Troy & Boston R. R. Co., 20 Wall. 117, it was held that this defendant, while lessee, operating this road in Vermout, and the plaintiff here, who was a citizen of New York, were citizens of the same State of New York, so that the case was not removable. U. S. Circ. Ct., Vermont, May, 1880. Brownell v. Troy & Boston Railroad Co. Opinion by Wheeler, D. J. MARITIME LAW-JURISDICTION OF ADMIRALTY AS TO CREW OF FOREIGN VESSEL. - The nationality of a foreign vessel, and not that of the crew, should regulate the action of a court of admiralty in assuming jurisdiction over a controversy between the officers and seamen of such vessel. And in the investigation of a case where seamen asked to be discharged from further service on a Swedish ship and for the payment of wages, held, that all the crew of the ship must be deemed Swedish subjects, notwithstanding it appeared that some of them wero in fact citizens of other nationalities. The Nina, L. R., 2 P. C. 39. U. S. Dist. Ct., Maine, Sept. 13, 1880. The Amalia. Opinion by Fox, D. J. MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAĻ CARRIER OF PASSENGERS-INJURY TO PASSENGER ON STREET RAILROAD-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCESITTING ON FRONT PLATFORM.-Plaintiff's intestate, a passenger on defendant's street railroad car, when the car was approaching a draw-bridge sat down on the front platform. He was told by the driver of the car that he had better not sit in that place, as it was against the rules of the defendant and unsafe, to which he made a reply not understood by the driver. He continued to occupy his position while the car was detained at the bridge some fifteen minutes by an open draw; and remained there until he fell from the car after it had passed the bridge, receiving the injuries whereof he died. There were notices posted upon the car forbidding passengers to be upon the platforms and that the defendant would not be responsible for the safety of passengers while there. In an action for such injuries, held, that the defendant was not liable. It was for the plaintiff to prove that the intestate was free from negligence contributing to the injury which he received. Plaintiff could recover if the case presented failed to disclose the exercise on his part of ordinary care, as judged of in the light of common knowledge and experience. The rule is to be applied which requires the exercise of such care as men of common prudence usually exercise in positions of like exposure and danger. The question is in most cases a question to be submitted to the jury, but when the circumstances are not complicated, and the undisputed evidence discloses conduct which would be condemned as careless by men of common prudence, it is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. Garrett v. Manchester & Lawrence R. Co., 16 Gray, 501; Gahagan v. Boston & Lowell R. Co., 1 Allen, 187; Todd v. Old Colony R. Co., 7 id. 207. The evidence in this case wholly failed to show that intestate was in the exercise of due care. He was a passenger occupying an exposed and unusual place in a constrained and awkward position, against the rules of the road and the warning of the driver. The case differs from Meesel v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 8 Allen, 234. A street railway corporation has a right to make all reasonable regulations for the safety of passengers. A rule prohibiting passengers from riding on the front platform is a reasonable regulation; and one who knowingly violates it, without some reasonable excuse or necessity, cannot be said to be free from negligence, if the act contributes to his injury. There could be no doubt that the negligence of intestate contributed to the injury which he suffered. Wills v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co. Opinion by Colt, J. LIFE INSURANCE PAYMENT OF FIRST PREMIUM BY ANOTHER THAN INSURED WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE.— A policy of insurance on the life of F. contained this provision, that "it shall not take effect until the advance premium thereon shall have been paid during the lifetime of the person when life is thereby insured." F. applied for the policy and it was issued and left at F.'s place of business by an agent of the. company, who, by letter, requested the payment of the premium if correct and satisfactory. The agent repeated the request by letter a few weeks later. This letter was received by the sister of F. and opened by her, he being ill of a sickness whereof he died. The sister, without his direction or knowledge, paid the premium and F. died without knowledge of the payment. Held, that the policy was not binding upon the insurance company. No contract of insurance existed between the parties at the time of the death of F. The possession of the policy, without a waiver on the part of the company of the condition upon the performance of which it was to take effect, did not, on the facts disclosed, show a delivery of it in completion of the contract, or furnish any evidence that the minds of the parties had met. It was not enough that the form of the policy had been approved, for it was still optional with F. whether he would by payment make it a binding contract. If he declined or neglected to pay, the company would have no claim for the premium against him or against his estate, because the risk never