Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

for if we have a good judge we want to compliment him by a re-election, and if we have one who is not good, we do not want to suffer him for life.

The only essays read were one by Mr. Edward E. Sprague, of Flushing, on Law and Lawyers in Shakespeare, and one by Mr. Joshua Gaskill, of Lockport, on Exemption of Personal Property from Execution, both highly creditable productions.

Judge Andrews, of the Court of Appeals, spoke strongly at the dinner in favor of limiting appeals to that court, and against what he called a "double headed court." We have no dread of a "double headed court," if we can get seven other heads as good as those of the present judges. It might be difficult to find them, but we have faith that they might be found, and that if added, or rather subjoined, to the present court, they would not constitute a monster of dreadful mien. We shall give a fuller report of the meeting next week. It is important to say that while the attendance at these meetings is small, the membership of the association is increasing, and that the association is becoming a wealthy corporation.

IN

NOTES OF CASES.

Campbell v. Crampton, United States Circuit Court, Northern District of New York, May, 1880, 2 Fed. Rep. 417, it was held by Wallace, D. J., that while under the laws of New York a marriage between nephew and aunt may not be voidable for consanguinity, an agreement to marry between parties so related, and living in a State where such marriage is incestuous, will not be tolerated, nor damages permitted to be recovered for the breach thereof, in the courts of New York. The marriage agreement was made in Alabama, where such marriages are by statute declared incestuous, and the intention of the parties was to reside there after marriage. The court first pronounce that the contract is to be construed by the place of performance, and that this, in the case of a promise of marriage, is the place where the parties intended to live in marriage, which in this case was Alabama. Citing Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 1 Otto, 406; Sottomeyer v. De Barros, 20 Alb. L. J. 450. The court examine the question whether such a marriage would be void or voidable in this State, and answer it in the negative. The court proceed: "Notwithstanding the extensive research of counsel, no case has been found which determines whether an agreement for a marriage between a nephew and aunt is obnoxious as contravening morality or public policy. Such marriages are expressly prohibited by the civil law, by the laws of England, and by the statutes of many of our own States." "It is not improbable that the question has not been presented to the courts of the States where there is no statutory prohibition, because such marriages are felt to be so unnatural and revolting that they have been very

rare, and but few persons have been found willing to contemplate such a union." "The fact that marriages between persons so related are so commonly prohibited by legislation in those communities which are most advanced in moral and intellectual progress, must be deemed high evidence of the generally prevailing sentiment on the subject. Whether this sentiment finds its origin in the mandate of divine law, or a belief that such unions are a violation of the physical laws of nature, or in the conviction that to tolerate such alliances would impair the peace of families and lead to domestic licentiousness, its existence must be acknowledged and

traced to some or all of these sources. The statutes of Henry VIII, prohibiting such marriages, are but a reaffirmation of the Levitical law. Regina v. Chadwick, 12 Eng. Jour. 174. While the Levitical law is not binding as a rule of municipal obedience, it has been judicially declared to be a moral prohibition, and as such, binding upon all mankind (Harrison v. Buswell, 2 Vent. 9), and is now incorporated into the statutes of England by the acts of 5 and 6 William IV, ch. 54. In Illinois it is held that such a marriage 'is prohibited by the laws of God,' within the meaning of a statute of that State. Bonham v. Badgley, 2 Gilm. 622. In Parker's Appeal, 44 Penn. St. 309-312, the court, while holding that such a marriage was not void under the laws of Pennsylvania, took occasion to say: 'We cannot refrain from stating that such connections are destructive of good morals, and should be frowned upon by the community.' Between what degrees of consanguinity the line is to be found, which determines what marriages are unobjectionable and what are not to be tolerated, it is not necessary to decide, but the better opinion would seem to be that marriages should not be sanctioned in any nearer degree than that of cousin-german. A marriage between uncle and niece, or nephew and aunt, would certainly shock the sentiment of any enlightened community, and this, in the absence of any other test of the propriety of decency of things, should be accepted as controlling. It can hardly be doubted that if the parties here had become husband and wife, they would have been regarded as joined in an unnatural union, and as victims of a corrupt moral taste, to be pitied and avoided, if not as objects of detestation; and in this view the plaintiff may consider herself fortunate that she has been saved from such a future by the selfish and perfidious conduct of the defendant."

