Jan. 1878, whereby he gave his residuary personal estate, one-third to my first cousins and two-thirds to my second cousins." The only question raised was whether "second cousins" meant second cousins strictly so called, or whether it also included children of first cousins, or as they are commonly called, first cousins once removed.

JESSEL, M. R. The question I have to decide is, what is the meaning of " second cousins in this will? "First cousins" clearly means cousins german, both in ordinary parlance and according to the authorities. So, too, the term "second cousins" has a well-known meaning, as signifying collateral descendants from a common great-grandfather. No doubt as to the meaning has been suggested, but it is said that I am bound to alter that meaning because of certain decisions. Now, unless those decisions lay down some principle, they do not bind me, and accordingly it is said that the principle they establish is this-that a gift to "second cousins" is a gift to all persons related within that degree. Has it been so laid down? The first case is Mayott v. Mayott, 2 B. C. C. 125, which I am bound to say succeeding judges have misunderstood. That case is stated much more fully in the note in the last edition, and it there appears that the same persons, and no others, must have been living at the date of the will and the death of the testator, and therefore that at the date of the will he had no second cousins. It was evident he was referring to some persons whom he knew, and consequently it was necessary to hold that he used the term "second cousins" in other than its strict sense. The decision accordingly was, that he meant persons within the same degree of relationship, so that even his grandniece was included. With all respect, I should not have let in the grandniece, but in other respects I see no objection to the decision. Nothing is better settled than this, that where there is no person or property answering the description, the court looks to see whether there is not some one or something that may be within it. That is all that case really decided. The next case is Silcox v. Bell, 1 Sim. & S. 301. The report does not state what relations the testator left; it is evident that the decree did not follow the words of the will, but we cannot see now why the direction was framed as it was. If, however, you look at Mr. Sugden's argument, you will see that Mayott v. Mayott is altogether misdescribed by him, and yet the Vice-Chancellor in his judgment follows that argument. So here we have a case, in my opinion, entirely wrong, where the Vice-Chancellor was clearly misled by counsel - a counsel, no doubt, of great influence and eminence as to the effect of Mayott v. Mayott. The next case of Charge v. Goodyer, 3 Russ. 140, is an illustration of the danger of following authorities without looking at them. There the gift was to first and second cousins, and the report says: "It was admitted that the bequest to first and second cousins, had it stood unmodified by any circumstance or expression, would have included all persons of the degree of second cousins; that is, first cousins once removed and first cousins twice removed." The cases of Mayott V. Mayott and Silcox v. Bell are then referred to, and throughout this is spoken of as the legal construction of the gift, aud in his judgment the Master of the Rolls gives no decision as to whether that was the legal construction, although, with all respect, it seems to me that that was the point before him. Those are the cases supposed to establish the proposition that a gift to second cousins is a gift to all within the degree of second cousin. But there is a good deal of authority the other way. There is the case of Corporation of Bridgnorth v. Collins, 15 Sim. 541, in which Shadwell, V. C., held that second cousins meant second cousins and nothing else. There are two cases decided by Lord Chancellors. The one, Sanderson v, Bayley, 4 My. &

Cr. 56, decided two things, first, that cousin means cousin german; and secondly, that first cousin once removed does not mean second cousin. In the other, Stoddart v. Nelson, 6 De G. M. & G. 68, the question was, whether cousin did not mean first cousin once removed and second cousin, and the Lord Chancellor, in deciding in favor of tho first cousins simpliciter, uses words which evidently refer to what, as I have pointed out, occurred in Mayott v. Mayott. When you look at the case, the most that can be said against it is, that the Lord Chancellor does not appear to have noticed that in the case before Lord Kenyon there was no person to answer the one description. As regards the case of Re Blower's Trusts, L. R., 6 Ch. 351, I have only to remark, that it shows that modern judges are coming to this principle-that in questions of construction you are not to alter the well-defined legal meaning of words, unless there are circumstances in the nature of the gift, or by way of context, to show that the testator intended a different meaning, including in such circumstances the state of affairs at the date of the will.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