attached. A proof of loss by the widow and personal representative of F. did not amount to such ratification of the unauthorized payment by F.'s sister as would give validity to the policy. The difficulty is that there was no contract existing at the time of the death to be ratified. The payment of the premium was not the payment by another of a debt due from F., which the administrator, without affecting the rights of the company, would have power to ratify; and to say that the administrator might do it so as to bind the company, would be to say that a policy of life insurance may be made to take effect as a contract by an act of ratification by the administrator after the death of the person whose life is thereby insured. Whiting v. Massachusetts Life Insurance Co. Opinion by Colt, J. NEGLIGENCE-FAILURE TO MAINTAIN FLAGMAN OR GATE AT RAILROAD CROSSING, IN ABSENCE OF MUNICIPAL REQUIREMENTS, MAY BE.—In an action for injuries received by plaintiffs who were travelling in the highway at a crossing of defendant's railroad, by reason of defendant's negligence, it was claimed that defendant was negligent in not having a gate or a flagman at the railroad crossing. It appeared that no proper authority had ever required the establishment of a flagman or gate at this crossing. The court below ruled that it was competent for the jury, under the declaration, to consider whether the defendant had used such reasonable care, in addition to the ringing of the bell or the blowing of the whistlo required by the statutes, as the safety of travellers demanded at this particular crossing. Held, that the ruling was correct, as recognized by numerous decisions. These cases all rest on the common-law rule that when there are different public easements to be enjoyed by two parties, at the same time and at the same place, each must use his privilege with due care not to injure the other. The rule applies to grade crossings, because the traveller and the railroad each has common rights in the highway at those points. The fact that the Legislature has seen fit for the additional safety of travellers imperatively to require the corporation to use certain warnings at such crossings, does not relieve it from the duty of doing whatever else may be reasonably necessary. Bradley v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 2 Cush. 539; Linfield v. Old Colony R. Co., 10 id. 562; Norton v. Eastern R. Co., 113 Mass. 366; Favor v. Boston & Lowell R. Co., 114 id. 351. Even though the proper authorities had never required the maintenance of a gate or flagman at the crossing in question, the defendant was still under the rule which requires the exercise of reasonable care on its part; and the jury could not be limited in their inquiries by the fact that a gate or a flagman has never been ordered, however proper it might be for them to take that fact into consideration. Eaton v. Fitchburg Railroad Co. Opinion by Colt, J. CRIMINAL LAW. PLEADING IDEM SONANS.-The indictment charged defendant with entry into a stable with intent to commit "larcey." Held, that the maxim of idem sonans did not apply so as to render the indictment valid by reason of the word "larcey meauing "larceny." California Supreme Court, Aug. 17, 1880. People of California v. St. Clair. Opinion per curiam. RIGHT OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL-EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF DECEASED WIT NESS. (1) Under statutes making it the duty of a county attorney to appear in the District Court and prosecute all criminal cases, and providing that no county attorney should receive any fee or other reward from any prosecutor or individual for services in prosecuting criminals, nor be an attorney or counsel for any party other than the State, in any civil action depending upon the same facts upon which a criminal prosecution undetermined might depend, held, that this did not prohibit the county attorney from accepting the assistance of counsel employed for hire by private parties to aid him in a criminal prosecution. The case of Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 101, dissented from. The purpose of a public prosecution is to prevent the use of the criminal law to gratify private malice or accomplish personal gain. This purpose is fully subserved when the control of the case is with the county attorney. As to an argument that if private counsel be permitted, the county attorney will be influenced by their wishes and defer to their views and thus in effect a private be substituted for a public prosecution, a satisfactory reply is, that if he is disposed to so yield and defer, he will be as apt to do it when those suggestions and wishes are made known to him outside the court room, and that there is less danger of wrong by permitting private counsel to appear and act openly in the presence of the court, than by shutting them out from any open participation in the trial and leaving them to their private and secret suggestions to him in his office. Publicity prevents wrong, and the courts can always check undue zeal. The true construction of the statute is that it prohibits the public prosecutor from accepting private compensation and gives him the control of all public prosecutions, leaving to him a discretion as to the matter of accepting offered assistance, subject to the power of the court to