thereof as might be necessary, be appropriated for the payment of any deficiency arising from the expenses, the same to be paid by the treasurer on the certificate of Mr. Peyton F. Miller.

The treasurer, Martin W. Cooke, Esq., presented his report of receipts and disbursements during the year. The bill of Hon. P. S. Danforth, chairman of the Committee on Admissions, for $6.50, for postage, etc., paid by treasurer, was audited.

On motion, Mr. Shepard was appointed a committee to audit the accounts of the treasurer.

The treasurer also reported 64 members in arrears for dues; of these several had resigned.

Mr. Hand moved that the resignations of those who are not indebted to the Association be accepted, and that those who have resigned, but not paid their dues, be stricken from the rolls, unless the same are paid within twenty days after notice has been given by the treasurer. Adopted.

Mr. Ivins, from the committee appointed "to consider what changes may be made in the Constitution and By-laws in order to facilitate the purposes for which the Association was formed," reported progress and asked permission to continue, which was granted. On motion, a recess was taken till 8 P. M.

8 P. M.

Mr. Ivins moved that the treasurer be authorized to advance $250 out of the funds of the Association to pay the prize to be awarded to the successful competitor for the post-graduate prize for 1880, to be reimbursed to the treasury out of the funds subscribed for that purpose. Adopted.

Mr. Shepard, from auditing committee, reported that he had examined the accounts of the treasurer and found them to be correct, and recommended that the items of disbursements made by the treasurer for incidental expenses be approved and allowed, as stated in his report.

Mr. Hand moved that the report be accepted and the recommendations of the committee be approved. Adopted.

Mr. Ivins moved that Mr. Mathews, as chairman, and Mr. Rosendale, as secretary of Executive Committee, prepare for publication the report of the annual meeting of 1880, pursuant to article XII of the Constitution, and that a sum not exceeding $600, out of any money in the treasury, is hereby appropriated for that purpose, to be paid on the certificato of this committee. Adopted.

On motion, meeting adjourned. (A transcript.)

S. W. ROSENDALE,

CARTER'S OLD COURT HOUSE.

The Old Court House: Reminiscences and Anecdotes of the Courts and Bar of Cincinnati. By Judge Carter. Cincinnati: Peter G. Thomson. 1880. Pp. 466.

This book is one of a class which we are always sorry to see. It misrepresents the bar. It is in the main a collection of coarse, vulgar, drunken, profane and commou place matters, which either ought not to be told in print, or are not worth the telling; things only excusable after a bar dinner. The book is well peppered with italics to point the jokes, and with dashes to take the curse off the profanity. Also with startling head lines to excite the curiosity, after the mauner of modern newspapers. A few of these latter will give an idea of the contents: "John Brough beaten by a darkey witness;" "Jacob Flinn and the Old Democrat;

66

Lawyer Cross and the Cincinnati Lager Beer! 'Lawyer Nelson Cross and Lawyer Adam Hodge, they have a bout; "Money makes the mare go." These will suffice. We are not aware whether "Judge " on the title page is the author's surname or his official title. But aside from that, he evidently thinks well of himself and his writing, for he gives us an engraved portrait of himself (a good picture and a good-looking man, we are bound to say), and in his dedication he informs us that his ". pages are "facetious." We can discover nothing in the portrait nor in the "pages," however, to warrant him in pronouncing the late Recorder Hackett, of the city of New York, one of the and one who did much to restrain and intimidate the most useful citizens and best judges that we ever had, criminal classes personal and official tyrant" and a" vulgar tyrant." One of the harshest terms which this author can find to characterize a criminal is "poor devil murderer," a favorite expression of his. He collects, at the end, some passages from Shakespeare,

on

a

"Law and Lawyers and the like." If we thought this book correctly depicted lawyers as a class, or the old bar of Cincinnati, or even the author himself, we should exclaim, with Jack Cade, in Henry VI, as quoted in this book, "The first thing wo do, let's kill all the lawyers."

WEEKS ON DEPOSITIONS.

A Treatise on the Law of Depositions, comprising also abstracts of the Statutory law pertaining thereto. By Edward P. Weeks, Counsellor at Law, etc. San Francisco: Sumner, Whitney & Co. 1880. Pp. xx, 714. This is apparently a very exhaustive and careful monograph, on a useful subject, and is prepared by a very competent author. The work bears marks of good method, industry, and intelligence, and it must prove a welcome guide in a field hitherto unoccupied.