What constitutes a "riot " was defined in Lycoming Fire Insurance Co. v. Schwenk, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, June 14, 1880, 37 Leg. Int. 426. This was an action on a fire policy. A breaker at a coal mine was set on fire at night by a party of men, who fired several shots, drove the watchmen away and then burned down the breaker. Held, that this was a riot within the provisions of the policy of insurance. The court said: "We are decidedly of the opinion that in the foregoing testimony every element of riot is found, whether at common law or

--

although having power to employ men or represent the master in other respects, is, in the management of the machinery, a fellow-servant of the other operatives. Albro v. Agawam Canal Co., 6 Cush. 75; Wood's Mast. & Servt., § 438; also §§ 431, 436, 437. On the same principle, however low the grade or rank of the employee, the master is liable for injuries caused by him to another servant if they result from the omission of some duty of the master which he has confided to such inferior employee. Flike case, 53 N. Y. 549. The liability of the master depends upon the character of the act in the performance of which the injury arises, without regard to the rank of the employee performing it. If it is one pertaining to the duty the master owes to his servants, he is responsible to them for the manner of its performance. The converse of this necessarily follows. If the act is one which pertains only to the duty of an operative, the employee per

under an act of 1705. There was the unlawful assemblage of three or more persons, combined together to perpetrate an outrageous and violent crime. The commission of the crime was immediately preceded by numerous discharges of fire-arms. Two peaceable citizens, engaged in watching and protecting the premises — placed there for that purpose were compelled to flee therefrom in terror of their lives. The crime was arson, one of the most odious known to the criminal law. It was committed at a late hour of the night, when the great majority of persons are in their beds and asleep, and least prepared to defend themselves or their property. It is an offense having a more natural and necessary tendency to put whole communities in fear and terror than almost any other. In this instance it was accompanied by the voices of men calling for wood and oil, with which to apply the fire, by the loud and appalling noise of exploding weapons of destruction, and the criminals them-forming it is a mere servant and the master, although selves were a band of men whose numbers could not be determined on account of the darkness of the night. For a court, in charging a jury, to speak of such an occurrence as any thing less than a riot of the most marked and distinct character, would be simply to mislead them. We think the learned judge of the court below, in his comments to the jury, dealt quite too leniently with the plain and undisputed facts of the case. He said to them that to prove a riot there must be a previous unlawful assemblage, accompanied with circumstances of force and violence, and 'that if the assembling of persons be not accompanied with such circumstances as these, it cannot be deemed a riot, however unlawful the acts which they actually committed.' From this the jury would naturally infer that unless the proof went back to the time when the men first met together, and established that such original meeting was attended with circumstances of actual force and violence, a case of riot could not be made out, no matter what acts of outrage and violence were subsequently perpetrated. Such is not the law as we understand it, and we consider it error to say or to intimate that it is, to a jury charged with the trial of such a case." The latter view is sustained by the authority of Chief Justice Holt, in 11 Mod. 116, and by U. S. v. Macfarland, 1 Cr. C. Ct. 140. It is not necessary that the act should be unlawful. State v. Brooks, 1 Hill (S. C.), 361; Kiphart v. State, 42 Ind. 273; nor that it should be done by the rioters themselves, if they assembled to do it. Newby v. Territory, 1 Or. 163.

In Crispin v. Babbitt, New York Court of Appeals, Sept. 21, 1880, it was held as follows: The liability of a master to his servant for injuries sustained while in his employ, by the wrongful or negligent act of another employee of the same master, does not depend upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. The liability of the master does not depend upon the grade or rank of the employee whose negligence causes the injury. A superintendent of a factory,

liable to strangers, is not liable to a fellow-servant
for its improper performance. The doctrine in
Mullan v. Phila. & South. Mail Steamship Co., 78
Penn. St. 25; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 2, sustains this
proposition. Accordingly, where B. who repre-
sented the employer as financial agent or superin-
tendent, overseer, or manager, and stood in his
place, held, that he did so only in respect to these
duties, which the employer had confided to him; as
to other acts about the employer's place, he was a
mere employee. And where he turned on steam he
performed the act of a mere operative, and the em-
ployer would not be liable to a fellow-employee for
an injury caused by that act. In the opinion writ-
ten by Rapallo, J., Folger, C. J., and Andrews and
Miller, JJ., concurred, while Earl, Danforth, and
Finch, JJ., dissented. The Mullan case supports
this doctrine, but in Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31
Ohio St. 237; S. C., 27 Am. Rep. 510, the contrary
was held. There a foreman temporarily assisted a
laborer in the master's employ in fastening a hook
to a stone, and owing to the foreman's negligence
the plaintiff sustained an injury. The master was
held liable. The court said: "Where the master,
or one placed by him in charge of men engaged in
his service, personally assists or interferes in the
labor being performed under his direction and con-
trol, and is, while performing such labor, or inter-
fering with its performance, guilty of negligence
resulting in an injury to one engaged in such ser-
vice, there is no sound principle of law that will
excuse or exonerate the master from liability.
mond v. Holland, 96 Eng. Com. Law, 102; Shearm.
& Redf. on Neg., § 89 et seq.; Wharton on Neg., §
205." "If the act done by him had been done un-
der his direction, as he did it by one of the em-
ployees of the company, its liability could not be
doubted, and for the reason that the negligent act,
although committed by the hand of another, was;
in law, the act of the foreman, and consequently the
act of the master. And it could be no less the act
of the master when performed by the foreman in
person."

