no matter how good their intentions, must be a matter of regret to both factions, if they are interested in the promotion of the principles of the organization. If the order is to live, it must be as a national body, and if segregated into various parts, acting independently of each other and acknowledging no supreme authority to govern the entire body it will soon wither and die by the sure process of disintegration. Common prudence suggests that the contending factions should settle their differences and work together as one harmonious body of national scope and character. But this is the work of the officers and members and not of the courts."

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

First: The relators are the officers of Jordan Council No. 746 Junior Order United American Mechanics and are entitled to have, hold and receive all the books, papers, paraphernalia and personal property of Jordan Council appertaining to their respective offices.

Second: An injunction should issue requiring the respondents to deliver and turn over to the persons herein declared to be the lawful officers of Jordan Council No. 746 Junior Order United American Mechanics, all of the books, papers, paraphernalia and belongings of Jordan Council, which the lawful officers of Jordan Council are entitled to have, hold and receive.

Third: An injunction should issue restraining the respondents from interfering with the receiving, having or holding of the books, papers, paraphernalia and belongings by the lawful officers of Jordan Council No. 746 Junior Order United American Mechanics, and appertaining to the said officers.

Now April 5, 1915, let a decree be drawn accordingly.

OTT vs. NEIMEYER.

Mortgage-Merger in Fee.

Where a mortgage is given to one in trust, to be paid after the death of the mortgagor and his wife, "to their issue (if any) if none, then to their legal representatives," and the cestui que trustent in said mortgage are the legal representatives of said mortgagor, and, after the death of the mortgagor and his wife, acquire title by descent to the land mortgaged, and convey to plaintiff without any restriction or reservation, it was held that the plaintiff had title to said land, discharged of said mortgage.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. Lesher S. Ott vs. Florence A. Neimeyer. No. 49 June Term, 1915. Case Stated.

Milton C. Henninger, for Plaintiff.
Richard W. Iobst, for Defendant.

Groman, P. J., June 28, 1915. The following statement of facts was agreed upon: Peter Egner was the owner of the real estate in question, the deed for which is found recorded in the Office for the Recording of Deeds for Lehigh County in Deed Book Volume 20, Page 38. On the 21st day of December, A. D. 1881, Peter Egner executed a bond and mortgage to Massy Ann, his wife, in trust for Franklin Ott and Birsha Ott, to secure the sum of thirty-five hundred dollars. Franklin Ott and Birsha Ott were the children of Amanda Egner intermarried with Lesher Ott, who was the only child and heir of the said Peter Egner and his wife, Massy Ann. Amanda Ott died prior to the death of Peter Egner and his wife, Mary Ann. Peter Egner died intestate, seized in his demesne as of fee of the real estate in question, leaving to survive him no widow and no children, his only surviving heirs being Franklin Ott and Birsha Ott, aforesaid, in whom title vested by virtue of the intestate laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. By sundry good conveyances and assurances in law the title of the said Franklin Ott and Birsha Ott thus vested in them was acquired, conveyed and confirmed to Lesher S. Ott, the plaintiff. The language used in the bond and mortgage given by Peter Egner to Massy Ann, his wife, reads as follows: "Conditioned for the payment of $3500.00, to be paid after the death of the said Peter Egner, without interest, during the life-time of the said Peter Egner, and further, the sum of $3500.00 shall remain a lien on the herein described messuage or tenement and lot of ground, during the natural life-time of the survivor of them, and after their death shall descend and come to their issue (if any), if none, then to their legal representatives forever, without any fraud or further delay, as in and by the said recited obligation and the conditions thereto, relation being thereunto had may more fully and at large appear."

The mortgage was given to secure the payment of a bond after the death of the mortgagor for the sum of $3500.00 to Franklin Ott and Birsha Ott. The bond was so clearly personal property that a citation of authorities would be superfluous. At the time of the death of the mortgage, Peter Egner, the heirs of the said mortgagor were the said Franklin Ott and Birsha Ott and consequently by virtue of the operation of the intestate laws of the State of Pennsylvania the title to the real estate in question vested in the said Franklin Ott and Birsha Ott, in other words the title merged.

Brown vs. Simpson, 2nd Watts, Page 233; Cooley's Appeal, 1st Grant, Page 401; Fries vs. Overbold, 1st Pa. C. C., Page 538; Seller, Executor, etc., vs. Montgomery, 2nd D. R., Page 551 fully bear out the above conclusion. The mortgage thus became extinguished under the doctrine of merger unless an intention was shown by the parties that a merger should not take place. It appears that Franklin Ott and Birsha Ott conveyed and confirmed their different interests to Lesher S. Ott, the plaintiff, without any restriction and reservation; nowhere does it appear on the record that a contrary intention was manifested. The Court is of the opinion, therefore, that judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the amount for which the defendant agreed to pay for the premises by the written articles of agreement, to wit, the sum of forty-five hundred dollars.

