Brown et al. v. Marzyck-Opinion of Court. recting a deed to be executed to the purchaser and a distribution of the purchase money. Upon the second ground upon which a reversal is asked, it is necessary to examine the proofs before the chancellor. The depositions are somewhat voluminous, but a brief statement from them will be sufficient. It appears that Brown and wife have occupied the premises from 1875 down to "a few weeks" before November 11, 1882; that the decree of sale was entered in June, 1881, and the sale was made September 2, 1882. Brown says he paid a certain claim for repairs on the house "in rent and board" for Lewis and his brother, from which we infer that Lewis boarded with his family. Geo. A. Lewis swears that he has been in possession for his brother, Robert E. Lewis, "ever since the commencement of said foreclosure suit and at the time of the decree. therein, and is still in possession of said property for said Robert E. Lewis." We do not find any statement that he had such possession before the commencement of the suit. The following exhibits were produced by appellants: A deed to A. Fries, executed by the County Clerk, dated December 10, 1877, for the unpaid taxes of 1875, of the property in question. Also a deed by Fries to Robert E. Lewis, dated February 4, 1878. Also a deed by the City Clerk of Jacksonville to Robert E. Lewis, dated 12th July, 1879, for the city taxes of 1875. Also a deed by the County Clerk to Lewis dated 8th July, 1878, for taxes of 1876, upon certificate of sale issued to Fries and assigned to Lewis. On the part of the appellee the following exhibits were introduced: Deed of County Clerk to M. C. Jordan dated December 29, 1879, for unpaid taxes of 1877, on certificate of sale to A. Fries, assigned to Jordan; deed by City Clerk to Jordan dated December 29, 1879, for taxes of 1875, on Brown et al. v. Marzyck-Opinion of Court. certificate of sale issued to F. F. L'Engle, assigned to Jordan; deed by City Clerk to Jordan dated December 29, 1879, for taxes of 1877, on certificate of sale issued to Robert E. Lewis, and by him assigned to Jordan; deed of sheriff to Jordan dated December 1, 1879, under execution upon a judgment of James K. Robinson against Robert E. Lewis and John H. Brown, rendered in the Circuit Court for Duval county on the first day of September, 1879; also a deed by Jordan dated 21st December, 1879, conveying the same property to John H. Brown, duly executed and recorded. These deeds and others, as appears by the depositions, were obtained for the purpose of removing obstructions in the way of Brown's title, in order to enable him to give the mortgage dated 31st December, 1879, to Mrs. Marzyck which was foreclosed. One of the tax deeds to Jordan, it will be noticed, was executed in pursuance of a city tax sale for the taxes of 1877, on which sale Robert E. Lewis was the purchaser, and the certificate of sale was assigned by Lewis to Jordan, upon which Jordan obtained a deed December 29, 1879. Whatever interest Lewis had was based upon tax deeds issued upon sales for the non-payment of taxes levied prior to 1877. When, therefore, he assigned to Jordan the certificate of the sale to himself for the taxes of 1877, enabling Jordan to obtain a deed thereon, and to convey the lot to Brown, he was estopped from setting up a claim of title or right of possession under prior tax sales as against Brown's mortgagee. E. J. Murphy swears that Brown told him "that he intended to beat said Jordan in his efforts to get said property for Mary Marzyck, that he intended when the effort was made to put him, Brown, out, he would put somebody else on the property against whom the writ of possession Brown et al. v. Marzyck-Opinion of Court. would not run, and whom they could not put out under said writ, and that he would keep said Jordan out of said property until next spring, and the said Jordan would have to commence proceedings all over again." There is in the record an affidavit made by a brother of Robert E. Lewis stating that Robert, at the time of the alleged execution sale under the judgment of Robinson against Lewis and Brown in 1879, was a little under twenty-one years of age; that he was born in January, 1859. Robert himself says nothing on the subject. He was a relative of Brown, Brown "boarded" him, and he seems to have been engaged in dealing in tax titles for Brown's benefit. Whether he was of lawful age at the time of that judgment and execution sale is of little consequence here. He aided Brown and Jordan in the matter of the last tax title, obtaining the tax certificate and assigning it