LXII ALABAMA REPORTS.

Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Alabama, during December Term, 1878, ending July 31, 1879. By Thomas G. Jones, State Reporter. Vol. LXII. Montgomery, Ala.: Joel White, 1880. Pp. vii, 662.

The following cases are noteworthy: Hutchinson v. State, p. 3.- One who carries concealed on his person readily and effectively put together, is guilty of carryall the separated pieces of a pistol, capable of being ing concealed weapons. Dotson v. State, p. 141.— The intent in bigamy is immaterial, and one is guilty of that crime who, in the life-time of his first wife, marries again, knowing her to be living, or not having a reasonable belief of her death. Herring v. Skaggs, p. 180.- An agent for the sale of safes has no implied authority to warrant them burglar proof, but express authority or a custom must be shown to found a warranty. In case of an alleged breach of such a warranty, the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the safe as it was, and that as rep

resented, and does not include the value of articles stolen from it. National Commercial Bank of Mobile v. Mayor, p. 284.- An assessment upon the shares of a National bank in gross, or upon the capital stock, against the corporation, is invalid, but the remedy is at law and not by injunction. Buckalew v. State, p. 334.- Where money is put upon a round board, having different numbers around its rim, in equal amounts by several persons, each in turn whirling a hand fastened in the center, the oue at whose whirl the hand registers the highest number taking all the money, the owner of the board sometimes putting up money and sometimes charging the winner a small sum for the use of the board, this is not a lottery. Wright v. Paine, p. 340.-An instrument acknowledging the receipt of money "for safe-keeping," to be "returned whenever called for," is prima facie a special and not a general deposit; and an instrument acknowledging the receipt of money "on deposit, to be paid on demand," is prima facie a loan, against the recovery of which the statute of limitations will run from the date of the writing, and not from demand. Sumter County v. National Bank of Gainesville, p. 464.-Repeating the doctrine of Nat. Bk. v. Mayor, supra, and adding that where a provision in a statute, that a tax shall be paid by the bank for the shareholders, depends upon other and unconstitutional provisions, and is incapable of independent operation, it is invalid, and the county has no right of action against the bank for the tax. John v. City National Bank of Selma, p. 529.It is a sufficient excuse for omitting personal notice of dishonor to an indorser, residing in the same place with the holder, that an attempt was made during business hours to do so, but his office was locked and no one was present to receive the notice, and in such case notice by mail is valid. The volume is marked by the usual excellencies of the series.

CORRESPONDENCE.

FORENSIC ELOQUENCE.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Your note in yesterday's ALBANY LAW JOURNAL on the decline of eloquence at the bar brought to my mind a passage which I regard as one of the gems of our judicial literature. It is from William Eden's* "Principles of Penal Law," published anonymously in 1771. Of course its allusions will be readily understood by placing one's self in imagination at that period. You will find it on the 159th and 160th pages of the second edition -one paragraph commencing with the words: "It is a consequence of that wisdom," etc. Lest you may not be able to lay your hands on the volume, I copy the paragraph:

"It is a consequence of that wisdom which characterizes the English, as a people, in the whole system and administration of their laws, that all the artifices of speech are banished from the bar. The passions ought not to be addressed in appeals to the reason. The unsubstantial harmony of declamation may be well adapted to the ears of an arbitrary tribunal; but the decisions of English judges are founded on the argumentative inferences of strict statutes and recorded precedents. Our courts have furnished proofs indeed, that the strains of ancient eloquence are neither inimitable nor unattainable; but a nobler and more proper theater hath been found for the exertion of that talent. Plain sense, delivered in accurate expression, with a warm and graceful articulation, is the true eloquence of law."

It seems to me that this passage is worthy to be set beside the concluding paragraph of Coke's Commentary upon Littleton, and his application of the apologue

*Afterward Lord Auckland.

of the eagle's nest, in the Preface to the 8th Reports. How delicate and beautiful is the allusion to Mansfield and Camden, then holding divided rule in the House of Lords! Lord Bacon, however, had said before. "When the famous case of the copper-mines was argued in this court [the Exchequer], and judged for the king, it was not upon the fine reasons of wit; as that the king's prerogative drew to it the chief in quaque specie;' the lion is the chief of beasts, the eagle the chief of birds, the whale the chief of fishes, and so copper the chief of minerals; for these are but dalliances of law, and ornaments; but it was the grave records and precedents that grounded the judgment of that cause; and therefore I would have you both guide and arm yourself with them against these vapours and fumes of the law, which are extracted out of men's inventions and conceits."

