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for if we have a good judge we want to compliment rare, and but few persons have been found willing him by a re-election, and if we bave one who is not to contemplate such a union.” " The fact that margood, we do not want to suffer him for life. riages between persons so related are so commonly

prohibited by legislation in those communities The only essays read were one by Mr. Edward which are most advanced in moral and intellectual E. Sprague, of Flushing, on Law and Lawyers in progress, must be deemed high evidence of the genShakespeare, and one by Mr. Joshua Gaskill

, of erally prevailing sentiment on the subject. Whether Lockport, on Exemption of Personal Property from

this sentiment finds its origin in the mandate of diExecution, both higlily creditable productions.

vine law, or a belief that such unions are a violation of the physical laws of nature, or in the con

viction that to tolerate such alliances would impair Judge Andrews, of the Court of Appeals, spoke the peace of families and lead to domestic licenstrongly at the dinner in favor of limiting appeals to tiousness, its existence must be acknowledged and that court, and against what he called a “double

traced to some or all of these sources. The statheaded court." We have no dread of a “double

utes of Henry VIII, prohibiting such marriages, are headed court,” if we can get seven other heads as

but a reaffirmation of the Levitical law. Regina v. good as those of the present judges. It might be Chadwick, 12 Eng. Jour. 174. While the Levitical difficult to find them, but we have faith that they law is not binding as a rule of municipal obedience, might be found, and that if added, or rather sub- it has been judicially declared to be a moral prohijoined, to the present court, they would not consti- bition, and as such, binding upon all mankind (Hartute a monster of dreadful mien. We shall give rison v. Buswell, 2 Vent. 9), and is now incorporated a fuller report of the meeting next week. It is im

into the statutes of England by the acts of 5 and 6 portant to say that while the attendance at these

William IV, ch. 54. In Illinois it is held that such meetings is small, the membership of the association is increasing, and that the association is becoming within the meaning of a statute of that State.

a marriage is prohibited by the laws of God,' & wealthy corporation.

Bonham v. Badgley, 2 Gilm. 622. In Parker's Ap

peal, 44 Penn. St. 309–312, the court, while holding NOTES OF CASES.

that such a marriage was not void under the laws of

Pennsylvania, took occasion to say: "We cannot reN Campbell v. Crampton, United States Circuit frain from stating that such connections are destruct1880, 2 Fed. Rep. 417, it was held by Wallace, D. the community.' Between what degrees of conJ., that while under the laws of New York a mar- sanguinity the line is to be found, which determines riage between nephew and aunt may not be voidable what marriages are unobjectionable and what are for consanguinity, an agreement to marry between not to be tolerated, it is not necessary to decide, parties so related, and living in a State where such but the better opinion would seem to be that marmarriage is incestuous, will not be tolerated, nor riages should not be sanctioned in any nearer dedamages permitted to be recovered for the breach gree than that of cousin-german. A marriage thereof, in the courts of New York. The marriage between uncle and niece, or nephew and aunt, agreement was made in Alabama, where such mar

would certainly shock the sentiment of any enlightriages are by statute declared incestuous, and the

ened community, and this, in the absence of any intention of the parties was to reside there after other test of the propriety of decency of things, marriage. The court first pronounce that the con

should be accepted as controlling. It can hardly be tract is to be construed by the place of perform- doubted that if the parties here had become husance, and that this, in the case of a promise of mar

band and wife, they would have been regarded as riage, is the place where the parties intended to live joined in an unnatural union, and as victims of a in marriage, which in this case was Alabama. Cit. corrupt moral taste, to be pitied and avoided, if not ing Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 1 Otto, 406; Sotto

as objects of detestation; and in this view the meyer v. De Barros, 20 Alb. L. J. 450. The court plaintiff may consider herself fortunate that she examine the question whether such a marriage has been saved from such a future by the selfish and would be void or voidable in this State, and answer

