It was held that where of a third concealed in the plain that the she riffimnight 2. DE GRAFFENREID V. MITCHELL, May T. 1826, 3 M'Cord's beak open posed they had gone. the doors to take them he enquired for him, Trespass. It appeared that the defendant as sheriff, had levthe slaves ied on certain negroes as the property of one Thomas, against person were whom he had sundry executions, and had possession of them some time. The plaintiff set up a claim to the negroes and by tiff's house, some means got them into his possession. Mitchell immediately made search for them and went to the plaintiff's where he supWhen he arrived at the plaintiff's house and was informed he was not at home. The defendant then told the plaintiff's wife his business; she request and said the negroes were there; the defendant then requested her liver them to open the door of the room where the negroes were, which she refused. He then said he would have them, if he had to break open the door, and attempted to open the door, which was fastened; he then kicked the door two or three times and injured or spoiled the lock, and entered and found the negroes concealed, and took possession of them. inexeen tion, upon a refusal to de Verdict for the plaintiff. Per Cur. Nott, J. It is said in Lemaynes' case, (5 Co.) that the sheriff at the suit of a common person, upon request made to open the doors and denial thereof, ought not to break open the door of the house to execute any process at the suit of any subject, or to execute a fieri facias, but if he do he is a trespasser. Yet it was resolved that the house of a man is not a castle or defence for any other person but for the owner, his family and goods, and not to protect another who flyeth into the same, or the goods of another; for then the sheriff upon request and denial may break the house and do execution. A distinction is attempted to be made between the case before us and the one in Coke. That the sheriff was not about to execute the process, but to retake the goods after they had been in execution and had in contemplation of law become his own. But the principle is the same, except that this is a stronger case, the goods being in the custody of the law. The house of every man, says Lord Coke, is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for defence against injuries and violence as for his repose. And the reason is, domus sua cuiqui est tutissimum refugium. But the principle is not to be extended beyond the object which the law intended to effect. The house or castle of a man is to be a refuge for himself, a place of safety for his goods, and of repose for his family. But that immunity is to be allowed only to the owner himself. It is not to be a sanctuary for others. It does not appear that the sheriff was guilty of any rudeness to the family, or that he used any unnecessary force or violence. I concur, therefore, in opinion with the presiding judge, that he was guilty of no trespass, and that the verdict ought to have been for the defendant. VII. OF THE SHERIFF'S POWER TO SELL PROPERTY LOFLAND V. EWING, Spring T. 1 Lit. Ky. Rep. 42, 44. S. P. takes prop a fi. fa, and ges he may not ing proceed or wi hout a venditioni SUNDERSON V. ROGERS, 2 Devereaux's N. Ca. Rep. 39. Per Cur. Boyle, C. J. It has been repeatedly held by this Ifa sheriff court, that where a sheriff takes property under a fi fa. and erry under goes out of office before he has sold, it he may notwithstanding as out of proceed to sell either with or without a venditioni exponas, upon office before the principle that the authority to make the money by the seizure helli, an I sale of property, being entire, he who begins may finish it. withstand But it is urged that there is a difference in this respect, where to sell with the sheriff's term of office expires, and where he resigns, as in this case. The difference is, however, not perceived; and it is exponas. manifest that the same principle upon which the doctrine is foundel in the former case, is equally applicable to the latter. In fact, the selling of the estate, in such a case, is not a privilege which the sheriff may or may not exercise a this pleasure; but it is a duty enjoined upon him by law, for the public convenience, and which he may be compelled to perform, by a writ of distringas; and it would be preposterous, to suppose that by resigning his office, he could discharge himself from the performance of the duty. VIII. OF THE LEVY. 1. BULLETT'S EX'RS v. WINSTON, March T. 1810, 1 Munf. Va. Rep. 260. It is not no cessary in stitu'e a One of the questions in this case was, what acts amounted to order to con a legal levying of a fieri facias; and the court held, that when god ley the sheriff had declared his intention to levy the executi o on on personal the property in his view, it being within his immediate power, it that the he was unnecessary to touch it in order to give effect to the levy. property riff should touch it. Or make a public a vow al at the 2. BUTLER V. MAYNARD, May T. 1834, 11 Wend. N. Y Rep. 548.553. Per Cur. Nelson, J. The mere circumstance of the officer's omitting to proclaim or give notoriety to his levy, at the time it time of the is made, is not of itself fraudulent so as to impair its effect. evy. But it must 3. WOOD V. VANARSDALE, Feb. T. 1832, 3 Rawle's Penn. R. 405. One of the questions in this case was, what constitutes a good his power levy on personal property, under a fieri facias? be within and control, or at least view. Per Cur. Kennedy, J. To constitute a levy upon personal within his property, it is not necessary that there should first be an inventory of it made out; nor is it necessary, perhaps, in all cases, that an inventory should be made out at any time. Neither is it necessary that the sheriff should remove the goods levied on immediately; nor that he put a person in every case, immediately into the possession of them; a reasonable time must be allowed for this, which may be more or less, to be judged of according to attending circumstances. A levy, however, upon such property, cannot be made without the sheriff has it within his power and controul, or at least within his view; and if, having it so, he makes a levy upon it, it will be good, if followed up afterwards, within a reasonable time, by taking possession in such manner as to apprise every body of the fact of its having been taken in execution. A levy up on part of a house in the name of 4. LEWIS V. SMITH, Dec. T. 1815, 2 Serg. & Rawle's Penn. Rep. 142. 