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be excus'd if I bestow, more than what may seem a Proportionable Part of this Discourse, in a thorough Examination of it, with regard to what I have advanc'd on this Argument.

The fenfe and meaning of the Objection I take to consist in one of these two things: Either, 1. That Thought may be one of the many, to to us unknown, Properties which Omnipotence has bestow'd upon Matter. Or, 2. That there may be in Matter a Capacity of Thought, when-ever it pleases Omnipotence to conferr it; tho' it does not lye within the Compafs of our Apprehenfion.

In the first Senfe, the Objection is too weak to deserve that Name; for it is a Weakness in an Objection to prove too much, as this does, if it proves any thing; viz. That all Matter, as fuch, does actually Think: An Affertion too wild in it self to merit a fober Confutation. Nor will the Old Refuge of an Occult Quality serve the Turn; as if this wanted only to be excited in the Substance of any Body: For Thought, and Self-consciousness, and Perception, are not Dormant Principles in any Body; unless this Thought in Matter, be of a quite different kind from what we underftand by that Word; as indeed Matter it felf, when made Thinking, must be a far

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different Object from what is represented to us by our prefent Idea of it.

But the Second is doubtless the Sense of Mr. L. and others, That there may be Some to us unknown, Capacity of Thought in Matter; by which, when Omnipotence pleases, it is fufceptible of that Faculty. I fay a Capacity, tho' I do not remember Mr. L. exprefling himself thus, but, in loofer Terms, that Omnipotence may fuperadd, &c. For I cannot fuppofe a Man of just Thought and Reasoning, could be content with folving an Operation, by an Appeal only to an Omnipotent Agent, without prefuppofing a Capacity in the Subject.

The Objection, as it ftands here, I have met with in feveral Modern Writers; and, fo far as I have obferv'd and can recollect, is never urg'd but upon one, or more of these Reasons : 1. That we do not know all the Properties of Matter, and therefore neither can we say that this Capacity is not one of them. 2. Whereas we urge, that neither Thought, nor the Capacity of it are included in our Idea of Matter, this does not hinder at all but that it may actually belong to fome Syftems of it. And, 3. Tho' we farther Suppose it impoffible to conceive how Matter can think, yet Omnipotence can act beyond our Conception of things.

But

But before I undertake to answer the feveral Arguments in Confirmation of the Objection, it will be requifite to premise, in what Sense, and upon what Accounts we maintain, that Omnipotence cannot create Cogitative Matter.

Now this we do not affert abfolutely, but upon Suppofition of the Truth of our Idea in contemplating, and the Truth of Our Faculties in collecting from that Idea of Matter; that is, We affert that God cannot do it, because it appears to us no less than a Contradiction that it fhou'd be done: But a Contradiction being a Non Ens, without fo much as the Poffibility of Exiftence, is the Object of no Power, not the Divine. If then it is lawful for us, in any Cafe, to inquire, Whether a Thing be contradictory, or not; it is no Prefumption to determin, upon Satisfaction had, wheit can be the Object of Divine Power: For he that affirms a thing to be contradictory, does virtually declare that God cannot do it. It is to be obferv'd therefore, in the Cafe before us that we do not deny the Power of God in Changing, if he fees fit, every Particle of Matter in the Univerfe, into fo many Thinking Immaterial SubStances; for that involves no Contradiction, that we know of; but that, so long as our Idea of Phyfical Extenfion and of Cogitation

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continues the fame, they must remain Properties inconfiftent in the fame Subftance, for the Reafons alledg'd Sect. 6, and 7. and this confider'd, our Affertion may not appear fo prefumptuous or offenfive, as it has done to fome.

But in Bar to this Affertion, it is pleaded in the first Place, That we are, doubtless, ignorant of many Properties of Matter; one of which may be either Actual Thought, or at least a Capacity of it.

In anfwer to this, let us confider upon what Accounts we do, in any Cafe, juftly exclude fuch a Property from being of the Number belonging to fuch a Subject, and I affirm we can do this but one, or both of thefe Ways, viz. Induction and Inconfistency; as to the firft, when we do fully underftand all the Properties of a Subject, and find not the Property in Dispute amongst them; we are oblig'd by virtue of our Indution of all the Particulars, to exclude that from the Number, tho' it fhou'd appear to be very confiftent with the Subject: But then this is not the only Method of thus denying or excluding; For fecondly, we may as fafely, and must as forcibly do it in the Cafe of Inconsistency; that is, when we do know one, or more Properties actually belonging to the Subject, which are inconfiftent with, and contradictory to the Property

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under Confideration: For inftance, we do know that Matter cannot be in its Nature both Active and Paffive, in one and the fame Sense; that it cannot be endu'd with the Power of Self-Motion, and at the fame time move only as it is moved. And this a Man will be pofitive in, who is not only ignorant of many real Properties of Matter, but of many, that perhaps fall within the Compafs of better Heads. Thus again I don't know, nor, I think, does any Man, all the Properties of a Triangle z yet I will fay, It is impoffible for Omnipotence to make its three Angles equal to three Right ones; because I am not ignorant of this Property, nor to what Subject it belongs, that There are three Angles just equal to two Right ones. So that the Objection is rais'd upon this falfe Suppofition, That we must have view'd, and been acquainted with the whole Family of Properties belonging to a Subject, before we can exclude any from being of the Number: This is indeed one, but not the only Way of doing it; fo far from that, that it may be question'd whether Human Understanding is capable of pursuing this Method in any one Inftance; however, it muft be own'd that the other, of denying by reafon of Inconfiftency, is the more usual, as it is the better adapted Method.

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