REPORT CALLED FOR BY ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY. OFFICE QUARTERMASTER, EASTERN DEPARTMENT, From: Department quartermaster. With reference to the letter from the Adjutant General of the Army, No. 2457329, dated September 21, 1916, calling for certain information in connection with the mustering into the Federal service of the National Guard organizations covered by the call of the President dated June 18, 1916, I submit the following replies to that portion of the letter of the Adjutant General of the Army which pertains to the business of the Quartermaster Corps, to wit: (f) 1. I enclose a memorandum marked "A" indicating the dates upon which the National Guard organizations left their State mobilization camps for the border. 2. There was delay in moving the National Guard organizations to the border, and such causes for this delay as are attributable to the business pertaining to the Quartermaster Corps are considered to be the following, to wit: First. The failure of the Quartermaster Corps to function promptly, accurately, and efficiently under that portion of paragraph 455–1. (b) which states that "The Federal supply departments concerned will ship at once to the senior mustering officers at the proper State mobilization camps, without requisition, etc., etc." The cause for this failure appeared to be due to the fact that the commanding officers of the field supply depots were not specifically and promptly notified of the issue of the President's call, and had not received specific instructions to begin shipment when so notified. In this connection the commanding officers of these field supply depots should be given instructions to report immediately by telegraph to the department commanders whose troops they are to supply for detailed instructions as to the sequence in which their organizations are to be supplied. Such instructions would have obviated the delay caused in the Eastern Department by supplies being shipped to mobilization camps at which troops had not arrived before they shipped supplies to mobilization camps at which troops had arrived. Second. The failure to have sufficient supplies in stock to equip completely the National Guard organizations between peace-strength and war-strength. Third. The apparent. lack of arrangements to insure a prompt supply of essential personal equipment of a suitable kind and quality to promptly supply the deficiency between the stock on hand and the amounts of these articles necessary to supply the National Guard organizations between peace and war strength. (g) 1. The National Guard organizations as a whole were not equipped, as was contemplated by Army regulations, to their peace strength. 2. Such equipment as they had in their possession and which had been furnished by the Quartermaster Corps was the same as that furnished for the Regular Army. 3. One of the material causes for the delay in supplying National Guard organizations was due to the fact that supplies furnished to equip National Guard organizations from peace to war strength were used to make good their shortages of equipment to peace strength. (h) First. The necessary equipment and supplies to be furnished by the Quartermaster Corps were not on hand in the depots designated to supply the National Guard organizations located in the Eastern Department, for these depots reported that they did not have certain supplies and were unable to supply them. Second. Considerable delay was caused in moving organizations to the border, due to this lack of supplies, and the length of this delay would have been greatly increased had the War Department not directed that the troops should be forwarded to the border without waiting for supplies to equip them beyond the absolutely necessary minimum for a short period of field service. (i) First. I do not consider that any material delay was occasioned in moving the troops, due to a lack of adequate transportation facilities, provided the available, and in my opinion entirely suitable, facilities had been used. Second. There was a delay in moving the troops when it was determined that they must be moved in tourist's sleeping cars, because the total number of tourist's sleepings cars in the United States was not sufficient to move all of the troops as soon as they were ready to be moved. Third. I do not con sider that any unnecessary hardship was caused by lack of provisions or accommodations, but the reports received on the troop-train movement indicate that, in a few cases, some inconvenience was caused due to the lack of experience of the officers in charge of the troops and the troop trains in obtaining provisions and in utilizing them and the troop-train accommodations to their maximum efficiency. Résumé. The deficiencies in the transaction of the business of the Quartermaster Corps during the mobilization of the National Guard under the presidential call of June 18, 1916, were in general as follows: 1. Failure of paragraph 455-1b A. R. 1913, to function. 2. Failure to provide promptly suitable animals for mounts and draft. 3. Failure to have the National Guard troops equipped with clothing for peace strength. 4. Failure to have on hand sufficient clothing and certain other supplies to equip the troops from peace to war strength. 5. Failure to obtain prompt deliveries of suitable supplies to make up the shortages in supplies necessary to equip the National Guard from peace to war strengh. 6. The purchasing of supplies of clothing wholly unsuitable in character and quality. 7. The most essential supplies which were not on had for issue and which, in some cases, were not supplied for several months afterwards are as follows, to wit: Samples of some of the articles of clothing furnished by the St. Louis depot and shipped to mobilization camps in the Eastern Department are forwarded under separate cover for your information. J. B. BELLINGER, Colonel, Quartermaster Corps. GEORGIA. WASHINGTON, D. C., July 10, 1916. COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEPARTMENT, Governors Island, N. Y.: 66 Following message repeated to you for investigation and report: Representative Vinson, of Georgia, telephoned this afternoon asking whether something could not be done to correct deplorable condition of mobilization camp at Macon, Georgia. He states there are five thousand troops there. At least fifty per cent are supposed to sleep on ground in rainy weather because of lack of cots, and governor has been forced to buy all cots in State of Georgia. He also states that soldiers at Macon are not supplied with shoes and other equipment." MCCAIN. GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N. Y., THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, Washington, D. C.: Replying to yours tenth concerning shortage cots and shoes Georgia mobilization camp. No cots have been available in quartermaster depots either at Philadelphia or Saint Louis for some time, due to failure to maintain adequate reserve. Every possible effort is being made here to purchase in open market. Day before yesterday all available cots in hands of Coast Artillery at Scriven were ordered to this camp as an emergency measure, and yesterday morning the balance required were purchased in open market in New York and shipped by express and should now be in hands of officers on the ground. Donaldson, inspector, reported satisfactory sanitary condition, and that while clothing of troops arriving was in bad condition there was ample on hand, but not yet issued to supply all concerned. WOOD. Telegraphic instructions were immediately sent to Ft. Scriven, Ga., and Ft. Moultrie, S. G., to ship immediately by express all available cots to mobilization camp at Macon, Ga. Other goods were purchased in the open market. Some 2,600 cots were purchased in open market in New York City, and enough of these, with those sent from the posts indicated above, were shipped to Macon, Ga., to meet the needs of the situation. HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, Governors Island, New York City, July 18, 1916. From: Department commander. To: The Adjutant General of the Army. Subject: Shortages. 