Gambar halaman


established. See Vandenburgh v. Ilall, 20 Wend. 70; Justice and equity forbid that one man's money shall Burckle v. Eckart, 3 N. Y. 132; Richardson v. Hughitt, bo applied to the payment of another man's debts. On 76 id. 55. The contract of sub-partnership, which is a this is based the right of a vendor to stoppago in trancontract between a partner and a third person, whereby situ, which arises solely upon the insolvency of the the latter is to share the profits and losses of such buyer. Where a vendor has delivered goods out of his partner will not make the person a partner in the firm. possession, into the hands of a carrier for delivery to Burnett v. Suyder, 76 N. Y. 344; Ex parte Barrow v. the buyer, if he discovers that the buyer is insolvent, Rose, 252; Bray v. Fromant, 6 Madd. 5; Killcock he may retake the goods, if he can, before they reach v. Greed, 4 Russ. 285; Frost v. Moulton, 21 Beav. 596; the buyer's possession, and thus avoid having his propColly on Part. (6th ed.), S 27. Snyder was not, in the erty applied to paying debts due by the buyer to the case at bar, liable for the debts of the firm, Judgment other people. It was long a mooted question whether reversed. Burnett v. Snyder, appellant, et al. Opinion the effect of this remedy of the vendor is a rescission of by Andrews, J.

the sale, or a restoration of possession of the goods [Decided Sept. 21, 1880.]

with the rights of an unpaid vendor; but now it seems the better opinion that the contract is not rescinded.

Although this remedy of a vendor, which exists only NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

before actual delivery of the goods into the buyer's

possession, cannot be exercised in precisely the samo CRIMINAL LAW

mode by a lender of money or credit, yet for similar DELICTI. - A confession is not alone sufficient to cause the lender ought to have as efficient a remedy establish the commission of a crime. That a crime has until the money is paid to, or the credit is used by the actually been committed must necessarily be the foun- borrower. The lenders remedy may have the effect of dation of every criminal prosecution, and this must a rescission of the bargain. Goods can be held subject be proved by other testimony than a confession, tbo to a lien for the price agreed upon, and if disposed of confession being allowed for the purpose of connecting for more than that, the buyer may have the gain or the accused with the offense. In People v. Hennessey, suffer the loss; but when a borrower has as little right 15 Wend. 147, it was held that a confession of embez- to the money as a buyer has to the goods, it is impraczlement by a clerk would not warrant a conviction, ticable to hold and dispose of the money with like unless there was other evidence that an embezzlement result. Nor is there reason for so holding - the value had been committed. And in Peoplo v. Parker, 2 of the goods may increase or diminish, whereby the Park. Cr. 14, it was held, in an indictment for blas-buyer may be gainer or loser by bis contract-tbe phemy, that there must be other evidence of the value of money is fixed. Insolvency takes the pith blasphemy than the mere confession of the accused. out of the borrower's promise to pay, and if he has In the case of State v. Stringfellow, 26 Miss, it was not yet received the money he should not take it. He held that a confession of a murder was not sufficient did not get the credit in view of his bankruptcy. to warrant a conviction, unless the death of the per- Dougherty Bros. & Co. v. Central National Bank. son confessed to have been murdered was proved by Opinion by Trunkey, J.; Mercur aud Sterritt. JJ., other testimony. All experience has shown that dissented. verbal confessions of guilt are to be received with [Decided May 3, 1880.] great caution. The danger of mistake from the mis- JURISDICTION-STATE COURTS HAVE, OF ACTIONS IN use of words, the failure of the party to express his

PERSONAM FOR MARITIME TORTS. — State courts haro meaning, the misapprehension or want of recollection jurisdiction over actions in personam for damages by of the witness, or his zeal in pursuit of evidence, all

reason of a collision between boats on the Ohio river, admonish us to receive such testimony with great care. against the owners of the boat in fault. Sectiou 563, Priest v. State of Nebraska. Opinion by Maxwell, C. J.

