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lawfully purchase promissory notes, as well as discount such paper. The State law in question is substantially the same as the Federal act. The power is "to carry on the business of banking by discounting bills, notes and other evidences of debt," "by buying and selling gold and other bullion, foreign coins and bills of exchange," etc. The court, quoting and approving McLeod on Banking, said: "In the language of the money market it is usual to estimate the value of money by the discount or profit it yields, and to buy or purchase a debt is always in commerce termed to discount it." In Tracy v. Tallmage, 18 Barb. 456, it is said: "To discount includes to buy, for discounting at most is but another term for buying at a discount." See Johnson v. National Bank of Gloversville, 74 N. Y. 329; S. C., Browne's Nat. Bank Cas. 302. Of authorities holding a different doctrine, Niagara Co. Bank v. Baker, 15 Ohio St. 68; Farmers', etc., Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 198, the court said the decisions were upon violations of positive law, and are distinguishable from this case. The doctrine thus pronounced is in harmony with Pape v. Capitol Bank of Topeka, 20 Kans. 440; 27 Am. Rep. 183; Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 238; First Nat. Bk. of North Bennington v. Town of Bennington, Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 437; but is opposed to the dissenting opinion of Tappan, J., in Nat. Bk. of Gloversville v. Wells, 15 Hun, 51; S. C., Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 333; to First Nat. Bk. of Rochester v. Pierson, 24 Minn. 140; 31 Am. Rep. 341; Thomp. Nat. Bk. Cas. 637; and to Lazear v. Nat. Union Bk. of Baltimore, Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 261, besides the cases mentioned by the court in the principal case. In the case last cited, in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the court said: "While we do not mean to say that a National bank may not invest its surplus capital in notes, we are of opinion that it has no authority to use such surplus funds, as may remain on hand from day to day, for the purpose of buying notes" (citing the Minnesota cases). "If any other construction were given to such a transaction as this the intention of Congress to prohibit National banks from buying and selling notes would be entirely defeated, and those institutions would be at perfect liberty to decline making discounts for their customers, and afterward to buy up the very paper which had been offered for discount and refused, at such price as the banks might choose to give." This important question ought to be settled, as to National banks, by the Federal Supreme Court.

In Meriwether v. Morrison, Kentucky Court of Appeals, September 28, 1880, 10 Rep. 661, the deceased, a few weeks before his death, indorsed upon certain notes of which he was the owner, the words: "I transfer the within note as a gift to Miss Agnes Morrison." The evidence would authorize the finding of fact that the deceased then placed the notes in the hands of A. in trust, to be delivered to Miss Morrison, at his death, or that they were so handed to A. and were placed by him in a desk of deceased and remained under the control of deceased until

his death. Held, that in either case it was a gift inter vivos, and that the title to the notes vested in the donee at the instant they were assigned and delivered as aforesaid. The court said: "The contingency of death simply postponed the beneficial enjoyment. It was an event that must happen, and did not render the gift conditional. By the as| signment and delivery all control over the notes passed from Meriwether, Sr., and the gift became irrevocable. In Ray v. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266; S. C., 23 Am. Rep. 447, the facts are that B. deposited in bank certain moneys in his own name as trustee for R. B. gave the bank book to R., who returned it to B., in whose control it remained. In an equity suit by R. against the administrator of B., claiming the deposit, it was held that the trust was completely constituted, and the fact that it was voluntary was no reason for refusing it. In Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185; S. C., 18 Am. Rep. 178, the facts are: On a slate by the bedside of E., who was found dead, was, in her writing and signed by her, "I wish Dr. L. to take possession of all, both personal, real, and mixed. I am so sick I believe I shall die; look in valise." In valise was found a memorandum written by her, directing Dr. L. to take all of her property. In the opinion it is said: "We think it clear that Rachel Hill did all that she could to create a gift causa mortis, and fully intended it, and that the written declaration should prevail as a valid appointment to the uses indicated as fully as if there had been a manual delivery of the securities." So far as the act of delivery is necessary to complete the gift, the law is the same as to gifts causa mortis and inter vivos. A case in point is Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364; S. C., 18 Am. Rep. 231. M., having money on deposit in bank, handed her book to C., at the same time saying to him that she gave the money in that book to H. and I., and requested him to keep the book, and after her decease divide the money between H. and I. It was held to be a valid gift of the money on deposit to H. and I. In Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512; S. C., 16 Am. Rep. 69, A. deposited in bank money in her own name as trustee for W., but during her life drew out the money at different times. A. died leaving a will in which no mention was made of W. or the deposit. In the suit by W. against the executor of A., it was held that the deposit was a complete gift that the depositor could not revoke. See, also, Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88; S. C., 4 Am. Rep. 39; Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78; S. C., 3 Am. Rep. 115; Southerland v. Southerland's Adm'r, 5 Bush, 591." To same effect, Giddings v. Giddings' Adm'r, 51 Vt. 227; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 682.