1. The depot quartermasters at Philadelphia and at St. Louis have reported to these headquarters that they can not furnish the following class of articles for the troops now in the State mobilization camps, viz: Philadelphia depot shortages: Prs. breeches. Hats. Ornaments. Shirts. Bed sacks. Cots. St. Louis depot shortages: Drawers. Hats and cords. Socks. Waist belts. Bed sacks. Cots. Mosquito bars. Pyramidal tents. 2. It is stated that some of these articles can be furnished when received from contractors, but no date is indicated when they will be available. 3. These articles must be supplied these troops before they can be forwarded to the border, and, as the depots can not furnish them, authority is requested for these headquarters to purchase them as near to standard specifications as possible. LEONARD WOOD, Major General. These headquarters being informed by the depot quartermasters, Philadelphia, that it was impossible to state when mosquito bars could be furnished, went into the open market and purchased mosquito bars as follows, to wit: Aug. 23, 1916, 1, 200 bobbinette mosquito bars with frames, at $1.39 each Aug. 23, 1916, 350 bobbinette mosquito bars with frames, at $8 Total 1, 550 bobbinette mosquito bars with frames. $1,668. 00 233. 34 It being impossible to purchase any more bobbinette mosquito bars an order was placed for 5,000 mosquito bars of the best cheesecloth, at $1 each, which were delivered within ten days of the placing of the order. Not only did this action of these headquarters obtain prompt delivery of mosquito bars which permitted regiments that were being held in mobilization camps for this article to be forwarded to the Mexican border for duty immediately after receipt of mosquito bars, thus saving the Government $1,000 a day for retaining these troops in their mobilization camps at home, but resulted in an actual saving to the Government of approximately $18,850 on the price paid for these mosquito bars, as the contract price of the Quartermaster Corps for bobbinette mosquito bars at this time was about $4.20. Call of the President for mobilization of the National Guard June 18, 1916-Outstanding deficiencies Oct. 31, 1916 (4 months and 12 days after the call). The foregoing show some of the shortages of the troops on official record in this department. Recently an officer who had been on duty with Gen. Pershing's expedition informed an officer of my staff that the troops were suffering for lack of winter clothing; that the temperature frequently fell below freezing; that their requisitions for winter clothing had not been honored, and that the troops of Pershing's expedition felt that they were being sacrificed in order to favor the militia on the border. This officer stated in addition that as he passed along the border he found that this was not so; that both the Regulars and the militia on the border were suffering similarly from a lack of proper clothing. These statements can readily be confirmed by reference to the reports made by the commanding general, Southern Department, to the War Department. Senator LEE of Maryland. You are talking about the Regular Army? Gen. WOOD. The Regular Army, just the same as the militia, so far as equipment goes. The Regulars are instructed men, with instructed officers, and are available to the limit of their number and 74663-17-66 equipment; the militia are not. The Regular Infantry in this country has been at or below half war strength for the past five years, and we have been short, as you know, of Artillery. The only radio company in the Canal Zone was ordered north with its wireless equip ment. The condition of the Field Artillery material is shown by the following extract from an indorsement by the Chief of Ordnance: I assume this is in addition to that in the hands of troops. 4. The following is a statement of the Field Artillery material and machine guns completed and under manufacture: It is expected that the batteries under manufacture, with the exception of the 3.8-inch Howitzer batteries, will be completed within the year. For machine guns, as you know, we had to go to the British Government. They let us have some 240 or 250 of one of the best light guns made, the Lewis gun. These were not what we got for the troops going to the border. I insert a letter from the Chief of Ordnance as to our machine-gun supply. From: The Ordnance Office. To: The Adjutant General of the Army. JUNE 22, 1916. 1. Fifty-four regiments of the Organized Militia have properly approved machine-gun organizations, and of these 44 are completely equipped, including four guns each, 5 regiments have no equipment, and 5 require the automatic machine rifles with tools, accessories, spare parts, and pack outfits, but have the personal equipment. 2. Ninety-nine complete Infantry regiments and 3 complete Cavalry regiments have been ordered mobilized, so that 58 regiments, which will shortly be in the Federal service, are without machine guns. 3. The records of this department show that there are available at ordnance arsenals, general supply depot No. 1, Schuylkill Arsenal, at the base, Columbus. N. Mex., and the seacoast forts intended for provisional regiments of Coast Artillery, a total of 141 machine guns, of which 69 are Benet and 72 Maxim, model of 1904; deducting 6 which are counted as being on hand at the base, Columbus, N. Mex., leaves 135; of these, 45 are required for the equipment of nine new regiments to be organized under the national-defense act in the immediate future. This leaves 90 guns, of which 18 are Benet and 72 Maxim, model of 1904. 4. It is considered important that at least 18 Benet guns and 22 Maxim should be retained for replacements during repairs of guns in service and for other special demands. This number is, of course, inadequate, but the entire supply is so small that it is thought it should be reduced to a minimum. 5. In addition to the above, there are in the United States 67 Maxim automatic machine guns, model of 1904, in the hands of Coast Artillery troops and |