horse was struck while yet on the first track. It is scarcely conceivable that he would have done so after actually seeing and hearing the approaching train. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that he did not stop, look and listen at a proper place, and the case falls within the rulings in Carroll vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 12 W. N. C. 348; Dryden vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 211 Pa. 620; Weikel vs. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 237 Pa. 524; Hamilton vs. Central R. R. of N. J., 227 Pa. 137; Myers vs. B. & O. R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 386; Harvey vs. R. R. Co., 210 Pa. 195; Welsh vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 162. The evidence shows that the deceased lived on an adjoining farm about an eighth of a mile from this crossing, and was acquainted with his surroundings at the time of the accident Under facts and circumstances of the case which seem to be indubitably established we are of the opinion that the deceased was guilty of such contributory negligence as prevents recovery by the plaintiffs. The motion for a new trial is refused. M'CAFFREY vs. LUKENS. Negligence-Automobile Collision-Contributory Negligence -Leg Protruding Beyond Automobile-Operator Under 16 Years of Age-Act of 7 July, 1913, P. L. 672. It is not negligence per se for a person riding in an automobile on a public highway to permit his feet or legs to extend beyond the vehicle. Where a plaintiff shows that the driver of an automobile, a child of the owner under 16 years of age, is driving a car maintained by the owner for the use of his family, to procure a fixture for his residence, under an order of the owner's wife, who is authorized by the owner to procure it, whether the car is being driven by the authority of the owner is a question for the jury, notwithstanding he has given orders that the driver should not operate the car unless accompanied by himself or son. Where in a collision between automobiles at a street crossing it is shown that one of the automobiles driven by a person of immature years, ran into the side of the other one, and there is some evidence of absence of warning by the driver, the question of negligence is for the jury. In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Motion by defendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. A. B. Geary, for Motion. J. DeHaven Ledward, Contra. May 1, 1916. Broomall, J.: By this action the plaintiff seeks to recover compensation for injuries caused by an automobile owned by the defendant and driven by his daughter, who is under sixteen years of age. The verdict of the jury was rendered on February 15, 1916, in favor of the plaintiff for three hundred dollars. No complaint is made as to the amount of the verdict, nor as to the manner of the submission of the case to the jury. By this motion the defendant urges to our attention three propositions: 1st. That the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 2nd. That there was no evidence which legally imposes upon the defendant any liability for the injuries caused by his daughter in driving the automobile. 3rd. That no negligence was shown in the daughter's driving of the automobile. The evidence upon the first question was to the effect that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile, and that the seats of the automobile being occupied, he was sitting on the side door with his leg protruding outside of the body of the automobile, and that defendant's automobile ran against the side of the automobile in which he was riding, coming in contact with his leg producing the injuries of which he complains. It is contended that the protrusion of his leg outside of the body of the automobile whereby it was injured is negligence per se. It would be profitless to discuss this question upon principle, because it has been decided against the defendant's contention in Little vs. Telegraph Co., 213 Pa. 229, in which Mr. Justice Mestrezat says, "It is not of itself negligence for a person riding in a wagon on a public highway to permit his feet or arms to extend beyond the side of the vehicle." The question of contributory negligence was submitted to the jury, who have found it in favor of the plaintiff. The evidence upon the second question was that the defendant was the owner of the automobile which collided with the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding, that he had bought it for the use of his family, that at the time of the accident it was being driven by his daughter, who is under sixteen years of age, that she was on an errand to procure a fixture for defendant's residence, that she had been sent on this errand by her mother, that the mother had defendant's authority in a general way to procure supplies for his residence, that the defendant was away from home at the time of the accident, that the defendant had given orders to his daughter never to take the automobile out, without being accompanied either by himself or his son, and that she had so driven the automobile on numerous occasions. Under this evidence the question was submitted to the jury, whether the daughter was driving the automobile with the defendant's authority, and they have found this question with the plaintiff. Was this a jury question? We think it was. Where a plaintiff shows that the driver, a minor child of the owner, is driving a car which is maintained by the owner for the use of his family, to procure a fixture for his residence, under an order of the owner's