In Steinman v. Henderson, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, May 17, 1880, 10 Rep. 617, it was held that a husband cannot subject his wife's realty to a lien even for necessary repairs without her authority or consent. The court said: "It is essential to the validity of a mechanic's lien against the separate estate of a married woman that the claim should set forth that the work was done and the materials furnished

with her authority and consent; in other words, that she or some one authorized by her contracted therefor. Her property is not subject to a lien for work done or materials furnished under a contract with her husband unless by her authority, nor can he incumber her real estate without her consent, even for the purpose of making necessary repairs.” The same was held in Flannery v. Rohrmayer, 46 Conn. 558; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 36, where the wife knew of the erection, while it was in progress, and did not object to it. The court there said: "She was not a party to the contract out of which the debt originated. It was the debt of her husband alone, and she was under no obligation to pay it. The fact that she knew of the work and made no objection to it does not make it her debt, and does not charge her land with its payment. Her husband having a life estate in the land might well contract for an improvement which would make it more valuable to him, and her knowledge and silence, without an active participation in the contract, and with no resulting benefit to her or her estate, are insufficient to impose upon her any liability. But it is claimed that the statute justifies this decree. That provides that a lien attaches where services are performed 'by virtue of an agreement with or by consent of the owner of the land upon which such building is erected.' It is true the language of the statute seems to be broad enough to include the estate of the wife under the circumstances of this case, if mere knowledge and silence constitute a consent. We think they do not. It has never been the policy of our law to subject the wife's real estate to the payment of the husband's debts, and the tendency of modern legislation is to extend rather than contract this immunity. If the statute is to be interpreted as including the real estate of the wife in cases where she is not a party to the contract, and where it does not appear to be for her benefit or for the benefit of her estate, then it works a radical change in the law relating to the property of married women, and subjects it to the payment of the debts of the husband, thereby and to that extent repealing prior laws on that subject. We cannot believe that such was the intention of the Legislature, and must therefore hold that such a construction is inadmissible." To the same effect, Lauer v. Bandow, 43 Wis. 556; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 571.

THIRTY-SECOND AMERICAN REPORTS.

THIS

HIS volume contains cases selected from 61 Alabama, 90 Illinois, 65, 66 Indiana, 50 Iowa, 41 Michigan, 12 Vroom, 76 New York, 34 Ohio State, 88 Pennsylvania State, 11, 12 South Carolina, 6, 7 Baxter, 5, 6, 7 Texas Court Appeals, 50, 51 Texas, 30 Grattan, 46, 47 Wisconsin. It has notes on the following subjects: Removal of remains from burial grounds; destroying private property to stop fire; contract by letter; evasion of statutes; larceny of paraphernalia; reservation of timber in deed; duress; evidence of declarations of testator to show his mental condition; who is "head of a family ";

revocation of warrant of extradition; infant's repudiation of executed contract for services; disqualification of juror for opinion; leap-year; action by wife for procuring husband to abandon her; liability of husband for wife's funeral expenses; mechanics' lien in favor of architect; obstruction of surface-water by municipal corporation; action by employee against co-employee for negligence; negiigent communication of fire; partnership — share of profits for services; real property — ice in pond; sale of article for unlawful use; keeping open barber-shop on Sunday; surety for faithful performchange of principal's duties; taxation of capital stock and shares; exemption of bank building from taxation.