to Jordan in the process of perfecting a tax deed in order that Brown might obtain a clear record title as a basis of his mortgage to Mary Marzyck. Brown employed Jordan to perfect the whole business. Lewis has been of lawful age at least since January, 1880, and does not appear to have taken any steps toward revoking any acts done during his minority. It does not appear that Lewis had possession before the commencement of the foreclosure suit. It is only shown that he had possession "ever since the suit was commenced," and the legitimate inference from all the circumstances is that he claims possession in the behalf of Brown and for the purpose of causing delay and trouble and not in good faith under an adverse title. From this state of facts, as they appear in the record, the Chancellor was clearly right in concluding that Robert E. Lewis has no equitable standing in resisting the execution of the decree of sale and the possession of the property un Stewart v. Stewart-Syllabus. der the master's deed. He does not put himself under oath in relation to any fact in the case, but permits his name to be used (if indeed he knows anything about the business) by those who use it to accomplish an unconscionable end. If he has any legal rights in the premises he may enforce them before the proper tribunal, but as the case stands here he seems to have been the instrument of others in a manner not commending itself to favorable consideration. A proceeding of this character was entertained by the Chancellor in Van Hook vs. Throckmorton, 8 Paige, 33. The decree appealed from is affirmed. LYCURGUS G. STEWART, APPELLANT, VS. SARAH A. STEWART, APPELLEE. 1. A deed signed by the grantor and attested by two witnesses, and delivered to the grantee (a married woman) or to her husband, is good as between the parties, though the acknowledgment taken by a Justice of the Peace out of his own county may be invalid. 2. Parol evidence that one party "conveyed the land" to another, in a suit in equity involving the question of title, is not sufficient to prove a conveyance in fee. It is only when the deed is lost or destroyed, or is withheld by the other party to the suit, that parol evidence is admissible to prove the due execution and the contents of the instrument. 3. Parol proof of a deed of conveyance, when admissible, must clear y show the due execution of the deed and so much of its contents as will enable the court to determine the character of the instrument, the identity of the property, and the quantity and quality of the estate conveyed. 4. Where a party files a bill to quiet the title to land, or to prevent or remove a cloud, it is necessary to establish his legal title as against the claim of the party defendant. 5. Neither a party to a suit nor his assignor or grantor should be Stewart v. Stewart-Opinion of Court. allowed to testify to transactions or communications between such persons and a person deceased, as against an heir at law, legatee or devisee of the deceased, except where the last named persons have testified in respect to the same transactions or communications, and a court of equity will disregard testimony given in violation of this statutory rule, though no objection was made to its introduction. McClellan's Digest, 318, Section 24; Tunno vs. Robert, 16 Fla., 750. 6. Decree (as to title of land) reversed without prejudice to the right of complainant to assert or maintain any legal title she may have in any other suit or proceeding. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion county. S. D. McConnell for Appellant. W. W. Hampton and John G. Reardon for Appellee. THE CHIEF-JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court. This is a suit brought by Mrs. S. A. Stewart, appellee, to enjoin Lycurgus G. Stewart from taking certain proceedings before the County Court in the matter of the estate of her husband, Richard A. Stewart. By an amended bill she seeks the decree of the court declaring certain real estate to be her separate property and her estate of inheritance, and that she be not further annoyed by the interference of parties claiming as heirs or legatees. The decree sustains the prayers of the original and amended bills. To support her claim she produces a deed executed by Calvin W. Keep and wife to herself, dated October 6, 1875, conveying the property to her in fee simple. This deed was objected to as evidence on the grounds-1, that no precedent title was shown in Keep, and 2, that the deed was not executed and authenticated in the manner required by law. This objection goes only to the manner of its authen |