Sampson v. Peaslee. tion; and that is, the appraisement must be made by the value of the goods in the principal markets of the country from which they are exported, at the time of such exportation to the United States." The case of Stairs v. Peaslee, considered in connection with what this court had decided under the revenue acts in Greely v. Howard, and in Maxwell v. Griswold, 10 How. 242, shows, whatever may have been the practice in computing the time * for [* 579 ] the assessment of duties, that this court viewed the act of the 3d March, 1851, as having fixed the rule to be the time or date of the exportation, as that might be shown by the day of the vessel's sailing from the foreign port to the United States. Indeed, from the phraseology of the act, without reference to preceding acts upon the same subject, or what had been their construction, the same conclusion must be reached. The word period has its etymological meaning, but it also has a distinctive signification according to the subject with which it may be used in connection. It may mean any portion of complete time, from a thousand years, or less, to the period of a day; and when used to designate an act to be done, or to be begun, though its completion may take an uncertain time, as, for instance, the act of exportation, it must mean the day on which the exportation commences, or it would be an unmeaning and useless word in its connection in the statute. The ruling of the court upon the first prayer of the plaintiffs is not subject to the exception taken. We proceed to the second exception taken by the counsel of the plaintiffs to the ruling of the court upon their prayer. It was, that the court would instruct the jury, upon the facts proved, that all the hemp imported by the plaintiffs was to be taken to be one entire entry, for the purpose of declaring and appraising the value for the levy of duties. No facts in the case were proved, upon which such an instruction could have been given. The proof is, that the plaintiffs were purchasers in Manilla of four thousand bales of hemp, which were put by them into two invoices for their own convenience; one containing two thousand five hundred and twenty bales, the other one thousand five hundred and twenty, and a quantity of loose hemp; the first valued at $58,772-69, the second at $36,367-03, for each of which a separate bill of lading was taken. The plaintiffs entered them separately at the custom house, and they were separately appraised without any objection at the time from the defendant. But it turned. out, upon the appraisement, that the appraised value of the first exceeded by ten per centum the value of it declared upon the entry, Sampson v. Peaslee. which made it liable, under the eighth section of the act of the 30th July, 1846, to the additional duty of twenty per centum al valorem on the appraised value. But the appraisement of the second invoice of one thousand five hundred and twenty-eight bales did not exceed by ten per centum the value declared on the entry of it; nor did the appraised value of the two invoices, constituting the importation of four thousand bales, exceed by ten per centum the aggregate of their separate values declared in the entries of them. [* 580] *Now, the plaintiffs seek to be released from the twenty per cent. additional upon the appraised value of the first invoice, because the second invoice was not subject to it, and because the aggregate of the values of both, as declared upon the entries of them, were not exceeded by ten per cent. upon the appraisement. Upon such a state of facts, the court rightly instructed the jury, that each invoice and entry was to be deemed and treated as a separate transaction for appraisement, and for the assessment of duties. An importer of merchandise is bound by the law to make his entry at the custom house according to his invoice, either by himself, the consignee, or their agent, and not otherwise than by invoice verified by oath, unless it shall be done conditionally, either under the tenth section of the act of March 1st, 1823, or under the second section of the same act, permitting entries to be made of imported merchandise, subject to ad valorem duties upon appraisement without invoice. (3 Stat. at L. 729.) When an entry has been made, it is conclusive upon the importer as to the contents, and declared value of the invoice; and for all of those consequences which the law may impose upon the examination and appraisement of it, and for any deficiency or non-compliance with the revenue laws regulating the entries of imported merchandise, or for any violation or substantial departure from directions which may have been given by the secretary of the treasury for the entry and appraisement of foreign goods, and for the collection of duties upon the same. See general regulations under United States revenue laws, by Mr. Secretary Guthrie, of February 1, 1857. As to the third exception taken by the plaintiffs to the rulings of the court, we think it was right in telling the jury, that if the examination of the hemp made by the merchant appraiser was such as is usually made in buying and selling the article, and was satisfactory to the merchant appraiser, it was not open to the plaintiffs to show that he adopted a mode of examination insufficient to detect fraudulent packing or diversities in the qualities of the different parts of the bales of hemp. Ex parte Ransom v. The City of New York. The importance of this case in respect to the collection of the revenue under the act of the 3d March, 1851, and under the regulations of the secretary of the treasury upon it, have induced us to give to the different points in the case our mature consideration, and we are of the opinion that the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed. It is ordered accordingly, and that the appellants shall pay the costs which have been incurred in the prosecution of their writ of error. Mr. Justice GRIER dissented. EX PARTE RANSOM and another, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK. 20 H. 581. MANDAMUS-PRACTICE IN THE CIRCUIT Court. The action of the circuit court, in vacating a judgment, and refusing to order an execution on it, held to be correct, under the special circumstances of this case, on a motion for a mandamus to compel the circuit court to execute the judgment. THE case arose on a motion for a mandamus to the circuit court for the southern district of New York, and is fully stated in the opinion. Mr. Keller, for the motion. * Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. [* 582] A motion is made on behalf of the plaintiffs for a man damus to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, to compel that court to vacate an order in the above cause, directing a judgment entered against the defendants on the 12th of December, 1857, of $21,458.21, to be vacated. The judgment was entered upon a verdict rendered for the plaintiffs in an action for the alleged infringement of a patent for an "improvement in the mode of applying water to fire engines, so as to render their operation more effective." The judgment was entered in consequence of the stay of proceedings having expired, given to the defendants to make a case on which to move for a new trial. Afterwards, on the 19th December, during the same term, an order was entered on motion of the defendants, after hearing coun * sel on both sides, by Judge Ingersoll, then holding the [* 583] court, vacating the judgment on the payment of costs that had previously accrued, and also upon the condition that the case Taylor v. Carryl. should be settled in a short time mentioned, and the motion made for a new trial, with liberty to either party to turn the case into a bill of exceptions, which right had been reserved at the trial. The case was settled accordingly, the motion for a new trial heard and denied, a bill of exceptions settled and signed, agreeably to the order of the 19th December, and filed in the office of the clerk of said court. Since the motion for a new trial, and the settlement of the bill of exceptions, the attorney for the plaintiff has issued an execution on the judgment of the 12th December, claiming it to be still in force, on the ground that the condition had not been complied with in respect to the payment of costs. A motion was subsequently made by the defendants to set aside this execution and the judgment aforesaid unconditionally, which was granted by the court. The present motion to this court is for a rule to show cause against the court below, why a mandamus should not issue to vacate this last order. The ground upon which the court below placed its decision for setting aside the judgment and execution unconditionally, is, that the attorney for the plaintiffs, by not making out his bill of costs, procuring a taxation, and demanding them previous to the hearing of the motion for a new trial, thereby impliedly consented to waive this condition, and cannot afterwards set it up for the purpose of invalidating the order of the 19th December, vacating the judgment. We concur in this view of the court, and we are also satisfied, from the course of the proceedings preparatory to the motion for the new trial, the hearing of that motion, and the turning of the case into a bill of exceptions with a view to a writ of error, it was the understanding of both parties that the judgment of the 12th December was to be considered as vacated, and that a new one be entered for the plaintiffs, if a motion for a new trial was desired. The court is of opinion, therefore, that the facts presented upon this motion for a mandamus are not such as entitle the plaintiffs to a rule to their cause, and it must therefore be denied. 20h 5831 L-ed 1028 37f 209 JAMES L. TAYLOR and another, Plaintiffs in Error, v. NATHAN T. CARRYL. 20 H. 583. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION-CONFLICT WITH STATE COURTS. 1. Where a vessel has been seized under a process of attachment in a State court, and is in the actual custody of the sheriff, no valid seizure can be made of her so as to give Taylor v. Carryl. jurisdiction in proceedings in rem in the district court of the United states sitting in admiralty. 2. Consequently, where the vessel was sold under the attachment proceeding, having been in the actual custody of the sheriff until the sale, and was afterwards sold under the decree of the admiralty court, the title was in the purchaser under the attachment proceeding. See Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334. THIS was a writ of error to the supreme court of Pennsylvania. The case is well stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Cadwallader and Mr Hood, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Evarts, for defendant. *Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court. [591] This cause comes before this court by writ of error to the supreme court of Pennsylvania, under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of the 24th September, 1789. The defendants (Ward & Co.) instituted an action of replevin in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, for the bark Royal Saxon. Upon the trial of the cause at nisi prius, it appeared that the bark arrived at the port of Philadelphia in October, 1847, on a trading voyage, and was the property of Robert McIntyre, of Londonderry, in Ireland. In November, 1847, she was seized by the sheriff of Philadelphia county, under a writ of foreign attachment that was issued against her owner and another, at the suit of McGee & Co., of New Orleans, from the supreme court; and at the same time her captain was summoned as a garnishee. On the 15th January, 1848, those creditors commenced proceedings in the supreme court to obtain an order of sale, because the bark was of a chargeable and perishable nature, suffering deterioration from exposure to the weather, and incurring expenses of wharfage, custody fees, &c., &c. This application was opposed by the captain of the bark, but was allowed by the court on the 29th of January, 1848. The vessel was duly sold by the sheriff under this order, the 9th February, 1848, to the plaintiffs in the replevin, Ward & Co. On the 21st January, 1848, while the writs of attachment were operative, and a motion for the sale of the bark was pending in the supreme court, the seamen on board the bark filed their libel in the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, sitting in admiralty, for the balances of wages due to them, respectively, up to that date, *and [* 592 ] prayed for the process of attachment against the bark, according to the practice of the court. This was issued, and, on the same day, the marshal returned on the writ, "Attached the |