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The following cases are worthy of especial note: ACTION. An action of tort for negligence or deceit lies against the personal representatives of the deceased wrong-doer. Tichenor v. Hayes, 12 Vroom, 193; p. 186.

AGENCY.— An agent appointed to sell a horse is not thereby authorized to warrant. Cooley v. Perrine, 12 Vroom, 322; p. 210.

BAIL.-In an action on a bail bond for the appearance of an indicted person, it is a good defense that the person was in prison in another county in the same State, on conviction for another offense. Cooper v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 215; p. 571.

BURIAL GROUNDS.- The Legislature has a right to authorize a municipality to remove the remains of the dead from cemeteries. The right of burial in a church-yard is a privilege enjoyable only so long as the ground continues a church-yard, and is subject to any right of the church to abandon it; and one who is merely a pew-holder, or has relatives buried in the yard, and has no contract relation with the church, cannot maintain the objection that an act of the Legislature authorizing the removal of the dead from such church-yard impairs the obligation of a contract. Craig v. First Presbyterian Church of Pittsburgh, 88 Penn. St. 42; p. 417.

CARRIER.- A passenger on defendant's railway, finding no vacant seats in the ordinary coaches, the seats being occupied either by passengers or their baggage, proceeded to a drawing-room car, owned by a private individual, but forming part of the train, and regularly run with it by contract with the defendant, and there took a seat. When called on for extra fare for that seat, he refused, announcing his readiness to go into the other cars if a seat were provided for him there. Thereupon the porter of the drawing-room car, employed by its owner, attempted to eject him. Held, that the defendant was liable for this assault. Thorpe v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 402; p. 325.

In an action against a common carrier for failure to receive and carry live stock in pursuance of its agreement, it is a good defense that it was prevented from fulfillment solely by the armed violence of its late employees, whose wages had been reduced, and who had quit work and struck for higher wages. Pittsburg, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Hollo well, 65 Ind. 188; p. 63.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-The constitutional pro

hibition of agricultural leases for a longer period, berth was offered him in another car, which he dethan twelve years cannot be evaded by the executing of two leases at the same time and for the same consideration, one for eight, and the other for twelve years, the latter to commence at the expiration of the first term; but both are void; and a former lease, surrendered in consideration of the execution of these, is not reinstated. Clark v. Barnes, 76 N. Y. 301; p. 306.

The destruction of private property by the fire department of a city, to stay a conflagration, is not such an act as will sustain an action for damages against the city at common law, and is not a taking of private property for public use, within the sense of the Constitution; and if any remedy is provided by law it must be pursued in the defined mode. Keller v. City of Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614; p. 613.

The Legislature cannot create new subjects of exemption from execution, in addition to those enumerated in the Constitution. Duncan v. Barnett, 11 S. C. 333; p. 476.

CONTRACT. In consideration of the grant of a right of way over his land, the defendant agreed by parol to furnish the plaintiff for life with a free pass for himself and his family over its road. The pass was given for a while, and then refused. In an action for breach of the contract, held, that the measure of damages was the value of such pass, to be approximated as closely as the nature of the case would admit. Erie & Pittsburgh Railroad Co. v. Douthel, 88 Penn. St. 243; p. 451.

Defendant offered, by letter sent through the mail, to engage the plaintiff in his employment, stating terms, and asking for a reply by return mail. The plaintiff received the letter on the 22d of March, and next day gave a postal card, accepting the offer, to a boy, to be mailed, but he neglected to mail it until the 25th. Held, that defendant was not bound by his offer, nor was he bound after receiving the postal card to notify her that it was not in time, nor was he estopped by his mere subsequent intention to accept her services and an unsuccessful attempt to see her. Maclay v. Harvey, 90 Ill. 525; P. 35.

Plaintiffs intrusted a claim for collection to a mercantile and collecting agency, taking a receipt conditioned that the claim was to be transmitted to an attorney for collection or adjustment, at the risk and on the account of the plaintiffs, and signing a similar agreement in the defendants' books. Held, that these instruments constituted the contract, and the defendants were not liable for the attorney's acts or default, in the absence of proof of gross negligence in selecting him. Sanger v. Dun, 47 Wis. 615; p. 789.