Now June 28, 1915, judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of fortyfive hundred dollars ($4500.00).

FRANTZ ET AL. vs. CITY OF ALLENTOWN.

City Ordinance-Title-Sufficiency.

The title to a city ordinance need not be a complete index of its contents.

The title is sufficient if it gives notice so as to lead to an inquiry into the body of the ordinance.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. Frantz et al. vs. City of Allentown, No. 2 September Term, 1914. In Equity. Exceptions to Decree.

ants.

Francis J. Lewis and Francis J. Gildner, for Except

Malcolm W. Gross, City Solicitor, Contra.

Groman, P. J., July 1, 1915. Exceptions filed to the order of court in the above entitled case principally raise the question whether or not the subjects are clearly expressed in the title of the ordinance which reads as follows: "An ordinance to secure the wholesomeness and purity of meat and milk and their products, by authorizing the inspection thereof, by providing for the licensing of persons dealing therein, by prohibiting the sale or offering for sale of meat and meat food products, and also milk and milk food products which are impure, unwholesome or adulterated or otherwise unfit for human consumption by providing penalties for the enforcement of the same."

The Supreme Court in Mauch Chunk vs. McGee, 81 Pa. St., Page 433 held, "The title need not be a complete index to the bill, if it fairly gives notice of the subject of the act so as reasonably to lead into an inquiry into the body of the bill it is all that is necessary.

It seems to the Court that the ordinance clearly sets forth in the title that the purpose of the ordinance was to regulate the sale of meat and milk and provide for the licensing of persons dealing therein. The title gives notice so as to lead to an inquiry into the body of the ordinance and that is all that is required. It is not necessary that the title should be a complete index to the contents of the ordinance. Pittsburgh vs. Daly, 5 Pa. Sup. Ct., Page 528; Baker vs. Warren Co. 11 Pa. Sup. Ct., Page 170; Commonwealth vs. Beatty, 15 Pa. Sup Ct., Page 5; Commonwealth vs. Hanly, 15 Pa. Sup. Ct., Page 271; Commonwealth vs. Mintz, 19 Pa. Sup. Ct., Page 285. Now July 1st, 1915, Plaintiff's exceptions to the Order of Court are hereby dismissed.

TREXLER LUMBER CO. vs. SCHOENLY.
Sheriff's Sale-Setting Aside.

Under what circumstances and conditions a Sheriff's sale of real estate was set aside.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County.

Trexler Lumber Company vs. Clement A. Schoenly. No. 228 January Term, 1915. Exceptions to Sheriff's Sale.

J. Thomas Schantz, for Plaintiff.

Thomas F. Diefenderfer, for Defendant.

Groman, P. J., June 28, 1915. It appears that certain real estate owned by the defendant was sold to Max S. Erdman, Attorney, on a Fi. Fa. issued February 13th, 1915; on April 26th, 1915, exceptions to the Sheriff's sale were filed by Francis J. Newhard through his attorney, Thomas F. Diefenderfer, Esq. At the argument of the exceptions it was agreed by the above counsel that the facts alleged in the exceptions be taken as verity. The Court, therefore, finds that Francis J. Newhard is a judgment creditor and, therefore, a party in interest; that the sum of $775.00 was bid for the property subject to such liens not discharged by the Sheriff's sale; that the price was inadequate and unreasonably low; that the said Francis J. Newhard offers $250.00 over and above the amount bid at the sale upon a re-sale of said premises; that the said sale would not be prejudicial to the creditors of the defendant, but would be beneficial to the defendant in the execution. From the foregoing admissions it seems the only course left for the Court is to sustain the exceptions. This will accordingly be done if the petitioner reimburse the purchaser of the real estate for the outlay in cash for improvements to the property made by the purchaser after the Sheriff's sale, for the amount stated at the hearing, not exceeding Thirty ($30) Dollars.

Now June 28, 1915, exceptions to the Sheriff's sale sustained on terms hereinbefore set forth.

TURNER vs. STANDARD PROTECTIVE SOCIETY. New Trial-Charge of Court-Inadequacy.

A new trial will not be granted for inadequacy of the charge of the Court where the main question in the case was sufficiently covered and the inadequacy alleged related to a secondary question which became material only if the first were decided adversely to plaintiff and the Court had briefly stated to the jury the law governing the second question.