perfidious conduct of the defendant.” it in the negative. The court proceed: “Notwithstanding the extensive research of counsel, no case What constitutes a “riot” was defined in Lycomhas been found which determines whether an agreeing Fire Insurance Co. v. Schwenk, Pennsylvania Sument for a marriage between a nephew and aunt is preme Court, June 14, 1880, 37 Leg. Int. 426. This obnoxious as contravening morality or public policy. was an action on a fire policy. A breaker at a coal Such marriages are expressly prohibited by the civil mine was set on fire at night by a party of men, law, by the laws of England, and by the statutes of who fired several shots, drove the watchmen away many of our own States.” “It is not improbable and then burned down the breaker. Held, that this that the question has not been presented to the was a riot within the provisions of the policy of incourts of the States where there is no statutory pro- surance. The court said: “We are decidedly of hibition, because such marriages are felt to be so the opinion that in the foregoing testimony every unnatural and revolting that they have been very element of riot is found, whether at common law or under an act of 1705. There was the unlawful as- although having power to employ men or represent semblage of three or more persons, combined to- the master in other respects, is, in the management gether to perpetrate an outrageous and violent of the machinery, a fellow-servant of the other opcrime. The commission of the crime was immedi-eratives. Aloro v. Agawam Canal Co., 6 Cush. 75; ately preceded by numerous discharges of fire-arms. Wood's Mast. & Servt., § 438; also SS 431, 436, 437. Two peaceable citizens, engaged in watching and On the same principle, however low the grade or protecting the premises — placed there for that pur- rank of the employee, the master is liable for inpose were compelled to flee therefrom in terror of juries caused by him to another servant if they retheir lives. The crime was arson, one of the most sult from the omission of some duty of the master odious known to the criminal law. It was com- which he has confided to such inferior einployee. mitted at a late hour of the night, when the great Flike case, 53 N. Y. 549. The liability of the masmajority of persons are in their beds and asleep, ter depends upon the character of the act in the and least prepared to defend themselves or their performance of which the injury arises, without reproperty. It is an offense having a more natural gard to the rank of the employee performing it. If and necessary tendency to put whole communities it is one pertaining to the duty the master owes to in fear and terror than almost any other. In this his servants, he is responsible to them for the maninstance it was accompanied by the voices of men ner of its performance. The converse of this necescalling for wood and oil, with which to apply the sarily follows. If the act is one which pertains fire, by the loud and appalling noise of exploding only to the duty of an operative, the employee perweapons of destruction, and the criminals them- forming it is a mere servant and the master, although selves were a band of men whose numbers could not liable to strangers, is not liable to a fellow-servant be determined on account of the darkness of the for its improper performance. The doctrine in night. For a court, in charging a jury, to speak of Mullan v. Phila. & South. Mail Steamship Co., 78 such an occurrence as any thing less than a riot of Penn. St. 25; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 2, sustains this the most marked and distinct character, would be proposition. Accordingly, where B. who represimply to mislead them. We think the learned sented the employer as financial agent or superinjudge of the court below, in his comments to the tendent, overseer, or manager, and stood in his jury, dealt quite too leniently with the plain and place, held, that he did so only in respect to these undisputed facts of the case. He said to them that duties, which the employer had confided to him; as to prove a riot there must be a previous unlawful to other acts about the employer's place, he was a assemblage, accompanied with circumstances of mere employee. And where he turned on steam he force and violence, and that if the assembling of performed the act of a mere operative, and the empersons be not accompanied with such circumstances ployer would not be liable to a fellow-employee for as these, it cannot be deemed a riot, however unlaw- an injury caused by that act. In the opinion writful the acts which they actually committed.' From ten by Rapallo, J., Folger, C. J., and Andrews and this the jury would naturally infer that unless the Miller, JJ., concurred, while Earl, Danforth, and proof went back to the time when the men first met Finch, JJ., dissented. The Mullan case supports together, and established that such original meeting this doctrine, but in Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 was attended with circumstances of actual force and Ohio St. 237; S. C., 27 Am. Rep. 510, the contrary violence, a case of riot could not be made out, no was held. There a foreman temporarily assisted a matter what acts of outrage and violence were sub- laborer in the master's employ in fastening a hook sequently perpetrated. Such is not the law as we to a stone, and owing to the foreman's negligence understand it, and we consider it error to say or to the plaintiff sustained an injury. The master was intimate that it is, to a jury charged with the trial beld liable. The court said: “Where the master, of such a case.” The latter view is sustained by or one placed by him in charge of men engaged in the authority of Chief Justice Holt, in 11 Mod. his service, personally assists or interferes in the 116, and by U. S. v. Macfarland, 1 Cr. C. Ct. 140. labor being performed under his direction and conIt is not necessary that the act should be unlawful. trol, and is, while performing such labor, or interState v. Brooks, 1 Hill (8. C.), 361; Kiphart v. State, fering with its performance, guilty of negligence 42 Ind. 273; nor that it should be done by the riot- resulting in an injury to one engaged in such ser. ers themselves, if they assembled to do it. Neroby vice, there is no sound principle of law that will v. Territory, 1 Or. 163.

