force and effect of a contract between the shipper and the transportation company without there having been an actual meeting of minds between them. This principle the Secretary utilized in preparing his plan. In brief, it would provide a fixed wage for a certain period, with the employer liable to civil suit in case he should deviate from it one way or the other.

The proposed Wage Commission would be composed of an equal number of representatives of employers, employees, and the Government. This Wage Commission should not be given full judicial powers nor would the Commissioners be appointed for life. It is deemed essential that the opportunity should exist for change at stated periods if changing economic thought, the development of bias on the part of any of the Commissioners, or any other reason should make a change desirable.

When the Interstate Commerce Commission fixes a rate which is not confiscatory, and which is based on substantial evidence taken at hearings, the rate fixed is made to apply, not to any particular shipper, but to any and all shippers. When the rate is fixed. it cannot be raised to one shipper and lowered to another. The same principle is introduced into this Wilson plan in its application to wages. Although means would be provided by which errors of law, apparent on the face of the record, could be determined by the courts, yet all employers in a given locality and given industry would be treated alike.

It is believed that by making it impossible for the wage rate to be raised or lowered within the period for which the award would be made, the principal cause of strikes and lockouts would be eliminated.

Although the wage earners would then be left free to strike and the transportation companies would be free to use the lockout, nothing could be gained by either side. Consequently neither strike nor lockout would occur. If the employer knew that he could be sued by his wage workers in case he paid them less than the fixed wage, and the wage workers knew that he would be sued by the District Attorney if he paid more than the fixed wage, all incentive to striking would be removed. The only requisite to insure the success of such a plan would be to have enough intelligent Wage Commissioners and to have them change the rate of wage often enough to protect both the industry and the wage workers. The chief purpose of such a board would be to have the rate of wage as nearly as possible that which would be the natural wage if left to the law of supply and demand, and to have it apply to all employers (in a given community and industry) alike, making them liable to suit for deviating from it in either direction.

The Wage Commission could be given thirty days in which to file its decisions with the courts and ten days thereafter could be allowed for filing exemptions; but as the order of the Wage Commissioners would go into effect on the date fixed by the Commission (unless the courts reversed the action of the Commission on errors of law apparent on the face of the record), the length of time allowed for filing the order and taking exceptions thereto would not be of grave importance.

The employer always controls the fund from which wages are paid. Hence, under such a plan there would be no way by which the employee could compel him

to pay more than such a Wage Commission might award. He might, however, pay less; but the employee would then be able to sue and recover. If he must enter the suit at his own expense, the employee would be placed at a decided disadvantage in the enforcement of the award. It is, therefore, deemed equitable to require the United States Attorneys to prosecute the suit in his behalf. By the same law, however, the United States Attorneys would be directed to institute and prosecute proceedings to prevent employers from paying more than the award, so that a strike to force higher wages than the award would be valueless.

The awards would be made for a definite period, but sufficiently short to make it useless for either employer or employee to tie up operations pending the expiration of the award. An opportunity should be given for a periodical radical readjusting on a basis of changed conditions or advance in economic thought. Provision should also be made for readjustment within the period in the event of an emergency. The need of the hour is increased production. This can be secured only by making the wage worker happy and interested in producing all possible. This means that he must always feel right toward the employer and the system of wage adjustment in force.

In the minds of many of the ablest captains of industry and leaders of labor, this is the most hopeful solution of wage controversies yet suggested. Although the Secretary outlined it as applicable to transportation and public utilities, why could it not be applied to general industry as well? I believe that it could be and will be.

As a step in this direction, Secretary Wilson submitted the following memoranda to the Industrial Conference in October, 1919:

"There shall be created a Board of equal numbers of employers and employees in each of the principal industries and a Board to deal with miscellaneous industries not having separate Boards. The representatives of labor on such Boards shall be selected in such manner as the workmen in the industry may determine. The representatives of the employers shall be selected in such manner as the employers in the industry may determine.

"Whenever any dispute arises in any plant or series of plants that cannot be adjusted locally the question or questions in dispute shall be referred to the Board created for that industry for adjustment. The Board shall also take jurisdiction whenever in the judgment of one-half of its members a strike or lockout is imminent. Decisions of the Board on questions of wages, hours of labor, or working conditions must be arrived at by unanimous vote. If the Board shall fail to come to a unanimous determination of any such question, the question in dispute shall be referred to a General Board appointed by the President of the United States in the following

manner:

"One-third of the number to be appointed in agreement with the organization or organizations of employers most representative of employers; onethird of the number to be appointed in agreement with the organization or organizations of labor most representative of labor; one-third of the number to be appointed by the President direct.