U. S. R. S., prescribes in what cases the District Court [Decided Aug. 31, 1880.]

shall havo jurisdiction, and pl. 8 thereof declares, “of STATUTE OF FRAUDS-DEFENSE UNDER, PERSONAL.- all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, Only a party to a contract can avail himself of a de- saving to suitors in all cases the right of a commonfense founded upon the statute of frauds. Strangers law remedy, where the common law is competent to cannot set it up. As is said by the court in Cahill v. give it.” In Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 570, and in The Bigelow, 18 Pick. 369: “The effect of the statuto is Belfast, 7 id. 644, brought in the State courts, the prothat the promisor, who would otherwise be liable to ceedings were in rem, and as there was no proceeding in such au action, may avoid it.” And also in Chicago rem at common law, the cases were held not to come Dock Co. v. Kinzee, 49 Ill. 289: “This statutory de- within the saving clause of the act of Congress. But fense is personal, and cannot be interposed by stran- in Leon v. Galceran, 11 id. 188, it was held the State gers to the agreement. Like usury, infancy, and a

courts have jurisdiction in an action in personam. It variety of other defenses, it can only be relied ou by is true that case was on a contract; but the act of Conparties and privies.” See, also, Robison v. Uhl, 6 Neb. gress makes no distinction between a tort and a con328; Uhl v. Robison, 8 id. 272; Eiseley v. Malchow, 9 tract. The test is, whether the common law gives to a id. 174; McCormick v. Deurnmett, id. 384. Rickards suitor the right of a common-law remedy, to redress v. Cunningham. Opinion by Lake, J.

the wrong which he has suffered. Whenever it does, [Decided Sept. 1, 1880.]

the party injured may maintain such action in a State court. Brown v. Gilmore. Opinion by Mercur, J.



SEPTEMBER 21, 1880.* MONEYS LOANED, IN HIS HANDS. — Where a lender, before he pays over money loaned on the borrower's CONTRACT DEED

LAND ACCEPTED BINDS note, discovers that the borrower is insolvent, he has GRANTEE NOT SIGNING – PAROL PROOF TO CONTRAa right of a similar nature to that of stoppage in tran- DICT. – The acceptance by the grantee, of a deed or situ. He may tender back the discounted note and land contract executed by the grantor alone, binds refuse payment to the borrower: and the borrower's assignees have no superior rights to him in the matter.

* To appear in 50 Wisconsin Reports.




such grantee. Lowbor v. Connit, 36 Wis. 176; Hutch- OFFICE ELIGIBILITY TO. - The doctrine that a inson v. Railway Co., 37 id. 582. Plaintiff sold, as- person elected to an office, though not eligible at the signed and delivered to defendant, for an agreed time of the election, may take and hold the office if his consideration in money, certain notes and mortgages of disability is removed within the time limited to him a third party, and all his interest in a contract for the by law for entering upon its duties, adhered to upon sale of certain land by him to such third party, the the ground that it was so decided in State ex rel. Shuet assignment being in writing under seal, executed by v. Murray, 28 Wis. 96. The opinion criticises that dethe plaintiff alone, and containing a statement of the cision. State of Wisconsin v. Trumpf. Opinion by consideration, and stipulations for the security of the Ryan, C. J. plaintiff and as to the effect of a default by the defendant to make the payments therein specified; and in execution of said agreement, defendant paid a part

INSURANCE LAW. of the sum named as consideration, and delivered to plaintiff his three promissory notes for the remainder. FIRE INSURANCE – OWNERSHIP OF MONEY FOR INIn an action on the notes, held, that defendant cannot SURANCE AS BETWEEN VENDOR AND PURCHASER. prove a contemporaneous oral agreement, by which, in After tho date of a contract for the sale of a house, case the timber on the lands described in the contract and before completion of the purchase, the house was should fall short of a certain amount, he was to be damaged by fire, and the vendors received the insurallowed at a certain rate per M. for the shortage, and ance money from the insurance company under a that there was such a shortage. Hunt v. Adams, 7 policy existing at the date of the contract. The conMass. 518; Curtis v. Wakefield, 15 Pick. 437; Moseley tract contained no reference to tho insurance. In an 5. Hanford, 10 Barn. & Cress. 729; St. Louis Perpetual action by the purchasers against the vendors, held, that Ins. Co. v. Homer, 9 Meto. 39. Hubbard v. Marshall. the purchasers were not entitled to recover the moneys Opinion by Lyon, J.