excuse or exonerate the master from liability. Or

Holland, 96 Eng. Com. Law, 102; Shearm.

& Redf. on Neg., § 89 et seq.; Wharton on Neg., § In Crispin v. Babbitt, New York Court of Appeals, 205." "If the act done by him had been done unSept. 21, 1880, it was held as follows: The liability der his direction, as he did it by one of the emof a master to his servant for injuries sustained ployees of the company, its liability could not be while in his employ, by the wrongful or negligent doubted, and for the reason that the negligent act, act of another employee of the same master, does although committed by the hand of another, was; not depend upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. in law, the act of the foreman, and consequently the The liability of the master does not depend upon act of the master. And it could be no less the act the grade or rank of the employee whose negligence of the master when performed by the foreman in causes the injury. A superintendent of a factory, person.”

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SALE OF GOODS FOR UNLAWFUL USE. ises knowingly leased for the purpose of prostitu

tion (Girarday v. Richardson, 1 Esp. 13); nor, when N Brunswick v. Valleau, 50 Iowa, 120; 8. C., 32 the landlord was not aware of the purpose at the

time of the letting, provided he afterward learned the price of a billiard table it is no defense that it it, and might have evicted the lessee, can he recover may be used for gambling, unless it was sold under rent accruing during the period when he willingly a contract that it was so to be used; and knowl- allowed such occupancy. Jennings v. Throgmorton, edge of such intended use will not be inferred from Ry. & M. 251. the fact that it was accompanied by a pool set and An action may be maintained against a prostitute rules for its use. This was founded on Tracy v. for clothes sold her (Bowry v. Bennett, 1 Camp. Talmadge, 14 N. Y. 162. The court said: “It was 348); or for washing her clothes (Lloyd v. Johnson, held, however, in Spurgeon v. McElwein, 6 Ohio, 1 B. & P. 340), although the plaintiff may have 442, that a carpenter could not recover for labor known the use made of them. done in erecting a nine-pin alley, appurtenant to a But in Pearce v. Brooks, L. R., 1 Ex. 213, the decoffee-house.” “The sale of cards, with knowl- fendant, a prostitute, was sued by coach builders edge that they are to be used in gambling, would, for the use of a brougham. It was found that they under the doctrine of Spurgeon v. McElwein, be un- knew her to be a prostitute, and supplied the lawful; and if cards were made for no other pur- brougham with knowledge that it would be, as in pose the seller, under the authority of that case, fact it was, used by her as part of her display to atwould be deemed to have knowledge that they were tract men, but there was no proof that they expected to be used in gambling. Without such knowledge to be paid out of the earnings of her prostitution. the sale is not unlawful."

