payee, makes the paper the payee's own and discharges the drawer. In this case E., being indebted to A., proposed to give him an order on X., and A. refused to receive it, giving no reason, except that he wanted the money. E. then promised to send A. a 60-day draft, which A. understood to be on a bank. Six weeks thereafter A. wrote to E. asking the latter to send him a 60-day draft for the amount due, and E. sent him a 60-day draft on X. Without presenting this draft to NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. MCCRARY ON ELECTIONS. A Treatise on the American Law of Elections. By George W. X., returning it to E., or making any objection to it, ON, N the appearance of the first edition of this work. in 1875, we spoke in terms of commendation of it. See 12 Alb. L. J. 381. There is no equally careful, comprehensive and orderly treatise on this topic, within our knowledge. It is of value not only to law is a chapter on statutes regulating the conduct of elections, which was originally published by the author in the North American Review. THOMPSON'S CHARGING THE JURY. Charging the Jury. A Monograph. By Seymour D. Thompson. St. Louis: William H. Stevens, 1880. Pp. xxvii, 196. This work is divided as follows: Questions of law for the court; power to order a nonsuit or direct a verdict; invading the province of the jury; the elements of the charge; requests, exceptions, and the manner of giving the charge; statutes requiring instructions to be in writing; principles which govern courts of error in granting or refusing new trials for misdirection or non-direction. Mr. Thompson has hit upon a fresh subject, and has treated it in an excellent manner. The book is an admirable manual for every person who is "studying to be a judge," and for every judge to have at his right hand, in every trial, with Abbott's "Trial Evidence." The lawyer will find it not only instructive as a book of reference, but very interesting for consecutive perusal. There is a table of cases cited. Wo have commented in another place on the author's estimate of the jury system. He has not allowed his dislike of the system to color his work. On the contrary, he urges the policy of allowing verdicts to stand on the merits, disregarding immaterial technicalities. A. kept it about a year and then offered to return it, but E. refused to receive it. It does not appear that X. was unable to pay the draft at any time, or that E. suffered any loss by the delay in presenting or returning it. Held, that these facts are not sufficient in lawyers but to election officers. Among the new matter to relieve A. from the operation of the rule above stated, in the absence of any finding by the jury that E. acted in bad faith in sending the draft to A. under the circumstances. Millberg v. Fisher, 24 Wis. 607; Webster v. Studdin, 14 id. 277; Ford v. Mitchell, 15 id. 204; Lindsley v. McLelland, 18 id. 481; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Shoales, 20 id. 35. Wisconsin Sup. Ct., Sept. 21, 1880. Allan v. Eldred. Opinion by Orton, J. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT- - RECEIVER'S CERTIFICATE NOT.-A receiver was authorized by order of the court to issue certificates payable to the payees named "or order." The receiver issued a certificate payable to the payee "or bearer." Held, that an innocent purchaser for value did not hold such certificate unindorsed by the payee free from the equities; first, because the receiver was not authorized to issue it in the form it was in, and second, because such a certificate is not commercial paper. In Dawks v. Loraine, 3 Wils. 207, in respect to such paper it is said, that a bill of exchange must carry with it a personal and certain credit given to the drawer not confined to credit upon any thing or fund. He to whom such a deed is made payable or indorsed takes it upon no particular event or contingency except the failure of the general personal credit of the persons drawing or negotiating the same. The courts of this country have, with great unanimity, given the same general definition of negotiable instruments. In Beard v. Underwood, 74 Ill. 176, it is said that it enters not into the definition of a promissory note that the money must be payable at all events, not depending on any contingency in regard to the event, or the fund out of which payment is to be made, or to the parties by or to whom payment is to be made. Husband v. Epling, 81 Ill. 172; Mills v. Kuykendall, 2 Black, 47; Haniman v. Sanborn, 43 Me. 128; West v. Fonner, 21 Ala. 400; Corbit v. State, 24 Ga. 287. Applying these principles, it is apparent that receivers' certificates, such as the one in issue, have none of the essential qualities of negotiable or commercial paper. They are of recent introduction in business transactions, and have not been the subject of much judicial construction. The most that can be predicated of them is that they are evidence in the hands of the holder that he is entitled to receive from the fund under the control of the court, that author-curity, allowing a transfer of the stock to himself on ized its officers to issue them, the amount specified, if the fund is sufficient to pay in full all holders of such certificates, or if it is not sufficient, then only a pro ruta share with other holders. Nearly every quality essential to the negotiability of commercial paper is wanting in such certificates. In the first place they are not payable unconditionally out of any fund. Whether