Dr. Blair evidently had Eden's book before him when he composed his Lecture on the Eloquence of the Bar-the 28th of his "Rhetoric."

Having thus displayed before us in the old books the true model of forensic eloquence, it is not to be wondered at that the highest legal talent should aim at a calm and temperate method of speech. As, in the progress of the nation, all the arts become more refined and subdued to the rigid laws of taste, it is but natural that our profession should feel the influence of this progress. The fervid flights of Patrick Henry and the vehement declamation of Pinckney would hardly be deemed fitting, at the present day, in the discussion of grave questions before a competent court. The finest exhibitions of legal eloquence to which it has been my fortune to listen have been made by the late George Wood, of New York, and Judge B. R. Curtis. Their arguments always filled the mind, the ear and the sense of fitness and good taste. And of the two, I always thought the style of George Wood the more admirable. It was chaste, yet rich in choice legal diction, pervaded with the odor of jurisprudence, as parchments with the sandal-wood in which they are kept, and conveying the impression that it was the law itself, and not an argument upon the law, which the advocate was unfolding.

But I am digressing. I took my pen merely to refer you to the beautiful passage of Eden.

Respectfully, your obed't servant,

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14, 1880.

JOSEPH P. BRADLEY.

LEGISLATIVE HUMORISTS.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Your correspondent, J. H. Hopkins, in his article on Legislative Humorists, might have instanced several other blunders perpetrated by the last Legislature of the State of New York.

Chapter 480 of the Laws of 1880, cited by him, not only amends a section that had been twice repealed, but is in conflict with the Constitution of the State (Art. 6, § 15).

Chapter 416 of the Laws of 1880 purports to amend sections 197 and 198 of title 3, chapter 3, part 4 of the Revised Statutes. These numbers are evidently taken from Banks & Brothers' sixth edition of the Revised Statutes (so called), a book which, as every lawyer knows, is an unauthorized compilation of all the statutes of the State, revised or general, which seemed to the editor to be of general interest, and in which the editor has taken the unwarrantable liberty of prefixing numbers to the various sections to suit himself. The sections intended to be amended by chapter 416 of the Laws of 1880, are 150 and 151 of the above title, chapter and part of the Revised Statutes.

Chapter 437 of the Laws of 1880, amends section 16, article 3, chapter 6, part 1 of the Revised Statutes. There are eight titles in chapter 6, and several sections

16. The amendment is evidently intended to apply to title 3, though no title is mentioned.

Chapter 517 of the Laws of 1880 amends section 20, chapter 9, title 14, part 1 of the Revised Statutes. There is no title 14 to that chapter, as it ends with title 13, but the editor of Banks & Brothers' compilation has, for some reason best known to himself, taken several statutes relating to the United States deposit fund, consolidated them and called them part 14 of the Revised Statutes. The section the Legislature intended to amend is section 18 of chapter 150 of the Laws of 1837.

No man has any business in the Legislature of this State unless he knows enough about statute law to avoid such gross blunders. As most of the acts mentioned herein and by your correspondent, Mr. Hopkins, must have come before the committees on the judiciary of the two houses, I think it would be no more than fair for you to publish the names of the members of those committees. They are as follows: Senate — Robertson, Williams, Mills, Pitts, Winslow, Fowler, Astor. Assembly - Terry, Congdon, Brennan, Potts, Travis, Mitchell, Roberts, McCarthy, Steele, Rhodes, Russell. R.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

THE

Cassody, of Janesville, as associate justice in place of Judge Cole thus promoted. Judge Cole has held the office of associate justice for about twenty-five years. Previous to accepting that position he served a term as a Representative in Congress.—The Georgia Legislature have promoted Judge Jackson to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and elected Judge Crawford associate justice in place of Judge Bleckley, resigned. For the vacancy caused by Judge Jackson's promotion, there is a dead-lock among seven candidates. Mr. Seymour D. Thompson has been elected a judge of the St. Louis Court of Appeals by a majority of 3,800. This does not look much like a failure of the electivo system, despite Judge Thompson's own views of the subject.

