the liability in the case as to William Stanilonis is finally determined. The petition for the rule recites (inter alia) that the judgment was entered against the above named defendants for two thousand, three hundred and twenty-five dollars, upon a judgment note dated November 1st, 1912, payable on demand to the order of J. A. Mandour, wherein the indebtedness of the defendants is joint and not several; that on the 30th day of December, 1912, William Stanilonis, one of the defendants, filed a petition in said court, alleging that his signature to the note was obtained by fraud on the part of Andrew Karpowsky and Joseph Walukas, and setting forth at length the circumstances of the fraud; that counsel for J. A. Mandour and William Stanilonis agreed in writing, February 13, 1913, that the rule to open the judgment as to William Stanilonis should be made absolute and the said William Stanilonis be permitted to defend upon certain questions to be submitted to a jury for their determination. These questions were duly submitted, the jury rendered a verdict, but the court, in an opinion filed, granted a new trial, and the issue is now pending in the common pleas court. That the said J. A. Mandour has issued an execution against the said Andrew Karpowsky to collect the whole amount of the said judgment, and has not issued execution against William Stanilonis; That if the whole amount of the judgment is collected from the said Andrew Karpowsky, the plaintiff will have no interest to pursue the case against the other defendants, and the said Andrew Karpowsky, the petitioner, will be deprived of showing that Stanilonis is a codebtor, and that, therefore, until the liability of Stanilonis is established, the amount each defendant is liable for is uncertain, and the said Andrew Karpowsky cannot compel contribution from Joseph Walukas as codefendant.

Counsel for the plaintiff demur to this petition. Counsel for defendant lay great stress upon the cases of Struthers vs. Lloyd, 14 Pa. 216, and Sterret vs. Ramsey, 2 Watts 91, as supporting their contention that to permit the plaintiff in this case to collect the entire amount of the judgment from Andrew Karpowsky would be in effect to defeat his right to compel contribution from his codefendants, Stanilonis and Walukas, by reason of the fact that the plaintiff would have no further interest in the

case now pending between himself and Stanilonis; and these decisions seem to bear out counsel's contention. It will be noted, however, that both of these decisions were rendered prior to the passage of the Act of 22 April, 1856, P. L. 534, paragraph 9, which act relates to the marshalling of liens and the subrogation of parties entitled to the same. We think that this act was passed to remedy the difficulties presented in these decisions, and that the language of the act is broad enough to supply the case at bar.

It will be noted that there is no fraud alleged against the plaintiff in the judgment. The acts complained of by Stanilonis are the acts of Karpowsky and Walukas, his codefendants, and we do not see why any acts of the defendants themselves, or any understanding that they may have had, of which the plaintiff was innocent or ignorant, could affect his rights in this judgment. It is not alleged that the full consideration was not given, or that the plaintiff did not take the judgment in good faith, or that he is not now proceeding in good faith to collect what is rightfully his on a valid obligation and legally due. All the equities of the case are with the plaintiff, and we do not see why he should be delayed in the collection of what is rightfully and legally his, by a fight between the defendants from whom he seeks to collect his claim.

And now, to wit, April 27th, 1914, the rule heretofore granted in this case is herewith dismissed at the costs of the petitioner.

ESTATE OF FRANKLIN A. COMLY, DECEASED.

A died unmarried and without issue, leaving a last will and testament, wherein, after making certain specific bequests, he gave the residue of his estate to trustees, in trust, until the death of the last of four bneficiaries, his sister, brother, niece and nephew. Under the will of the testator, the trustees were directed to divide the yearly income of the residuary estate into four equal parts and to pay one part each to his sister, his brother, his niece and his nephew, during their respective lives.

After the death of the last survivor of the said four life beneficiaries, upon distribution of the corpus of said estate, it was held that said corpus, on the death of the last survivor, became payable to the next of kin of the said sister, brother, niece and nephew.

Adjudication.

In the Orphans' Court of Montgomery County. Joseph Fornance and Bernard Gilpin, Esqs., for Accountant.

N. H. Larzelere and Franklin L. Wright, Esqs., for Samuel B. C. Trexler and Dr. James E. Trexler.

Francis K. Swartley, Esq., for Julia Trexler Longwell and for Horace C. Longwell.

Neville D. Tyson, Esq., for William D. Neilson, trustee under deed of trust of Emma P. Bunting.

E. Spencer Miller, Esq., for J. Murray Bunting, surviving husband of Emma P. Bunting.

Carroll R. Williams, Esq., for Commonwealth Title Insurance & Trust Company of Philadelphia, assignee of Dr. James E. Trexler.

Solly, P. J., January 29, 1914.

FACTS.