Held, that the action could not be maintained. This In Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474; 8. C., 8 Am. was founded on Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & A. 179, and Rep. 138, it was held that in an action for work and McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434, cases of materials on a house, it is no defense that the work money lent for gambling. Pollock, C. B., said: “If was done and the materials were furnished with a person lends money, but with a doubt in his mind knowledge on the part of the plaintiff that the whether it is to be actually applied to an illegal purhouse was to be used by the defendant for purposes pose, it will be a question for the jury whether he of gambling. In Hubbard v. Moore, 24 La. Ann. meant it to be so applied; but if it were advanced in 591; S. C., 13 Am. Rep. 128, and Mahood v. Tealza, such a way that it could not possibly be a bribe to 26 La. Ann. 108; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 546, the same an illegal purpose, and afterward it was turned to was held of furniture sold with knowledge that it that use, neither Cannan v. Bryce nor any other case was to be used in a house of prostitution.

decides that his act would be illegal. The case cited Tracy v. Talmadge contains a very elaborate re- rests on the fact that the money was borrowed with view and discussion of this subject, and cites as au- the very object of satisfying an illegal purpose." thorities for its holding, the English cases of Faik- Bramwell, B., said: “I think the jury were entiney v. Reynous, 4 Burr. 206; Holman v. Johnson, tled to infer, as they did, that it was hired for the Cowp. 341; Pellecat v. Angell, 2 C. M. & P. 311; purpose of display, that is, for the purpose of enaHodgson v. Temple, 5 Taunt. 181; distinguishes bling the defendant to pursue her calling, and that Briggs v. Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454; Clugas v. Penaluna, the plaintiffs knew it. That being made out, my 4 id. 466; Waynsell v. Reed, 5 id. 599; Cannan v. diffiulty was whether, though the defendant hired Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. the brougham for that purpose, it could be said that & W. 434; and disapproves Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. the plaintiffs let it for the same purpose. If a man & S. 593. The court conclude as follows: “I con- were to ask for duelling pistols, and say, 'I think I sider it, therefore, as entirely settled by the author- shall fight a duel to-morrow,' might not the seller ities to which I have referred, that it is no defense answer, 'I do not want to know your purpose; I to an action brought to recover the price of goods have nothing to do with it; that is your business; sold, that the vendor knew that they were bought mine is to sell the pistols, and I work only to the for an illegal purpose, provided it is not made a profit of trade.' No doubt the act would be impart of the contract that they shall be used for that moral, but I have felt a doubt whether it would be purpose; and provided, also, that the vendor has illegal; and I should still feel it best that the audone nothing in aid or furtherance of the unlawful thority of Cannan v. Bryce and McKinnell v. Robindesign. The law does not punislı a wrongful intent, son concludes the matter. In this latter case the when nothing is done to carry that intent into effect; plea does not say that the money was lent on the much less bare knowledge of such an intent, with- terms that the borrower should game with it; but out any participation in it. Upon the whole, I only that it was borrowed by the defendant and lent think it clear, in reason as well as upon authority, hy the plaintiff 'for the purpose of the defendant's that in a case like this, where the sale is not necessa- illegally playing and gaming therewith.” Martin, rily per se a violation of law, unless the unlawful B., said: “As to the case of Cannan v. Bryce, I purpose enters into and forms a part of the contract have a strong impression that it has been questioned of sale, the vendee cannot set up his own illegal in- to this extent, that if money is lent, the lender tent in bar of an action for the purchase-money." merely handing it over into the absolute control of

An action cannot be maintained for rent of prem- the borrower, although he may have reason to sup

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pose that it may be employed illegally, he will not the purpose of enabling the owner to purchase be disentitled from recovering.”

horses, etc., for the use by the Confederate governIn Pringle v. Corporation of Napanee, Ont. Q. B., ment against the United States. The court said it was held that an agreement to let a hall for the that mere knowledge on the part of the bank of the purpose of delivering lectures attacking Christian- | illegal purpose to which it was intended to apply ity is not enforceable.