In the English Court of Appeals, after remarks by the Lord Chancellor on the death of Lord Justice Thesiger, Sir Henry James, Attorney-General, made the following address, the members of the bar meanwhile standing: My Lords, I hope you will forgive me if I take this opportunity, the first which has been offered to me, and therefore I take it, of speaking a few words rather to those around me than to your Lordships. It was the wish of the late Lord Justice that I should do When his end was coming near-very near — he claimed the attention of one who stood by him, and

80.

Judgment affirmed with costs-Baker v. Walsh; Shepard v. New York and Oswego Midland Railroad Company. Judgment of General Term, so far as it affirms that of Special Term, affirmed, and order of General Term reversing in part the judgment of Special Term, reversed, and judgment of Special Term affirmed, with costs to the defendant-Avery v. The Empire Woollen Company.

THE

NOTES.

HE Virginia Law Journal for November has a leading article by Judge William Archer Cocke, of Florida, on Distinctions under the Constitution of the United States between law and equity, and the mingling of legal and equitable remedies in the States where Codes exist; also another, by James Lyons, Sr., on Information as to commission of offenses. The Criminal Law Magazine, for November, has a leading article by Dr. Wharton, on Conflict of Criminal Laws; the case of Com. v. Petroff, on bribery of public o.ficer and effect of prisoner's testimony, with note; and the case of Jones v. Queen, on discharge of jury without verdict, with note. In the former case, Pearson, J., at Dauphin quarter sessions, Pennsylvania, uttered the following extraordinary language to the jury: "We have the evidence of a person who comes forward and testifies in his own cause. We must take that with a good deal of scrutiny, if not jealousy and suspicion. Such evidence must be carefully weighed, and when it comes in conflict with an honest man, we generally give very little weight to it." The prisoner was convicted, but we guess he will get a new trial. The price of the Magazine is to be reduced from $6 to $5.

·The American Law Register, for October, contains the continuation of the paper on Expert [testimony and the microscopic examination of blood; the case of Fritz v. Hobson, on obstruction of highway for building purposes, with note by Edmund H. Bennett; the case of Queen v. Orton (the Tichborne claimant), on cumulative sentences, with note by Hugh Weightman, in which the annotator distinguishes and defends the Tweed case in this State, on the ground of the preservation of the right of peremptory challenges.

The Governor of Wisconsin has appointed Orsamus Cole Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in place of Chief Justice Ryan, deceased, and has appointed J. B.

him in that to him supreme moment to those who had been his comrades, and ho begged that it should be told to them that ho had never forgotten, and even in that moment did not forget, the kindness and consideration which he had received from them, and he hoped and trusted that in return he would not be forgotten by them. My Lords, that message I now give, and although the words seem to come from afar, and no reply can be sent to them, still it may be some satisfaction to those who so sadly mourn to know that 'men will come and men will go' before he will be forgotten by us, or his character and conduct cease to be regarded as an example to us all. My Lords, I pray your forgiveness for having delivered this message; but my apology consists in the hope that words so coming from such a man will tend to forge stronger a bond of importance to the public the bond which binds the Bench and Bar together."

Not long ago a judge of the Quarter Sessions of Lancaster, U. S., summarily expelled from the bar of his court two attorneys, upon grounds of some novelty. The attorneys were the editors of the Lancaster Intelligencer, in which newspaper a libellous article had been published, reflecting upon the judicial conduct of the learned judge. It did not appear that the attorneys had been at all guilty of misconduct in their professional capacity. We are therefore not surprised that the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL "urged pretty stoutly" that the judge had exceeded his authority. From a recent number of that journal we learn that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has restored the attorneys to their privileges, and expressed the opinion that a libel does not amount to a breach of professional duty unless it has been designed to acquiro an influence over the judge in tho exercise of his judicial functions by the instrumentality of popular prejudice. Our contemporary suggests very properly that the attorneys should make a public apology to the judge for the publication which they did not undertake to justify. By the law in force in this country the court will strike a solicitor off the roll for an indictable offenso involving much criminality, where the offense has reference to a proceeding in court, and is clearly made out (Stephens v. Hill, 10 M. & W. 28); but a mere verdict against him in an action for libel is not of itself a sufficient ground for striking the solicitor off the roll. 2 Dowl. 110. Even when the solicitor has been struck off, the punishment is by no meaus in all cases to be considered a perpetual disability.-London Law Times.