Or

SALE OF GOODS FOR UNLAWFUL USE.
'N Brunswick v. Valleau, 50 Iowa, 120; S. C., 32

the price of a billiard table it is no defense that it
may be used for gambling, unless it was sold under
a contract that it was so to be used; and knowl-
edge of such intended use will not be inferred from
the fact that it was accompanied by a pool set and
rules for its use. This was founded on Tracy v.
Talmadge, 14 N. Y. 162. The court said: "It was
held, however, in Spurgeon v. McElwein, 6 Ohio,
442, that a carpenter could not recover for labor
done in erecting a nine-pin alley, appurtenant to a
coffee-house." "The sale of cards, with knowl-
edge that they are to be used in gambling, would,
under the doctrine of Spurgeon v. McElwein, be un-
lawful; and if cards were made for no other pur-
pose the seller, under the authority of that case,
would be deemed to have knowledge that they were
to be used in gambling. Without such knowledge
the sale is not unlawful."

In Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 138, it was held that in an action for work and materials on a house, it is no defense that the work was done and the materials were furnished with knowledge on the part of the plaintiff that the house was to be used by the defendant for purposes of gambling. In Hubbard v. Moore, 24 La. Ann. 591; S. C., 13 Am. Rep. 128, and Mahood v. Tealza, 26 La. Ann. 108; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 546, the same was held of furniture sold with knowledge that it was to be used in a house of prostitution.

Tracy v. Talmadge contains a very elaborate review and discussion of this subject, and cites as authorities for its holding, the English cases of Faikney v. Reynous, 4 Burr. 206; Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341; Pellecat v. Angell, 2 C. M. & R. 311; Hodgson v. Temple, 5 Taunt. 181; distinguishes Briggs v. Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454; Clugas v. Penaluna,

4 id. 466; Waynsell v. Reed, 5 id. 599; Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434; and disapproves Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 593. The court conclude as follows: "I consider it, therefore, as entirely settled by the authorities to which I have referred, that it is no defense to an action brought to recover the price of goods sold, that the vendor knew that they were bought for an illegal purpose, provided it is not made a part of the contract that they shall be used for that purpose; and provided, also, that the vendor has done nothing in aid or furtherance of the unlawful design. The law does not punish a wrongful intent, when nothing is done to carry that intent into effect; much less bare knowledge of such an intent, without any participation in it. Upon the whole, I think it clear, in reason as well as upon authority, that in a case like this, where the sale is not necessarily per se a violation of law, unless the unlawful purpose enters into and forms a part of the contract of sale, the vendee cannot set up his own illegal intent in bar of an action for the purchase-money."

An action cannot be maintained for rent of prem

[ocr errors]

ises knowingly leased for the purpose of prostitution (Girarday v. Richardson, 1 Esp. 13); nor, when the landlord was not aware of the purpose at the time of the letting, provided he afterward learned it, and might have evicted the lessee, can he recover rent accruing during the period when he willingly allowed such occupancy. Jennings v. Throgmorton, Ry. & M. 251.

An action may be maintained against a prostitute for clothes sold her (Bowry v. Bennett, 1 Camp. 348); or for washing her clothes (Lloyd v. Johnson, 1 B. & P. 340), although the plaintiff may have known the use made of them.

