In the case of Dudley Canal v. Grazebrook, an Act provided that no owner of any mines should work within twelve yards of the canal without leave of the company. If the owner wished to work the mines, he was to give the canal proprietors notice, and they might inspect. If they did not inspect he might work them, and if they refused to let him work them they were to buy. By another clause nothing was to defeat the right of owners of mines to work them, provided that in working the same no injury was done to the navigation. It was held that this proviso was to be construed with some qualificationnamely, either that the party working the mines was to do no unnecessary damage to the navigation, or no extraordinary damage by working out of the usual mode. Therefore, where notice had been given of the working of a coal-mine under a reservoir, and the canal company had not purchased the owner's rights, it was held that he was entitled to work the mine under the reservoir in the ordinary mode, and the reservoir having been damaged by such working, no action was maintainable for such damage. No action of tort will, however, lie against a canal company for damage done to a mine near their canal by flooding it, when they have done all in their power to prevent such flooding. In the case of Dunn v. Birmingham Canal Co., the defendants were authorized under their Act to take land, doing as little harm as possible, and making satisfaction for all damage to any hereditaments prejudiced. The minerals under the canal were reserved to the owners, who were at liberty to work them provided no damage was done to the navigation. The owners were not to work the minerals without giving three months' notice to the defendants, who might inspect the mines and prevent the bridge Canal v. Dudley, 3 L. J., Q. B. 108. See ante, Chap. III. p. 1 1 B. & Ad. 59. Ordinary rules of construction as to conveyances binding on canal companies. working of them, paying the owners the value. The canal having been used many years, the plaintiff gave defendants notice that he was going to work certain mines, but the defendants did not inspect, and refused to buy. Plaintiff worked his mines without negligence, but without regard to supporting the surface, and defendants did all they could to keep the canal watertight. The result of the working was that the water of the canal escaped through the cracks and flooded the plaintiff's mine, whereupon he brought his action. It was held that no action of tort would lie, though Kelly, C. B., and Pigott, B., were of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation under the Act. "Striking out the charge "of negligence," said Kelly, C. B., "the defendants are 66 charged with nothing but that they brought water into "the canal near the plaintiff's mine. They had full power under the Act to bring the water where they brought it." 66 In some cases Acts contain provisions for the benefit of mine owners with regard to the transport of the minerals along the canal passing through their lands.1 The terms of conveyances of land to the company are regulated in each case by the provisions of each particular Act, but the ordinary rules with respect to such contracts would appear to be binding on them. A local Act empowered proprietors to contract for the sale of, and to sell their lands to, a canal company; and such contracts, sales, &c. were to be valid to all intents and purposes, and were to be enrolled with the clerks of the peace. Copies thereof were to be evidence; and on payment of the sums agreed on, the lands were to vest in the company. It was held that conveyances of land under the Act must be in writing.2 A canal company, empowered to purchase lands for 1 Finch v. Birmingham Canal, 5 B. & C. 820. 2 Robins v. Warwick Canal, 2 Bing. N. C. 483; see Harborough v. Shadlow, 7 M. & W. 37. gross sums, or rent-charges, took possession of lands of an infant on agreement with his steward, and, after an award by commissioners of the gross sum or rent-charge, such sum was paid to the steward. No person being party to this award who had power to bind the infant, it was invalid, and no conveyance was executed, and the purchasemoney was returned. The company, however, used the land for the canal, paying rent for forty years to the landowner after he attained his majority. It was held that no agreement for sale of the fee, in consideration of the rent-charge, could be presumed to have been entered into or ratified by the landlord, but that an action of ejectment, as well as the intended erection of a bridge by the latter, should be restrained by injunction, on the ground of acquiescence, the company undertaking to put in force their parliamentary powers for the purchase of land.1 In another case, lands were demised in 1779 by P. to M. and Company for sixty-five years. In 1794 an Act was obtained for making Swansea Canal through part of the lands in question; and it was enacted that on payment or tender of certain sums