the money would not defeat a recovery, but that In Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253, where the author- “it must be shown that the bank made the loan ities are very carefully reviewed, the doctrine of with the purpose, on its part, to furnish money to Tracy v. Talmadge is adopted, and that of Lightfoot enable the borrowers to do the illegal act.” v. Tenant and Pearce v. Brooks disapproved. Of the The same was held in Green v. Collins, 3 Cliff. 494, latter the court say: “So a sale of silks and jewels to a case of liquors sold in Rhode Island for use in Masa prostitute, if it be clearly shown that such sale was sachusetts. The court approve Holman v. Johnson, made for the express purpose of rendering her person Hodgson v. Temple and Tracy v. Talmage, and disattractive and seductive, and with the view of aiding tinguish Langton v. Hughes, Cannan v. Bryce and her unlawful commerce, would be an illegal sale; Pearce v. Brooks. In regard to the latter they say: but shall the seller of such merchandise be disabled “The act of supplying a female engaged in such from recovery merely because he knows the buyer criminal practices would warrant a jury in finding to be a prostitute? Is such mere knowledge suffi- | that the articles were intended to facilitate the obcient to render the contract void ? We cannot be-jects of her vocation." licve that public policy requires the exercise of so The same was held in the similar case of Curran much scrutiny into the designs of the purchaser, v. Downs, 3 Mo. App. 468; and in Michael v. Bacon, and the imposition of such restraints upon ordinary 49 Mo. 474, an action to recover for work and matraffic, as the rule, so broadly stated in Pearce v. terials upon a gambling house. Pearce v. Brooks Brooks, would seem to imply; and directly contrary was denied as authority. to such doctrine are the express decisions in Bowry The same was held in Webber v. Donnelly, 33 v. Bennett, 1 Camp. 348; Appleton v. Campbell, 2 C. & Mich. 469, a liquor case, on the authority of Tracy P. 347, and Hodgson v. Temple, before cited.” They v. Talmage and Hill v. Spear, and in Bishop v. Honey, also say, of Pearce v. Brooks : Cannan v. Bryce is 34 Tex. 245, an action for work done on a house of clearly distinguishable from this, and will not sup- prostitution. port the latter case; for, says Abbott, C. J., in Can- The contrary doctrine was held in Territt v. Bartnan v. Bryce, 'It will be recollected that I am speak-lett, 21 Vt. 184. This was an action for the price of ing of a case wherein the means were furnished, spirituous liquors sold in Vermont but delivered in with a full knowledge of the object to which they New York. The plaintiff knew the defendant inwere to be applied, and for the express purpose of tended to sell them contrary to the statute. The court accomplishing that object.' Is there no valid dis-disapprove Hodgson v. Temple; distinguish Holman tinction ? In Cannan v. Bryce the money was loaned v. Johnson as involving the infringement of the law for the purpose of enabling the party to engage in only of a foreign State; and approve Langton. v. illegal stock-jobbing transactions.

If the money

Hughes, Cannan v. Bryce and Lightfoot v. Tenant. had simply been loaned to a person who, the lender There is little examination of the authorities, and knew, was engaged in such transactions, and would the consideration of the principle is brief. But in probably use the money for such purposes, would the Lander v. Seaver, 32 id. 114, the doctrine of the contract be invalid ? Money loaned to a gambler, principal case was held where the sale was made in for the purpose of being staked upon a pending New York, and so in Tuttle v. Holland, 43 id. 542. game, cannot be recovered. Is it the same of money In Hannauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342, it was held lent to one known to be a gambler, but concerning that an action will not lie for the price of goods sold which loan and the unlawful game there is no other with knowledge that they were purchased for the connection between the parties than that which re- Confederate government. This is founded on Lightsults from a simple borrowing and lending of foot v. Tenant, Langton v. Hughes and Cannan v.