But in Pearce v. Brooks, L. R., 1 Ex. 213, the defendant, a prostitute, was sued by coach builders for the use of a brougham. It was found that they knew her to be a prostitute, and supplied the brougham with knowledge that it would be, as in fact it was, used by her as part of her display to attract men, but there was no proof that they expected to be paid out of the earnings of her prostitution. Held, that the action could not be maintained. This was founded on Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & A. 179, and McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434, cases of money lent for gambling. Pollock, C. B., said: “If a person lends money, but with a doubt in his mind whether it is to be actually applied to an illegal purpose, it will be a question for the jury whether he meant it to be so applied; but if it were advanced in such a way that it could not possibly be a bribe to an illegal purpose, and afterward it was turned to that use, neither Cannan v. Bryce nor any other case decides that his act would be illegal. The case cited rests on the fact that the money was borrowed with the very object of satisfying an illegal purpose." Bramwell, B., said: "I think the jury were entitled to infer, as they did, that it was hired for the purpose of display, that is, for the purpose of enabling the defendant to pursue her calling, and that the plaintiffs knew it. That being made out, my diffiulty was whether, though the defendant hired the brougham for that purpose, it could be said that the plaintiffs let it for the same purpose. If a man were to ask for duelling pistols, and say, 'I think I shall fight a duel to-morrow,' might not the seller answer, 'I do not want to know your purpose; I have nothing to do with it; that is your business; mine is to sell the pistols, and I work only to the profit of trade.' No doubt the act would be immoral, but I have felt a doubt whether it would be illegal; and I should still feel it best that the authority of Cannan v. Bryce and McKinnell v. Robinson concludes the matter. In this latter case the plea does not say that the money was lent on the terms that the borrower should game with it; but only that it was borrowed by the defendant and lent by the plaintiff for the purpose of the defendant's illegally playing and gaming therewith." Martin, B., said: "As to the case of Cannan v. Bryce, I have a strong impression that it has been questioned to this extent, that if money is lent, the lender merely handing it over into the absolute control of the borrower, although he may have reason to sup

pose that it may be employed illegally, he will not be disentitled from recovering."

In Pringle v. Corporation of Napanee, Ont. Q. B., it was held that an agreement to let a hall for the purpose of delivering lectures attacking Christianity is not enforceable.

In Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253, where the authorities are very carefully reviewed, the doctrine of Tracy v. Talmadge is adopted, and that of Lightfoot v. Tenant and Pearce v. Brooks disapproved. Of the latter the court say: "So a sale of silks and jewels to a prostitute, if it be clearly shown that such sale was made for the express purpose of rendering her person attractive and seductive, and with the view of aiding her unlawful commerce, would be an illegal sale; but shall the seller of such merchandise be disabled from recovery merely because he knows the buyer to be a prostitute? Is such mere knowledge sufficient to render the contract void? We cannot believe that public policy requires the exercise of so much scrutiny into the designs of the purchaser, and the imposition of such restraints upon ordinary traffic, as the rule, so broadly stated in Pearce v. Brooks, would seem to imply; and directly contrary to such doctrine are the express decisions in Bowry v. Bennett, 1 Camp. 348; Appleton v. Campbell, 2 C. & P. 347, and Hodgson v. Temple, before cited." They also say, of Pearce v. Brooks: "Cannan v. Bryce is clearly distinguishable from this, and will not support the latter case; for, says Abbott, C. J., in Cannan v. Bryce, 'It will be recollected that I am speaking of a case wherein the means were furnished, with a full knowledge of the object to which they were to be applied, and for the express purpose of accomplishing that object.' Is there no valid distinction? In Cannan v. Bryce the money was loaned for the purpose of enabling the party to engage in illegal stock-jobbing transactions. If the money had simply been loaned to a person who, the lender knew, was engaged in such transactions, and would probably use the money for such purposes, would the contract be invalid? Money loaned to a gambler, for the purpose of being staked upon a pending game, cannot be recovered. Is it the same of money lent to one known to be a gambler, but concerning which loen and the unlawful game there is no other connection between the parties than that which results from a simple borrowing and lending of money?"

In Cheney v. Duke, 10 G. & J. 11, the action was to recover the price of a negro slave. There was a statute to prevent the unlawful exportation of such slaves, and the defendant had purchased the slave for the purpose of exporting him. It was held that the seller's knowledge of that purpose would not alone defeat his action for the price, but it must be shown that he was a sharer in the illegal transaction, or aided in its execution, or did something in furtherance of it. This is founded on Holman v. Johnson and Hodgson v. Temple. This doctrine, the court say, is "abundantly settled."

