pictures, but that these passed under the gift of the furniture, statuary, and effects in the said leasehold messuage. Lord Londesborough was a nobleman of very large fortune, a man of great taste, a patron and lover of the arts, and lived in a very large house in Carlton House-terrace. Besides the articles above mentioned, he had a collection of armor and autographs, which are settled and made heirlooms. The pictures were all by English artists, except a head by Carlo Dolce, and included the "Monarch of the Glen," a well-known picture by Landseer; a child, said to be a portrait of the testator's daughter; and pictures by D. Roberts, Stanfield, Hollings, Ansdell, and Cook. The court said: "It is clear, and was decided in Sir George Kelly v. Powlett, 2 Amb. 605, by the then Master of the Rolls, that where there is nothing to show the contrary, pictures pass as part of the furniture of the house." "I must say that it seems to me very improbable that a man possessed of a collection of very valuable pictures, if he intended to give them absolutely, would omit the word pictures. If a man, knowing perfectly well that he had these pictures by the first painters, intended to give them, I cannot understand upon what principle the word 'pictures' was omitted. Mr. Bristowe argued that pictures were objects of vertu and taste, and that a virtuoso is a man who loves pictures as well as other works of art. Pictures are most undoubtedly articles of taste. We commonly say that a man has a very great taste in pictures, but I suppose this is the very first will that has occurred in which pictures are to pass, if they do pass, by the words 'objects of vertu and taste.' There is a rule of construction which has always been acted upon, and which was acted upon in the case cited of Rawlings v. Jennings (ubi sup.), where words are used which would pass the whole property of the testator. In that case the words were 'all other goods,' but Sir Wm. Grant, acting on the rule, said they meant things ejusdem generis, not all the man's property, but things of the same nature as those which he had been disposing of. Mr. Bristowe says the pictures are of the same nature as the things he has been disposing of; a picture is an object of vertu and taste. So it is, I agree. I do not say by any means that the words are insufficient to pass pictures, but whether they do so or not depends upon the particular circumstances of the case, and therefore inasmuch as it would have been so very easy for the testator to have removed all difficulty on the subject by using the word pictures, I think that mentioning as he does 'gold and silver plate, ornamental or other china,' and then 'all objects of vertu and taste,' he means things ejusdem generis, such as painted snuff-boxes and small statuettes, and any thing of that kind about the house. I can hardly think that if he had meant those pictures to pass he would not have used the proper word 'pictures ' instead of those doubtful and ambiguous words 'objects of vertu and taste.'" "On the whole, therefore, I come to the conclusion that he considered those words 'vertu and taste' as comprehending every thing else of the same sort, or, as we lawyers say, ejusdem generis with those before enumer ated, and I cannot consider that by such words he intended to pass a valuable collection of pictures such as he had; and I am therefore of opinion that Lady Londesborough did not take them absolutely, but that she is entitled to the enjoyment during her life, under the next clause, of all the articles which were in the house at the time of the death. It was said that it was very improbable that he could have intended the portrait of his daughter to be sold. I agree that it is very improbable, but he may have forgotten that, or he may have thought the family were sure to buy it; probably it is not very valuable. I cannot think that that circumstance sufficiently controls the construction of the will to make those words have the operation which they otherwise would not have." The matter of "catching bargains" comes up almost simultaneously in this country and in England. In Nevill v. Snelling, English High Court, Ch. Div., 43 L. T. (N. S.) 244, a money lender induced a younger son of a nobleman of high rank and great estate, while still under age, to borrow money of him on extravagantly usurious conditions, and to continue to do so after he had attained his majority, and made no inquiry into the position of the borrower, but relied for repayment, not on any definite expectations of the latter, but on the probability that if he should be unable to pay, his father or friends would pay to avert bankruptcy and exposure, or that he would himself pay if he should by any means come into any of the family property, and unconscientiously received and afterward insisted upon the continuance of payments originally made to him by the borrower under a mistake, and without any obligation to do so. Held, that the money lender was only entitled to obtain repayment of the sums actually advanced, with interest at five per cent from the dates of the several advances. And in Bogle's Estate, Orphan's Court of Dauphin county, Penn., March, 1880, 9 W. N. C. 256, the court said: "We find Bogle, a young man between twenty-three and twenty-four years of age, having been engaged in the grocery business for two or three years, to all appearances pretty closely pressed for money, borrowing