ADMINISTRATOR

INFORMALITIES IN BOND OFSURROGATE MAY COMPEL ACCOUNTING AND DISTRIBU

TION AFTER REMOVAL. (1) The statutes (2 R. S. 77, § 42) do not prescribe the tenor (Doug. 193; 7 Exch. 537) of the condition of the bond to be given by an administrator; they prescribe the substance. A bond given by an administrator to whom letters were issued by the surrogate of Steuben county, named the surrogate of Ontario county as one whose orders the principal was to obey, but contained a clause that he should faithfully execute the trust reposed in him as administrator, and another that he should obey all orders of any other officer or court having jurisdiction in the premises, touching the administration of the estate committed to him. Held, sufficient to render the sureties liable in case of failure of the principal to pay moneys ordered to be paid by the surrogato of Steuben county. In such bonds the substance is looked to more than the form, even though it is a surety to be held. Wiser v. Blachly, 1 Johns. Ch. 607. See, also, Ring v. Gibbs, 26 Wend. 502; Casori v. Jerome, 58 N. Y. 315. (2) Upon an order made upon the application of one of the next of kin, a final accounting was had, the administrator rendered his accounts, and the surrogate found and decreed that there was due and payable to the person next of kin named, a sum specified as her distributive share of the intestate estate and the administrator was ordered to pay it to her. But it appeared that before the proceedings for accounting were instituted, the letters of the administrator had been revoked. No one had been appointed in his place, and the moneys in question had come into his hands as administrator. Held, that the surrogate had power to decree a distribution of the moneys in the administrator's hands to the next of kin. This he would have under the provisions of Laws of 1837, chapter 460, and without this act, under 2 R. S. 92, § 52. The statutes in general terms give to the surrogate the authority to cite an administrator to an account after the lapse of eighteen months from his appointment, and the section (§ 52) does not mean to confine the power so that it may not be exercised save against one who is actually in the office of an administrator. See Dakin v. Deming, 6 Pai. 95; Everts v. Everts, 62 Barb. 577; Annett v. Kerr, 2 Robt. 556. The order of distribution made by the surrogate bound the administrator and the sureties upon his bond. Schofield v. Churchill, 72 N. Y. 565. Order affirmed. Gerould v. Wilson, appellant, et al. Opinion by Folger, C. J. [Decided Sept. 21, 1880.]

living there.

At this time no creditor had assented to the assignment, and the only consideration therefor was the acceptance of the assignee. Afterward all creditors but D. proved their claims in the assignment proceedings. Held, that the assignment was invalid as against the attachment. Independently of insolvent laws or assignments for the benefit of creditors authorized by statute, it has always been held by this court that voluntary assignments by a debtor in this State in trust for the payment of debts, and without other adequate consideration, are invalid as against an attachment, except so far as assented to by the creditors for whose benefit they were made. Edwards v. Mitchell, 1 Gray, 239; May v. Wannemacher, 111 Mass. 207. The assent of creditors is not presumed, but must be shown by some affirmative act, such as presenting claims, or becoming parties to the written assignment. Russell v. Woodward, 10 Pick. 407. Such assignments made by judicial or legislative authority in another State are not binding here. Taylor v. Columbian Ins. Co., 14 Allen, 353. And an assignment made by the debtor himself in another State, which, if made here, would be set aside for want of consideration, will not be sustained against an attachment by a Massachusetts creditor, although valid in the place where it is made. There is no comity which requires us to give force to laws of another State which directly conflict with the laws of our own, or to allow to the act of a debtor resident in another State an effect in disposing of his property, as against his creditors here, which it would not have if he lived in Massachusetts. Zipsey v. Thompson, 1 Gray, 243; Swan v. Crafts, 124 Mass. 453; Fall River Iron Works v. Croade, 15 Pick. 11. The subsequent assent of the Rhode Island creditors to this assignment, manifested by proving their claims under it, cannot defeat the title to this property which the creditor in Massachusetts acquired by his attachment. Bradford v. Tappan, 11 Pick. 76; Ward v. Lamson, 6 id. 358; Pierce v. O'Brien. Opinion by Colt, J. CONSIGNMENT

SALE OF CONSIGNED GOODS AND GOODS OF CONSIGNEE AT ONE TIME- RIGHT OF ACTION BY CONSIGNOR AGAINST PURCHASER. - A firm of dealers in window and plate glass, in Boston, made a contract with defendant to furnish glass for a building he was about to erect, according to specifications furnished, for the gross sum of $688. The contract described the quality and dimensions of ths glass to be furnished, and the number of lights of each quality. The firm was the selling agent for the plaintiff for plate glass, and the first four items of glass to be furnished as specified in the contract were plate glass and belonged to the plaintiff, having been consigued to the firm for sale. The remainder of the glass was furnished by the firm. The defendant had no knowledge that any of the glass belonged to the plaintiff. Held, that plaintiff could not maintain an action against defendant for the plate glass belonging to him. The firm could not recover for any portion of the glass furnished, but only upon the entire contract. A factor may sell his own goods with those of his principal, and take a note which includes the amount due for both. Hapgood v. Batchelder, 4 Metc. 473; Vail v. Durant, 9 Allen, 408. They could therefore mingle the goods of plaintiff with their own and make an entire contract, and the remedy against the purchaser must be upon the contract itself, the character of which would preclude the plaintiff from suing upon it. Roosevelt v. Doherty. Opinion by Endicott, J.

INTEREST - WHEN AT CONTRACT RATE AFTER DUE.— A mortgage to secure a note set forth that it was to be void if the mortgagor should pay the sum secured in five years, "with interest at the rate of seven and onehalf per cent per annum." Held, that after the five years, if the note was not paid, the rate of interest would be seven and one-half per cent, and not the

legal rate, six per cent. The court say that in Brannon v. Hursell, 112 Mass. 63, it was held in an action upon a promissory note payable in four months, "with interest at ten per cent," that interest was to be computed at that rate not merely to the maturity of the note, but to the time of the verdict; and upon reconsideration of the authorities there referred to, and examination of the numerous decisions cited at the argument of the present case, we see no reason to overrule or qualify the point adjudged. See Price v. Great Western Railway, 16 M. & W. 244; Morgan v. Jones, 8 Exch. 120; Keane v. Keane, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 144; Cook v. Fowler, L. R., 7 II. L. 27; Gordillo v. Weguelin, 5 Ch. D. 287; In re Roberts, 14 id. 49. Before the decision in Brannon v. Hursell, the rule there declared had been established in Indiana, California, Texas, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin and Nevada. It has since been affirmed by decisions of the highest courts of Ohio, Michigan, Virginia and Tennessee. And it has been acted on by Judge Lowell in the Circuit Court of the United States for this district. Burgess v. Southbridge Savings Bank, 2 Fed. Rep. 500. In Connecticut, the law seems formerly to have been considered as settled in accordance with these decisious; and, although some recent dicta have a tendency to explain away the grounds assigned in the earlier judgments, there is no adjudication to the contrary. The earlier decisions in New York support the same rule, both as to mortgages and as to ordinary debts. But in the light of later cases, the questions may perhaps be considered an open one in that State. The leading cases in support of the opposite view are Ludwick v. Huntzinger, 5 W. & S. 51, and Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 118. The same rule appears to have been followed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Brunbisel v. Firman, 22 Wall. 170. And it has since been adopted as a general rule by the courts of Kansas, Minnesota, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Kentucky, Arkansas and Maine. But the later judgments of the Supreme Court exhibit a difference of opinion as to the general rule, though not of adjudication in the particular cases before the court. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. 51; Holden v. Trust Co., 100 id. 72. Union Institution for Savings v. City of Boston. Opiniou by Gray, C. J.

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

FRANCHISE -WHAT IS RIGHT OF RAILROAD COMPANY TO LAY TRACK THROUGH CITY-RIGHT NEED NOT BE EXCLUSIVE BUT MUST BE FROM SOVEREIGN

POWER. Power in a railroad company to exercise the right of eminent domain in a city is a franchise, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution, in defining what cases must be taken to the Supreme Court by appeal or writ of error. It is not essential to a franchise, in its legal sense, that it should, in all cases, be exclusive. This court has held that a license by a city to use a street for a horse railway is not a franchise. Chicago C. R. Co. v. People, 73 Ill. 547. Corporate franchises in this country emanate from the sovereign power. It has decided that a right to membership in a board of trade is not a franchise. Board of Trade v. People, 91 Ill. 80. See, also, City of Bridgeport v. New York, etc., R. Co., 36 Conn. 255. Α franchise is, in law, sometimes used to mean an exclusive right held by graut from the sovereign powersuch in its nature that the same right cannot be granted to another without an invasion of the franchise of the first grantee. The strictly legal signification of the word is not always confined to exclusive rights; but the term is used in law to designate powers and privileges which are not exclusive in their nature. The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Taney, C. J., said: "Franchises are special privileges

conferred by government upon individuals, and which do not belong to the citizens of the country, of common right." Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 595. The term, according to Blackstone, embraces in its legal meaning several kinds of rights, some exclusive and some not exclusive. 2 Bl. Com. 21. Kid says: "A corporation is a political person capable of enjoying a variety of franchises." Spencer, J., says: "If there are certain immunities and privileges in which the public have an interest, as contradistinguished from private rights, and which cannot be exercised without authority derived from the sovereign power, it would seem to me that such immunities and privileges must be franchises." People v. Etna Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 387. And so the Supreme Court of New York held in that case, unanimously, that the right of an insuranco company to carry on banking business was a franchise, although the judges differed on the question whether the defendant in that case had lawful right to such franchise. Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Co. v. Dunbar.

[Decided Aug. 11, 1880.]

SURETYSHIP-OFFICIAL BOND-BOND SIGNED WITH UNFILLED BLANKS ESTOPPEL-OFFICE VACANT BY DEFAULT IN FILING BOND-WHEN PROVISION AS TO

VACANCY DIRECTORY.—(1) A party executing a bond knowing that there are blanks in it to be filled up by inserting particular names or things necessary to make it a perfect instrument, must be considered as agreeing that the blanks may be thus filled after he has executed the bond. If the party signing the paper shall insert in the appropriate places the amount of the penalty, or the names of the sureties, or any other thing he may deem of importance as affecting his interest, he may in that way protect himself against being bound otherwise than as he shall thus specify. But if, relying upon the good faith of the principal, the surety shall permit him to have possession of a bond signed in blank, the surety will have clothed the principal with an apparent authority to fill up the blanks at his discretion, in any appropriate manner consistent with the nature of the obligation proposed to be given, so that, as against the obligee receiving the bond without notice or negligence, and in good faith, the surety will be estopped to allege that he executed the paper with a reservation or upon a condition in respect of the filling of such blanks, and this, whether the blanks to be filled havo reference to the penalty of the bond, the names of co-sureties, or other thing. The apparent authority of the principal in an obligation which has been executed in blank by others as sureties, to fill in the blanks in an appropriate manner, may be implied from the facts and circumstances attending the transaction, and may be shown by parol; and this rule applies to instruments under seal as well as to those which are not under seal. United States v. Nelson, 2 Brock. 64; Speake v. United States, 9 Cranch, 28; Smith v. Crooker, 5 Mass. 538; Butler v. United States, 21 Wall. 272; Dair v. United States, 6 id. 1; Drury v. Foster, 2 id. 24; Inhabitants of Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me. 89; State v. Pepper, 31 Ind. 76; McCormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich 457; State v. Young, 23 Minn. 551; Packard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & El. 469; Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480. The doctrine in People v. Organ, 27 Ill. 29, has not been followed. Bartlett v. Board of Education, 53 Ill. 364; Texira v. Evans, referred to, 1 Anstruther, 228; Smith v. Board of Supervisors, 59 Ill. 412; Comstock v. Gage, 91 Ill. 328. (2) The charter of a city provided that all city oficers who were required to give bonds for faithful performance of official duties should "file their bonds with the city clerk within fifteen days after their election," etc. The charter further provided that when bonds should not be so filed, "the person so in default should be deemed to have refused said office, and the same should be filled by appointment as in

other cases.

And in case a bond so filed should not be approved, and a satisfactory bond should not be filed within fifteen days after such disapproval, the person soin default should "be deemed to have refused said office, and the same should be filled as above provided." And further, the charter made it "the duty of the clerk to notify all persons elected to office of their election, and unless such persons should respectively qualify within fifteen days thereafter the office should become vacant." It was held, these provisions in respect to the time within which the official bonds were required to be filed were not mandatory, but merely directory. The municipal authorities were empowered, in their discretion, to declare a vacancy, or to waive the default as to the mere time of filing bond, and to accept and approve it when afterward filed. The mere default in that regard would not, of itself, operate to vacate the office. And in case the city authorities waived a default, the bond filed would be valid against the sureties. Ross v. People, 78 Ill. 375; Rex v. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 447; Kane v. Footh, 70 Ill. 590; People v. Holly, 12 Wend. 480; State v. Churchill, 41 Mo. 41; State v. Porter, 7 Ind. 204; and see Kearney v. Andrews, 2 Stockt. Ch. 70; Speake v. United States, 9 Cranch, 28; State v. Toomer, 7 Rich. (Law) 216; Sprowl v. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674. City of Chicago v. Gage. Opinion by Sheldon, J. [Decided Sept. 13, 1880.]

OHIO SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. OCTOBER 5, 1880.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— ACT REQUIRING CONSTRUCTION OF FISH-WAYS BY DAM OWNERS.-A legislative act requiring the owner of a dam constructed across a stream not navigable, and who has enjoyed the adverse use of such dam for the period of twenty-one years, to construct and maintain at his own expense, a chute or passage way over the same, for fish, held, unconstitutional. Whether the act is valid where the adverse use is less than twenty-one years is not decided. Woolever v. Stewart. Opinion by Boynton, J.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS PROMISE TO ANSWER FOR DEBT OF ANOTHER.-C., who was a large stockholder of a business corporation, aud president thereof, verbally promised M. that if ho would subscribe and pay $500 to the capital stock of the company he should, within one year, receive fifteen per cent on the amount invested. M., in consideration of this promise, subscribed and paid for the stock. No dividends were made or earned within the year. Held, that this was not a contract to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. Morehouse v. Crangle. Opinion by Johnson, J.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-SET-OFF.-The statute of limitations ceases to run against a set-off from the date of the commencement of the action in which it is pleaded. McEwing v. James. Opinion by McIlvaine, C. J.

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

SEPTEMBER 21, 1880.

---

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION VILLAGE CANNOT EMBRACE DISCONNECTED TRACT OF LAND. — An uninhabited tract of country, nowhere adjoining an existing village, and in which such existing corporation has no special interest, cannot be made by act of the Legislaturo a part of such village, for the mere purpose of increasing the corporate revenues by the exaction of taxes. The court say: "The idea of a city or village implies an assemblage of inhabitants living in the vicinity of each other and not separated by any other intervening civil division of the State. We do not by

this decision intend to set bounds to the discretion of the Legislature in fixing the boundaries of a village so long as tho territory of which it is composed is adjacent or contiguous, nor to intimate that the Legislature may not incorporate as ono village two or more assemblages of inhabitants living at some distance from each other, with spaces of uninhabited lands intervening, when such intervening spaces are also included in such village, but that a villago cannot be incorporated containing two or more tracts of territory not contiguous or adjoining, and separated by some other civil subdivision of the State, and especially that an uninhabited and separate tract of country cannot be annexed to or made a part of an incorporated village. If by an act of the Legislature a tract of country not inhabited, and not adjoining a village, can be made a part of such village, then it would seem to follow that by another act of the Legislature the inhabited part of such village might be separated therefrom, and we would have the anomalous thing of a village without inhabitants, and composed simply of a tract of territory, which would be an absurdity." Smith v. Sherry. Opinion by Taylor, J.

REAL ESTATE - FIXTURES TREATED AS PERSONALTY BY ALL PARTIES, NOT — ESTOPPEL. Where a junior chattel mortgagee took possession of mortgaged fixtures and severed them from the real estate with which they were connected, to subject them to sale to satisfy his mortgage, held, that he could not, as against a prior chattle mortgagee, assert that such fixtures were a part of the realty. When all the parties have seen fit to treat what might otherwise be fixtures and part of the realty as personal property, by their agreements, and thus sever them from the freehold and license their removal, the law will consider such fixtures, as between the parties, personal property to all intents and purposes. Smith v. Benson, 1 Hill, 176; Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344; Tift v. Horton, 53 id. 377; Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279. Smith v. Waggoner. Opinion by Orton, J.

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE INSURANCE-CONTRACT BETWEEN INSURED AND MUTUAL COMPANY MAY BE CANCELLED AND NOTE SURRENDERED BY AGREEMENT OF PARTIES. — The business of an insurance company, whether conducted on the mutual or stock plan, is managed by its officers and agents, and the corporators are bound by the acts of such agents in all matters properly done within the scope of the powers committed to them. A policy of insurance and the premium noto given therefor constitute a contract between the company and the insured, and the parties usually have the same power to rescind it by mutual agreement as they had to make it. Such a power on the part of the company seems essentially necessary to the safe and proper transaction of its business. Boland v. Whitman, 33 Ind. 64; Wadsworth v. Davis, 13 Ohio St. 123. Most mutual companies insert stipulations in their policies that they shall become void, either ipso facto or at the option of the company, for certain acts of omission or commission by the insured, and when avoided, the rights and liabilities of the member are ended, except his liability for debts already incurred. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Masonheimer, 26 P. F. S.; Wilson v. Trumbull Ins. Co., 7 Harris, 372. The right of the company to cancel policies and thus terminate the contract, for various

acts of the insured, though such right be not expressly reserved, has constantly been recognized, and it would be strange if it could not agree with the insured to abrogate the contract when deemed expedient or advantageous. In one sense the premium note is a security, but it may be given up for a good consideration. Thus when the assured surrendered his policy

and received from the secretary of the company his deposit note, there being contested claims which were subs quently established and on which he paid nothing, and afterward a receiver was appointed who made an assessment on the said assured for payment of said losses, it was held that the matter had been adjusted between the company and the assured, and the receiver could not impeach or disaffirm the lawful acts of the corporation. Hyde v. Lynde, 4 N. Y. 387. After the filing of a petition by a mutual insurance company, but before publication of the appointment of a receiver, tho maker of a premium note paid an assessment thereon and surrendered his policy under an agreement with an authorized agent of the company that such payment and surrender should be in full of said note, which was agreed to be given up, but was not; the note was extinguished, and the receiver could not maintain an action thereon. Sands v. Hill, 55 N. Y. 18. A good faith agreement between the parties in a contract of insurance, to annul it, is valid. Pennsylvania Sup. Ct., May 31, 1880. Acker, receiver, v. Hite. Opinion by Trunkey, J.

MARINE INSURANCE UNSEAWORTHY SHIP. - To render a ship "seaworthy," within the meaning of a contract of insurance, she must be sufficiently furnished with proper cables and anchors. 1 Kay's Shipmasters, 90. In Wilkie v. Geddes, 3 Daw. 57, a ship was held to be unseaworthy where it appeared that the best bower anchor and the cable of the small bower anchor were defective. Lord Eldon, in his opinion in the House of Lords, says nothing is more clear than that there is an implied warranty, in every contract of marine insurance, that the ship is seaworthy at the commencement of the risk, or at the time of her sailing on the voyage insured, and is provided with sufficient ground tackle to encounter the ordinary perils of the sea. The law seems to be perfectly well settled on this point. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 6 Wis. 670. Wisconsin Sup. Ct., Sept. 21, 1880. Lawton v. Royal Canadian Insurance Co. Opinion by Cole, J.

CRIMINAL LAW.

JOINT OFFENDERS INVALID

TRIAL-JOINT ASSESSMENT OF PUNISHMENT AGAINST In a prosecution against several defendants jointly for an aggravated assault, the jury found the defendants guilty and assessed the punishment "at $250 fine and six months imprisonment," no separato verdict or assessment being made as to each defendant. The judgment entered was of the punishment assessed against each defendant. Held, erroneous. It is well settled that when several are joined in one indictment a joint award of one fine against them all is erroneous, for it ought to be several against each defendant, for otherwise one who has paid his proportionable part might be coutinued in prison till the others havo also paid theirs, which would be, in effect, to punish him for the offenso of another." 2 Hawkins' P. C. 633; State v. Guy, 10 Mo. 277. In Strangham v. State, 16 Ark. 37, it was said: In criminal cases, though several persons concerned in the same offense may be jointly indicted and tried together *** yet each one is answerable for his own criminal conduct and not for his associates, and the verdict and judgment against them should be several, that is, should fix the fine or punishment to be paid or suffered by each, but the judgment for costs may be joint. Citing 4 Ark. 430; Whart. on Crim. Law, 156, 694; March v. People, 7 Barb. 393. The same

doctrino was declared in Allen v. State, 34 Tex. 230. Texas Ct. of Appeals, March 26, 1880. Flynn v. State of Texas. Opinion by White, P. J.

LARCENY BY BAILEE PURCHASER UNDER CONTRACT OF SALE OR RETURN NOT BAILEE.-The owner of horses placed them in possession of defendant un