in any event they are payable in full depends on the question whether the fund under the control of the court is sufficient for that purpose. That fact cannot be known except upon inquiry into the amount of such certificates issued by the officer authorized to act, and as to the value of the fund to be administered. Illinois Sup. Ct.. May 18, 1880. Turner v. Peoria & Springfield Railroad Co. Opinion by Scott, J. 3D WOOD'S REPORTS. Cases Argued and Determined in the Circuit Courts of the This volume contains cases arising in Louisiana, Texas, Florida, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. We note the following of general interest: Booth v. Smith, p. 19. The owner of a promissory note, who has voluntarily destroyed it, cannot recover upon it nor upon the original consideration. Moore v. Jones, p. 53.- A pledgee of National banking stock as collateral se the bank books, becomes individually liable for the engagements of the bank. New Orleans v. Morris, p. 103.— A bazaar, owned by a city, and exclusively used for the sale of merchandise other than comestibles, is subject to sale under execution. Bertonneau v. Directors of City Schools, p. 177.- Public schools being provided for all children, the mere exclusion of colored children from the schools where white children attend is not unconstitutional. United States v. Goldman, p. 187.- The Federal statute making it a criminal offense to conspire forcibly to prevent any citizen entitled to vote from giving his support and advocacy in a legal manner in favor of a lawfully qualified candidate for Congress is constitutional. State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, p. 222.-A legislative act, repealing the charter of a lottery company, granted for a term of years, upon payment of an annual license fee to the State, for the expressed purpose of providing a fund for educational and charitable objects for citizens of the State, which charter has been acted upon, is unconstitutional. Kidwell v. Houston & Great Northern Ry. Co., p. 313.In an action by a servant of a railway company against the company for an injury sustained by a defect in a car, notice of such defect to the car-inspector and master-mechanic of the company is not notice to the company. Ex parte Francois, p. 367.-A State statute prohibiting marriage between white persons and negroes, and imposing penalties for its violation upon such white persons, but none on negroes, is not unconstitutional. Jones v. Gray, p. 494.-An unmarried man, who lives (but does not keep house) in one town, and supports his mother and his unmarried sister, who board with his married sister in another town, is not the "head of a family." CORRESPONDENCE. THE "INDIAN SUMMER" PROBLEM. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Since the "Indian Summer" problem has elicited no response, I suggest that although the chancellor seems to have fully answered the question in Guion v. Knapp, 6 Paige, 39, yet good lawyers differ as to the correct solution of the problem. D. M. W. CAMBRIDGE, N. Y., October 25, 1880. INJUNCTION AGAINST CUTTING PLAY. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In your issue of the 23d instant, under the head of "Current Topics," you mention that "Miss Genevieve Ward, it seems, has bought from Messrs. Merrivale & Grove the privilege of acting for a term of years a play called 'Forget me not.' Miss Ward has seen fit, in putting the play upon the stage, to omit a single character. Messrs. Merrivale & Grove sued to restrain her from making this omission, and Lord Coleridge has denied the application." Permit me to say this is not precisely the state of facts. As you quote from the London News in support of the alleged refusal of Lord Coleridge, I think I cannot do better than transcribe the explanation given by the London Times of the decision of his Lordship, as well as the nature of the application made to the court. The Times of October 14th says: "The point of law has not been decided, and an injunction has not, properly speaking, been refused. The application was for an interim injunction, to take effect while the cause is waiting for a hearing. Lord Coleridge only decided that there were not sufficient reasons, at this stage of the case, for the issue of an injunction. But he gave no opinion whatever as to whether this contract between Mr. Merrivale and Miss Ward had been broken, nor whether, if it had, the injury inflicted on the author was of such a character as to be properly restrained by an injunction." The Times bases this assurance upon an "authoritative letter signed 'C,' published elsewhere." Upon turning to that letter, in another part of the paper, the internal evidence proclaims it to be a letter from Lord Coleridge himself, or one written by his authority, and its concluding passago is as follows: "Nothing has been decided but that, in the opinion of a judge, there was not a prima facie case for a summary interference." The writer of the letter also says: "The only question before Lord Coleridge was as to the issuing of an interim injunction before the hearing of the cause, which still stands for hearing." | As the writer of the articles on legal subjects in the Times is invariably a barrister of experience, I think we may take it for granted that he has rightly represented the case, and has been properly advised as to the authorship and authority of the letter referred to. Yours respectfully, HUGH WEIGHTMAN. NEW YORK, October 27, 1880. JUDICIAL NEPOTISM. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: I have seen no reply to the communication published in your JOURNAL under the head of Judicial Nepotism," in vol. 22, at page 279, over the signature of Lawyer," and dated at Providence, R. I., September 20. 1880. It would not surprise any one if the state of things in the administration of law and of justice in the State of Rhode Island, which "Lawyer" publishes, existed in a barbarous or semi-barbarous community. The trial-justice serves the writ for the plaintiff, who is his own brother, and renders judgment for him for the amount claimed and costs-the defendant protesting and other enormities. See his correspondence above referred to. "Lawyer" asks: "Is there any law outside the statute which prohibits a judge from officiating as officer of and in his own court, or which prohibits a judge from sitting in a case in which he may have an interest except an immediate pecuniary interest?" Answer: I am not aware that there is any law outside of the statute which prohibits the joining of judicial with ministerial functions in the samo official, except the course and practice of the old common-law and equity courts; although it is obvious that they should be kept separate and distinct in a well-considered system of jurisprudence, or rather code of laws and of judicial procedure. As to the other proposition involved in the question, I know of no common-law rule forbidding a judge from sitting in a case in which he may have an interest other than an immediate pecuniary interest. In the absence of such law, let me cite the remarks of the late Judge Cowen, in his celebrated treatise on "Justices' Courts." In vol. 2, page 977 (I quote from the second edition, which is by far the most valuable edition), he says: "A justice is not, like a juror, liable to be challenged for favor, partiality, or even corruption; though he would be subject to indictment for the latter. 12 Johns. 356. Thus, where the justice was the father-in-law of the plaintiff (13 id. 191); or where he was half-uncle to the plaintiff's wifo (17 id. 133); or where he had given an opinion in the cause (12 id. 356), this was held to be no cause of challenge. But there is a gross indecency in one's trying a cause, as justice, for a near relation, which should induce the Supreme Court, on certiorari, to scrutinize his proceedings with a jealous eye. 13 id. 191. And if the fact of relationship appear from the return, the judgment would be reversed. 21 Wend. 63. And it is the duty of a justice, where he has inadvertently issued process, or proceeded in the prosecution of a suit in which he is related to one of the parties by consanguinity or affinity, on his attention being called to the fact, to suspend all further proceedings and render no judgment whatever in tho cause; ho cannot, on that ground, render judgment of nonsuit, if the plaintiff be his relative; and if he does render such judgment it will be reversed. Id. The statute declares (2 R. S. 204, $2, 2d ed., N. Y.) that no judge of any court can sit, as such, in any cause to which he is a party, or in which he is interested, or in which he would be excluded from being a juror by reason of consanguinity or affinity to either of the parties. It is not denied that this applies to a justice. 21 Wend. 64. And therefore, although a justice, who is related to one of the parties in a suit before him cannot be prevented from proceeding with the cause by a challenge or otherwise, yet his judgment in the cause, if he render one, will be reversed for this cause alone, and a justice ought never to grant process for the trial of a cause, either where he is a near relative of the party by blood or marriage or where his opinion has been sought aud obtained in relation to the matter in controversy; nor even where the party has made a statement of facts, and taken from the justice any direction whatever concerning them, though it be merely as to a course of proceeding to obtain redress." A juror cannot sit in a cause where he is related to a party in the action within the ninth degree, 3 Blacks. Com. 363; (which rule excludes third cousins by the civil law mode of counting degrees up to and from the common stock, which is generally followed in this country), and according to Sir Edward Coke a juror cannot sit, however remote the relationship. Co. Lit. 137. If a juror related to a party to the action is not allowed to sit, for the reason that he might be affected by the kinship, what reason is there why the justice may not be affected in the same way? How is it that there is a 66 gross indecency" in one's hearing a cause as justice in the State of New York, for a near relation, and that it is considered lawful and proper in the State of Rhode Island? Do the laws defining what is judicially decent or indecent vary at the boundary lines of separate States and territories? I had supposed that the rule forbidding a judge to sit in his own cause, or where he has a pecuniary interest, or where he is related to a party-litigant, is founded upon principle, and is invariable, in contemplation of universal law and the constitution and nature of man, to guard against the weakness of human nature in vindicating and establishing human rights. EGBERT WHITAKER. SAUGERTIES, N. Y., October 19, 1880. evening time he said nothing. I came with my brothers, Horace and Heury-1 came with my brother's horse and Henry. A medical witness, speaking