The same doctrine was held in McGavock v. Puryear, 6 Cold. 35. The action was on a note, and the defense was that the note was discounted for

the purpose of enabling the owner to purchase horses, etc., for the use by the Confederate government against the United States. The court said that mere knowledge on the part of the bank of the illegal purpose to which it was intended to apply the money would not defeat a recovery, but that "it must be shown that the bank made the loan with the purpose, on its part, to furnish money to enable the borrowers to do the illegal act."

The same was held in Green v. Collins, 3 Cliff. 494, a case of liquors sold in Rhode Island for use in Massachusetts. The court approve Holman v. Johnson, Hodgson v. Temple and Tracy v. Talmage, and distinguish Langton v. Hughes, Cannan v. Bryce and Pearce v. Brooks. In regard to the latter they say: "The act of supplying a female engaged in such criminal practices would warrant a jury in finding that the articles were intended to facilitate the objects of her vocation."

The same was held in the similar case of Curran v. Downs, 3 Mo. App. 468; and in Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474, an action to recover for work and materials upon a gambling house. Pearce v. Brooks was denied as authority.

The same was held in Webber v. Donnelly, 33 Mich. 469, a liquor case, on the authority of Tracy v. Talmage and Hill v. Spear, and in Bishop v. Honey, 34 Tex. 245, an action for work done on a house of prostitution.

The contrary doctrine was held in Territt v. Bartlett, 21 Vt. 184. This was an action for the price of spirituous liquors sold in Vermont but delivered in New York. The plaintiff knew the defendant intended to sell them contrary to the statute. The court disapprove Hodgson v. Temple; distinguish Holman v. Johnson as involving the infringement of the law only of a foreign State; and approve Langton v. Hughes, Cannan v. Bryce and Lightfoot v. Tenant. There is little examination of the authorities, and the consideration of the principle is brief. But in Lander v. Seaver, 32 id. 114, the doctrine of the principal case was held where the sale was made in New York, and so in Tuttle v. Holland, 43 id. 542.

In Hannauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342, it was held that an action will not lie for the price of goods sold with knowledge that they were purchased for the Confederate government. This is founded on Lightfoot v. Tenant, Langton v. Hughes and Cannan v. Bryce, and Armstrong v. Toler is distinguished on the ground of the difference between malum prohibitum and malum in se.

In Adams v. Coulliard, 102 Mass. 167, the doctrine of Tuttle v. Holland and Lander v. Seaver was laid down; and it was held that mere reasonable cause of belief, without actual knowledge of the unlawful intent, would not defeat the action.

Mr. Benjamin (Sales, §§ 506–508) says: "The sale of a thing, in itself an innocent and proper article of commerce, is void when the vendor sells it knowing that it is intended to be used for an immoral and illegal purpose. In some of the earlier cases something more than this mere knowledge was held necessary, and evidence was required of an intention on the vendor's part to aid in the illegal pur

pose, or profit by the immoral act. The later decisions overrule this doctrine." He then argues that Faikney v. Reynous, and Petrie v. Hannay, 3 T. R. 418, are overruled by Booth v. Hodgson, 6 id. 405; Aubert v. Maze, 2 B. & P. 371; Mitchell v. Cockburne, 2 H. Bl. 379; Webb v. Brooke, 3 Taunt. 6; Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 594; Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; McKinnell v. Robinson; 3 M. & W. 435; Pearce v. Brooks, L. R., 1 Ex. 212, and says, in these cases "the distinction between malum prohibitum | and malum in se is positively repudiated." Of Hodgson v. Temple he says: "This decision was given in November, 1813, and is the more remarkable because the case of Langton v. Hughes had been decided exactly to the contrary, in the King's Bench, in the month of June, in the same year, and was not noticed by the counsel or the court in Hodgson v. Temple."

It should be observed that Bowry v. Bennett and Langton v. Hughes were both tried before Lord Ellenborough, who must have thought the cases distinguishable, as indeed they are, for selling clothes to a woman for her personal wearing apparel is very different from selling drugs to a brewer. The clothes might, and must sometimes, have been worn innocently and necessarily; but under the circumstances the brewer could hardly have wanted the drugs for any innocent purpose. So it seems to us that Pearce v. Brooks is distinguishable from Bowry v. Bennett, for it could hardly be possible that a prostitute, who, as the proof showed, could not read, should need a carriage for any purpose but the ordinary one of airing her charms to tempt men. But we much prefer the doctrine of the principal case and Tracy v. Talmage to that of Langton v. Hughes and Pearce v. Brooks.

