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The State ex rel. v. Baker-Opinion of Court.

cases at law is confined by the Constitution to those cases in which the demand or the value of the property involved (other than real estate) exceeds one hundred dollars, and the original jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace extends to one hundred dollars value.

The Circuit Courts have appellate jurisdiction in civil causes arising in a Justice court involving twenty-five dollars and upwards. The Circuit Court has no original jurisdiction of such matters cognizable in a Justice's court; in other words, it has no original jurisdiction of a case at law in which only one hundred dollars or less than one hundred dollar is involved. The case in which the appeal is taken is one of them, and as to these cases the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is strictly appellate.

"Appellate pertains to the judicial review of adjudications. Appellate jurisdiction is the power to take cognizance of and review proceedings had in an inferior court, irrespective of the manner in which they are brought up, whether by appeal, or by writ of error." (Abbott's Law Dict.) It would seem to be idle to inquire whether a court having purely appellate jurisdiction of a subject-matter by the terms of the Constitution can have original jurisdiction of the same subject-matter conferred by the Legislature, yet this is one of the questions presented in this case.

The case of Ex-parte Henderson, in 6 Fla. R., 279,decided that the trial de novo of a cause coming to the Circuit Court on appeal from a Justice's court was the exercise of original rather than appellate jurisdiction.

It was held also in Lacy vs. Williams, 27 Mo., 280, and Co. of St. Louis vs. Sparks, II Mo., 203, that a trial de novo in the Circuit Court on an appeal from the County Court would not strictly be the exercise of appellate but of original jurisdiction.

Where words confer only appellate jurisdiction, original

The State ex rel. v. Baker-Opinion of Court.

is clearly not given. (Ex-parte Henderson.) And especially where the Constitution draws the line distinctly and clearly declares where the boundary is, it is beyond the power of the Legislature to establish a different one.

The Constitution confers on Circuit Courts appellate jurisdiction, and it is confined to the limits there defined. Whether exercised by a write of error, certiorari or appeal, as may be provided by statute, it is still appellate, and its office is to review the proceedings of the inferior tribunal and to decide the law of the case as presented by the record legitimately brought up by the appeal.

The Constitution conferring on parties the right of appeal, and on the Circuit Courts the power to entertain it, the statute has provided how an appeal may be taken. While it is evident that the Legislature had in view a trial by the exercise of original jurisdiction of the cause appealed, yet so far as it provided the machinery by which the appeal might be effected, the law is valid to give the Circuit Court power to dispose of the case; while so much of the law as provided for a trial by a jury, or otherwise than by a review, is not authorized but conflicts with the Constitutional restriction. The appeal here provided operates as a stututory writ of error, bringing up the proceedings for examination and judgment upon their validity. Hendricks vs. Johnson, 6 Porter, 472; Lewis vs. Nuckolls, 26 Mo. 278; Lyles vs. Barnes, 40 Miss. 608.

It is said that the Legislature has not provided any machinery by which the proceedings, testimony, exceptions, etc., may be brought up by the appeal for review. This may be true, and if it is beyond the power of the courts to establish rules to accomplish the object, resort must be had to the Legislature to supply them.

As the law stands it is undoubtedly the duty of the Circuit Courts on such an appeal duly perfected to exam

The State ex el. v. Baker-Opinion of Court.

ine the proceedings as certified by the Justice and to reverse or affirm the judgment as material errors may or may not appear, and so certify the same to the court below as on a writ of error or certiorari at common law. Lewis vs. Nuckclls, 26 Mo.

In this view the appeal should not be dismissed if regularly taken, without examining the return of the Justice to ascertain if error was apparent which affected the rights of the appellant to his injury.

In many of the States where the jurisdiction of the courts is not so sharply defined, it is provided that a new trial may be had in the Circuit Court on appeal from judgments of inferior courts. It was so in this State under the former Constitution which gave Circuit Courts original jurisdiction of matters without regard to the amount involved, and having such original jurisdiction, it could try de novo causes brought before it by means of the statutory appeals from Justice's courts in the same manner as causes commenced by summons. But as the present Constitution forbids the Circuit Courts to take original jurisdiction of matters at law involving less than one hundred dollars in value or amount, the Legislature cannot confer such jurisdiction by indirect means.

Relator prays a peremptory writ requiring the Judge to reinstate the cause upon the docket, and that he proceed to try the cause de novo as provided by the statute.

The first ground of Relator's demurrer questioning the Constitutional power of the Legislature to authorize such trial is sustained. The second ground of demurrer, that the law authorizing appeals in civil cases is "contained in the provisions of a statute which is unconstitutional" is not sustained. The act regulating proceedings in Justices' courts is not an unconstitutional act, though it may contain provisions that are void, if the several portions are

The State ex rel. v. Vann-Statement of Case.

not dependent upon each other.

Cooley's Cons.

Lim.

177-8; Bucky vs. Willard, 16 Fla. 330.

The peremptory writ is refused.

STATE EX REL. DUVAL SELPH, VS. ENOCH J. VANN, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT.

1. The provisions of the acts relating to appeals from judgments of Justices of the Peace, so far as they provide for a trial de novo in the Circuit Court, are in conflict with the Eighth Section of Article 8, of the Constitution, and void.

2. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in such cases is appellate only. 3. A trial de novo, or new trial, is the exercise of original jurisdiction; and in cases at law, where the amount in controversy does not exceed one hundred dollars, the Circuit Courts have no such jurisdiction.

4. An appeal from the judgment of a Justice of the Peace has only the effect of a common law writ of error.

The order of the Supreme Court upon the suggestion being filed was as follows:

On reading and filing the suggestion, by petition, of Duval Selph, duly verified, averring that in a certain cause pending in the Circuit Court in and for the county of Columbia, in the Third Judicial Circuit of our State, wherein Duval Selph is plaintiff and W. M. Ives, Sr., is defendant, the same being an action of replevin commenced in a court of a Justice of the Peace of said county, wherein the said Justice had rendered a judgment in favor of the said Duval Selph and against said W. M. Ives, Sr., and the said W. M. Ives had appealed from the said judgment to the said Circuit Court, and that the Hon. E. J. Vann, Judge of said Circuit Court, has determined and intends, contrary to

The State ex rel. v. Vann-Opinion of Court.

the provisions of the Constitution, to try the said cause upon said appeal de novo, as a case of original jurisdiction in that court, and refuses to try and determine the same as a court of appellate jurisdiction only, upon the record and proceedings had in the Justice's court. and the said Duval Selph prays that a writ of prohibition may be granted, commanding the said Judge to desist from proceeding in the said cause by a trial thereof de novo as aforesaid: It is thereupon ordered that the said E. J. Vann, Circuit Judge, and the said W. M. Ives, appellant, as aforesaid, and the said Duval Selph, plaintiff, do show cause before this court, at the Capitol, in Tallahassee, on the fifth day of July, A. D. 1882, at the opening of the court, why the said writ of prohibition prayed shall not be granted. The other facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

C. R. King for Relator.

The Chief-JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.

The suggestion of Duval Selph gives this court to understand that in a certain action of replevin commenced by him against W. M. Ives, before a Justice of the Peace, in The county of Columbia,he recovered a judgment, from which an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court. That the cause coming on to be heard the said Duval Selph moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no petition of appeal had been filed, nor citation issued, as required by law and the rules of the court, and because the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction to try the cause, except by the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, upon the record, and not de novo.

The Judge overruled the motion, and decided that he would try the cause de novo, and continued the cause for that purpose.

Relator prays that a writ of prohibition may be issued,

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