Bryce, and Armstrong v. Toler is distinguished on In Cheney v. Duke, 10 G. & J. 11, the action was the ground of the difference between malum proto recover the price of a negro slave. There was a hibitum and malum in se. statute to prevent the unlawful exportation of such In Adams v. Coulliard, 102 Mass. 167, the docslaves, and the defendant had purchased the slave trine of Tuttle v. Holland and Lander v. Seader was for the purpose of exporting him. It was held that laid down; and it was held that mere reasonable the seller's knowledge of that purpose would not cause of belief, without actual knowledge of the alone defeat his action for the price, but it must be unlawful intent, would not defeat the action. shown that he was a sharer in the illegal transac- Mr. Benjamin (Sales, $$ 506-508) says: “The sale tion, or aided in its execution, or did something in of a thing, in itself an innocent and proper article furtherance of it. This is founded on Holman v. of commerce, is void when the vendor sells it know. Johnson and Hodgson v. Temple. This doctrine, the ing that it is intended to be used for an immoral court say, is “abundantly settled.”

and illegal purpose. In some of the earlier cases The same doctrine was held in McGavock v. Pur- something more than this mere knowledge was held year, 6 Cold. 35. The action was on a note, and necessary, and evidence was required of an intenthe defense was that the note was discounted for 'tion on the vendor's part to aid in the illegal pur

money ?"

pose, or profit by the immoral act. The later de his youth, had been at the equity bar, looked at the cisions overrule this doctrine.” He then argues indignity put upon him, as he supposed, by this want that Faikney v. Reynous, and Petrie v. Hannay, 3 T.

of dress, and his puzzled and not altogether satisfied

look, even after the explanation had been given and R. 418, are overruled by Booth v. Hodgson, 6 id. 405;

the privilege claimed. Aubert v. Maze, 2 B. & P. 371; Mitchell v. Cockburne, In those days there was a certain amount of romance 2 H. Bl. 379; Webb v. Brooke, 3 Taunt. 6; Langton and adventure in circuit life – when Thurlow rode the v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 594; Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & western circuit on a horse procured "on trial;" Eldon Ald. 179; McKinnell v. Robinson; 3 M. & W. 435;

went the "northern iter" on a hired borse, but was

obliged to borrow one for the youth who rode behind Pearce v. Brooks, L. R., 1 Ex. 212, and says, in these cases “the distinction between malum prohibitum clerk; and North, afterward Lord Keeper Guilford,

him, in charge of the saddle-bags, in the capacity of and malum in se is positively repudiated.” Of Hodg- when riding the Norfolk circuit, got mellow and had 80n v. Temple he says: “This decision was given in

to be put to bed in a public house, wbile “the rest of November, 1813, and is the more remarkable be- the company went on for fear of losing their market.” cause the case of Langton v. Hughes had been decided Campbell's " Lives of the Chancellors,” vol. iii, p. 441.

Even the perils of the road had to be shared by the exactly to the contrary, in the King's Bench, in the gentlemen of the long robe in comparatively recent month of June, in the same year, and was not no- times. Thus we find that Mr. Wood and Mr. Holroyd ticed by the counsel or the court in Hodgson v. Tem- (both of whom were afterward raised to the bench), ple."

when crossing Finchley Common on their way to join

the Northern Circuit, were stopped by a gentleman of It should be observed that Bowry v. Bennett and

fashionable appearance, who rodo up to the side of the Langton v. Hughes were both tried before Lord Ellen-carriage and begged to know “what o'clock it was." borough, who must have thought the cases distin- Mr. Wood, with the greatest politeness, drew out a guishable, as indeed they are, for selling clothes to handsome gold repeater and answered the question; a woman for her personal wearing apparel is very

upon which the stranger, drawing a pistol, presented

it to his breast and demanded the watch. Mr. Wood different from selling drugs to a brewer. The

was compelled to resign it into his hauds, and the clothes might, and must sometimes, have been worn highwayman, after wishing them a pleasant journey, innocently and necessarily; but under the circum- touched his hat and rode away. The story became stances the brewer could hardly have wanted the known at York, and Mr. Wond could not show his face drugs for any innocent purpose. So it seems to us

in court without some or other of the bar reminding that Pearce v. Brooks is distinguishable from Bowry Wood?” Law and Lawyers, vol. I, p. 142. 1840.

