Palmes v. The L. & N. R. R. Co.-Opinion of Court. used exclusively for State, county, municipal, literary, educational, scientific, religious, benevolent, and charitable purposes, and personal property to the amouut of at least two hundred dollars for each family, shall be exempt from taxation." Considering the question whether the Legislature could legally exempt any property from taxation other than that expressly named in the Constitution, the Supreme Court of that State, in Frances, Treas., vs. A. T. and S. F. Railroad Co., 19 Kan., 310, says: "There is, in terms, no prohibition in such exemption, and as to personal property, the language of the Constitution seems to imply the existence of a power to exempt." It says: "All property used, * * and personal property to the amount of. at least, two hundred dollars for each family, shall be exempted from taxation." The court, after calling attention to the provisions of the Constitutions of Arkansas, 1868; Illinois, 1870; Louisiana, 1868; Minnesota, 1857; Missis sippi, 1868; Missouri, 1865; North Carolina, 1868; Tennessee, 1870; Virginia, 1870; says: "In all these provisions will be noticed either an express direction to tax all property, or an express prohibition on exempting any other than certain proposed property. Our constitution contains neither. Does it mean the same without, as those do with? The positive language of these several sections, sustains, if it does not compel, the positive assertions of the various decisions cited by counsel." These decisions held that the Constitution prohibited exemptions. Mississippi-Section 13, Article XII., Constitution— "The property of all corporations, for pecuniary profits, shall be subject to taxation the same as that of individuals." Section 20, Article XII., Constitution-"Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. All property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law." In the case of the Mississippi Mills Palmes v. The L. & N. R. R. Co.-Opinion of Court. Company vs. W. W. Cook, Tax Collector, 56 Miss., 41, the Supreme Court of that State held that the requirement is not that the property of all corporations, for pecuniary profits, shall be subjected to taxation, but that it shall be subject, that is, liable to taxation. That the Legislature may exempt property of a particular class, whether the owners be corporations or natural persons; but such property could not be placed beyond the taxing power. That the words "all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value," do not require that all property shall be taxed and deny to the Legislature the right to exempt any. That the Legislature may exempt property of a certain class, or property used for a certain purpose. Alabama-Section 1, Article XIII.-"Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act except for municipal purposes. All general laws and special acts passed pursuant to this section may be altered, amended or repealed." Section 4, Article XIII.-"The property of corporations now existing, or hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation the same as property of individuals, except corporations for educational and charitable purposes." In the case of The Mayor of Mobile vs. Stonewall Insurance Company, 53 Ala., 580, it was held that it was not competent for the General Assembly, in the imposition of taxes, to distinguish or discriminate in favor of corporate property subject to taxation and that if property of a particular kind is subject to taxation and owned by a corporation, it must bear the rate of taxation imposed on individuals. This decision, and the case of The City of Davenport vs. The C. R. 1. & P. R. R. Co., 38 Iowa 643, seem to conflict to some extent with the case cited from Mississippi. Illinois "The General Assembly shall provide for levy Palmes v. The L. & N. R. R. Co.-Opinion of Court. * and ing a tax by valuation so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property. But the General Assembly shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, persons using or exercising franchises and privileges in such manner as they shall from time to time direct." "The specifications of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive the General Assembly of the power to require other objects or subjects to be taxed in such manner as may be consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in this Constitution." Held, in the Illinois Central Railroad Company vs. The County of McLean, 17 Ill., 291, that "it was within the constitutional power of the Legislature to commute the general rate of taxation for a fixed sum," and that "the provisions in the charter of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, exempting its property from taxation upon the payment of a certain proportion of its earnings, are constitutional." To the same effect see Hunsacker, Sheriff, vs. Wright, 30 Ill., 146. See also Chicago vs. Sheldon, 9 Wall., 55. Arkansas-"All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uniform throughout the State. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than another species of equal value." In Pike vs. The State, 5 Ark., 205, it was held that "property of every character and description upon which a State tax may be levied must be taxed in proportion to its real and true value; and no portion of any distinct genus or species of property on which such tax is imposed can ever be exempt from it." The doctrine of the last clause was overruled in The State of Arkansas vs. County Court of Crittenden county, 19 Ark., 368. The court say, "We de Palmes v. The L. & N. R. R. Co.-Opinion of Court. clare the true rule of construction to be that the Legisla ture has the power, under the Constitution, to select the objects of taxation, and upon the exercise of this power there is no constitutional restriction. When the Legislature has selected the objects, then restrictions attach as to the imposition of taxes upon them, and the end intended to be accomplished is equality and uniformity in the taxation of all property tared throughout the State, and not equality and uniformity throughout the State as to the whole of each or any particular species of property from which objects of taxation may have been selected. The restrictions relate to the valuation of the property taxed, and to the rate of taxation imposed. They require all the property selected for taxation to be taxed according to its value, and that the rate of taxation shall not be higher upon the property of one tax-payer than upon that of another, no matter whether the property be of the same or different species." The court then allude to the fact that a number of named exemptions have existed under statutes ever since the adoption of the Constitution. In the late Constitutions of Arkansas, in the Constitution of California in force in 1868, and in the Constitution of Ohio in force in 1856, the provisions upon the subject of taxation require, in terms; the taxation of all property and the power of the Legislature to exempt is denied. Fletcher vs. Oliver, Sheriff, 25 Ark., 293; People vs. McCreery, 34 Cal., 435; Exchange Bank of Columbus vs. Hines, 3 Ohio State, 16. Louisiana "Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. All property shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law. The General Assembly shall have power to exempt fron taxation property actually used for church, school or charitable purposes," etc. In Mr. and Mrs. Lefranc vs. City of New Orleans, 27 La. An., 189, held that this excludes the Palmes v. The L. & N. R. R. Co.-Opinion of Court. In City power to exempt beyond the named exemptions. of New Orleans vs. Fourchy, 30 La. An., 913, an exemption from taxation of $500 worth of household furniture and an exemption of $1,000 of income were sustained. It cannot be a matter of surprise that two members of the court dissented. With these decisions before us there is little difficulty in giving the rule of exemptions as existing under our Constitution. The Legislature has full power here over the subject of taxation. It is directed to devise and adopt a system of revenue, and in doing so nothing is required of it except that regard shall be had to an equal and uniforni mode of taxation to be general throughout the State. There is no provision directing all property to be taxed or limiting the power of the Legislature in the matter of exemptions. As to the property made the subject of taxation, the requirement of uniformity prevents the adoption of different and irreconcilable methods as applicable to the same class or kind of property, and the requirement of equality prohibits taxing property of equal value at different rates. This we conceive to be the rule deduced from the Constitution. We think the language quoted from the case of The State of Arkansas vs. County Court of Crittenden County, 19 Ark., 368, gives the rule in this State. We cannot better express what is there said and quoted in this opinion, and we adopt it. We must confess that we cannot appreciate what may be called the classification exemption cases. As an elementary proposition, a house owned by a corporation is as much the subject of taxation as a house owned by an individual. It is the same kind and species of property, no matter who owns it, and we cannot see how the Legisla ture, when the rule it is to prescribe is to be equal and uniform, can exempt it for the reason that it is used for one |