wife, who is authorized by the owner to procure it, the case is for the jury to find whether the car is being driven by the authority of the owner notwithstanding he has given orders that the driver should not drive the car unless accompanied by himself or son. The owner's instructions as to the manner in which his service shall be performed will not relieve him from responsibility for the driver's torts while violating his instructions: McClung vs. Dearborne, 134 Pa., 396; Moon vs. Matthews, 227 Pa., 488. The wife having the defendant's authority to send the daughter on the errand, and having his authority to use the automobile, it is just the same as if he had sent her himself, at the same time ordering her not to go unaccompanied by himself or son. She is performing his service, and the order relates only to the manner in which she shall perform it. The great test of liability is whether the driver is performing service for his master, on the one hand, or is upon his own business or pleasure on the other. Disobedience of orders is important to be considered in deciding this question, but when the conclusion is once reached that the driver is performing the authorized service of the owner, then orders as to the manner of performance are unimportant. The evidence upon the third question was two-fold; that which related to the manner of the accident and that which related to the violation of Section 8 of the Act of July 7, 1913, P. L. 672, which forbids the operation of an automobile on the public roads by a person under sixteen years of age. The evidence showed as to the manner of the accident, that the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding was proceeding westwardly on Third street, one of the main arteries of travel of the City of Chester. It was what is called a jitney and was probably running at an excessive speed, but this, however, much we may think it to be the cause of the accident, could not be attributable to the plaintiff. The defendant's automobile was proceeding southwardly on Concord avenue which crosses Third street substantially at right angles. The driver of the defendant's automobile intended to cross Third street diagonally somewhat to the left to a store on the South side of Third street at or near the corner of Concord avenue. The two vehicles came to the intersection at the same time, the drivers of each of them in ignorance that the other was about to occupy the intersection. The evidence is various as to whether the driver of defendant's automobile sounded a horn. When the drivers of the two vehicles each became aware of the presence of the other, they each endeavored to avoid a collision, the plaintiff's driver by swerving to the left and the defendant's by swerving to the right. In this they were not successful, and the defendant's automobile ran into the side of the other. It was the duty of each of the drivers to use the highway with a due and reasonable regard to the use of it by others, and where one vehicle runs into the side of another driven by a driver whom the law characterizes as immature, and where there is some evidence of absence of warning of its approach, it is the province of a jury to say if that duty has been violated. The defendant's responsibility for the negligence of the violation of the automobile law rests upon the evidence that the driver under sixteen years of age was upon his service at the instance of his authorized agent under his general permission to drive the car, and the evidence that she had driven it on numerous occasions. This also is a question for a jury. For the reasons above expressed, we refuse defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. INDEX ACTS OF ASSEMBLY CONSTRUED. 1798, April 4, 3 Smith, 332, Limitation of Actions, 144. 1832, March 29, P. L. 191, Partition, 201. 1832, March 15, P. L. 135, Decedents' Estates, 277. 1836, June 13, P. L. 559, Roads, 315. 1845, April 15, P. L. 459, Execution, 163. 1855, April 26, P. L. 339, Injuries producing death, 407. 1856, April 22, P. L. 534, Marshalling Liens, 42. 1862, April 10, P. L. 364, Distribution Sheriff Sale Proceeds, 331. 1867, March 12, P. L. 35, Tender of money after suit brought, 243. 1876, April 17, P. L. 29, Summary Conviction, 366. 1889, May 8, P. L. 173, Streets, 11. 1891, June 11, P. L. 287, Evidence, 282. 1901, May 11, P. L. 164, Certiorari, 371. 1901, June 4, P. L. 404, Assignments for Creditors, 224. 1901, June 4, P. L. 431, Mechanic's Lien, 386. 1903, April 22, P. L. 258, License, 173. 1905, Feb. 28, P. L. 26, Appeals from Register of Wills, 277. 1905, April 14, P. L. 152, Costs in Criminal Cases, 18. 1905, April 17, P. L. 172, Mechanics Liens, 386. 1905, April 22, P. L. 260, Health Department over Streams, 66. 1911, April 20, P. L. 71, Divorce, 382. 1911, June 8, P. L. 710, Corporations, 125. 1913, May 14, P. L. 203, Constable's Fees, 129 and 134. 1913, July 26, P. L. 1439, Mines and Mining, 38. 1913, July 7, P. L. 672, Automobiles, 413, 246 and 322. 1913, June 5, P. L. 435, Church Property, 350. 1915, May 14, P. L. 483, Practice Act, 405 and 407. AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIM. 1. A judgment given by a Justice of the Peace on Affidavit of AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE. 1. A. of D. insufficient which sets up a contemporaneous agree- 2. Rule for judgment for want of sufficient Affidavit of De- 3. Affidavit of Defense sufficient where alleged that note given 4. Equity will set aside a transferer of stock without considera- 5. In a scire facias to revive an Affidavit of Defense averring |