interfere and prevent any oppression of the defendant, and holding him personally responsible for any violation of the statute or malfeasance in office. See State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 478; Commonwealth v. Williams, 2 Cush. 582. (2) Defendant was arrested and a preliminary examination held on a charge of assault with intent to kill. On such examination the testimony of the party assaulted was taken. This testimony was taken at the rooms of the witness, he being unable to move therefrom, and in the presence of the justice and the counsel for defendant, the defendant himself being absent. Не could have been present if he had desired, but preferred not to be. Subsequently the party assaulted died, and a charge of murder was preferred in lieu of the original charge of assault with intent to kill. Upon the trial upon this charge, evidence was received of the testimony given by such deceased witness on the preliminary examination. Held no error. In United States v. Macomb, 5 McLean, 286, the testimony of a witness since deceased, given on a preliminary examination, was held admissible on the trial of the indictment found for the same offense. See, also, Davis v. State, 17 Ala. 354; Kendrick v. State, 10 Humph. 479; Rex v. Barber, 1 Root (Conn.), 76; Bostwick v. State, Humph. 344; State v. Campbell, 1 Rich. (S. C.) 214; United States v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. 440; State v. Atkins, 1 Overton, 229. Both reason and authority unite to support the competency of this testimony. Kansas Supreme Court, July term, 1880. State of Kansas v. Wilson. Opinion by Brewer, J. CORRESPONDENCE. JUSTICE DAVIS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Mr. Arnoux's communication in the LAW JOURNAL of the 4th inst., concerning Mr. Justice Davis, does not fully dispose of the case. That distinguished judge's abilities are well known. Lawyers who have felt compelled to condemn his performance of the character of a committing magistrate, would deeply regret his absence from the tribunal where his learning and ability could with difficulty be supplied. From the General Term of the Supreme Court it is to be hoped that he will not soon deem himself called away in deference to a precedent which might better be called notorious than illustrious. In the Philp case the justice differed in opinion from the testimony by a witness of his own opinion concerning the genuineness of certain handwriting. The question of genuineness was, in the view of the law taken by the justice, of essential importance to the prisoner. The testimony of an accomplice before the fact of a witness who by asserting its genuineness had prompted the exhibition, or rather publication, of this writing, would be of less weight than that of a person free from such previous connection with the suspected writing. Is it not a fact that the justice so misstated the evidence before him as to place this witness for the prisoner in the position of an accomplice, whose testimony as that of an accomplice was to be deemed of little weight? May not the justice's own conclusion in the matter have been aided by his mistake concerning the facts? Such an error, according to the spirit of the English law, when committed to the possible prejudice of a prisoner is inexcusable. It is startling to think what might result from similar want of attention in a trial involving life or death. C. W. S. Dec. 9, 1880. incalculable benefit to the practicing lawyers of this State. When the old Code was in force, what was known as "Voorhies' Code," prepared by John Townshend, Esq., was considered by our bar as an indispensable part of a working law library. The enactment of the first thirteen chapters of the present Code impaired, to a great extent, the usefulness of that compilation, but the first volume, prepared by Mr. Bliss, who incorporated so much of that as was relevant with his own labors, furnished as full and complete a collection of case law, upon the matters it related to, as was then practicable. By the adoption of the final chapters of the new Code the statute law regulating practice here became comparatively symmetrical, and an opportunity was afforded Mr. Bliss to finish what he had undertaken. This he has availed himself of in a manner which cannot fail to meet the approbation of the bench and bar of this State. As most of the profession are familiar with the first volume of the work, an extended notice of the one before us is unnecessary. From a somewhat thorough examination we are satisfied that no reported case of any value in relation to practice has been overlooked. And as such provisions of the statute law upon that subject as are not contained in the Code are referred to, and in some instances given in full, we do not hesitate to pronounce the entire work a complete hand-book of the law of procedure in our various civil courts. The annotations to the chapter upon surrogates' courts, which are stated in the preface to be the work of Wm. T. Schley, Esq., will be found of peculiar value in view of the important changes made by the Code in regard to those courts and proceedings before them. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. Dec. 14, 1880: THE following decisions were handed down Tuesday. Judgment affirmed with costs-The Union Dime Savings Bank v. Andariese; Decker v. Boice; Taintor v. Hemingway; Avery v. Wheat; Johnson v. Heiser; Patton v. Giles. Judgment affirmed The People v. Bork; The People v. Cox.-Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event - Davies v. The Mayor, etc., of New York; Schwinger v. Raymond; Devens v. The Mechanics and Traders' Insurance Company.- -Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event, unless plaintiff stipulates to reduce its recovery by striking therefrom $8,200, and interest thereon, in which event, judgment as so modified, affirmed with costs - The Chenango Bridge Company v. Paige.- -Order reversed and motion for commission denied without costs- In re Hahn. -Order affirmed, and judgment absolute for respondent, on stipulation, with costs- - Osborn v. Schenck.-Motion for re-argument denied without costs - In re Eldridge. our recent comment on judges acting as referees, judges think the salary insufficient, but it has happened in Connecticut that when a judge has retired from the bench in old age he has not only shown a remarkable physical vigor and ability to work, but has been able to make more money out of committee work alone than he earned when serving in the double capacity of judge and committeeman. The bench The subject of confining judges to work on the bench alone is attracting attention in other States. We have before us a letter from a well-known lawyer in New Hampshire, whose attention has been attracted to the discussion in Connecticut and elsewhere. He says: 'We are troubled with the same pernicious system here. The practice of permitting judges to appoint each other as referees, and of their sitting as such from the close of one term to the beginning of another -devoting no time to the preparation of their published decisions, or to the briefs or arguments of counsel—is having a disastrous effect upon the quality of their judgments and upon that respect which an intelligent profession ought to feel for the decisions of an intelligent court. I think some effort will be made to compel our court to attend to its legitimate duties.'" Our excellent contemporary should reflect that a man at seventy is crowded for time, and rarely has much opportunity thereafter to lay up money, however efficient the training of the "preparatory school" may have been. The judges may not ask for pensions, but we think they would not refuse them, and that they ought to have them. At the second annual meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, held at Montgomery, Dec. 2d, the annual address was delivered by the president, Edmund W. Pettus; and papers were read by M. L. Stansel on The Struggle for Law, by George F. Moore on Judicial Delay, and by David Clopton on Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over Suits against Municipal Corporations. One of the ablest and best known lawyers of this State writes us about Judge Davis' attack on Mr. Hewett: "A more inexcusable stab at private character was never dealt from the safe seclusion of the judgment seat."—The Memphis Avalanche says: "The ALBANY LAW JOURNAL should cultivate the Avalanche more intimately. We are very nice and companionable, and disposed to growl only at persons who insist that the people of the north and the south have any cause for making ugly faces at each other." Four men in India bought several bales of India rugs, and also some cotton bales. That the rats might not destroy the cotton, they purchased a cat. It was agreed that each of the four should own a particular leg of the cat; and each adorned with beads, etc., the particular leg apportioned to him. The cat accidentally injured one of its legs and the owner of that member wound a rag around it, soaked in oil. The cat going too near the hearth set the rag on fire, and being in great pain rushed in among the cotton bales where she was accustomed to hunt rats and set fire to the cotton and rugs, which were consumed. The three owners of the unburnt legs brought a suit against the other to recover the value of the goods destroyed. The defendant denied his liability and claimed to recover against the plaintiffs. The court said: "The leg that had the oiled rag on it was hurt; the cat could not use that leg; in fact, it held up that leg and ran with the other three legs. The three unhurt legs, therefore, carried the fire to the cotton and alone are culpable. The injured leg is not to be blamed. The three partners who owned the three legs with which the cat ran to the cotton, will pay the whole value of the bales to the partner who was the proprietor of the injured here has been a sort of preparatory school for the retirement of judges at seventy years of age into fields of work and usefulness most promising in a pecuniary point of view. An ex-judge in this State was never known to be seriously overworked nor to die young, and the last thing he would ask would be a pension. | leg." 1102 " The Albany Albany Law Journal. THE ALBANY, DECEMBER 25, 1880. CURRENT TOPICS. THERE seems just now to have been a sort of tacit convention among the leading editors of this country to say something on the subject of libel, apparently with a view to ascertain just how much the people will stand from the press. Mr. Godkin, editor of the Nation, starts off in the December Atlantic, but he does not arrive anywhere in particular. He tells us that most of the libelling is done by newspapers; that