from the vendors, or to be allowed to have the amount

deducted from their purchase-money, or to have the JOINDER-IN ACTIONS FOR TORT -- RELEASE OF ONE

moneys applied in reinstatement of the premises. PARTY WHEN NOT RELEASE OF OTHERS. — Although an

Eng. High Ct. of Just., Ch. Div., April 19, 1880. Rayagreement not to sue one of the several joint and seve

ner v. Preston. Opinion by Jessel, M. R. ral contractors, or joint trespassers, made upon a sufficient consideration, is not a technical release or dis- LIFE INSURANCE -- FORFEITURE BY FAILURE TO PAY charge of the debt or damages, yet to avoid circuity PREMIUM WHEN DUE -- RELUCTANCE OF COURTS of action, the party with whom the agreement has ENFORCE FORFEITURES. — A life insurance policy, conbeen made may set it up as a bar to an action brought taining a provision that the same should " cease and against him alone for such debt or damages. Lacy y. determine" if the premium should not be paid when Kyanston, 2 Salk. 575; 1 Pars. on Cont. 28 n. (i). In due, is not forfeited by the failure to pay such prethe absence of any technical release or discharge, un- mium on the day it is due, where tho company negder seal, of one joint trespasser, the receipt of money lected to inform the assured of a change in the agent from one, with an agreement not to prosecute him, authorized to receive the same after they had adopted discharges the others ouly where such money is re- a rule to give such notice in all cases, and the assured ceived as an accord and satisfaction for tho whole tendered the premium in due season to the former injury. Where it is received only as part satisfaction, agent of the company, and was unable to find the new it discharges the others only pro tanto, and the ques- agent after reasonable inquiry. In such case the astion of fact is for the jury; at ieast in all cases where sured was entitled to a reasonable time before forfeitthe amount of the damages does not rest chiefly in tho ure could be declared. The failure to pay such premium discretion of the jury, but is the subject of proof and for sixty days after it was due was not, under such computation. Bronson v. Fitzhugh, 1 Hill, 185; Corks circumstances, an unreasonable time, where the comv. Nash, 9 Bing. 341; Brooks v. Stuart, 9 A. & E. 854; pany had waived the timo of payment in the previous Brown F. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 475; McCrillis v. Hawes, year, and it did not appear at what time, if ever, the 38 Me. 568; Gilpatrick v. Hunter, 24 id. 18; Eastman assured was informed of the place of payment. In v. Greene, 34 Vt. 390; Ellis v. Betzer, 2 Ohio, 293; Insurance Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 572, Bradley, J., Knickerbocker y. Colver, 8 Cow. 111; Cooley on Torts, said: “We have recently, in the case of Insurance Co. 139; Story on Cont., & 997; Miller v. Lovejoy, 3 Wall. v. Norton (96 U. S. 234), shown that forfeitures are not 1. Iu an action for a trespass to real estate by enter-favored in the law, and the courts are always prompt ing thereon, and cutting and carrying away from it to seize hold of any circumstances that indicate an saw logs, the jury found the amount and value of the election to waive a forfeiture, or an agreement to do so logs carried away, and also that plaintiff, in considera- | on which the party has relied and acted. Any agreetion of a certain sum of money (much less than the ment, declaration, or cause of action on tho part of value of the logs) paid him by one who committed the an insurance company which leads a party insured trespass jointly with defendants, had agreed not to suo honestly to believe that by conforming thereto a forhim therefor; that at that time the damages remained feiture of his policy will not be incurred, followed by unliquidated; but that it was not understood between due conformity on his part, will and ought to estop tho the parties to such agreement that said sum satisfied company from insisting upon the forfeiture, although plaintiff for the damages sustained, but it was under- it might be claimed under the express letter of the stood that he intended to look to the other joint tres-contract." And it was accordingly iu that case held, passers therefor, held, that the action was not barred that where an insurance company had been in the by such agreement. Snow v. Chandler, 8 N. H. 92; habit of notifying the assured of tho time when and Spencer v. Williams, 2 Vt. 209; Chamberlain v. Mur- place where premiums were to be paid, he had reasonphy, 41 id. 110; Sloan v. Herrick, 49 id. 328; Mathews able cause to expect and rely on receiving such notice, v. Chickopee Co., 3 Robt. 712; Bloss v. Pyenale, 3 and that the company was estopped from setting up West Va. 393; Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 307; Pond v. that the policy was forfeited by the non-payment of a Williams, 1 Gray, 630; Bank v. Messenger, 9 Cow. 37; premium of which no such notice was given. The folLine v. Nelson, 38 N. J. L. 358; Greenwald v. Milbank, lowing authorities show the reluctance of courts to 15 Abb. Pr. 378 (N. S.); Solly'v. Forbes, 6 Eng. Com. enforce forfeitures in this class of cases, and support Law, 651; Thompson v. Lark, 54 id. ; Bank v. Curtiss, the general views expressed : Insurance Co. v. Wolff, 37 Barb. 319; Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md. 60. Ellis v. Es- 95 U. s. 326; Insurance Co. v. Pierce, 75 Ill. 426; sau. Opinion by Taylor, J.

