Governor, for use of, v. Ext'rs of Hooker-Argument of Counsel. arises who was the legal representative of Cuthbert Parker at and for two years after the appointment of these appellees as executors of Wm. B. Hooker? Most unquestionably the appellees were her legal representatives at that time, as the trust of her guardianship devolved upon them. Then these appellees, being the legal representatives of Hooker's estate and the legal representatives of Cuthbert Blount, possessing undoubted knowledge of this appellant's claim against the estate of Wm. B. Hooker, in possession of all the documents pertaining to it, with evidence indisputably sufficient to establish this claim against the estate of their testator beyond question, can they now be permitted to allege that this claim was not presented to them within the statutory period? We do not regard it necessary to present any authorities to the court in support of so self-evident a proposition as this. Confiding in the justice and equity of her cause, behieving that this court will grant her the justice denied by the honorable Circuit Court, the appellants submit this cause. J. B. Wall, S. M. & G. B. Sparkman for Appellees. Counsel for appellees claim-first, that since the plea is sufficient in law, and if sustainable by proof, is a complete bar to the action. Hence the court properly overruled appellants' demurrer to that plea. When the statute has not run in the life-time of the deceased, and the cause of action survives, then, after his death, it ceases to run until letters of administration or testamentary are issued. Then in actions of this kind suit must be brought within one year after the issuing of letters testamentary or of administration are issued. Sanderson's Administrators vs. Sanderson, 17 Fla., 850; McClellan's Digest, 734, Sec. 15. Governor, for use of, v. Ext'rs of Hooker-Argument of Counsel. This claim is neither a legacy nor a distributive share of an estate, consequently is reached by the statute of limitation. Amos vs. Campbell, 9 Fla., 187. Statutes of limitation apply to all cases except trusts. And to exempt a trust from a bar of the statute it must be --first, a direct trust; second, it must be a trust as belongs exclusively to a court of chancery, and third, it must arise between a trustee and the cestui que trust. (Angell on Limitations, 161.) Appellants' claim is not a direct trust; it does not arise between the trustee and a cestui que trust. And it is not a claim that belongs exclusively to a jurisdiction of a court of chancery. Appellants themselves recognize that fact, for this suit is brought on the common law side of the court. Second. Defendants' fourth and additional pleas are sufficient in law. Appellants should have presented said claims to appellees within two years from a publicacation of a notice to debtors and creditors. Filyaw & Wife vs. Laverty, 3 Fla., 72; McClellan's Digest, 84, Sec. 30. If appellants have any claim at all against appellees this claim is that of a creditor, and not of a legatee or distributee. Hence it is at once affected by the statute of nonclaim. Amos vs. Campbell, 9 Fla., 187. Third. The court very properly sustained defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs' replication to said pleas. Neither coverture nor infancy are any defence to pleas in a case like this, setting up the statute of limitation and of nonclaim. Neither of said statutes make any proviso or reservation in favor of infants or married women in such cases. Lastly. It follows from what has been stated above that the court below very properly overruled appellants' motion for a new trial, and that the action thereon was not erro neous. Governor, for use of, v. Ext'rs of Hooker-Opinion of Court. THE CHIEF-JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court. This was a suit on a guardian's bond executed on the 24th day of April, 1858, by Wm. B. Hooker, now deceased, brought against the appellees, executors of the will of Wm. B. Hooker. The bond was given to the then Governor and his successors in office, and is conditioned that "Wm. B. Hooker will well and truly and faithfully discharge the duties and perform the trusts committed to him as guardian of the person and estate of Cuthbert Parker, infant daughter of William Parker, late of said county, deceased, during the minority of the said Cuthbert Parker, and render to this court a just and true account of his guardianship when he shall be thereunto required." The declaration alleges that Cuthbert Parker has attained lawful age and is now the wife of James N. Blount. Wm. B. Hooker died in 1871, and defendants are the executors of his will. The said Hooker as such guardian had in his possession a large sum of money belonging to his ward, and the sum of fourteen hundred and seventy-one dollars remained in his hands at a settlement of the estate made by the said guardian with the Probate Court, which settlement was duly approved by the court in 1867, and Hooker in his lifetime, and his executors since his death, have refused to pay over the money to Mrs. Blount or to her husband. Plaintiff demands judgment for the $1,471, and interest from 1867. Defendants filed several pleas, upon some of which issue was joined, and to others, or to the replications thereto, demurrers were interposed. The attention of the court is directed only to questions arising upon the demurrers. The third plea is that the suit was not commenced within one year after the issuing of the letters testamentary. The fourth and an additional plea set up that defendants Governor, for use of, v. Ext'rs of Hooker-Opinion of Court. as executors, &c., in 1872, and after February 27th, 1872, they caused due notice to be published to all persons having claims or demands against the estate of decedent to present the same duly authenticated to them as executors within two years from the date of such notice in default. whereof said notice would be pleaded in bar of their recovery, and that the plaintiffs alleged demands was not presented within the two years. Plaintiff demurred to these pleas that they did not constitute a defence, and the court overruled the demurrers. Plaintiff, with the demurrers, filed replications to each plea, alleging that at the time of the issuing of the letters testamentary, and at the time of the publication of the alleged notice, the ward was a minor. Defendants demurred to these several replications and the court sustained the demurrers. The plaintiff declined to plead further, and on motion of defendants the court dismissed the suit and plaintiff appealed. The errors assigned are the overruling of plaintiffs' demurrers, and the sustaining of defendants' demurrers and pleas, and in giving judgment for defendants dismissing the suit. Tht questions thus presented are-1, whether the suit can be maintained under the statute of limitations, sec. 15. act of February 27, 1872, not having been brought against the defendants as executors within one year after letters testamentary issued; and 2, whether the claim of plaintiff was barred by the statute of non-claim, the same not having been presented to the executors within two years after rotice by them requiring claims to be presented against the estate of Wm. B. Hooker. The first question arises upon the application of the second clause of Section 15 of Chapter 1869, Acts of 1872. (McClellan's Digest, p. 734.) which reads as follows: "If Governor, for use of, v. Ext'rs of Hooker-Opinion of Court. a person against whom an action may be brought die before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced against his executors or administrators after the expiration of that time and within one year after the issuing of letters testamentary or of administration." The first section of the act provides that civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in the act. * * The same statute provides that "this act shall not apply to any action by this State, * or with respect to any moneys or property held or collected by any officer or trustee, or his sureties." Sec. 20. A guardian holds the money of his ward as a trustee for the use of the ward. This guardian was, therefore, a trustee of "money or property held or colleeted" for the use of the ward within the meaning of the act. It is a direct trust. The result is that the provision of the act requiring suit to be commenced against executors or administrators within one year after the issuing of letters to them cannot apply. where the suit is brought by or in behalf of a cestui que trust to recover money held or collected by a guardian which belongs to his ward. This was always the rule in equity, and it is saved as to actions at law by the exception of cases against trustees by this statute. Angell on Limitations, §§166, 468, and citations. The possession of the trustee of an express trust is in law the possession of the cestui que trust, and there can be no adverse claim or possession during the continuance of the relation. 2 Perry on Trusts, §863, and notes. An executor of a trustee or guardian by entering upon the administration takes the property and estate charged with all the trusts attached to them. "An executor, in |