gravita

18:

tion of Matter towards Matter, by Ways unconceivable to me, is not only a Demonftration that God can, if he pleases, put into Bodies Powers, and Ways of Operation, above what can be derived from our Idea of Body, or can be explained by what we know of Matter; but also an unquestionable, and every where inftance that he has done fo. I conceive this Mutual Gravitation, however unfolvable, and therefore to be fuppos'd as a Principle in Phyfics, falls much fhort, not only of Thought, Reafon, and Volition; but of Sense and Spontaneous Motion: It does not come up to Senfe, for then all Matter would be fenfible, that is in the Vifible World at leaft; and tho' it is Motion, or a tendency to it, yet that cannot be call'd Spontaneous; for then one Body wou'd have it, without the prefence of another; which is contrary to the Suppofition: So that if it has this Power given it; it has not, in that, receiv'd the Power of Thought. But tho' it is an Operation unaccountable, as proceeding from Matter, yet may it not be accounted for, as proceeding from fome other Cause? I am forry to find a Man of fo good Understanding, inclinable to recurr to Unaccountable Powers in Matter, rather than to, what will account for them, an Immaterial Principle.

Thus