Injunction-Labor Organization. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court for the First Department held, in the recent case of Beattie v Callanan et al., that an injunction would lie against a labor organization and its officers to prevent interference with the plaintiff's business by inducing parties under contract with him to break the same through threats of ordering or inducing their employés to strike, it appearing that the reasons for the hostile course against the plaintiff were that he refused to recognize the association in a formal way and had offered an alleged affront to the walking delegate.

Employe" Laborer" — Contract. Where a contract of employment contemplates work, the doing of which depends mainly upon the mere physical power of the employé to do ordinary manual labor, the person so employed is a "laborer" within the meaning of the statute of Georgia exempting from the process of garnishment the wages of journeymen, mechanics and day laborers, and the mere fact that such an employé has the control and management of coemployés engaged in similar work would not deprive him of the exemption allowed by the statute. So held by the Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of Stothart v. Melton.

Minor Employé — Accident Negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held, in the recent case of Marino r. Lehmaier, that, under the provisions of the labor law of that state forbidding the employment of a child under fourteen years of age in a factory, an employer who put a child only thirteen years and three months old at work on a printing press, where he was injured, was liable for the injury in a civil action, although no affirmative act of negligence or wrong other than a violation of the statute was shown on the part of the employer, and that the child could not as matter of law be chargeable with contributory negligence or with having assumed the risk of the employ

ment.

Laborer's Lien - Logs - Reservation. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held, in the case of The Commonwealth Lumber Company . Rowley, which arose out of an action to foreclose a laborer's lien, claimed under the provisions of chapter 42 of the General Laws of 1899, for labor performed in cutting

and banking certain pine logs on the White Earth Indian reservation under contract with a representative of the general government, that at the time the labor of cutting and banking such logs was performed the same belonged to the government of the United States, and that no lien could attach thereto, and that the appellees having acquired title to the logs subsequent to the performance of such labor, they received the same free and clear of the plaintiff's asserted lien.

Stockholder's Liability Interstate Law. Where a suit was brought to enforce the liability of stockholders under the law of Minnesota against a resident of Wisconsin, who owned a number of shares of stock in a Minnesota bank which failed, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a receiver appointed in Minnesota under the laws of that state could not maintain an action outside of that state to enforce liability. The case was brought up to the Supreme Court of the United States, but that tribunal held (Finney r. Guy) that it could not review the action of the Wisconsin court, no federal question being involved, adding: "Whether, aside from the federal question, the Wisconsin court should have permitted this action to be maintained because of the principle of comity between the states is a question exclusively for the courts of that state to decide."

Minimum Wage Law Unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Indiana held, in the recent case of Street. Varney Electrical Supply Company, that the act of March 9, 1901, fixing a minimum wage for unskilled labor on public work was unconstitutional. This law provided that unskilled laborers employed on all work done for counties, cities and towns should be paid not less than 20 cents an hour. The court held that the act constituted class legislation and interfered with the liberty of contract, saying, among other things, that no suflicient reason had been assigned why the wages of the unskilled laborer should be fixed by law and maintained at an unalterable rate regardless of their actual value, and that all other laborers should be left to secure to themselves such compensation for their work as the conditions of supply and demand, competition, personal qualities, energy, skill and experience might enable them to do.

Bankruptcy-Wages-Priority. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, in The Matter of Slomka et al., reported in the New York Law Journal, that under the bankruptcy act priority of payment of debts for wages of employés of the bankrupt can be allowed only as to wages earned within three months before the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, and that where a general assignment for the benefit of creditors was made under a state statute granting preference to wages earned within a year before the execution of the assignment, which assignment was avoided and superseded by a bankruptcy proceeding, priority could not be allowed as to wages earned more than three months before the commencement of the latter proceeding, as the same did not constitute "debts owing to any person who by the laws of the state *** is entitled to priority' " within the meaning of clause 5 of section 64 of the bankruptcy act.

Railroad-Regulation — Passengers The Supreme Court of Georgia held, in the recent case of The Central of Georgia Railway Company . Motes, that whether a regulation adopted and sought to be enforced by a carrier of passengers is or is not reasonable is a question of law and not one of fact for determination by a

jury; that in the absence of any duty devolving upon a railway company to provide at its stations a place wherein its patrons may sleep while awaiting the arrival or departure of trains, a regulation forbidding passengers from going to sleep in its waiting rooms or lying down on the benches therein is not in a legal sense unreasonable, and that a passenger who displays a persistent determination to disregard such a regulation, and by his wrongful conduct so exasperates an employé of the company as to unfit him for properly performing the duty he owes to his employer with respect to his treatment of his patrons, cannot justly complain that the company's employé lost his temper and resorted to unnecessary force in compelling an observance of the regulation on the part of the pas. senger.