Franklin A. Comly, late president of the North Pennsylvania Railroad Co., and a resident of the Township of Whitemarsh, died on the 23rd day of April, 1887, unmarried and without issue. He left a last will and testament, wholly written by himself, bearing date the 27th day of June, 1885, which was duly admitted to probate the 28th day of April, 1887, wherein, after making certain specific bequests, he gave the residue of his estate to Peter C. Hollis and John S. Wise, in trust until the death of the last of four beneficiaries, namely Sarah W. Paxson and Joshua Comly, his sister and brother, and Emma P. Trexler and Franklin A. Comly, Jr., his niece and nephew, the children of his deceased brother, Samuel W. Comly.

Sarah W. Paxson, the sister, died April 10, 1887, leaving issue surviving, three children, namely, Anne W. Dickey, Franklin C. Paxson, and Eliza A. Paxson, they being her next of kin. Franklin C. Paxson died February 11, 1900, testate. By his will he bequeathed his interest. in this estate to Walter Penn Shipley and the Girard Trust Company of Philadelphia, in trust for his sister, Anne W. Dickey, and her three children. Eliza A. Paxson died September 3, 1890, testate. By her will she bequeathed her interest in this estate to her brother, Franklin C. Paxson, in trust for her husband, Jacob; her son, Edward E.; her brother, the said Franklin C., and her

sister, the said Anne W. Dickey. Edward E. Paxson died February 26, 1899, intestate, without lawful wife, or children surviving.

Joshua Comly, the brother, died November 20, 1887, leaving surviving his wife, Catherine A., since deceased, and issue, one daughter, Elizabeth C. Purviance.

Emma P. Trexler, the niece, who afterwards intermarried with J. Murray Bunting, died September 14, 1913, leaving surviving her said husband, and issue, three children, Samuel B. C. Trexler, James E. Trexler, and Julia Trexler Longwell. She left a paper writing, in the nature of a last will and testament, in which she bequeathed her estate, consisting of her interest, if any, in this estate, to her husband. An issue to try the validity of the writing is pending in the courts of Philadelphia.

Franklin A. Comly, Jr., the nephew, died April 15, 1903, unmarried and without issue. His sole heir and next of kin was his sister, Mrs. Trexler.

All the life benficiaries are dead and the residuary estate of the decedent is now distributable and payable to the persons entitled under the provision of the will.

Under the will of the testator, the trustees were directed to divide the yearly income of the residuary estate into four equal parts, and to pay one part each to his sister, his brother, his niece, and nephew, during their respective lives, and upon the death of each to pay said part to his or her heirs, assigns or legal representatives. In construing the will, the Supreme Court, (Comly's Estate, 136 Pa. 153), held that the income "ayable to a legatee during his life was, after his death, payable to his heirs, next of kin under the intestate laws-their assigns or legal representatives.

QUESTION.

The question raised on this distribution is, when did the corpus of the residuary estate vest, and in whom? OPINION.

The clause of the will which gives rise to the question is as follows:

"I do hereby give to Peter C. Hollis and John S. Wise all my property and estate of whatsoever kind, in trust (i. e. not otherwise hereinbefore or hereinafter disposed of,) to be held by them for the use and purpose

herein named, to wit:-the yearly income from said estate to be divided into four equal parts, one-fourth part to be paid to my sister, Sarah W. Paxson; one-fourth part to be paid to my brother, Joshua Comly; one-fourth part to be paid to my niece, Emma P. Trexler; and one-fourth part to be paid to my inephew, Franklin A. Comly, Jr., said yearly income to be paid to them quarterly or half yearly as may be most convenient, so long as any of the said legatees may live, it being my wish and direction that the trust estate shall be kept together as a whole until the death of all the said legatees. And upon the death of any one of them, then the part payable to said legatee shall be paid to their heirs, assigns or legal representatives, as the case may be. And upon the death of all four of the legatees then the principal of the trust estate to be divided into four equal parts, and one-fourth part paid over to the heirs, assigns or legal representatives of each of the four legatees."

It is contended by the trustee under the deed of assignment of Emma P. Bunting, and by her surviving husband, that, as she was the sole next of kin of her brother, Franklin A. Comly, Jr., there vested in her, at the time of his death, a one-fourth part of the principal of the estate, which she died possessed of, and the same is to be awarded to her estate, subject to the amount due on the bonds which are collaterally secured by said assignment.

Mrs. Bunting's children, on the other hand, contend there was no vesting of the principal of the testator's estate until the death of the last survivor of the four life beneficiaries, and not only did a one-fourth part of the estate then vest in them as the next of kin of their mother, but also another fourth part as the heirs and next of kin of their uncle, the said Franklin A. Comly, Jr.

The solution of the question depends upon the intent of the testator as gathered from the four corners of the will. The whole matter is controlled by what the testator said. In expounding a will the question is not what the testator meant, but what is the meaning of his words. It is not what, perhaps, he may have meant, but what he has said. Woelper's Appeal, 126 Pa. 562. When the meaning is clear from language unmistakable, the instrument interprets itself. Huber's Appeal, 80 Pa. 348. All mere