MASTER OF A VESSEL.
2. The master of a vessel has an absolute authority on board the vessel,
under his command, and his lawful orders must be obeyed. He
may inflict moderate correction for disobedience, and impertinent
language or behaviour. The seaman may endeavour to escape
from it; and if he is exposed, and is otherwise exposed to a repe-
tition of such treatment, he may resist for the mere purpose of
protecting himself from injury. The United States vs. Smith et al.
525.
3. If the master use an unlawful weapon, or the seaman is exposed to
danger of his life, or limbs, he may resort to any necessary species
of defence to avoid this danger. Ibid. 525.
4. If the master strikes the seaman, and is seized by him, and is so
firmly held, as that he cannot extricate himself, the seaman is guilty
of confining the captain. Ibid. 525.
Offences against the Laws of the United States, 11, 12, 13, 14.
The Court refused to grant a new trial, where the evidence submitted
to the jury, and upon which their verdict was founded, was such
as it was peculiarly their right to decide upon; and also, where the
construction given by the jury to the evidence, appeared to be
consistent with the justice of the case. Blagg vs. The Phænix In-
surance Company, 58.
NON-INTERCOURSE LAWS.
1. The prohibited articles, the importation or the putting on board of
which, with intent to import the same, is made a cause of for-
feiture by the 5th section of the Act of 1st March 1809, are, as
well those which are prohibited on account of the place at which
they were laden, as those which are the growth, produce, or manu-
facture, of the offending nation. The United States vs. The Nancy
et al. 281.
2. Although the merchandise, which is the subject of this information,
was landed, and the duties paid thereon, at Amelia Island, in Flo-
rida, and thence trans-shipped to Philadelphia-yet, as the goods
were originally put on board the vessel, with intention to import
them into the United States, no question can arise as to the con
VOL. III.
4 K
*tinuity of the voyage; the offence under the law consisting, not
in the importation, but in the intention with which the merchan-
dise was put on board. Ibid. 281.
3. The Non-Importation Law of 2d March 1811, which revived the Act
of 1st March 1809, the provisions of which extended to the pos-
sessions, as well as the colonies and dependencies, of Great Bri-
tain, did not extend to the possessions, but only to the colonies and
dependencies of that power. Malta was not a dependency of Great
Britain. Ibid. 281.
OBSTRUCTION OF PROCESS.
1. Indictment for resisting the marshal of the United States, in the exe-
cution of a warrant issued by the Judge of the District Court of
the United States. The United States vs. Lukins, 335.
2. The 22d section of the Act of Congress, passed on the 30th day
of April 1790, for the punishment of certain crimes, includes every
species of process, legal and judicial, whether issued by the Court
in session, or by a Judge or magistrate, acting in that capacity out
of Court, in the execution of the laws of the United States. Ibid.
335.
3. On a count in the indictment, for resisting the officer of the United
States, it is not necessary that the person resisting should use or
threaten violence. Ibid. 335.
OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES.
1. Indictment, for an illegal augmentation of the force of a French
privateer, by raising or otherwise altering the gun carriages.
The offence consists, in increasing, or augmenting, (or being concerned
in so doing,) the force of any belligerent vessel, which was armed at
the time of her arrival in the United States, by adding to the num-
ber or size of her guns prepared for use, or by the addition to her
force, of any equipment solely applicable to war.
Raising or lowering the carriages, or cutting away the decayed wood
in them, and replacing them with sound wood, by which they are
rendered fit for use, is increasing the force of the vessel, by an
equipment solely applicable to war, and is expressly within the
words and meaning of the Act of Congress. The United States vs.
Grassin, 65.
2. Indictment against the defendants, part of the crew of the vessel.
First count, for confining the master; and the second count, for
OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES.
endeavouring to make a revolt in the ship; both charged to have
been committed on the high seas. The United States vs. Smith
et al. 78.
3. It seems, that to constitute the offence of endeavouring to make a
revolt, the attack on the master should be accompanied by some
evidence, indicating, on the part of the assailants, an intention to
take possession of the vessel. Ibid. 78.
4. Any confinement of the master, whether by depriving him of the
use of his limbs, or by shutting him in the cabin, or, by intimida-
tion, preventing him from the free use of every part of the vessel,
amounts to a confinement in contemplation of law. Ibid. 78.
5. The offences charged against the defendants, were committed whilst
the vessel was lying in the river, about one and a half miles below
St. Ubes, and within the bar, the river being about one mile and
a half wide at the mouth; and the Court were of opinion, that
they had jurisdiction of the case. Ibid. 78.
6. Indictment against the defendant, as mate of the Lucy, he not be-
ing owner, for casting away and destroying the vessel, on the high
seas, the Lucy being the property of Augustus Masol, a citizen
of the United States. The United States vs. Vanranst, 146.
7. In any case, more particularly in one which is capital, the circum-
stances relied upon to establish the guilt of the accused, ought to
be strong, so as to leave no doubt of the fact; and they should
be consistent with themselves, each circumstance tending to es-
tablish the guilt of the accused. Ibid. 146.