Thompson v. Insurance Co., 52 Mo. 469; Mayer v. Insurance Co., 38 Iowa, 304; Insurance Co. v. Warner, 80 History and Laws." He states at the commencement Ill. 410; Insurance Co. v. Robertson, 59 id. 1.23, U. S. his intention to be to pass in review the leading inciCirc. Ct., Minnesota, Aug. 4, 1880. Seaman's v. North- dents in the history of the chase, and the laws which western Mutual Life Insurance Co. Opinion by Mc- have regulated its exercise, or determined the extent Crary, C. J.

to which property could be asserted or acquired in the wild animals which it is beyond the art, or foreign to

the purpose, of man to domesticate; but as he only CORRESPONDENCE.

gets so far in his first paper as the hunting of the East

ern world in ancient times, there is no legal aspect of DISQUALIFICATION OF PERJURY.

the matter to consider. It is, as ho says, with the Editor of the Albany Law Journal :

Romans that we first find any question raised as to the

relative rights and obligations of the hunter and As relating to the subject which you comment upon the owner of the soil, inter se. - Solicitors' Journal. in your last number, whether the penalties attached to

When is his Lordship going to give us his essay on the a conviction, such as a disqualification from testifying Authorship of “Junius?” or voting, will follow the convict into another State where similar disqualifications are imposed, I would refer you to the case of Jones v. Board of Registrars, The London Law Times utters the following awful 56 Miss. 766; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 385. There it was held communist sentiments: “We are altogether dead to that a pardon by the President of the United States the appeal which Sir George Bowyer makes through of an individual convicted of embezzlement in a Fed

the columns of tho Times with the hope of preserving eral court restores the offender to his right as a voter

the office of Lord Chief Baron. * * * Practicing in the State. So far as the opinion of the court goes, barristers are all keenly conscious that the administraan inference might be drawn from this case, that if the tion of the law in the present day is one of the most President had not pardoned the convict, he would have prosaic things in the world, and that no officer, howbeen debarred the privilege of voting in the State. In

ever lofty, gains any thing by its antiquity, or by its this respect perhaps the case might be considered as in venerable associations, but it is indebted for every accord with the case of State v. Kelley, which is in thing that it is, and for all the esteem which it secures, conflict with the New York decisions.

to the individual wbo occupies it for the time being. Respectfully,

For all purposes of practical utility an able puisne L. MAYER.

judge is of as much service to the State as an equally CHICAGO. Oct. 12, 1880.

able chief baron or chief justice, and although we are generally conservative in our tendencies, we should be very sorry indeed to uphold an institution simply be

cause it is venerable, when its abolition is likely to NOTES.

produce uniformity in the constitution of our courts,

economy in the administration of the law, and is also WE E hear with regret of the serious illness of Mr. calculated to secure the objects aimed at by the Judi

* * * Veneration for any particular Justice Clifford.

