INSURANCE.

are discharged from its obligations. In such a case, the insured
loses his indemnity, and the insurer his premium. Ibid. 276.
19. If the loss of the vessel arose from the ordinary circumstances of a
voyage, or from sea damage or wear and tear, which, without the
action of any extraordinary causes, was to be expected, the in-
surer is not liable. But if it happened in consequence of the vio-
lence of the winds and waves, running on rocks or the like, these
are perils against which the insurer agrees to indemnify. Coles
vs. The Marine Insurance Company, 159.

20. It is not sufficient for the insured to prove, that there were storms
during the voyage, unless he can fairly trace the injury sustained
to their influence. Ibid. 159.

* 21. What will be deemed a misrepresentation by the assured. Ibid. 159.
22. It is very certain, that every thing which concerns the state of the
vessel, at any particular period of her voyage, is generally consider-
ed material to the risk. Ibid. 159.

INTEREST.

1. The defendant settled his account at the Treasury Department, in
1808, on which a balance was stated against him. In 1812, he
claimed further credits, which were allowed to him, and which re-
duced the balance claimed from him in 1808. The Court instruct-
ed the jury to allow interest on the actual balance, from 1808.
The United States vs. Ormsby, 195.

2. Where there have been running accounts between parties, and one
party has been in the habit of transmitting his accounts regularly
to the other, striking a balance, and charging or giving credit for
interest, as the balance might be, and no objections have been
made to it; and where this mode of stating accounts is shown to
be the custom of trade; such manner of charging interest is legal,
and will be supported: Barclay et al. vs. Kennedy et al. 350.

3. A usage to add interest at the end of the year, to the annual account,
and interest on the balance, does not apply in a case in which the
commercial intercourse between the two countries in which the
parties reside, had ceased, when the account was transmitted; nor
will it authorize the creditor to make other rests in the account.
Denniston et al. vs. Imbrie, 396.

4. If an alien enemy has an agent here, and this is known to the debt-
or, interest ought not to abate during the war. Ibid. 396.

JUDGMENTS AND DECREES.

1. The Constitution of the United States, intended to vest in Congress

JUDGMENTS AND DECREES.

the full power to declare the judgments of one state Court con-
clusive in every other; and the "Act to prescribe the mode in
which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, in each
state, shall be authenticated, so as to take effect in every other
state," has declared, not that they shall have full power and con-
clusive effect, but that they shall have such effect, in every other
state, as they possessed in the state whence they were taken.-
Green vs. Sarmiento, 17.

2. The plaintiff had filed a bill on the equity side of the Circuit Court
of Georgia, against the defendant, in which he sought relief from
a judgment obtained against him upon a promissory note drawn
by him, claiming that the amount of the note had been paid by
the endorser, against whom a suit had been instituted in a state
Court in Pennsylvania; and who, having been taken in execution
under a capias ad satisfaciendum, gave the plaintiff certain securi-
ties, (afterwards found of no value,) and was then discharged from
the execution. The bill was dismissed in Georgia; and the plain.
tiff having paid to the defendant the amount of the judgment, in-
stituted this suit to recover the sum paid by him, on the ground,
that the discharge of the endorser from the execution, was a satis-
faction of the debt. Montford vs. Hunt, 28.

3. Held, that the decree of the Circuit Court of Georgia, was conclu-

sive on the plaintiff; the same facts, as those now relied upon,
having been before that Court, or which might have been submit-
ted by the plaintiff in the bill, to the consideration of the Court, at
the time of the proceeding. Ibid. 28.

4. Warrant of attorney,

JURISDICTION.

Offences against the laws of the United States, 5. 12, 13, 14.

LANDS AND LAND TITLES.

1. The law of Pennsylvania relative to titles to land under application,
warrants, surveys, locations, payment of purchase money, and the
rules established in the land office, relative thereto, by which such
titles are ascertained and determined. Lessee of Lewis vs. Mere-
dith, 81.

2. Ejectment. The order of the proprietaries to survey the land in
controversy, was dated in August 1773; and the survey was made,
and returned into the land office, in October 1774. The defend-
ant claimed title by possession in 1789, and subsequent settlement
and improvement. This ejectment was brought in 1805. The

LANDS AND LAND TITLES.

objection to the plaintiff's title was, that all the lines of the tract
had not been run, and that the plaintiff was barred by the Statute
of Limitations. Penn's Lessee vs. Ingraham, 90.

3. The defendant, who appears with no title, except possession and
improvement made after the survey, who is a mere intruder on
land long before appropriated, is not à person whom the laws of
the state favour. Ibid 90.

4. An entry and survey do not, in Virginia, convey the legal estate in
lands out of the commonwealth. Jones vs. Bache, 199.

5. A grant from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, passes a legal
possession to the grantee, which continues until disturbed by an
actual adverse possession. The title vests in the grantee, upon the
return and acceptance of the survey and payment of the purchase
money; and the legal possession vests at the same time. Lessee of
Potts vs. Gilbert, 475.

LAW OF NATIONS.