The plaintiff purchased of the defendant, a sleeping car company, at Indianapolis, a ticket purporting to entitle him to accommodations in a designated sleeping car, in a berth to be pointed out by the conductor, thence to New York city. A certain berth was accordingly assigned him, and designated on the ticket, but at Pittsburgh the car was detached, and a different and less safe and comfortable

clined. In an action for damages for breach of contract, held, that he was entitled to a continuous passage in the same car and berth, or in one equally safe, comfortable and convenient; and that it was no defense that the defendant simply rented the cars to the railway companies for the use of passengers. Pullman Palace Car Company v. Taylor, 65 Ind. 153; p. 57.

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COSTS. A judgment of the Federal Supreme Court against the State of Wisconsin, for costs in a criminal action, does not constitute a just claim against the State within the statute conferring on the State courts jurisdiction of actions against the State. Noyes v. State, 46 Wis. 250; p. 710.

CRIMINAL LAW.-- Pushing open a closed but unfastened transom, that swings horizontally on hinges over an outer door of a dwelling-house, and entering thereat, constitutes burglary. Timmons v. State, 34 Ohio St. 426; p. 376.

Where by law the death penalty cannot be inflicted for a given offense committed by a person of less than seventeen years of age, the burden of proof showing his non-age is on the defendant. Ake v. State, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 398; p. 586.

On the trial of an indictment for murder, the prosecution was allowed to prove that the examining magistrate had compelled the prisoner to make his footprints in an ash heap, and they corresponded with footprints found at the scene of the crime. Held, no error. Walker v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. 245; p. 595.

A white man and a colored woman, married according to the forms of law in Mississippi, may be indicted for living together as husband and wife, under the laws of Tennessee. State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. 12; p. 549.

K., a negro man, and M., a white woman, domiciled in Virginia, went to the District of Columbia and were there legally and regularly married, and after remaining there ten days returned to their home in Virginia, and continued to reside there as husband and wife. The law of Virginia prohibits marriages between white persons and negroes. Held, that the parties were liable to indictment in Virginia for lewd and lascivious cohabitation. Kinney v. Commonwealth, 30 Gratt. 858; p. 690.

The defendant was indicted under a statute making it a misdemeanor to employ female waiters in a drinking saloon. She had employed such waiters before the passage of the act, and after the enactment she discharged them and entered into partnership with them. Held, an evasion of the statute for which the indictment would lie. Walter v. Commonwealth, 88 Penn. St. 137; p. 429.

Keeping open a barber shop on Sunday is not an indictable nuisance. State v. Lorry, 7 Baxt. 95; p. 555.

Perjury cannot be predicated of an affidavit sworn before a notary public professing to act in the city of New York, but who was a non-resident of the State at that time and at the time of his appointLambert v. People, 76 N. Y. 220; p. 293. One may be convicted of rape on a woman who

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failed to resist because of imbecility. State v. Atherton, 50 Iowa, 189; p. 134.

The objection that jurors on a criminal trial did not understand the English language is waived if not specifically taken at the trial. Yanez v. State, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 429; p. 591.

On the trial of an indictment for larceny where six witnesses were examined on behalf of the people and three on behalf of the defendant, it was held error for the court to limit the arguments of counsel to five minutes each. White v. The People,

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EVIDENCE.-The rule that the execution of a writing must be proved by the subscribing witness is not modified by the recent legislation making parties competent witnesses. Henly v. Henning, 7 Baxt. 524; p. 568.

A deed, executed by a grantor making her mark, she and the attesting witnesses being dead, is well proved by evidence of the handwriting of the attesting witnesses, with other confirmatory evidence, and proof of the grantor's signature is not necessary. Lyons v. Holmes, 11 S. C. 429; p. 483.

EXEMPTION.—Under a statute exempting property from distress, a widow, keeping a boardinghouse, with a female friend residing with her, and female servants, besides the boarders, is the "head of a family." Race v. Oldridge, 90 Ill. 250; p. 27. EXTRADITION.-A citizen and resident of one State, charged in a requisition with the constructive commission of crime in another State, from which in fact he has never fled, is not a fugitive from justice, and the determination of the governor as to the sufficiency of the facts alleged is not conclusive. Jones v. Leonard, 50 Iowa, 106; p. 116.