8. What amounts to a casting away, was decided in the case of the
United States vs. Johns, (vol. i. p. 363,) in this Court. Ibid. 146.
9. This case is within the provisions of the first section of the Act of
Congress, passed 26th March 1804. Ibid. 146.
10. Obstruction of process, 1, 2, 3.
11. Indictment for aiding and assisting in the robbery of the mail; put-
ting the life of the carrier in jeopardy, by means of dangerous
weapons; and for robbing the mail.
Upon an indictment for robbing the mail, and putting the life of the
mail-carrier in jeopardy; a sword or pistol, in the hand of the rob-
ber, by terror of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous
weapon, within the law; although the sword be not drawn, and
the pistol be not pointed. It is not necessary to prove, that the
pistol was charged; it is presumed to be so, until the contrary is
proved. The United States vs. William Wood, 440.
OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAWS OF THE UNITED
12. Indictment for manslaughtery committed by the master of an Ame-
rican merchant ship, on a seaman, in the river off Wampoa in
China. The United States vs. Wiltberger, 515.
13. A man may oppose force to force in defence of himself, his family,
or property, against one who manifestly endeavours, by surprise
or violence, to commit a felony. The intent of the person resisted,
must be to commit a felony, or the killing will not be justified.
Ibid. 515.
14. No words or gestures, however irritating, will justify the killing;
although they may reduce the offence from murder to manslaugh-
ter. Ibid. 515.
15. The intent to commit the felony must be apparent—the damage
must be imminent, and the resistance used necessary to avert the
damage. Ibid. 515.
16. The prosecutor must prove, that the blows caused the death; but
if he proves that the blows were given by a dangerous weapon-
were followed by insensibility or other alarming symptoms, and
soon afterwards by death; this is sufficient to impose it on the ac-
cused, to show that the death was occasioned by some other cause.
Ibid. 515.
Quere, Whether this offence, which was committed on a river, was
within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States,
according to the provisions of the Act of Congress. Ibid. 515.
1. Oliver Evans's patent for the improved hopperboy, is not an excep-
tion from the general law, either by force of the private Act, un-
der which the patent was granted, or the decision of the Supreme
Court, in the case of Evans vs. Eaton. Evans vs. Hettick, 408.
2. Oliver Evans's patent is not for the whole hopperboy,-whether
he was the original inventor of it or not; nor does the opinion of
the Supreme Court, in Evans vs. Eaton, sanction such a claim.
Ibid. 408.
3. Unless Oliver Evans shows himself to be the original inventor of the
hopperboy, he can claim no right in virtue of the grant made to
him by the Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania, passed in 1787.
Ibid. 408.
PARTNER AND PARTNERSHIP.
1. Although one partner is not bound, singly, to pay a debt due from
him and his partner, if, when sued, he plead in abatement, the
omission to join his partner in the action; yet he is not entitled to
recover in his own name a partnership debt; and if he sue in his
own name, the defendant may take advantage of it on the trial on
the general issue. Jordan vs. Wilkins, 110.
2. B. & I., partners, being indebted to the United States for duties,
B. executed a bond for the debt, in his separate name. B. & I.
afterwards made a voluntary assignment of their property to the
defendants, for the use of their creditors; and B. assigned his es-
tate, for the use of his separate creditors. Before the bond was
given, B. & I. authorized, in writing, each to execute custom-
house bonds for duties,-each one of the partners agreeing to be
bound for the payment of the bonds, as if executed by both.
This action was instituted, (indebitatus assumpsit,) against the as-
signees of B. & I., to recover from them the amount of the bond
given by B. to the United States, out of the partnership effects of
B. and I. The United States vs. Astley et al. 508.
3. The bond is not evidence of a debt due by B. & I., because not
signed by them; nor of a debt due by I., because not signed by
him. Ibid. 508.
4. One partner cannot, by deed, bind his co-partner; unless executed
in his presence, and by his consent. Ibid. 508.
5. Although B. & I. were bound, on the importation of the goods,
for the duties on the goods, yet the bond of B. is not admissible
in evidence, to prove the amount of those duties; because the
bond, although given by one partner, extinguished the debt for
which it was given, and made it the separate debt of B. Ibid.
508.
PATENT LAWS AND PATENT RIGHTS.
1. Action for an infringement of the plaintiff's patent-right to alarm
bells for fire engines. The defendants opposed the claim, because
the plaintiff had given the use of his invention to the Philadelphia
fire company-that the invention is not an alarm-bell, as mention-
ed in the patent, nor a hose or fire engine—that their bells differ
in principle with the plaintiff's. Park vs. Little et al. 196.
2. The plaintiff, not having assigned the whole of his title and inter-
est in the invention, and no deed of assignment being recorded in
the office of the Secretary of State, may recover, notwith-
standing any agreement to assign. Ibid. 196.
3. The question, whether the invention is new, will be decided, not
by the fact that bells are not new, but whether the mode of ring-
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