the public practically demand it in respect to candidates for public office; that in some well-regulated communities libel suits are unknown, the gentlemanly practice of duelling being the vogue instead; that it would be foolish for one editor to sue another for libel; that the law of time afford a reasonable protection to the honest and well-meaning publisher. As the laws of the different States now stand, neither of the objects as above stated is very well or satisfactorily secured." Mr. Reid, of the New York Tribune, thinks two changes ought to be made: first, malice ought not to be presumed, but should be matter of affirmative proof; second, where there is no malice and there is no actual damage, there should be no judgment except for costs. The law which awards only nominal damages under the circumstances last mentioned substantially amounts to what Mr. Reid would have. As to the other point, Mr. Reid's requirement would amount to a defeat of justice three times in four. The Times continues: "Another editor in this State properly holds that there ought to be further legislation for the protection of newspaper publishers, requiring that persons bringing suits shall give approved security for costs. As it is now,' he says, a shyster lawyer may commence action in behalf of a vagabond client, and make us costs without rem เ damages in libel frequently affords very inadequate edy, though our defense be successful.'" reparation: that the French law, which absolutely prohibits the publication in any periodical of any thing relating to a man's private life, which is not in issue in a criminal proceeding, might possibly be advantageously adopted here; that the slow procedure in actions of libel in this country frequently defeats justice, and that the English procedure of criminal information is superior; that something might perhaps be devised to prevent indecent assaults by the press on private character, but that after all such assaults are far less common than might reasonably be apprehended. This seems the gist of Mr. Godkin's unobjectionable and very inconclusive article. But the tone and spirit of it leave the impression that the writer's sympathies are on the right side, and it must be said that the Nation never libels anybody. In short, we guess that the writer would gladly see some restraints on the license of newspapers, but he does not suggest what he would have. After witnessing the foul and shocking excesses of the political newspapers in the late campaign, we wish that wisdom could devise some preventive, some remedy, or some effectual reparation. The Troy Times says: "Early this year the Michigan press association appointed a committee whose duty, among other things, was to correspond with a large number of publishers throughout the country and ascertain their views as to what legal protection the press needs in the matter of the increasing frequency of frivolous and vexatious prosecutions for libel. About sixty prominent journalists were accordingly applied to for their views on the subject. A part of the responses received by the committee have been printed in pamphlet form and distributed. | They are exceedingly interesting as showing the tendency of the journalistic profession, if not of the general public, to secure the framing of such libel laws as shall at once protect the community from reckless and abusive publications, and at the same VOL. 22.- No. 26. This would be as ridiculous as to exact from every publisher a bond of indemnity against damages every time he essays to print any thing personal that can possibly injure if it prove not true. The community is not in half so much danger from "shyster" lawyers as from "shyster" editors. The privilege of suing an editor ought not to be any dearer than that of suing one who is not an editor. The editor of the New York Times holds that actual malice should always be shown in criminal cases, unless the case is one where the civil law will not provide an adequate remedy; that trials should be had in the county in which the publication was made, if the defendant so desire; and that the period in which suit for libel must be brought be reduced from two years to one year. Furthermore, that a suitable retraction, showing a desire to right a wrong done, should act as a bar to a criminal prosecution, should rebut the presumption of malice, and should act in reducing the damages to the amount shown to have been inflicted. Finally, he makes the important observation that the only effectual way in which to prevent unscrupulous attorneys from taking up cases on spec." is by strictly enforcing the laws against champerty and maintenance, and by making the attorneys personally liable for costs under certain circumstances. The Troy Times adds: "If all or most of the above suggestions were embodied in libel laws, the press would have little reason to complain. In some States these laws are so imperfect that journalists are seriously impeded in the prosecution of their work as agents of news and guardians of the public good.” The above is a specimen of average editorial intelligence and sense in respect to law. The idea of making an officer of court personally liable for costs under any circumstances is ridiculous. The press do not need protection. They already have a license regarded by many as outrageous and dangerous. The