INFANCY.-An infant cannot repudiate his executed contract to render services at a stipulated price, and recover quantum meruit, where the other party did not know of his infancy, and the contract was reasonable. Spicer v. Earl, 41 Mich. 191; p.

152.

INSURANCE. One who effected insurance covering his own goods and goods stored with him, and collected the insurance money, is liable to the owner of such stored goods for his share, although he did not request or know of the insurance, and did not ratify it before the payment of the loss. Snow v. Carr, 61 Ala. 363; p. 3.

An application for fire insurance contained a statement that "the foregoing is a just, full and true exposition of all the facts and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value and risk of the property to be insured, so far as the same are known to the applicant and are material to the risk,

and the same is hereby made a condition of the insurance and a warranty on the part of the assured;" and the policy made the application a part of it and a warranty. Held, that the warranty was only such as was described in the application, and embraced only such statements as were material to the risk and known to the insured to be false. Redman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 89; p. 751.

JURISDICTION.- Where a petition for letters of administration was presented to the clerk of the surrogate, in the surrogate's absence, and the clerk filled up a blank appointment signed and left with him by the surrogate, without evidence outside the petition of the death of the alleged decedent, the surrogate having no knowledge of and never acting upon the petition, the letters are void, and do not protect a debtor who in good faith pays his debt to the administrator named therein. Roderigas v. East River Savings Institution, 76 N. Y. 316; p. 309.

MANDAMUS. - A citizen who desires to inspect recommendations filed with the collector of taxes as the basis for issuing pending liquor licenses, in order to ascertain whether the provisions of the law have been observed, and to secure obedience to the law, is entitled to mandamus to compel the exhibition of such letters. Ferry v. Williams, 12 Vroom, 332; p. 219.

MARRIAGE.-A wife may maintain an action for the loss of the society and companionship of her husband, against one who wrongfully and maliciously induces and procures her husband to abandon or send her away. Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621; p. 397.

A threat by a husband, conveyed through a payee, that he will poison himself unless his wife signs a note as surety for him, by means whereof she is induced so to sign, does not amount to duress such as will avoid her note. Wright v. Remington, 12 Vroom, 48; p. 180.

A married woman held in her maiden name real estate which belonged to her before marriage. Representing herself as a widow and concealing her marriage, she applied for a loan thereon, and exe cuted a mortgage therefor in her maiden name, without her husband joining in it, the other party being ignorant of her marriage. Held, that in equity she could not avoid the mortgage and retain the money. Patterson v. Lawrence, 90 Ill. 174; p. 22.

A husband and his adult son went together to an undertaker and together ordered a coffin and carriages for the funeral of the wife and mother. Nothing was said as to who was to be charged. Held, that the husband was liable. Sears v. Giddy, 41 Mich. 590; p. 168.

MASTER AND SERVANT. — An action will lie in favor of one employee against a co-employee for physical injury caused to the former by the latter's negligence in the same undertaking. Hinds v. Overacker, 66 Ind. 547; p. 114.

MECHANICS' LIEN.- Under a Mechanics' Lien Act, giving a lien to any person who shall perform labor, etc., a supervising architect may enforce a lien. Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N. Y. 50; p. 262.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.—A city charter pro

vided for the exercise by ordinance of the power to employ legal counsel for the assistance of the common council, etc. No such ordinance was passed, but the mayor employed attorneys to give an opinion regarding municipal matters, which was read at a meeting of the common council and acted on. Held, that the attorneys could not recover of the city for their services in giving the opinion. City of Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; p. 637.

In the absence of statute a county is not liable for damage by failure to repair its public bridges. Wood v. Tipton County, 7 Baxt. 112; p. 561.

Defendant's charter authorized its officers to blow up any building on fire, or any other building which it might deem hazardous, and gave the owners a right to damages therefor. The officers, to arrest a fire, blew up a building, and by reason of the explosion the plaintiff's building on the opposite side of the street was shattered. Held, that he had no cause of action, although the injury was the natural and probable result of the explosion. People ex rel. Brisbane v. City of Buffalo, 76 N. Y. 558; p. 337.