of the illuess of a lady patient, said: "She appeared to be somewhat unstrung and nervous." The transcriber made him say, "She appeared to be somewhat kneesprung and nervous." A minister, preaching a sermon on the death of a gentleman named Samuel, quoted: "And buds and blossoms in the dust." He was delighted to read in the next issue of the paper: "Aud buds and blows Sam in the dust." An attorney asked a female witness how she came to be employed by plaintiff, and she answered: "I saw a sign in the window, Female clerks wanted here.'" The blundering reporter rendered it. "Family color warranted here." A physician under examination as to his attendance upon a sick lady, said “he never examined her antecedents," and was so reported by a stenographer. The transcriber, however, made it read, "he never examined her intestines." An orator referred to the different religious sects or denominatious "going for one another" throughout the country, and said: "Here we have one sect persecuting another," and was so reported, but the transcriber rendered it: "Here we have one sick person feeding another," and so it appeared in the morning papers. Several years ago an eminent lawyer hired one of these professors to take testimony in an important case. The transcribed minutes astonished him. A "patent," upon which much depended in the suit, was converted into a "potentate; " a "solid frame" was turned into an "isolated farm;" the "furnaces of this country "were set down as "Fenians of this country;" "clerks and bar-tenders" were made into "clocks and barometers;" and the question, "Were you in the habit of visiting the house?" was written, "Were you in the habit of fastening the hose?" In the Supreme Court of the United States, October 29th, in the case of United States ex rel. McBride v. Carl Schurz, Secretary of the Interior, a motion was filed by the Attorney-General for an order to strike from the files, on account of its scandalous character, a pamphlet placed thereon and purporting to be the remarks of James H. Mandeville, of counsel for plaintiff in error in this cause. The motion was argued by Assistant Attorney-General Smith in support, and by Mandeville in opposition. Upon consideration the court ordered the pamphlet purporting to be a brief of Mr. Mandeville, of counsel for plaintiff in error, to be stricken from the files of the court on account of the impertinent and scandalous matter contained therein. Among the passages to which tho attention of the court was especially called is one which contains an intemperate personal attack upon the Secretary of the Interior, who is described as "an arrogant scion of im There is some good reading in the current report of the New York State Stenographers' Association, in-perialism, a soldier of fortune, a traitor to his country, cluding an excellent paper on Books of Reference, by Mr. President Rogers. From a paper on Blunders, by F. J. Morgan, of Syracuse, we extract the following as ludicrous instances of stenographic interpretation, and transcriptions therefrom: Gross receipts-Grocery seats. Tamarack knees - Dam rickety knees. The mother's prayer - The matters prior. He was a little fellow He was a little full. They captured two parrot guns-They captured two pirate guns. The woman was baking bread -The woman was begging bread. I found the horse in that pasture-I found the horse in that posture. Counsel offered paper in evidence-Counsel brought pauper in evidence. Arthur Waite, the chalk-talk evangelist - Arthur Waite, the Choctaw evangelist. The showers were not sufficient to meet the wants of millmen-Wants of milkmen. In the intervening time he said nothing- In the entire and a fugitive from justice, wafted from Germany to America upon the wave of a revolution." Another passage imputes improper motives to the justices of the Supreme Court, as follows: "Your honors can never make good plain people in this land believe that this court is the palladium of their liberties if the rights of persons or property can be swept out of existence, as have been the rights of Thomas McBride, and then that the United States Supreme Court will deny relief because it is sensitive about interfering with a cabinet minister. These same plain people who toil and sweat to support the government, and who have fought to preserve it as the best of all governments, if you coldly turn him out of court because you hold a cabinet minister abovo the reach of the law, will justly suspect that you are controlled by some patronage which saves such officers from the wrath of the Legislature.” The Albany Law Journal. THE ALBANY, NOVEMBER 13, 1880. CURRENT TOPICS. HE November number of the American Law Review contains an article by William A. Maury, on Validity of Statutes Authorizing the Accused to Testify, in which the author takes the ground that such statutes are unconstitutional because they practically compel the accused to testify against himself. The author hardly succeeds in establishing that statutes which simply give the accused the right to testify if he chooses, and explicitly provide that his omission to testify shall not be taken against him, are unconstitutional as compelling him to testify against himself. As well might he be said to be compelled to testify against himself when he simply sits in court, and witnesses by looking at his face identify him as the criminal. Mr. Maury does not take into account the instances, presumably frequent, where an innocent