him of his misfortune by the question, "What's o'clock, v. Bennett, for it could hardly be possible that a The circuiteer set out on his biennial pilgrimage in a prostitute, who, as the proof showed, could not post-chaise if he was a man of means, or mounted on read, should need a carriage for any purpose but the some sturdy steed if otherwise, while some beardless ordinary one of airing her charms to tempt men.

youth, seated among the saddle-bags on another nag, But we much prefer the doctrine of the principal heavier baggage being consigned to the Circuit baggage

in the capacity of clerk, brought up the rear

- the case and Tracy v. Talmage to that of Langton v.

wagon. But in whatever mode he journeyed, the Hughes and Pearce v. Brooks.

etiquette of his profession had decreed that he should not avail himself of any stage-coach or other publio

conveyance, as he might thereby havo an opportunity THE DECLINE OF CIRCUIT LIFE.* afforded him of meeting an attorney and “hugging"

him, i. e., making himself agreeable to him and securN the olden time, when railways had not come into | ing his briefs; and that would be taking an undue ad

existence, and all travelling had to be done by road, vantage of his brethren. Arrived at the Circuit town, on horseback, or in rumbling coach or chaise, going he could not enter it before the judges, or at least not circuit was a formidable undertaking, involving much before midday of the Commission Day, so that all expenditure of both time and money, and so great an might have a fair start in the race for briefs; and even obstacle was the absence of good roads and travelling when he had got within the "bappy hunting-grounds," conveniences found to be, tbat though Assizes were he was not allowed to stay at or frequent any publio directed to be held twice in every year in every county

inn, lest the same temptation to “hugging," and other in the kingdom, an exception had to be made in favor undue influences should be presented to him, but he of the remote parts, and especially of the four north- must go into lodgings, for which, of course, he bad ern counties of Westmoreland, Cumberland, Durbam generally to pay an exorbitant price, there being no and Northumberland, where they were held only once keener appreciators of Circuit etiquette than the landa year, viz., in the summer. Indeed, so important a

ladies. In some of the northern towus they used to feature was the question of roads and locomotion con- adopt a sort of sliding scale of charges - a certain price sidered “upon the northern iter,” that when the busi- | if you had no business, an extra guinea if you had. It ness of any Assize town extended into the Commis- he was fortunate enough to know an attorney in the sion day of the next town, counsel wero privileged to

place, or be related to one there, he could not stay with appear in court on that day without their robes; the him, or dine with him, or even call ou or be civil to reason being that ordinarily these would have been him, without contravening the Circuit code; and were consigned to the baggage-wagon, or the clerks, and he even kuown to utter in public his opinion that any were already en route for the next circuit towu. Long attorney “was a most estimable and highly respectable after the reason for it had ceased to exist this rule was gentleman," he was certain to have to pay a fine to the religiously observed by the members of the uorthern

Circuit mess. Even the very judges were, su to speak, circuits as one of their especial privileges, and on the strangers in the land, an old statute of the 8 Richard last occasion of its observance, not many years ago, we

II making it unlawful for any one to ride Circuit iu a recollect how shocked the judge who, in the days of county of which he was a native, or in which he in

habited, without a writ of non obstante. * Extract from an article by John Kinghorn, Esq., in the With a body representing the bar of England - for Law Magazine for August, 1880.

in those days even chanoery barristers went Circuit

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