J

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, DECEMBER 4, 1880.

CURRENT TOPICS.

This

UDGE WALLACE, of the Federal Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York, has pronounced an important decision in respect to National banks, in National Albany Exchange Bank v. Hills. This was a suit to restrain the receiver of taxes and the city marshal of Albany from collecting the tax for 1879, against the bank, under the act of 1866, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. act, it will be remembered, was pronounced invalid as to National banks, by the Federal Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Williams v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; S. C., Browne's Nat. Bk. Cas. 57, in so far as it permits the debtor to deduct the amount of his debts from the valuation of all his personal property, including moneyed capital, except bank shares, inasmuch as it thus taxes shares in National banks at a greater rate than other moneyed capital. Judge Wallace now holds that the act is totally void and unconstitutional as to the National bank shares, and conferred no authority to make any assessment upon them, and is not simply erroneous with respect to the omission of the right to make the deduction for debts. This question was not before the Federal Supreme Court in the Weaver case, that decision simply holding that the debtor is entitled to a deduction from the assessment, to the amount of his debts. The Court of Appeals of this State, Dolan v. People, 36 N. Y. 59, had decided that the act of 1866 was peculiar, independent of, and designed as a substitute for the general system of taxation, as to bank capital, and consequently it must stand or fall upon its own provisions, and the Federal Supreme Court having declared it invalid in this particular it must go down altogether. This decision, of course, relates only to the tax of the year in question, as the Legislature last winter enacted that the deduction should be allowed. We give the opinion in full in another column.

The same judge has also decided the case of Stanley v. Supervisors, which grew out of the same subject. Mr. Williams, the relator in Williams v. Weaver, having paid under protest the tax thus unjustly laid on his bank stock, assigned his claim for recovery to Stanley, a citizen of Chicago, who thereupon brought this suit in the Federal Circuit Court. Judge Wallace now dismisses the suit, on the ground that this is not a Federal question, and that court has no jurisdiction. This is founded on the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, providing that no Circuit Court shall have cognizance of any suit founded on contract, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover thereon if no assignment had been made, except in cases of paper negotiable by the law merchant. Mr. VOL. 22.- No. 23.

Williams, being a citizen of this State, could not have maintained the action; therefore his assignee cannot. But is this a suit founded on contract? Like Lord Eldon, 66 we doubt."

We thought we had heard of every conceivable excuse for shirking jury-duty, but a new one has recently been invented in the city of New York. A juror asked to be excused on the ground that he belonged to the Reformed Presbyterian Church, the creed of which, he said, maintains that it is wrong to do any legal business under the present Constitution of the United States, since it does not mention God, or acknowledge Him as the "author of national existence and the source of all power and authority in civil government, and Jesus Christ as the ruler of nations and the Bible as the foundation of law and the supreme rule for the conduct of nations." The juror argued that as jurors are executive officers created by the Constitution, he could not conscientiously serve on that account. But the court, taking a different view of the matter, cruelly compelled the scrupulous man to serve. Wendell Phillips, after preparing for the bar, declined to follow the profession, it is said, because of the requirement of an oath to support the Federal Constitution. His objection, however, was more radical than the pious juror's, for he denounced the Constitution as "a covenant with death and league with hell." But we should think the juror might be satisfied with the Declaration of Independence, which recognizes God, the Creator, the Supreme Judge, and expresses a "firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence," in the act of separation from the mother-country. Really, a resort to the time-honored excuses of deafness, inability to sit for any great length of time, or a wife about to be confined, would appear more respectable than this pious pretext of honoring God by shirking duty to man.

Mr. Richard Grant White has recently written in support of the pleasant and comfortable theory that a common-school education is an incentive to crime. Or if that is putting it too strongly, we will say, he believes that education, instead of suppressing crime, seems favorable to its increase. He supports this theory, we believe, by a comparison of the statistics of crime at the North and at the South. It will be generally conceded, we suppose, that education is more diffused at the North than at the South, and considering the difference in population, we believe crime is more general at the South than at the North. This is true at least of crimes of violence, and among the superior classes. Our statistics of Texas criminal law some months ago showed this. But to treat the subject fairly, it must be conceded that there is an appalling amount, if not a decided increase, of violent crimes at the North. In two days, about a week ago, the telegraph brought us the news of no less than thirteen murders. To "pay off an old grudge," at Maysville, Kentucky, one man stabbed and killed another; a railroad employee, discharged from work, shot and