man wishes to testify and his testimony would make in his favor. To hold that a statute permitting such testimony is unconstitutional because it compels the witness to testify against himself, is clearly absurd. And yet it seems impossible to separate the statute, and hold it constitutional as to innocent persons whose testimony would help them, and unconstitutional as to others whose testimony would hurt them. The omission of the accused to testify cannot be held to proceed from a sense of guilt. It may frequently arise from an utter ignorance of and inability to explain circumstances. Therefore, unless there is criminating testimony, the mere omission probably never harms the accused. If there is sufficient criminating testimony, a conviction must follow without regard to the omission. Mr. Maury has some queer ideas about the disadvantages of innocence. He says: "Filled with the terror and distraction which usually take possession of the minds of the innocent from the moment they become the objects of a criminal prosecution, paralyzing their reasoning powers, the scene swims before him, and he becomes involved in contradictions and improbabilities of statement," etc. This is certainly a novel view of the situation. We had supposed that the righteous were bold as a lion. Mr. Maury, on the same principle, would prohibit our frontier settlers from carrying rifles to protect themselves against bears and Indians, because occasionally the settlers become flurried and shoot themselves. If he should allege that such was the habit of the settlers, it would be about as correct as his statement that innocence generally puts the accused at a disadvantage. His description seems to us a caricature, and his theory a weak resource of sophistry against the uniform teaching of experience. This tenderness toward the accused reminds us of VOL. 22.- No. 20. the objection raised many years ago against allowing counsel to prisoners, namely, the heavy expense to poor prisoners, an argument which Sidney Smith ridiculed out of hearing. The judiciary of this State, we think, have outlived the sentiments quoted by Mr. Maury from the Ruloff case in this State, and there is no wish, on the part of any considerable number, to return to the old rule. The current number of the International Review contains an article on the Whittaker case, by Prof. Andrews, of the West Point Military Academy. With the political part of the article we have nothing to do, but the reader will find in it a very careful and complete statement of the legal aspects of that curious case, tinged, it is true, with something of the West Point spirit, and its bias in this particular case, but expressed very intelligently, and generally in good taste. Prof. Andrews believes that Whittaker is an imposter and a perjurer, and says so, but he expresses himself temperately. He cannot, however, find it in his heart to give Mr. District Attorney Townsend his due title of "Hon.," and seems to think him blamable for charging the government $700 for his services in this case. But in this he shows only a natural antipathy to a gentleman who did something for once toward reversing the maxim, Inter arma silent leges. It is noteworthy that several of the same experts who pronounced the note of warning in this case to be in Whittaker's writing, unite in pronouncing the "Chinese letter," attributed to Gen. Garfield, a forgery by the accused Philp. We have more than once expressed our skepticism about the trustworthiness of expert evidence on handwriting, but it occurs to us that the large class of political partisans who accepted that evidence in the Whittaker case, must, in consistency, accept it also in the Philp case. From the opposite sides of the Atlantic come contemporaneously two somewhat conflicting opinions as to the conceded decline of eloquence at the bar. Mr. Frank Fuller, in the October number of the Southern Law Journal and Reporter, laments this decline. He says the omission to study the art of oratory "will develop a race of lawyers for the desk rather than the forum; good judges, poor pleaders; men who know the law, but fail in forcibly expounding it. The courts of to-day are crowded with such advocates, men whose mental armory is full of the choicest weapons of judicial warfare, but when the conflict deepens they become enervated, and the force of argument sweeps down the force of law." “We open the catalogue of our profession and find it barren of a single name which even claims a distinction for force of jury pleading. We have practically no jury lawyers. The shades of Choate, Wirt, Pinckney, and a host of legal chivalry, look down upon us to-day without a man to take their places and show us what once was. We have able lawyers, profound jurists and wise judges, but the advocates, whose souls kindle with their own fire and set the listening spirits ablaze, had been highly commendable, and that they were not obliged to give the plaintiff any thing more than a certificate stating she had lived with them a certain time." If there is any truth in the parables, of water, and will be dreadfully answered when she asks for it. But we feel certain that for good Mrs. Lawson and those "boots" there is a crown laid up somewhere. There is no use of Eliza's coming to this country after this warning. have drifted away like the mountain mists." Mr. Fuller thinks this decline is much less marked at the South than at the North, and he attributes the decline mainly