cature Acts. Tho Supreme Court assembling this month is seriously crippled by the absence judicial office is in our' opinion unnecessary to the of Mr. Justice Hunt, which seems permanent, that of

maintenance of our legal institutions in their highest Mr. Justice Clifford, which at his advanced ago we

efficiency. Give us able judges, judges without fear will prove so, and the temporary absence of Mr.

crotchets, judges who with the calm courage of capacJustice Field. – Tho venerable Peleg Sherman, for ity will sit alone, and we care not by what name they

are called, or what may be the designation of the office many years a distinguished Federal judge, is dead. He discharged his duties in a most admirable manner

which they fill. Does Sir George Bowyer really even while totally blind. — The current number of imagine that Sir Alexander Cockburn would be rethe Southern Law Review contains the following lead- garded with less respect if he were the President of ing articles: Purchases by Insolvents, by Orlando F.

the Common Law Divisions? We believe the suggesBump; Limitations on the Powers of National Banks, tion is idle; and it will be indeed deplorable if the gorby Frank P. Blair; Rights of Material Men and Em

ernment should be deterred or influenced by any such ployees of Railroad Companies as against Mortgagees,

considerations.” We tremble for the wigs. by George Tucker Bispham; Judicial Nominations, by Thomas T. Gantt; Confinement of the Insane, by Thomas M. Cooley.

The ALBANY LAW JOURNAL of the 9th contains the following: “Our lively friend, Mr. Bradwell, of tbe

Chicago Legal News, complains of Judge Harker for We have received from Mr. Freeman, Stato Reporter holding that a woman cannot be a master in chancery." of Illinois, advance sheets of volume 95 Illinois Re- The Central Law Journal of the 8th also pays its reports, coming down to September last. These are fur-spects to the Chicago Legal News in a severe upbraidnished to subscribers to the Reports at $1 per volume ing for the tendency of the latter to defend the rights in addition to the price of the volume. This plan is a

of women and glorify their successes. For shame, gengreat convenience and ought generally to be adopted. tlemen! The accomplished editor of the Chicago Legal The American Law Register, for September, con

News, as the Scotch say, "does na weer breeks," is, in tains a leading article on Expert testimony and the fact, a lady, a good lawyer, a thorough business man, microscopic examination of blood, by R. U. Piper, to be continued; the case of Leigh v. Jack, on presump

an elegant newspaper editor, and a gentleman, but of

the sex feminine for all that; and we venture the tion of ownership of soil in highway, with a note by opinion that if she had either Mr. Browne or Mr. Edmund H. Bennett; that of Dewey v. Union School | Lawson in chancery, in a pugilistic sense, she would District, on act of God excusing performance of con

prove herself a master in spite of Judge Harker. We tract, with a note by M. D. Ewell; and that of Palys hope to see an apology from our worthy contemporav. Jewett, on suits against receivers, with a note by J. ries at an early date. - Ohio Law Journal. We cerH. Stewart.

tainly have said nothing against Mrs. Bradwell, and

have explained how we came to attribute the mascuThe lord chief justice appears in the new issue of line gender to her. We think the Central Lare JourThe Nineteenth Century as a writer on "The Chase -- its l nal is unnecessarily and even unjustly severe on her.

The Albany Law Journal.


tice, however, it would necessarily degenerate into the summoning of such witnesses as either party desires. As to the latter suggestions, while it might not be improper to let the judge fix the compensation, it seems hardly fair to impose the expense of expert witnesses on the public.


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66 TXPERTS and Expert Testimony” is the title The late decision of the Court of Appeals of this