killed the foreman, at Columbia, Tennessee; a man in a saloon in Carbonville, Ohio, playfully said hè would shoot another with a pipe, and was immediately shot dead; a farmer at Napanee, Ontario, was found dead in his house with his head split open, it is thought by his wife; in an altercation at Newburgh, New York, one man shot another and killed him; a railroad workman in New York quarrelled with another about some trivial matter, and settled the dispute by plunging a knife to the heart of his comrade; a man at Cumberland, Rhode Island, shot and killed another who paid some attention to his wife; a man at Kankakee, Illinois, poisoned two children; a cavalryman at St. Louis killed a woman; the body of a seaman was found at Portsmouth, N. H., with indications of foul play; a man at Hoboken kicked his wife to death; a man at Pittsburgh was killed by a blow on the head received from some person unknown. Only three of this batch occurred at the South. There are 19 persons now in jail at Chicago, for murder. Since writing the above we read of two more murders, one in Maryland and one in Kentucky. The 8th Texas Court of Appeals Reports come to the front pretty well with 29 murder very few hangings, however, the jury having a discretion as to punishment. And yet the gallows was never so busy as now. Every Friday

cases

Has

brings its horrid catalogue of hangings. Justice seems vainly toiling after the law-breakers. this state of facts any dependence on the year of perihelions upon which we are entering? Have the planets indeed cast an evil eye upon us? That New York juror would better look at these facts, and waive his scruples, and if God is not in our Constitution, try to put Him into our administration of criminal justice. We cannot believe the "devil is dead," yet, notwithstanding, the victim in one of the Texas cases was Olenick.

The attention of the public in Connecticut is being called to the subject of prohibiting judges from sitting as referees, or "committees," as the term is in that State. This is a step which was taken in this State a number of years ago. It is said in Connecticut, that the courts are burdened with business,

judges to confine themselves to the discharge of their legitimate duties, and prohibit them from devoting any of their time to committee business. We call the attention of members-elect of the general assembly to this matter and trust that it will receive proper consideration. We know that many members of the bar regard the performances of committee work by the judges with disfavor, but are delicate about making a move to reform the abuse, which is already of large proportions and is constantly growing. If the lawyers do not wish to take hold of the matter, let the laymen come to the front and try their hand at it." The judges of course ought to devote their time to the public business, but it is probable that they have meager salaries, and being obliged to come down from the bench in old age, are under a constant temptation to earn all they can while in office. A pension would obviate this evil.

It is now judicially decided that an Indian and a negro look so much alike that persons of ordinary discrimination cannot tell them apart by a casual

glance. This is the doctrine of Leidersdorf v. Flint,

Wisconsin Supreme Court, Nov. 10, 1880, 7 Northw. Rep. 252. The action was brought to restrain the infringement of a trade-mark upon smoking-tobacco, put up in packages of a certain form, in paper wrappers of a particular color and mark, stamped "Nigger-hair smoking-tobacco." The most marked feature of the label is a representation of a negro's head surmounted by a copious crop of wool, and having a large ring depending from the nose and another from the ear. The defendant imitated the label, putting on the head of an Indian, with a ring in his ear but none in his nose, and stamping the packages "Big Indian." Fac similes of both labels were annexed to the complaint. It was held, on demurrer, that the dissimilarity was not so marked as to make it apparent that no one could be deceived, and the demurrer was overruled.

NOTES OF CASES.

'N Brooks v. Cook, Michigan Supreme Court, Nov. 10, 1880, 7 Northw. Rep. 216, it was held that under the Civil Damage Act, the person to whom liquor is sold, and who is injured by intoxication therefrom, cannot maintain an action therefor, as an "other person." In this case the injury was the loss of money by the plaintiff's having his pocket. picked while he was intoxicated. The court observed: "Is the person to whom the liquor is sold, etc., and who in consequence sustains an injury, one of the persons for whose benefit the statute is passed? So far as the statute attempts any enumeration of persons who may sue, they all stand in some one of the domestic relations to the person to whom the liquor is sold, given or furnished. To that extent the statute unquestionably contemplates that there shall be three persons concerned: the person selling, giving or furnishing, the person re