editors are not such weak saints as need extra-¡ Mr. Justice Strong has retired from the bench of the United States Supreme Court, at the age of 72, and is entitled to his annual salary of $10,000 for life, having served for more than 10 years. He had previously served 10 years as chief justice of Pennsylvania, resigning in 1868. He was nominated to the Federal Supreme Court bench by President Grant in 1870. President Hayes has nominated Judge Woods to succeed him. Judge Woods was admitted to the bar in 1847, and pursued practice till 1857. He was then chosen to the Ohio Legislature and made speaker, and was re-elected in 1858. At the beginning of the civil war he became lieutenant-colonel of the Seventy-sixth Ohio infantry, and was mustered out as major-general in Alabama, where he settled in 1865. In 1868 he was made chancellor of the State, and after serving two years, was appointed Circuit judge of the United States for the Fifth Circuit, which includes the districts of Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and other Southern States. The Albany Argus says: "His character as a gentleman, his humanity and firmness as a magistrate, and his abilities as a jurist, are marked." It is rumored that Judge Erskine, of the Georgia Federal District Court, will be named to succeed Judge Woods. The selection of Judge Woods harmonizes with our views of geographical fitness, but the question arises, what becomes of Pennsylvania's interests? We really hope that when Judge Swayne retires, his successor will be taken from Pennsylvania. Probably by diligent inquiry the president could find one proper person, resident of that State, who was born in Ohio, if, as it seems, birth or residence in Ohio is essential to an appointment to office under the present administration. ent there are four different owners of the series, and as many different prices. Every three years hereafter it is possible that there will be a new publisher. The difficulty of getting a complete set is already very considerable, and must continually increase under this system. The purchaser, too, is at the mercy of such of the publishers as are not bound by the contract price beyond the term of three years. There is one price for purchasers in this State, and another for those residing in other States. Out of the present system have grown unseemly squabbles and litigations, and delay, inconvenience and annoyance to the profession. It would be well if the State could purchase the interests of the present publishers at a fair price; but if this cannot be done, there is an excellent opportunity for the State to do what is greatly needed, namely, to publish a new edition of the past volumes, leaving out obsolete and overruled matter, and mere memoranda of decisions, and embracing such portions of Abbott's Decisions and Keyes' Reports as ought to be covered by the regular series, re-writing the head notes and statements of fact in many instances, omitting a great many of the citations of counsel, and giving the volumes cohesion by notes and references. Such a series would supplant the old, if the publishers would not listen to reason. But whether this were done or not, in the future the State should publish its own reports, at a fair price, and should not give them away. Judge Macomber, at New York Special Term, in Kerrison v. Kerrison, has passed upon the vexed question of a marriage by a party divorced and forbidden to marry again during the marriage of the other party, and going to another State, for the purpose of evading the prohibition, and there contracting a second marriage during the marriage of the other party. Judge Macomber holds that such a marriage is valid. This was an action by the second wife to have the second marriage declared void. The decision was influenced by the fact that the plaintiff was herself cognizant of and assenting to the fraud, and therefore did not come with clean hands. It is possible that this circumstance may be sufficient to warrant the decision, and that the rest of the holding may be obiter. At all events, it is contrary to the General Term decision of Marshall v. Marshall, 2 Hun, 238, which it examines and disapproves. A correspondent writes us that there are two other decisions to the contrary, and following the Marshall case, now on their way up. See 21 Alb. L. J. 486. A NOTES OF CASES. N interesting case of definition is re Lord Lon desborough, Bridgman v. Lord Otto Fitzgerald, before Malins, V. C., Nov. 8, 1880, 43 L. T. (N. S.) 408. A. by his will bequeathed unto his wife absolutely all his or her "jewels, trinkets, gold and silver plate, ornamental and other china, and all objects of vertu and taste." And he directed that his wife should be entitled during life to his leasehold messuage with the appurtenances in Carlton Houseterrace, and the statuary, furniture, and other effects purchased by him therewith, or which might be therein at the time of his decease. After her death the said leasehold premises, statuary, and effects were directed to be sold, and the produce was made part of his residuary estate. There were in the said house at the testator's death, but not purchased by him therewith, ten pictures, valued at £15,000. Held, that the words "objects of vertu and taste" were intended to include only things ejusdem generis with those enumerated, and did not include the |