A municipal corporation is not liable for damage caused by the accumulation of surface-water on city lots, when owing solely to the insufficient size of sewers, which are not defective in construction nor out of repair. Fair v. City of Philadelphia, 88 Penn. St. 309; p. 455.

The chief of police of a city is an officer of the State, and is not subject to removal by the mayor, and the mayor is liable in damages to him in a civil action for such removal. Burch v. Hardwicke,

Gratt. 24; p. 640.

cases to deliver letters at the nearest post-office, which was G. Held, that the notice was regular, although it never reached the indorser, and although she had changed her residence before the mailing. Central National Bank v. Adams, 11 S. C. 452; p. 495.

NUISANCE.-A livery-stable in a city is not necessarily a nuisance, and so where one has been burned down an injunction will not be granted against rebuilding and using it, but only against its use in a manner proved to have been a nuisance. Shiras v. Olinger, 50 Iowa, 571; p. 138.

REAL PROPERTY.-A sale of ice, already formed in a pond, is a valid sale of personal property. Higgins v. Kusterer, 41 Mich. 318; p. 160.

SALE. In an action for the price of a billiard table it is no defense that it may be used for gambling, unless it was sold under a contract that it was so to be used; and knowledge of such intended use will not be inferred from the fact that it was accompanied by a pool set and rules for its use. Brunswick v. Valleau, 50 Iowa, 120; p. 119.

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STATUTE. The statute of 21 Henry III, concerning leap-year, makes no provision as to how the 28th and 29th of February shall be counted in computing a number of days less than a year; the 29th of Feb30|ruary is an independent day in such computations; and so service of a summons on the 25th of February, for a term commencing March 6th, is a valid ten days' notice. Helphenstine v. Vincennes National Bank, 65 Ind. 582; p. 86.

NEGLIGENCE. -In an action against a railway company, by the owner of real estate adjoining the track, for the burning of his house by sparks from a locomotive, it being found that the fire was communicated by reason of a defective spark arrester, held, that the plaintiff might recover, although the sparks entered the house through an open window in an unoccupied room, the plaintiff not being aware of the defect in the locomotive. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Richardson, 66 Ind. 43; p. 94.

A locomotive engineer, killed by remaining upon his engine when a collision was imminent, and taking measures to stop his train, is not chargeable with contributory negligence as matter of law, although he might have escaped injury by leaving his post. Cottrill v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 47 Wis. 634; p. 796.

A common seaman is bound to obey orders, and if he receives an injury in obeying an order manifestly perilous he is not chargeable with contributory negligence. Thompson v. Hermann, 47 Wis. 602; p. 784.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.- A notary, having no precise knowledge of an indorser's residence, but being informed that she resided at A., mailed notice of protest to her at that place in care of the maker. She resided midway between A. and G., but had got her letters at G. There was no post-office at A., but it was the duty of the postal agents in such

SURETY. A surety signed an appeal bond, and intrusted it to the principal on condition that it should also be signed by another whose name appeared in the body of the bond as a co-surety. The principal did not procure such additional signature, but erased that name and delivered the bond. Held, that the surety was not liable. Allen v. Marney, 65 Ind. 398; p. 73.

A bond was executed for the faithful performance of duty by an "assistant clerk" in a bank. He was employed as a messenger. Afterward he was promoted to the next higher clerkship, and still later to the position of book-keeper. In the last position he was stationed near the money-drawer, and from time to time abstracted money from it, and made false entries to conceal his crime. The last promotion was without the knowledge of his sureties on the bond. Held, that they were not liable for the embezzlement. Manufacturers' National Bank of Newark v. Dickerson, 12 Vroom, 448; p. 237.

TAXATION.-Stockholders in a moneyed corporation are liable to taxation on their shares, although the capital stock has also paid a tax. City of Memphis v. Ensley, 6 Baxt. 553; p. 532.

Under a statute exempting from taxation a lot of ground for the use of a private banking institution, the bank is not entitled to exemption of such parts

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