from Mr. Sticker, or his wife, some $2,000, at a rate of interest of 18 per cent per annum, and applying to the same person for a new loan at like rate, this on the security of his patrimony in the hands of his guardian and not due for a little over a year. We find him afterward selling the claim at a discount of at least $1,000, receiving in payment the discharge of two small judgments amounting in all to $135, the balance due on a former mortgage, $200, some $357 in money, some small expenses paid, and notes at 6 and 12 months, $576.63 each, some $250 of a discount on the $500, and at least one of the notes, if not both, shaved at a discount of about 18 per cent. Mr. Bogle swears that he was to have the money when wanted. Is this such an oppressive and fraudulent advantage taken of Bogle under the circumstances as will entitle him to relief in equity? We must premise that his guardian, who had looked after his affairs "Bo for many years, and who stood in loco parentis, is paid the amount paid by Sticker to Bogle with legal exercise without showing or having any reasonable ground, and that exercise will not be enjoined. "The weight of authority is in favor of the right of the mortgagor to take and sell the property without any obligation to prove that the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties justified him in deeming himself insecure. Huggans v. Fryer, 1 Lans. 276; Chadwick v. Lamb, 29 Barb. 518; Rich v. Milk, 20 id. 616; Hall v. Sampson, 19 How. Pr. 481; Farrell v. Hildreth, 38 Barb. 178 Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 280." RESERVATION OF TIMBER IN DEED. IN N Irons v. Webb, 12 Vroom, 203; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 193, a deed of lands reserved the timber, the grantee stipulating that the grantor should have two years to remove it. Held, that it might be removed after that time. The action was trover by the grantor for the timber devised him by the The Supreme Court, by Beasley, C. J., grantee. said: "Upon looking at the frame of this instrument, it will be found that the timber in question is plainly excepted out of the operation of the conveyance, and that the right to take it away within a specified time is in the shape of an agreement on the part of the defendant. Such a stipulation on the side of the grantee of the deed cannot convert an absolute exception into a conditional one. The legal effect of an exception is to sever from that which is granted that which is excepted, so that the latter does not pass by the grant (Shep. Touch. 77), and when, consequently, any thing is thus set apart and declared to be outside of the grant, it should be plain words only that should bring it within the force of the grant. The excepting clause says, in effect, that the grantor withdraws from the grant a certain portion of the premises, and such act is so positive and emphatic that it cannot be controlled or affected by subsequent expressions or stipulations. of dubious meaning or uncertain effect." "Look In Roy v. Goings, 96 Ill. 361, it is held that under a clause in a chattel mortgage, that if the mortgagee shall, at any time before the debt becomes due,"feel himself unsafe or insecure," he shall have the right to take possession of the mortgaged prop-ing at the terms of the present agreement and its erty, the mortgagee has the right to judge of the crisis for himself, subject only to the limitation that his judgment of insecurity must be exercised in good faith, upon reasonable grounds or probable cause. That there need not be actual danger, or reasonable ground to decide that there was actual danger, but it will be sufficient if, at the trial, it appears that at the time of the taking of possession there was apparent danger, such that a reasonable man might, in good faith, act upon, or in other words, there should be reasonable grounds to believe there was danger, or that the mortgagee did not act without probable cause. Scott and Sheldon, JJ., dissenting, said: "We think it enough that the mortgagee felt himself insecure, and that it is not necessary, that in addition thereto, there should have been probable cause for feeling himself insecure." The doctrine of this dissent is the doctrine of Cline v. Libby, 46 Wis. 123; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 700, which holds that the mortgagee, under such a clause, has an arbitrary right, which he may subject-matter, I can see no mark, certainly no decisive mark, signifying that it was the intention of these parties that by the plaintiff's neglect to remove the timber it should be forfeited to the defendant. Such a purpose, it is certain, is not contained in any part of the language of the instrument, for it nowhere says, that in any event, the title to the timber is to pass to the grantee. As a consequence, as it is not in the words, such a right must be derived by inference from the nature of the transaction itself. But then what feature of the business is to have such an effect? The only particular relied on is the circumstance that if the timber was permitted to remain on the premises until the time of removal had expired, it became unlawful to enter for the purpose of taking it away. But the effect of such an incident is not in law to work a forfeiture of title." "The vendor could have called the vendee to account for leaving it on the land beyond the stipulated time, and for all damages to his land done by its removal