to the spirit of Avarice. The London Law Times takes a more prosaic view. Speak-this wicked servant herself will yet be sadly in need ing of the late Lord Thesiger, it says: "Another observation made by the same writer is, that the late judge laid no claim to the gift of eloquence. No barrister making a large income in the present day does, or would wish to do so. The occasions for its display rarely occur, and in ordinary business to be eloquent is a fatal disqualification unless counteracted by a large development of prosaic common sense. Fortunes are now being made by barristers to whom oratory is an unknown art." This goes far to justify Mr. Fuller's reason. We should incline to attribute the fact to the enormous increase of legal business, which leaves no time for eloquence. If there were time, the men would arise. Indeed, they already exist. There are a score of jury lawyers in this country second only to Choate on occasion. Pinckney cannot be called a great jury lawyer, for his triumphs were in the discussion of purely legal questions, and this was true of the latter part of Wirt's life. The Tichborne and Beecher trials brought several such men to widely public notice. But if eloquence has declined there is some consolation in the fact. Reason is a safer guide for courts of justice than eloquence. The carrying of a bad cause by sheer force of appeals to the sympathies, the prejudices, or the passions, is a degradation of a noble art. With eloquence | we have also lost a great deal of fustian and "highfalutin." Our current number of the Irish Law Times brings us some strange intelligence, namely, that in Dublin there is a "court of conscience"; that it is held by an alderman; that Irish ladies have trouble with their serving-maids; and that when a servant leaves her employer she may legally demand a "character." On the 13th of October, before Alderman Tarfey, Eliza Butler, a servant, summoned her late employer, Mr. William Lawson, jeweler, Fleet street, for £1 compensation for refusing her a character when she left. But it seems that if the master was a jeweler, the servant was not a "jewel," and yet she got a good setting-out. The Times says: "Mr. Lawson said the plaintiff left of her own accord under such circumstances that he thought himself entitled to refuse a certificate. Mrs. Lawson stated that while the plaintiff was in the house there was quite a reign of terror in it. She was a girl to whom they could not say the simplest thing without her threatening to leave directly. She came to witness' house very ignorant; the greatest pains were taken to teach her, and make her as happy and comfortable as one of the children, and at the present moment she was standing in a pair of boots belonging to witness' daughter. She finally got beyond herself and forgot herself, and the children could not ask for water she would answer so dreadfully. Finally witness dismissed her. His lordship dis.missed the case, holding that the defendants' action England may be willing to give up her Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, but she has a citizen who will not give up the signboard of the Royal Oak hotel at Bettwsycoed. This signboard was painted by the famous David Cox, R. A., and for many years was hung upon the outward wall, like Macbeth's banners. Subsequently it was brought inside for protection from the weather, and was framed and screwed into a wooden plug let into the wall of the hall. Lady Willoughby d'Eresby, the owner of the hotel, claimed it as a fixture, as against the trustees in bankruptcy of a tenant. The Bangor county court has awarded it to her ladyship. The court says: "I incline to think that as it was placed, and having regard to all the circumstances, it was a fixture, and as such, not a 'chattel' within the meaning of the order and disposition clause. But I rest my judgment mainly on the ground that the notoriety of the article, and the general knowledge of its history as the signboard of the hotel, absolutely exclude all legitimate ground for supposing that there could be any reputation of ownership in Miss Thomas as the person having the actual possession. I am of opinion that the circumstances of the history of this signboard, known to all interested parties, were such as to lead to the conclusion that it belonged to the house and not to the debtor, or to any other tenant for the time being of the house. It is idle to suppose that any credit was given to the debtor upon the faith of this particular article being her property. * I confess that it is difficult for me to imagine that any tradesman dealing with her, and having any knowledge of the house, could be ignorant of the fact that this picture was notoriously the signboard of the house, the history of which was well known to every frequenter of the district. I find the circumstances to be such as to exclude the possibility of any reputation of ownership in the tenant, and I must therefore hold that the order and disposition clause does not apply." The signboard probably represents Charles hiding in the oak after the battle of Worcester. We are glad to see a little reverence left for hallowed things in radical England. * IN * ** * * NOTES OF CASES. [N Green's Bank v. Chilton, Mississippi Supreme Court, 1 South. L. J. and Rep. 782, it was held that a collection and a conversion to his own use of the proceeds of a note by a bankrupt from a foreign correspondent does not fall within the exception in |