1. St. Domingo, 2, 3.

2. The laws of nations do not prohibit the carrying of enemies' goods
in neutral vessels; so far from so doing, upon the condemnation
of the goods, the vessel is entitled to freight. Schwartz vs. The
Insurance Company of North America, 117.

3. But, if a neutral endeavours by false appearances, to cover the pro-
perty of a belligerant from the lawful seizure of his enemy, such
conduct indentifies the neutral with the belligerant whom he thus
endeavours to protect; and is a fraud on the neutrality of his own
government, and upon the rights of the belligerant. Ibid. 117.
4. Private armed vessels.

5. Whether a neutral, within the territory of one belligerant, commits
a crime against that belligerant by an intercourse with the enemy,
must depend on the nature of that intercourse. Bas et al. vs.
Steele, 381.

LEX LOCI.

1. Contract, 1.

2. By the comity of nations, the laws of a foreign country where a con-
tract is made or discharged, is considered by the tribunals of other
nations, as the law of that contract, and they will decide accord-
ing to such laws. Golden vs. Prince, 313.

LIBEL.

1. No man is at liberty to trifle with the character of another, by pub-

LIBEL.

lishing charges against him, calculated to bring him into general
contempt, and then justify himself by stating his authority, and
proving the statement.. The United States vs. Duane et al. 246.
2. Evidence that the charge was taken from the Journals of Congress,
and thus showing that the publishers are not the authors of the
scandal, may be given in mitigation of damages." Ibid. 246.

1. The Act of Limitations did not begin to run, until the plaintiff's
lessor was ousted, or adversely kept out. Penn's Lessee vs. Ingra-
ham, 90.

2. The meaning of the Act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, of 26th
March 1785, section third, is this:-If, at the time the law passed,
a person was disseised, he was bound to bring his ejectment with-
in fifteen years. But if he was afterwards disseised, the Act of
Limitations, which would begin to run, would not be a bar in less
than twenty-one years. Ibid. 90.

3. Where a subsequent promise, or acknowledgment of a debt is
made, it may be given in evidence, to remove the bar of the Sta-
tute of Limitations; although the action be brought upon the ori
ginal cause of action. But if the new promise, vary the terms of
the original contract, on which the action is brought; as if the
former be conditional, and the latter absolute; the former cannot
be given in evidence. Lonsdale vs. Brown, 404.

4. The Statute of Limitations, of Pennsylvania, is substantially the
same as that of 21st James I. ch. 16. The limitation begins to
run from the time of an actual adverse possession, and not before.
Lessee of Potts vs. Gilbert, 475.

5. Adverse possession must continue, in point of locality, during the
twenty-one years. A possession of part of a tract of land, short
of twenty-one years, cannot be joined to a possession of another
part, so as to make up the period. The possession of different
intruders, in succession, upon the same part of the tract, cannot
be added together by the last intruder, so as to make up twenty-
one years of adverse possession against the real owner. Ibid. 475.
6. The possession of the disseisor, to bar the plaintiff, can never ex-
tend beyond the limits of the particular spot upon which he is
seated; and the legal possession of the owner continues unaffect-
ed as to the residue of the tract, by such tortious possession; and
his legal possession revives, the moment the intruder quits the
part of the tract he may have occupied. Ibid. 475.

LIMITATIONS.

7. A sale, by one intruder to another, without an exact definition of
the property conveyed, will not aid the purchaser in establishing
a continued adverse possession. Semble. That an intruder, who
has not had twenty-one years" possession, has no title to convey.
Ibid. 475.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

1. Action for damages for a malicious prosecution-1. In charging the
plaintiff with having stolen certain articles used in the manufacture
of gunpowder, and causing the plaintiff to be imprisoned thereon.
2. In bringing a civil action against the plaintiff, and demanding
excessive bail. 3. In causing the plaintiff to be indicted in the
state of Delaware, as the receiver of certain articles used in making
gunpowder, knowing them to have been stolen; all of which
charges were alleged to have been maliciously made, and without
probable cause. Munns vs. Dupont et al. 31.

2. Of the malice of a charge which is the ground of a prosecution for
a crime, the jury are exclusively the judges. Probable cause for
such a prosecution, is a mixed question of law and fact. What
circumstances are sufficient to prove a probable cause, must be
decided by the Court; but to the jury it must be left to decide,
whether these circumstances are proved by credible testimony.
Ibid. 31.

3. Probable cause, is a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves, to warrant a cau-
tious man in believing that the accused was guilty. Ibid. 31.

MARINERS' WAGES.

1. Libel for mariners' wages. Palmer stated in his libel, that he had
shipped and signed articles for a certain voyage; and was forcibly
expelled from the vessel during the voyage, without cause. The
answer denied the allegations in the libel, and charged the mari-
ner with mutiny, &c. Wilcocks vs. Palmer, 248.

2. To entitle the appellee to wages, he must not only produce the
shipping articles, but must prove he performed the voyage, or
show a legal cause for not having done so. Ibid. 248.

MASTER OF A VESSEL.

1. The master of a vessel, while at sea, has authority to do acts which,
on land, would not be justified. The United States vs. Wiltberger,

515.