after such period, but he had no right to claim such timber as his own, and to put it to his own uses. This decision is based on Hoit v. Stratton Mills, 54 N. H. 109; S. C., 20 Am. Rep. 119. In that case the deed conveyed growing trees to be removed by the grantee, and it was held that as the terms of the grant, taken in their literal and usual sense, signified an absolute conveyance of the title of the trees, the grant was not made conditional by the implied stipulation that the grantee should remove the trees within a reasonable time. In Knott v. Hylinck, 12 Rich. 314, the court construed a deed that reserved all the growing timber, as leaving the title absolutely in the grantor; although in these cases there was no time mentioned within which the trees were to be removed, the court in the principal case said: "That circumstance can take but little from the force of the precedent, as undoubtedly, in the absence of an express limitation of a period for the disincumbering the land by the removal of the trees, the law would imply an undertaking to produce that result within a resonable term." The court distinguished Holton v. Goodrich, 35 Vt. 19, as influenced by other stipulations, and dependent on the peculiar expression and provision of the deed; and Pease v. Gibson, infra, on the ground that the expressions on the point in question were mere dicta, and overthown by the criticism in Hoit v. Stratton Mills, supra. The court concluded: "I have endeavored to show that the exception is unconditional; and if this be so, by its own efficacy it kept the title to the timber in the plaintiff; but if, to the contrary, the property in the timber was not to remain in the plaintiff unless the trees were removed within such period, then, very clearly, the mere felling of the trees would not satisfy the requirement of such condition." In Pease v. Gibson, 6 Me. 84, the grantee was to have two years to take off the timber. The court said: "To admit the construction given by the defendants' counsel, and consider such a permission as a sale of the trees, to be cut and carried away at the good pleasure of the purchaser, and without any reference to the limitation, in point of time, specified in the permit, would be highly injurious in its consequences. It would deprive the owner of the land of the privilege of cultivating it and rendering it productive, thus occasioning public inconvenience and injury; and in fact it would amount to an indefinite permission. The purchaser, on this principle, might, by gradually cutting the trees and clearing them away, make room for a succeeding growth, and before he would have removed the trees standing on the land at the time of receiving such a license or sale, others would grow to a sufficient size to be useful and valuable; and then the owner of the land would be completely deprived of all use of it. Principles leading to such consequences as we have mentioned cannot receive the sanction of this court." This was followed in Howard v. Lincoln, 13 Me. 122. Both cases seem to have directly involved the point. In Holton v. Goodrich, 35 Vt. 19, there was a reservation of stone in a deed, with the privilege of taking it off" till " a certain day. The court said: "If the property was removed by that time, it belonged to the plaintiffs; but if not removed by that time their right to it was gone. This seems to be the natural and obvious construction of the deed." Boisaubin v. Reed, 2 Keyes, 323; S. C., 1 Abb. Ct. Dec. 161, was not noticed in the principal case nor in the New Hampshire cases, and is quite opposed to them. It was a suit to enjoin an entry on land and the carrying away of timber. The deed granted all the growing timber on certain land, and the right of entry and occupancy "for and during the term of ten years for the purpose of cutting and taking and carrying away said timber and manufacturing timber on said land," etc. The Supreme Court, on the authority of the two Maine cases, and McIntyre v. Barnard, 1 Sandf. Ch. 52, and Warren v. Leland, 2 Barb. 622, had held that this was only a sale of such timber as was actually removed within the specified term, and granted the injunction. This holding was now affirmed in the Court of Appeals. The court said: "After the expiration of the term, every entry upon the land for the purpose of taking timber away was without the license of the deed. Had there been no term named, the vendee would be entitled to enter and carry away timber for a reasonable time, which would have depended for its limit upon the facts of the case; as to the amount of the timber; the extent of the land; the natural impediments to be overcome in removing it; and other attending circumstances. But to hold to the continuation of the right to remove the timber from the land, after the term for so doing has been agreed on by the parties, and has expired, is to disregard their agreement, or to make a new one. Every entry upon the land by the defendant, to carry away timber or logs, after the expiration of the term, was an entry without license, and a clear trespass, and if he or his servants carried away timber, the plaintiffs could be made good for the injury committed only by damages to the extent of the value of the timber removed. These facts indicate clearly, to my judgment, that it was the intention of the parties to the original agreement to limit the right to take and carry away timber to the term within