for the purchase of such lands, and, by leave of the owners, such lands should vest in the canal company. In 1797 the Duke of Beaufort made arrangement with the company to extend the canal through certain other of the lands. No payment or satisfaction was made, but the owners, &c. consented. On the termination of the lease of 1779, the assignees of the reversion brought ejectment against the assignee of the Duke of Beaufort, who remained in possession of the canals:-Held, the mere consent of the owner of the land to the construction of the canal did not bring the case within the Act, and the lessors of the plaintiff were entitled to the land. Per Parke, B., "The reversioner could not "create such an interest except by deed."2 A question as to copyhold lands arose in the case of 1 Somerset Canal v. Harcourt, 2 2 Patrick v. Beaufort, 6 Ex. 498. De G. & J. 546. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal. There an Act of Parliament gave the defendants powers to purchase lands, and also provided a form of conveyance. S. was tenant of copyhold land, and sold part to the company, the then lord not objecting. On the death of S., the lord made proclamation for the heir of S. to come and be admitted. No one appeared, and the lord seized the land "quousque," and brought ejectment against the defendants, and obtained judgment on the ground that the conveyance, under the canal Act, only vested in the defendants an equitable estate. He interfered to stop the navigation, and the defendants, having filed a bill praying that the customary heir of S. might be admitted on their paying all fees, and having sought a perpetual injunction, the ViceChancellor made a decree directing the customary heir of S. to be admitted to hold as trustee for the canal company, and granted an injunction. On appeal, the House of Lords affirmed this decision. The Court will not grant a mandamus to compel a canal company to proceed to assess the value of land taken by them, if the parties interested in the land do not apply within a reasonable time, especially where there is another remedy by ejectment.2 Where a canal company had powers under their Act to take and give leases of other canals, and sold their rights under another Act to the Oxford Railway Company, it was held that the latter had authority to take a lease of another canal.3 Liabilities of It is usual in canal Acts to insert clauses providing for canal comthe amount of compensation to be given by companies for panies as to compensation damage done to the interests of neighbouring proprietors. Thus a canal Act provided that no mine owner should work within forty yards of certain tunnels without leave of the company; and if the company, instead of insisting under their Acts. 1 3 H. L. 794. 2 Rex v. Stainforth, 1 M. & S. 32; cf. Shand v. Henderson, 2 Dow, 519; see post, p. 287. 3 Rogers v. Oxford Rail. Co., 25 Beav. 322. on full forty yards, should require less than thirty yards, a quantity not exceeding thirty yards was to be left for the security of the mine. Whenever a mine should become workable within forty yards, the mine owner should give notice, and the company should pay him for so much of the forty yards as they required to be left:-Held, that where a mine had become workable within forty yards of the tunnels, and the company had required the whole forty yards to be left, the owner of the mine was entitled to compensation for the forty yards.1 Where under a canal Act commissioners were appointed for settling all matters in dispute between the company and the owners of lands prejudiced, and the amount of compensation was to be assessed by a jury, and to be binding and conclusive to all intents and purposes; it was held that the verdict and judgment were conclusive as to the amount, but not as to the claimants' right to compensation.2 It was provided by an Act for making a canal, that in case of disputes a jury should assess the value of the land, and award recompense either for damages which should or might before that time have been sustained, or for the future, temporary, or perpetual continuance of any recurring damages. It was also enacted that all the works should be completed within fifteen years. A jury having assessed the value of land at 67., the present damage at nil, but the future damage at 2,8007.; it was held that this verdict was wrong, since, in order to enable the jury to assess future damages, the cause of the injury must already exist in some of the work done; and it was also held, that unless the undertakers had finally abandoned the work, they might take land on payment of 67. at any time during the fifteen years.3 In the somewhat similar case of Thicknesse v. Lancaster 1 Fenton v. Trent and Mersey Navigation Co., 2 Rail. Cas. 837; cf. Cromford Canal v. Cutts, 5 Rail. Cas. 442; Dunn v. Birmingham Canal Co., L. R., 8 Q. B. 42; Reg. v. Delamere, 13 W. R. 757. 2 Barker v. Nottingham Canal Co., 15 C. B., N. S. 726. 3 Lee v. Milner, 2 M. & W. 824. |