157. Tilghman, C. J. It is objected that the sheriff did not make a the goods in regular levy on the plaintiff's execution. The return is," levied as per inventory, and then forewarned by the Marshall not the whole, to proceed any further in the levy. Annexed to the return is is a good le vy upon the an inventory of part of the furniture, headed in this manner :shole. "Levied on the following goods in the name of the whole.”— To render a Under the circumstances of the case, all the furniture being in one. house, I should consider this as a good levy upon the whole. 5. BARNES V. BILLINGTON, April T. 1803, 1 Wash. Circuit Court Washington. J. But there is another objection to the title of levy good, Billington and Corless under the execution, which is fatal, and seised that is the insufficiency of the levy. The sheriff must always the articles should be tion or sche designate the property seized under the execution, either designated in the body of his return, or by reference to the schedule ac- in the execu companying it. The reason is obvious; the execution creating dule annex a lien, it should be known to others who may take posterior executions, or who may deal with the debtor, what property is affected by the lien, and what is not. IX. STAY OF EXECUTION. 1. MILLIKEN V. BROWN, June T. 1823, 10 Serg. and Rawle Penn. Rep. 188. cd. A fi. fa. issu Per. Cur. Duncan, J. Hell, that a fieri facias issued within cd arera the period of a stay of execution, after security entered, was stay of exe a nullity, and trespass would lie against the plaintiff or prothon- nullity. otary for issuing it.. X. WHAT AMOUNTS TO A SATISFACTION OF THE cution is a DEBT. 1. HUNT AND ANOTHER V. & Rawle's Penn. Rep. 41. S. P. EX PARTE, LAWRENCE, goods to the ges the debt goods be Per Cur. Gibson, J. Gibson, J. Seising goods in execution to the value Seising of the debt, is a discharge of all responsibility on the part of value of the the debtor, and consequently, a discharge of the judgment; and debt dischar this whether the goods be sold or not; all further remedy being whether the against the sheriff, who becomes exclusively liable by the seiz- sold or not. ure; Clark v. Withers, 1 Salk. 323; Mountney v. Andrews, Cro. Eliz. 235; Slie v. Finch, 2 Roll. Rep. 57; Cockerant v. Welby, 2 Show. 79, pl. 63; Speake v. Richards, Hob. 206; 4 Mod. 404. Where, indeed, the sheriff has seisel on a fi. fa, but returns nulla bona, and there is a recovery against him by the judgment creditor for a false return, the fact of actual seisure will not discharge the judgment, but the property in the goods will remain in the debtor, subject to any other execution; Under wood v. Mordaunt, 2 Vern, 238. But this consequence, I apprehend, is produced by the conclusiveness of the return, which is of such regard, that generally, But a levv upon real es cient to sat cution is no satisfaction not sol! an may be issu ed which no averment is to be received against it; and it cannot therefore be shown, that the goods were actually seised; Com. Dig. Return, G. In Ward v. Hawchett, 1 Keble, 551, it was determined, that where the sheriff takes a bond for the money, it is payment of the debt as to the judgment creditor; and, further, that if he seises the goods and leaves them in the possession of the debtor, by the direction of the judgment creditor, and under an agreement with the creditor, it is in strictness, satisfaction of the judgment; and although the court would not, in that case, compel the sheriff to return the execution, to enable the party to have an audita querela, yet it was said, that if he had suffered damage, on account of the writ not having been returned, he might maintain an action for it. The sum of the matter, therefore, appears to be this; where the goods are actually seised, the property vests in the sheriff, and the debt becomes satisfied, as to the judgment creditor, who can look only to the sheriff, unless where the latter chooses to return nulla bma, and there becomes answerable to the judgment creditor for his false return, who may also levy the same goods on another execution. 2. HOGSHEAD V. CARRUTH, July T. 1833, 5 Yerger's Tenn. Per Cur. Green, J. The defendant in error insists that the tate of the alias execution could not properly issue in this case, because the value suffi first fi. fa, was levied on 160 acres of land, of which no dispoisfy the cxe sition is shown to have been made. We recognise the doctrine settled by this court in the case of Young and Whitcomb v. and if it be Reed, that a levy on personal property to an amount sufficient alias fi. f. to satisfy the execution, is a discharge, but it does not follow that the same rule applies to a levy on real estate. In the latmay be levi ter case, the sheriff has not possession of the property levied on, has no control over it, and it cannot be wasted in his hands, so as to injure the debtor. Morever, after such levy, the sheriff may discover personal property upon which it will become his duty to levy and make the money, before he can lawfully sell the lands. Therefore, we hold that a levy on real estate is no discharge of the fi. fa. and that the alias fi. fa. in this case was properly issued. ed upon personal property. So in Penn syivui. 3. GRAW AND TOWNSEND V. THE HUNTINGDON BANK, June T. 1830, 1 Penn. Rep. 425. In this case the lands of one of the plaintiffs in error were levied |