Master and Servant. Discharge. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held, in the recent case of Von Heyne v. Tompkins, that where the relation of mas. ter and servant exists between parties certain duties are cast upon the servant which he is bound to fulfill and discharge, the principal one being that of obedience to all reasonable orders of the master not inconsistent with the contract; that disobedience of reasonable orders justifies a rescission by the master of the contract of employment and the peremptory discharge of the servant, and that where a contract for service is an entire one and not severable, and a servant is lawfully discharged for disobedience of the reasonable orders of the master, he is not entitled to recover for his services. The court further held that the motives which actuate a master in discharging a servant are wholly immaterial, the act being justified if any legal ground therefor existed at the time, and it is also immaterial whether or not all the grounds were known to the master when discharging the servant. Nor is it neces sary for the master to assign a reason for the discharge, and should he assign one he is not bound by it, nor is he estopped to rely upon some other or different reason or cause, whether known to him at the time of the discharge or not.

Building Association Stockholder. In the case of Manheimer e. Henderson Building & Loan Association's Assignee, recently decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, it appeared that the appellee made a deed of Assignment for the benefit of its creditors and the assignee instituted proceedings for a settlement of the trust. Prior to the assignment the appellant, a stockholder, had paid all indebtedness on the stock, had reduced her claim against the association to judgment and filed the judgment with the commis. sioner, who reported it as a claim on an equal footing with those of other stockholders. The appellant filed exceptions to the report, contending that her claim

should be allowed as a preferred claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court below, overruling the appellant's exceptions. The court held that a stockholder in an insolvent building and loan association is not entitled to credit for stock payments made, or to the withdrawal value of the stock where the same remains with the company unsettled at the time the company becomes insolvent; that the uniform rule is that after the assignment of a building and loan association all stockholders are upon an equal footing; that the fact that the appellant paid in advance all premiums and dues assessed upon her stock or that she gave notice of withdrawal before the assignment could not alter the relationship of the parties as fixed by law, and that the fact that her claim had been merged in a judgment could not change her status as a stockholder or give her preference over other stock. holders.

Eight Hour Law Void. The Court of Appeals of New York declared unconstitutional the eight-hour provision of the penal code (subdivision 1 of section 384, H), in the case of the People 2. the Orange County Road Construction Company, reversing the decision of the appellate division, second department, and sustaining that of Judge Beattie of the Orange county court, who ordered the discharge of the defendant company, upon its demurrer alleging that the law was unconstitutional.

The law, which is a complement of the eight-hour law provision of the labor law, passed at the same session of 1899, made it a misdemeanor for any person or corporation, contracting with the state or with a municipal corporation, to require more than eight hours work for a day's labor.

The defendant corporation was engaged in road construction for the county of Orange, and criminal proceedings were instituted in behalf of the people for its infringement. The defendant entered a demurrer, asserting that the law was unconstitutional This demurrer was sustained by Judge Beattie, but overruled by the appellate division, from whose decision the defendant appealed.

Judge Cullen's opinion, in which the whole court concurs, holds that the law is not a proper exercise of the police power of the state, but unduly discriminates between different classes of contractors, and between the same contractor working for the state and for a private party, or for itself. It is conceded that the state has a right to protect women and children or adults from unwholesome or dangerous occupations. This law, Judge Culien holds, does not deal with the character of the work, or with age, sex or condition of employment, nor even with the personality of the employer.

Immigration into Boston in 1902. The growth of the trans-Atlantic passenger traffic at the Port of Boston in the last five calendar years may be seen from the following statement.

The number of immigrants arriving at this port in 1898 was 14,020; in 1899, 19,928; 1900, 17,777; 1901, 28,060; 1902, 53,278.

It will be seen that the increase in the number of immigrants in 1902 as compared with 1898 was 39,258, or 280.01 per cent; as compared with 1901, the increase in 1902 was 25,218, or 89.87 per cent.

In addition to the trans-Atlantic immigrants at the Port of Boston, there arrived at the ports in Massachusetts from the Dominion of Canada by water during 1898, 18,113; during 1899, 25,700; during 1900, 26,883; during 1901, 24,297; during 1902, 23,047.

The largest number of immigrants arriving during the year 1902 was 14,071 from Italy, 12,211 from Sweden, 7,690 from Ireland, 5,293 from England, 4,833 from Finland. These aggregate 44,098, or 82.77 per cent of the whole number of immigrants arriving during specified year.