which the vendee or his representatives might lawfully enter upon the land; and that the vendee has no title to the timber by cutting logs and leaving them upon the land; but to complete his title he must also remove the logs within the term." CRIMINAL LIBELS ON NON-RESIDENTS. The statute of our State is as follows: "In all cases where a libel has been or may hereafter be printed or published against any person not a resident of this State, the accused shall be indicted, and the trial thereof shall be had, in the county where the said libel was or may hereafter be printed or published. In all cases where such paper shall not upon its face purport to be or to have been printed or published in a particular county of this State, the accused shall be indicted and the trial thereof had in any one county where the said paper has been or may hereafter be circulated." By the literal meaning of this statute the printer or publisher anywhere, within or without the State, of a libel against a non-resident, no matter where he may reside, is liable to indictment, if his paper purport on its face to be printed and published in this State, or if it does not so purport but is circulated in this State. But as criminal actions are strictly local, and to subject an offender to punishment the crime must be committed within the limits of the sovereignty seeking to punish the offense, such literal rendering must be limited, and the statute applied only to those who print or publish, within this State, against non-residents. It is plain that a criminal ffense against a statute of this State cannot bo comitted outside of the State, and that our statutes have no force to create crime beyond the limits of the state. In some cases those who have committed crimes within the limits of other States or governments are delivered by our law to such other States or governments. Crime against the life, body, health or liberty of persons in Oregon cannot be committed in this State, for the rights of personal security in such cases do not exist in this State; to protect them by our statute would be absurd. Any crime against them must be committed in that State, and be punished there as crime against the laws of that State. Crimes are committed at the place where they take effect upon the object injured. A person was accused of shooting from an American ship and killing a man on a foreign schooner. Justice Story said: "The act was, in law, done where the shot took effect; he would be liable to the foreign government." So, too, crime against personal reputation is committed in the State where the person injured lives; the object injured in cases of libel is the person, as in all other cases of injury to personal rights. Injury to personal reputation is a crime because it is an injury to the person, and not because it is an injury to reputation distinguished from the person injured; which would be a very discriminating distinction, making reputation a kind of personal property existing in every State and in every county of every State; no matter who the owner thereof is, or where in the wide world he may reside, and thus a criminal libel is possible in every place; that this is not the idea upon which this statute is founded, it may be noted that the statute itself provides that indictment shall be had in only one county, thus avoiding the idea that reputation exists separate from the person so as to be the object of a criminal trespass cognizable by the grand jury of every county. In the cases of an injury by libel to residents of the State, indictment is had in the county where the injured citizen resides; the notion that his reputation is a kind of personal property existing in every county of the State, separate from the person, which could be the object of a criminal trespass in any county other than where he lives, was never recognized by our law. An offense by shooting from one county and killing entitled to the fullest protection our criminal law can give; an injury to such persons is as much a public offense as an injury to actual residents of our State; such persons really and practically are within this State, and our statute may legitimately treat the personal rights of such persons in every respect as existing within this State. Confining the application of our statute to such persons, that is, to non-residents within the State, would be giving to the statute a plain, reasonable and practical meaning, in accord with the meaning of other statutes concerning personal rights, and it would seem that this construction of the statute is more to be preferred than the other. The National Constitution provides that the trial of all crimes must be held in the State where they are committed. But the party who has, within this State, libelled a non-resident of the State, may, under this statute, be indicted, even though he may have been indicted for the same offense in the State where such non-resident resides. The Constitutions, State and National, also provide that no person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; and this statute seems to infringe upon these constitutional provisions unless the construction alluded to may be adopted. In England persons have been indicted for libelling in England members of other governments not resident in England, but this was under special statutes for that purpose. Was it the intention that our statute should include such persons? If the legal construction of a statute is doubtful upon a careful scrutiny, it should be construed in the sense most beneficial to the accused. It is a humane principle of the law that a prisoner shall have the benefit not only of doubts upon the facts, but doubts also upon the law. The following authorities may be consulted: People v. Adams, 3 Denio, 190; Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 176; Whitford v. Panama Railroad Co., 23 id. 467; Birmingham Iron Co. v. Glen Cove Starch Manufacturing Co., 78 id. 32; 30 Barb. 99; id. 439. JOHN MILLER. LIABILITY OF NATIONAL BANK FOR SPECIAL DEPOSITS. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, FEBRUARY 24, 1880. PATTISON V. SYRACUSE NATIONAL BANK, Appellant.* A National bank is liable for a special deposit, received by its teller on behalf of the bank, în accordance with its usage, for gratuitous safe-keeping, and lost through its gross negligence. in another must be tried in the latter. A resident of A Ireland, for publishing in London against a resident of London, was held for trial in London. This is so, because crimes are committed at the place where they take effect upon the object injured. Those persons who possibly never have been and never will be within this State, cannot be the subject of a crime within this State. Criminal trespass upon personal rights cannot be committed where those rights do not exist. We must arrive at the conclusion, then, that this statute creates for every person in the wide world, non-residents of this State, the personal right of reputation in every county of this State, and makes it the object of a criminal, that is indictable, trespass, or else we must give to the words "any person not a resident of this State" a more limited meaning. There are thousands whose property, business, life and reputation are almost wholly within this State, although they are not residents of this State. These persons live under, and recognize and render themselves amenable to our statutes; they help in supporting our government, and are CTION to recover the value of bonds deposited by the plaintiff with defendant for safe-keeping and which were stolen. The opinion states the case. Samuel Hand, for appellant. Geo. F. Comstock, for respondent. RAPALLO, J. The leading point made by the appellant is that a bank organized under the National Banking Act (Laws of U. S., 1864, ch. 106) has no authority to receive special deposits of securities, etc., for safekeeping, and that consequently the defendant incurred no liability by the receipt by its teller of the package deposited by the plaintiffs, and cannot be held responsible for its loss, even though the teller in receiving the deposit assumed to act in behalf of the bank, in accordance with its practice, and did so with the knowledge of its managers, and the loss occurred through gross negligence on the part of the officers of the bank. The *To same effect, First National Bank of Carlisle v. Graham, 21 Alb. L. J. 361; S. C., 100 U. S. 699; affirming S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 49. respondent disputes both the premises and the conclusion. In most of the cases in which the question of the liability of banks for special deposits has been considered, and which will be more particularly referred to hereafter, the corporate power of a bank to bind itself by such a transaction has been conceded, and the cases have turned upon questions relating to the authority of the officers receiving the deposits, and the degree of negligence by which the loss was occasioned. If it be assumed that the receiving of such deposits is a legitimate part of the business of banking, and that banks not organized under the act of Congress, which see fit to receive such deposits, may do so, there is nothing in the act of 1864 which especially restricts National banks in this respect. The act provides (section 5) that associations for carrying on the business of banking may be formed in a certain manner. Section 8 declares, that upon complying with the provisions of the act, such associations shall be corporations and may adopt a corporate name and may in that name make contracts; and further, that they may exercise under the act all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits, by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; by loaning money on personal security, by obtaining, issuing and circulating notes according to the provisions of the act. It cannot be contended that because the power to receive special deposits is not particularly mentioned, therefore it is intended to place banks organized under this act on a different footing in this respect from other banks. There are many contracts incident to the banking business, which although not enumerated in the act, are daily made by National banks without question as to their authority, such as receiving notes, checks, etc., for collection, etc. They are authorized to make any contracts, which legitimately appertain to the business of banking, and if receiving special as well as general deposits falls within the scope of that business, the power to receive deposits includes all kinds of deposits which are known and customary in the banking business. That the enumeration of banking powers contained in the act of 1864 was not significant of an intention to place any special restriction upon National banks as distinguished from State banks, is apparent from the