of a paper read by John B. Chapin, M. D., State in People ex rel. Campbell v. Campbell has been of the Willard Insane Asylum, before the associa- misunderstood in some quarters. The proceedings tion of superintendents of American asylums for the were instituted to reverse the action of the defendinsane, last May. Dr. Chapin makes a strong argu- ant, as commissioner of public works in the city of ment against the admission of hypothetical ques- New York, in the removal of the relator from his tions to witnesses who have not heard all the evi- office of chief engineer of the Croton aqueduct. dence. He attributes the popular prejudice against The alleged cause of removal was the improper conexpert witnesses to the following causes: “1st. The struction of an arch. The defense was that the refact that medical experts are usually summoned by lator was not charged with daily supervision of the counsel, and not by the court, in the interests of work, but that this duty was devolved by the comtheir side or clients, and their supposed liability to missioner of public works on certain inspectors aphave a bias arise in the progress of the case — a pos- pointed and employed by him for the purpose, and sible risk that their feelings and sympathies may that the defect resulted from the negligence of these become enlisted in behalf of the side on which they inspectors. This defense having been made out, the are called. 2d. The arrangement which is some- Court of Appeals now say that there was no evidence times made for the payment of money, or a retain- to justify the removal, and they annul the order of ing fee, to medical experts for their services, by removal. The opinion was written by Judge Finch, counsel in whose interests they are summoned, the Judges Rapallo, Andrews, and Earl, concurring; amount of which is not fixed by law, and which Chief Judge Folger and Judges Miller and Danmay possibly be contingent upon the issue of the forth dissenting. The relator's counsel very corcase. 3d. The form of submission of the hypo- | rectly states the law of the case and the theory of thetical question which is permitted to contain a the decision as follows: “The law, as laid down by portion, and not the whole, of what a physician the Court of Appeals in this and prior cases, is suhmay deem essential to the formation of a satisfactory stantially this: The heads of bureaus and regular opinion, or so much as may be necessary to bring an clerks under the city charter hold office by a qualianswer favorable to the interests of one or the other fied tenure of good behavior. They can only be parties; and 4th. The general prejudice which exists removed for cause, and “the cause is to be some in the popular mind against the interposition of dereliction or general neglect of duty or incapacity the plea of insanity in criminal cases."

to perform the duties or some delinquency affecting

their general character and fitness for the office.' While admitting the difficulty in adopting any new Such was the opinion of the court delivered by the rule for the selection of witnesses, he insists that late Judge Allen some two years ago in People ex rel. "legislation must be invoked to alter the practice Munday v. Fire Commissioners, 72 N. Y. 445. The so that the law confer upon judges alone the power charter provides that before a removal the person to subpæna experts in such cases where their opin- must be notified of the cause of the proposed reions would seem to be desirable. There can be no moval and be allowed an opportunity for an explanadoubt the power thus conferred would be exercised tion. The present case lays down clearly the prowisely and result in elevating the standing and cess for removal and the remedy in case of supposed character of expert testimony, and what is more injustice. The superior officer is to notify the subimportant, restore to experts that independence of ordinate of his intention of removing him and asjudgment and respect for their opinions we do not sign the cause, which of course must be sufficient believe they enjoy under the present system. No on its face. The subordinate then is allowed to exsuspicion of bias could then properly attach to plain the unfavorable appearances or alleged misthem. They would then assume their appropriate conduct. No formal trial is allowed and no evi. and originally-intended relation to the court, that of dence is taken. The superior officer can make the amicus curiæ.” As to the compensation of expert removal without further formalities. But there is witnesses, he says: “It would therefore seem to be one safeguard against abuse of this power. The the proper and obvious course to authorize and di- removed subordinate, if he deems himself aggrieved, rect the court in all cases where experts appear, to can apply to the court. Upon his application the fix and determine their compensation, in its discre- superior must give a statement of the facts from tion, and if deemed necessary to go further, pro- which he drew the conclusion that the accused party hibit by positive enactment the reception of any was guilty of the charge. If in this statement any gift or compensation for expert services directly facts appear which tend to prove the charge, the from parties interested.” We see no theoretical ob- removal stands, and the aggrieved party has no rejection to the first of these suggestions. In prac | dress except to sue his superior for making a false

VOL. 22. No. 18.