IN

THE DECLINE OF CIRCUIT LIFE.*

N the olden time, when railways had not come into existence, and all travelling had to be done by road, on horseback, or in rumbling coach or chaise, going circuit was a formidable undertaking, involving much expenditure of both time and money, and so great an obstacle was the absence of good roads and travelling conveniences found to be, that though Assizes were directed to be held twice in every year in every county in the kingdom, an exception had to be made in favor of the remote, parts, and especially of the four northern counties of Westmoreland, Cumberland, Durham and Northumberland, where they were held only once a year, viz., in the summer. Indeed, so important a feature was the question of roads and locomotion considered "upon the northern iter," that when the business of any Assize town extended into the Commission day of the next town, counsel wero privileged to appear in court on that day without their robes; the reason being that ordinarily these would have been consigned to the baggage-wagon, or the clerks, and were already en route for the next circuit town. Long after the reason for it had ceased to exist this rule was religiously observed by the members of the northern circuits as one of their especial privileges, and on the last occasion of its observance, not many years ago, we recollect how shocked the judge who, in the days of

* Extract from an article by John Kinghorn, Esq., in the Law Magazine for August, 1880.

his youth, had been at the equity bar, looked at the indignity put upon him, as he supposed, by this want of dress, and his puzzled and not altogether satisfied look, even after the explanation had been given and the privilege claimed.

In those days there was a certain amount of romance and adventure in circuit life when Thurlow rode the western circuit on a horse procured "on trial;" Eldon went the "northern iter" on a hired horse, but was obliged to borrow one for the youth who rode behind him, in charge of the saddle-bags, in the capacity of clerk; and North, afterward Lord Keeper Guilford, when riding the Norfolk circuit, got mellow and had to be put to bed in a public house, while "the rest of the company went on for fear of losing their market." Campbell's "Lives of the Chancellors," vol. iii, p. 441. Even the perils of the road had to be shared by the gentlemen of the long robe in comparatively recent times. Thus we find that Mr. Wood and Mr. Holroyd (both of whom were afterward raised to the bench), when crossing Finchley Common on their way to join the Northern Circuit, were stopped by a gentleman of fashionable appearance, who rode up to the side of the carriage and begged to know "what o'clock it was." Mr. Wood, with the greatest politeness, drew out a handsome gold repeater and answered the question; upon which the stranger, drawing a pistol, presented it to his breast and demanded the watch. Mr. Wood was compelled to resign it into his hands, and the highwayman, after wishing them a pleasant journey, touched his hat and rode away. The story became known at York, and Mr. Wood could not show his face in court without some or other of the bar reminding him of his misfortune by the question, "What's o'clock, Wood?" Law and Lawyers, vol. i, p. 142, 1840.

The circuiteer set out on his biennial pilgrimage in a post-chaise if he was a man of means, or mounted on some sturdy steed if otherwise, while some beardless youth, seated among the saddle-bags on another nag, heavier baggage being consigned to the Circuit baggagein the capacity of clerk, brought up the rear- - the wagon. But in whatever mode he journeyed, the etiquette of his profession had decreed that he should not avail himself of any stage-coach or other public conveyance, as he might thereby havo an opportunity afforded him of meeting an attorney and "hugging" him, i. e., making himself agreeable to him and securing his briefs; and that would be taking an undue advantage of his brethren. Arrived at the Circuit town, he could not enter it before the judges, or at least not before midday of the Commission Day, so that all might have a fair start in the race for briefs; and even when he had got within the "happy hunting-grounds," he was not allowed to stay at or frequent any public inn, lest the same temptation to "hugging," and other undue influences should be presented to him, but he must go into lodgings, for which, of course, he had generally to pay an exorbitant price, there being no keener appreciators of Circuit etiquette than the landladies. In some of the northern towns they used to adopt a sort of sliding scale of charges—a certain price if you had no business, an extra guinea if you had. If he was fortunate enough to know an attorney in the place, or be related to one there, he could not stay with him, or dine with him, or even call on or be civil to him, without contravening the Circuit code; and were he even known to utter in public his opinion that any attorney was a most estimable and highly respectable gentleman," he was certain to have to pay a fine to the Circuit mess. Even the very judges were, so to speak, strangers in the land, an old statute of the 8 Richard II making it unlawful for any one to ride Circuit in a county of which he was a native, or in which he inhabited, without a writ of non obstante.

With a body representing the bar of England - for in those days even chancery barristers went Circuit

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »