OPEN-DOOR DIPLOMACY DURING RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 269 belligerents. This would force the powers to reveal any designs against the "open door." If the United States should accede to this request, Germany would, of course, at once declare her own policy of disinterestedness. President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay agreed that it would be well to accept the Kaiser's suggestion. Accordingly the Secre tary framed a circular letter and despatched it to the American embassies throughout Europe. It stated that it had come to the knowledge of the United States that apprehension existed on the part of some of the powers lest claims be made after the close of the Russo-Japanese war for concession of Chinese territory to neutral powers. While the President was loath to share this apprehension, the United States considered it fitting to reassert the position it had maintained and which it had repeatedly made known, namely, the maintenance of the integrity of China and the open door to commerce in the Orient. The United States, therefore, in the existing situation disclaimed any thought of acquiring territorial rights or control in the Chinese Empire and invited the other governments DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Jan. 13, 1905. To the American Ambassadors to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great "It has come to our knowledge that apprehension exists on the part of some of the powers that in the eventual negotiations for peace between Russia and Japan claim may be made for the concession of Chinese territory to neutral powers. The President would be loath to share this apprehension, believing that the introduction of extraneous interests would seriously embarrass and postpone the settlement of the issues involved in the present contest in the Far East, thus making more remote the attainment of that peace which is so earnestly to be desired. For its part, the United States has repeatedly made its position well known, and has been gratified at the cordial welcome accorded to its efforts to strengthen and perpetuate the broad policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the "open door" in the Orient, whereby equality of commercial opportunity and access shall be enjoyed by all nations. Holding these views the United States disclaims any thought of reserved territorial rights or control in the Chinese Empire, and it is deemed fitting to make this purpose frankly known and to remove all apprehension on this score so far as concerns the policy of this nation, which maintains so considerable a share of the Pacific commerce of China and which holds such important possessions in the western Pacific, almost at the gateway of China. You will bring this matter to the notice of the government to which you are accredited, and you will invite the expression of its views thereon. JOHN HAY." 1 to express their views on the subject. The replies from all the powers declared them to be in full accord with the principle set forth by the United States. Germany's acceptances of her own invitation was of course especially emphatic and gratification was expressed that the American Government intended to continue to assist in the maintenance and strengthening of the policy of the integrity of China and the "open door" in the Far East. It is thus clear that after the taking of Kiao-Chao, and beginning with the Anglo-German agreement of 1900, the United States' doctrine of the "open door" received the active support of Germany. The German Government claimed that it had always acted upon that doctrine and that it had demonstrated this in declaring Kiao-Chao a free port. This explanation ignored, however, the special privileges secured to Germany in the province of Shantung. These, while they left all other nations on a par with one another in relation to the trade of that province, discriminated in favor of German industry, products and capital in a manner directly contrary to the doctrine. The general attitude of the two countries toward China itself was radically different The United States, although possessing a most-favored-nation treaty with China,54 did not assert its rights under that treaty as "F. R. 1905, p. 3 (Inclosure-translation by source). The German Chancellor to Ambassador Tower BERLIN, Jan. 18, 1905. "Mr. Ambassador: I have had the honor of receiving your communication of the 14th of January, 1905, in which you were good enough to set forth the position of your Government in regard to certain questions raised by the present war between Russia and Japan. I am extremely gratified to learn by it that the President and the Government of the United States of America intend to continue to assist in the maintenance and strengthening of the policy of the integrity of China and the open door in the Far East for the benefit of the free commercial intercourse of all nations and that they have no thought of acquiring territorial rights in the Chinese Empire. This view corresponds entirely with that of the German Government which has repeatedly declared its adherence to the principles of the integrity of China and the open door in the Far East. Its purpose is absolutely to stand by its former declarations. Germany's position is defined in the Anglo-German agreement of the 16th of October, 1900, which was communicated at that time to all the powers interested and accepted by them. In this agreement the Imperial Government has bound itself to support the principle of the open door in China wherever its influence may be felt. It is therefore scarcely necessary to add that the Imperial Government does not seek for itself any further acquisition of territory in China. I avail etc. "Malloy: Vol. I, p. 221. BUELOW." GERMAN AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN CHINA 271 a basis for claim to Chinese territory, when other nations were acquiring ports and other concessions on the ground of their mostfavored-nation treaties with China. The United States announced at the outset and consistently acted upon its purpose of maintaining the integrity of China" even though it had as much basis as the others for claims to similar concessions In the case of Germany the policy was governed by a deliberate expansion system, which ignored the rights of China and sought to justify itself by the actions of the other European powers. Great Britain, France and Russia had each secured a foothold in the Empire, therefore Germany had determined to secure one also and merely waited for the suitable occasion, which came in 1897. The attitude of the government was described openly by von Buelow before the Reichstag at the time of the seizure of Kiao-Chao.56 The Secretary stated that while the partition of China would not have been initiated by Germany, that the Government had merely seen to it that whatever happened Germany should not come out 55 Memoirs of Li Hung Chang, p. 234: "Peking, at U. S. Legation, October 19.-Today I received an American newspaperman, and gave him a lengthy interview. I would not have talked at all with him, but for two things: his paper, which is one of great influence at Washington, has been China's advocate in all this miserable affair; and secondly, he told me that he tried to get an interview with me at the Philadelphia junction (Germantown) but failed. So I made it up with him, and sent the thanks of China and myself to those fair-dealing people who live in the land of Lincoln and Grant and McKinley." £6 V. R. '97-'98, Bd. III, 76 Sitz., 27. April, '99, S. 1987. (transl. by author): "Reference has been made to the partition of China. Such a partition would at any rate not have proceeded from us; we have only seen to it in season that whatever may happen, we shall not come out entirely empty handed. When a railroad train shall start does not always depend on the inclination of the traveller, but (it is his business to see) that he does not miss connections. The devil takes the hindmost! (Den Letzen beissen die Hunde) (Amusement) But we do not desire-and this I wish to mark with especial emphasis-that it should come to a partition of the Chinese Empire. And I do not believe today that such a partition will occur within the visible future (in absehbarer Zeit). At any rate we have won and herewith I think are best summed up the reasons, which led us to Kiao-Chao and also the significance of Kiao-Chao for us-in Kiao-Chao a strategic and political position, which assures us a determining influence on the future fate of East Asia. From this firm position, we can await the further development of affairs with calmness and equanimity. We have before us so great a sphere of action and such important tasks that we need not begrudge other nations the concessions granted to them. (Very good!) German foreign policy will, as everywhere, so also in East Asia, understand how to go its way calmly, firmly and peacefully. We will nowhere play the role of disturber of the peace, but also not that of Cinderella. (Animated bravo!)" empty-handed. It was not the privilege of the traveller to determine when the train should start, but it was his business to see that he did not miss it. In other words, as the secretary expressed it, it was a case of "the devil takes the hindmost" ("den Letzten beissen die Hunde"). However, having secured in China that which suited well Germany's purposes, both from the viewpoints of strategic position and commercial opportunity, the Imperial Government considered that the interests of the empire dictated a maintenance of the status quo. For this the best instrument was the American doctrine of the "open door." The utterance of that doctrine, however, came with better grace from its first champion, the United States. For this reason57 the Emperor called upon President Roosevelt for a reassertion of this doctrine at the time when the status quo in China seemed to him again threatened. The United States was glad to take advantage of another opportunity to secure from the powers reinforcement of its well-known principle. Therefore, it resulted that from the time of the AngloGerman compact to the end of the period under consideration both the United States and Germany were acting as champions of the "open door." 57 Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 388. Mr. Thayer holds that the Kaiser felt isolated from the other great powers at this time and feared that they aimed at the partition of China without giving Germany a share of the spoile. Mr. Thayer also holds that a desire to humiliate France for intrigues in Morocco was an additional reason for the Kaiser's approach to the United States on this question. Secretary Hay himself records in his diary: "What the whole performance meant to the Kaiser it is difficult to see. But there is no possible doubt that we have scored for China." Mr. Elihu Root spoke of this subject in his address as Temporary Chairman of the Republican National Convention at Chicago in 1904. (See "The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Address and Reports," by Elihu Root, pp. 105 and 106). Mr. Root stated: "None other had won confidence in the sincerity of its purpose, and none other but America could render the service which we have rendered to humanity in China during the past four years. High evidence of that enviable position of our country is furnished by the fact that when all Europe was in apprehension lest the field of war between Russia and Japan should so spread as to involve China's ruin and a universal conflict, it was to the American government that the able and far-sighted German Emperor appealed, to take the lead again in bringing about an agreement for the limitation of the field of action, and the preservation of the administrative entity of China outside of Manchuria; and that was accomplished. CHAPTER VIII GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE FOR a complete and adequate study of the German policy toward the fundamental American policy of the Monroe Doctrine, many factors besides the events leading to diplomatic negotiations should be taken into account. Such a study should give full weight to the general expansion policy of the German Government as expressed openly by its representatives and demonstrated by its colonial acquisitions. Account should be taken of the programs framed and voiced by the Pan-Germanists, opposed by the Radicals and Moderates, but followed-at some distance-by the Imperial Government. There should also be considered the avenues through which this policy was conducted-the effective support given by the government to German enterprise in foreign countries and the efforts of the government to use the stream of German emigration to further the commerce and national prestige of the empire. It was the consciousness of these facts, rather than the factors of actual controversy between the two countries, which caused the American public to look upon Germany as the new foe of the Monroe Doctrine. In this chapter, however, the attempt only is made to view the German Government's attitude from those diplomatic negotiations in which the Monroe Doctrine was the main principle involved. During the forty-year period under consideration there were comparatively few diplomatic controversies between Germany and the United States relating to a possible violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and with the exception of the Venezuela episode of 1902 to 1904, none which-so far as published documents revealthreatened to become serious. The first episode occurred shortly after the unification of the empire in 1871 and related to the country so frequently the center of complications with European powers— |