Finch says:

return. If, on the other hand, the statement dis- catastrophe. The promoters of the fraud having proves the charge - that is, contains no evidence, now been put in jail, the question is asked, why however slight, to sustain it — the removal is to be could not the law have broken up this business beset aside, because made without cause." Judge |fore the suspension of the bank? The answer is

“Here, we conclude, there was no evi- simple: there is no law to prevent a bank from offerdence, since the solitary fact pon which the com- ing to pay eight per cent a month for deposits, nor missioner relied was one which in no manner affected from paying it. There is no law to prevent a man the relator."

from offering to carry passengers by balloon to the

moon, nor from carrying them there. All experiThe ghost of the constitutional amendment de- ence shows that neither of these promises can be cision in Indiana seems not yet laid. The New fulfilled, and if people are so silly as to believe that York Times says: “The remarkable claim set up they can be, they have none but themselves to blame by certain leaders of the Democratic party that the for loss by the inevitable failure. If the credulous recent election is not valid because the Supreme depositors in the women's bank could only have held Court, in its decision upon the constitutional their faith, and kept on depositing, the day of failamendments did not have the third amendment, ure would have been indefinitely postponed, for the which changed the date from October to No- early lenders would have received their interest out vember, before them at all, and therefore the of the capital of the later depositors, and the devil election should have been held under the amend-would have taken the hindinost, according to usage ments without questioning its ratification, has and the proverb. We do not now exactly underawakened no inconsiderable interest. It is sug- stand on what charge the managers have been ingested that the governor will be made a party to carcerated, but whatever it is, it could not have mandamus proceedings, and long litigation forced matured so long as the bank kept its promises. The upon successful candidates. The Republicans them- scheme was a shallow, shameless fraud from the selves have started the question whether or no the start, and the defense of it put forth by Gail Hamnew Supreme Bench — three Democrats and two ilton a few days before the breaking of the bubble, Republicans — might not reverse the decision of the is a pregnant commentary on the fitness of women old court (inasmuch as Judge Niblack will still be to vote, to legislate, to become lawyers, to hold a member of the readjusted court, and he decided office, and generally to take care of themselves. the amendments to have been legally ratified), and Fools are plenty among men, but it would be hard by such reversal invalidate the whole election of to find men who would invest their money at eight Tuesday week.” This paragraph illustrates four per cent a month. That is the reason why the points. First, the popular impression that the In- blessings of the late bank were only vouchsafed to diana Supreme Court is a very fickle tribunal, an impression which is warranted by its course in several recent cases. Second, the indecent partisan

The annual meeting of the New York State Bar estimate of the motives which influence courts in

Association will be held at the city of Albany, on pronouncing judicial decisions. Third, the singu- the 16th day of November next. We understand larly inconsistent suspicion, apparently entertained that Hon. George W. Biddle, of Philadelphia, is to by members of one political party, that judges of deliver the annual address, and that the exercises the opposite party would deliberately decide to turn will be of an interesting character. themselves out of office. Fourth, the gross popular ignorance of legal principles, which leads men to suppose that a court could pass on the validity of

NOTES OF CASES. its own election. The constitutional amendments must stand or fall as a whole. If the late election was irregularly held, all that it brought about must

[N People's Ice Co. v. Steamer Excelsior, Michigan go down, the two new Republican judges are not lawfully elected, and can join in no decision; and plaintiffs were engaged in a general ice business in as without them the former decision cannot be re

Detroit, Mich., and the lessees of a large portion of versed, it is difficult to see how it can in any event

the water front of Belle Isle, in the Detroit river, be set aside. The court would decide itself out of along which and outside of a line fifteen feet from office by such a judgment. It is like the case of the

the shore they had constructed a boom. On January man sitting on the limb of a tree, outside his saw,

11, 1878, the pond formed inside of such boom was and sawing himself off with the limb. The con

frozen over with hard, clear ice six inches thick, jecture described in the Times' paragraph is the

and on that day the defendant boat was, by her massheerest nonsense that was ever conceived.

ter, run backward and forward on such river, and so unusually near the boom that the swell

caused by the steamer broke up the ice so that The failure of the women's bank, in Boston, that plaintiff was unable to harvest it, and the weather pretended to pay eight per cent a month on deposits, continuing mild thereafter so that ice did not prophas stirred up some fault-finding. Those who have erly form, plaintiff was, by reason thereof, unable been deceived are now disposed to blame the law to get a stock or fill its ice-houses. There was room for not having laid hold of the cheats before the l for the boat to pass farther away from such boom,


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