fact that it is a usual formula descriptive of the banking business contained in bank charters (charter of Commercial Bank of Albany, Laws of 1825, p. 198; Dutchess Co. Bank, id. p. 204), and is almost identical with that contained in the General Banking Law of 1838 (Laws of 1838, p. 249, § 18), which provides that each association shall have power to carry on the business of banking by discounting bills, notes and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling gold and silver bullion, foreign coin and bills of exchange in the manner specified in this act, by loaning money on real and personal security, and by exercising such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on such business." The meaning of the two provisions is the same, and their language is the same except in the order of arrangement. In both the business of banking is defined, that is, discounting paper, receiving deposits, etc., and all powers incident to these general powers are added. In the act of Congress the frame of the sentence is that National banks shall exercise all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking, and then follows a description of the banking business, while in the act of 1838 the banking business is first described, and the grant of incidental powers follows. The enumeration in the act of Congress is not of the incidental but of the principal powers, and to these are superadded all inci dental powers. The question remains the same, therefore, as to a National as to a State bank, whether the power of receiving special deposits is incidental to the banking business, and no distinction can be made in determining this question between a State and a National bank. In the leading case upon the subject (Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, A. D. 1821), where a special deposit had been made with the defendant, of a cask containing gold coin, it was shown that it had been the practice of the bank to receive special deposits of money and other valuable things, but there was no regulation, or by-law, or provision of the charter upon the subject. The counsel for the plaintiff, as in the present case, claimed that it had been 'the practice of banks from the earliest periods to receive such deposits. That the Bank of England had no express power to do so, but it had become a part of their duty or business by usage, and belonged to the very nature of such institutions. On the other side it was denied that the bank had any such power, or that it was incidental to the business of a bank or banker; that the authority could not be inferred from usage, and the repetition of unauthorized acts by the officers could not give them validity, and the officers only, not the bank, wero bound. The point was thus distinctly presented, It was argued by the most eminent counsel of the period, and decided by a court of distinguished reputation. The court held that the practice of the bank having been to receive such deposits, and its building and vaults having been allowed to be used for that purpose, and its officers employed in receiving into custody the things deposited, the corporation, and not the cashier or other officer through whose particular agency tho property may have been received into the bank, must be deemed the depositary. The next case on the point is Lloyd v. West Branch Bank, 15 Penn. St. 172, decided in 1850. It was there held that the power to receivo deposits conferred on the bank by the Pennsylvania Banking Law referred to deposits of current money received as such and not to special deposits. But the court, although indulging in some strong expressions indicative of an opinion that the statute did not intend to confer the power, states the question to be whether there was any such general custom or practice of the cashier of the bank to act as a voluntary bailee without reward, as to make the bank liable for his acts, and the decision rests upon the want of evidence of any such practice. The court was undoubtedly correct in holding that it was not intended that banks should be turned into pawn-brokers' shops, or receive old clothes on deposit. But the case is not an authority for the proposition, that if a bank is in the habit of receiving on deposit coin or other valuables such as are usually the subject of special deposits in banks, it will not be bound by the act of its officers in receiving them. But in later cases in the same State the doctrine of Foster v. Essex Bank is expressly recognized and applied to National banks. In Lancaster Co. Nat. Bank v. Smith, 62 Peun. St. 47, where a special deposit of the U. S. bonds had been made with the bank by delivering them to the teller, and the teller had subsequently delivered them to a third party supposed to be the depositor, but without ascertaining his identity, the bank was held liable. The case of Lloyd v. West Branch Bank was referred to, but the power of the bank to bind itself by receiving the deposit was not disputed, and it was held that it was a question for the jury whether the bank had been guilty of gross negligence. In Scott v. National Bank of Chester Valley, 72 Penn. St. 471; S. C., 13 Am. Rep. 711; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 864, the facts were almost identical with those in Foster v. Essex Bank. A special deposit of bouds for safe-keeping had been made with the defendant by one of its customers, and the bonds were stolen by the |