Martinez et al. v. Ward et als.-Opinion of Court. money borrowed by James Ward from his, relatives and the business has ever since been carried on by said Ward and his wife as before the change in the name of the concern, without the payment of wages to either, and from time to time the said stock has been replenished with goods purchased on credit or with the proceeds of sales of such goods; that a policy of insurance was effected at the instance of James Ward on the stock, insuring against loss by fire, in the name of Catharine Ward-the premiums were paid out of the proceeds of the business; that a loss occurred whereby the Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Company became liable to pay $900, and that the Insurance Company will pay Mrs. Ward unless restrained. A receiver is prayed to collect said insurance money and pay the judgment out of it. The defendants answer fully, denying all the equities of the bill. They say that the goods of James Ward were not intermingled with the goods purchased by Mrs. Ward with which she is carrying on the business, but were sold at auction and used by him in supporting his family, and none of the proceeds were used in her business. They admit that Mrs. Ward applied to the Circuit Court in chancery to be declared a free dealer, and a decree was made granting her petition, and she is carrying on business under it to maintain their family, the ability of the said James Ward to support them having been destroyed by misfortune; that her first stock of goods was purchased partly with cash and partly on her credit, some money having beer. borrowed by her on her own responsibility; that the money was borrowed of Mr. Ward's sister, living in another State, and was secured by her note, also signed by her husband. and by a mortgage on their house and lot in Pensacola; that there is about $250 due and unpaid on goods purchased by her on credit. Martinez et al. v. Ward et als.—Opinion of Court. James Ward (her husband) assisted her in carrying on the business. From the proceeds of the business she supported herself and her husband and their large family, and she denies that her husband put anything into the business in the way of capital or stock, or that he has drawn out anything except that he has had his support with the rest of the family. The cause was set down for a hearing on bill and answer, and the Chancellor thereupon made a decree dismissing the bill. Afterwards, on the application of complainants, leave was given to file a replication without opening the decree of dismissal, and complainants not filing a replication ap pealed. They now pray a reversal on the general ground that the decree is erroneous. Appellants insist that the record shows a case of legal fraud on the part of Ward and his wife, and also a case of fraud in fact. The first proposition is that the "act to prescribe the manner in which married women who reside in the State of Florida may be authorized to become free dealers," approved March 11, 1879, (Cap. 3130, McClellan's Dig., 756, 813.) is unconstitutional because it vests legislative power in Circuit Judges. The act provides that it shall be lawful for married women who wish to take charge of their estates and to become free dealers to apply to the Circuit Judge in chancery "for a license to take charge of and manage their own estate and property, and to become free dealers." The Judge must make an order referring it to a Master to take testimony and make inquiry as to the capacity, competency and qualifications of the petitioner, and report to the Judge, who, if satisfied as to such capacity and qualifications, may "make an order confirming the report, ** and to grant to the applicant a license in accordance with the prayer of Martinez et al. v. Ward et als.-Opinion of Court. the petition; and thereupon such applicants shall be authorized and licensed to take charge of, manage and control their estates; to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued and to bind themselves in all respects as fully as if such married women were unmarried." The act requires a preliminary notice to be published before filing the petition, and a publication also of the order granting the license, before it becomes operative to enable a married women to act under it. We are unable to discover in this act any legislative power attempted to be conferred upon judicial officers. The Judge receives a petition in chancery and refers it to a Master, and upon his report coming in, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the Judge that the petitioner has proper qualifications to be a trader on her own account, he makes a decree declaratory of that fact as established by evidence and grants her a license to take charge of her estate and property and to become a free dealer. This "license" is but the decree of the court, to which the statute attaches certain results. It is urged in argument that this act "undertakes to empower a Judge to say, not what the law is, but what it should be in the future as to the married woman, who shall, in the manner pointed out, put the court in motion," and that the "action" is neither in rem nor in personam. The object of the act is to confer upon married women who their may desire to become traders and to acquire or add to property the power to do so, and the inquiry and judgment of the Chancellor is invoked for the purpose of ascertaining the capacity and qualifications of the applicant, and to decree upon them as facts, and upon his ascertaining and declaring these the law confers the right or removes the disability of the feme covert. Laws have always been enforced which authorize Chan Martinez et al. v. Ward et als.-Opinion of Court. cellors and other Judges to inquire into the sanity and capacity of men and women to manage their own affairs, and take from them the control of their property. Laws have always been enforced authorizing Judges and courts to grant "license" to sell property of infants and lunatics and deceased persons. The divorce laws authorizing courts. to establish the present and future status of men and women and of their property, and to award the custody and control of children, and the estates and property of children, have uniformly been recognized as constitutional. These and other similar matters have been, by the Legisture, committed to the courts for judicial action, the effect of such action being declared by the Legislature; and in such affairs the Legislature "undertakes to empower a Judge to say" not only "what the law is," but what the status of persons and property "shall be in the future" as to them. It is not the Judge but the law that confers the right or removes the disability. The Judge but finds the facts and certifies them, and in whatever form the certificate or decree may be it is the law which gives the effect to it. . The error of the argument is that the act does not confer upon the Judge the power to declare what the law "shall be in the future," but its purpose is solely to empower the Judge to declare the status of married women, to whom the law extends certain privileges and upon whom it imposes certain obligations, to-wit: the privilege of buying, selling and trading, to acquire money and property and to protect it in her own name, and the liability to be sued and to be bound by their contracts as if they were unmarried. This is the effect given by the Legislature to the facts found by the court, which the judgment or decree does not give, but which the law confers. We do not, therefore, find that the act in question is unconstitutional. Martinez et al. v. Ward et als.-Opinion of Court. The intention of the Legislature evidently is to give to the married woman the power to acquire property by her own labor, skill and credit, and to become personally indebted by borrowing, buying and trading, subjecting herself to the penalties of violating her contracts and securing to herself, free from the control of her husband, the fruits of her labor and skill as a trader. And a further result is that such gains are not liable to be subjected to the claims of the husband's creditors if she is acting in good faith. In this case the answer, which is not controverted, shows that none of the goods or money of Mr. Ward were used in creating or supplying the stock of goods, or in conducting the business carried on by Mrs. Ward. She borrowed some money for the purpose of buying the goods in the first instance from Miss Ward, her husband's sister, living in another State, which was secured by a mortgage on the house she lived in, her husband signing the note with her. It is claimed that the debt having been contracted by the husband before Mrs. Ward became a sole trader, and the husband being then entitled to her services and the fruits of her labor, it is a fraud upon the creditor now to give her the benefit of her own enterprise and labor freed from the creditor's claims. The law, as expounded by the courts, does not go so far as this. property in esse has been placed beyond the ordinary reach of execution. The creditor had no claims upon the skill of the wife of the debtor, had no right to demand or to expect that she would engage in trade for their benefit, and not apparent that Mrs. Ward is carrying on business it is It is not a case where in her own name as a cover to protect his capital and accumulations from the creditors of her husband. This is denied expressly by both the defendants, and the statements of fact in the answer disprove it. But it is insisted by appellants that Mr. Ward signed |